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Abstract 
This dissertation is an attempt to expound Heidegger' s conception of Volk. Its thesis 
is that there is but the one conception of Volk behind both Heidegger' s engagement 
and disengagement with National Socialism. In §74 of Being and Time, Heidegger 
introduces the word "Volk" in a discussion of the essential historicality of Dasein -
the Volk, which is not to be understood as an aggregate of subjects, takes its definition 
(as much as Dasein itself) from the being-outside-of-itself of ecstatic temporality. 
Given this definition of the Volk, Heidegger must arguably have welcomed in the 
"folkish" self-assertion of 1933 the assertion of Being's irreducibility to the static 
temporality of the present-at-hand. After his withdrawal from university politics in 
1934, Heidegger criticised the regime but he did not criticise his own error. The 
philosophical grounds for this stance towards error can be discerned in his defence of 
being-outside-of-itself in his confrontation with Hegel (chapter I). With its discussion 
of the failure of knowledge, the rectoral address is an exhortation of the Volk to the 
error of its own essence as Dasein (chapter II). Heidegger' s subsequent lectures on 
art develop the anti-modernist conception of the German people in the context of a re-
appraisal of the ecstatic character of mimesis (chapter III). Heidegger' s notion of a 
non-positive, and hence non-imperialistic, Heimat informs his readings of Kant and 
Holderlin (chapter IV). And in the 1952 essay on Trakl, "Geschlecht" carries the 
being-outside-of-itself of "Volk" to a contamination with the animal (chapter V). 
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Introduction 
Heidegger's engagement with National Socialism was a philosophical engagement. It 
was a philosophical engagement even as it appeared, and more than appeared, an 
abdication of philosophy. Mistaking the philosophical character peculiar to this 
engagement, Wolfgang Schadewaldt famously accosted Heidegger on a tram after his 
early resignation of the rectorship of Freiburg University with the question, "Back from 
Syracuse?" Unlike Plato, Heidegger had not sought out the political realm as the open 
space for the implementation of a preconceived philosophy of the ideal state. What 
Heidegger desired in 1933, and what he imagined he could effect through running the 
university in collaboration with the new regime, was, on the contrary, the irruption of the 
non-ideality of the political realm into philosophy. He confessed as much to Karl Lowith 
in Rome in 1936, explicitly identifying his concept of historicality as the basis for his 
engagement. 1 The political realm in its essential historicality was itself to philosophise 
under National Socialism. It was itself to philosophise without diverging from its anti-
philosophical character as the realm of the contingent and the finite. Philosophy was to 
be stood on its head. Heidegger' s politics are incomprehensible and irrecuperable as an 
act of expansion on the part of a metaphysics of eternity, since it is above all in his 
critique of just such a metaphysics and of the timeless, abstract presence of the Platonic 
Idea and its avatars that an early susceptibility to a "folkish" politics can be discerned. 
Arguably, for Heidegger, the year 1933 promised that overturning of the 
foundation of philosophy on whose necessity for the question of Being he expatiates in 
Being and Time. The subject, on which liberalism and modem metaphysics had been 
raised, was to give way to the people. As the subject, in truly giving way, can but carry 
with itself the presence that is its own foundation, National Socialism was to offer the 
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concrete possibility of a fundamental ontology. The regime extolled a return to the 
rootedness in the Volk and in Heidegger's ears this was taken to announce the repudiation 
of that abstraction from historicality in which the subject comes to itself in its autonomy 
and self-presence. Heidegger does not formulate the choice at issue here as a choice 
between autonomy and heteronomy, but rather as a choice between alleged autonomy and 
the historicality in which Being is understood as other than present. Inasmuch as it 
comes to itself and is thus present to itself, the subject fixes on Being only in its presence 
and thereby cannot think the originary Being of the time in which presence is able to be 
presence. With respect to an understanding of Being, the subject is constricted by its 
liberalism. That Heidegger was politically reactionary is generally accepted as evident 
from the anti-liberalism of his engagement with National Socialism. That his notion of 
historicality, which he himself admitted to be the basis for his engagement, is 
consequently reactionary is the thesis that is to be disputed here. 2 What has to be 
ascertained and not assumed are the relations between historicality and nationalism and 
between the historicality of a people and the people of historicality. This is to ask after 
that which was to be conserved in Heidegger' s conservatism and uncovered in his 
destruction of the metaphysics of presence. 
In her article "Heidegger' s Concept of Volk", Sonya Sikka expresses the 
conviction that Heidegger did not thoroughly renounce his thinking on the issue of Volk 
after the military defeat of National Socialism: 
Heidegger never came to believe that the "essence" of this movement 
consisted in brutality and genocidal totalitarianism, and always felt, 
instead, that "the Nazis" were the Unwesen of National Socialism. As a 
result, "National Socialism," for Heidegger, never really happened. It fell 
prey to the everpresent danger of perversion, of being pushed out of its 
essence. It therefore did not bring forth its positive possibilities, and this 
means, wit~in the framework of Heidegger's thought (which, lacking any 
fact/value distinction, is actually deeply "essentialist" in a way that is too 
often overlooked), that it never came to presence at all, or at ieast not 
"authentically. "3 
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The "essence" of the movement - the Volk - will have been left untouched by the 
atrocities of the regime. But as her charge of "essentialism" shows, Sikka interprets the 
discussions of the Volk in Heidegger' s writings too metaphysically. Attributing to 
Heidegger a Leibnizian conception of the people as a self-unfolding organic unity4, Sikka 
denies to historicality its primacy. The being-outside-of-itself of temporality becomes 
simply the stage of the people's self-unfolding from which the unity itself of the people 
remains Platonically aloof. Sikka misses the radical innovation of Heidegger' s defining 
the people itself as a being-outside-of-itself. The essential corruptness of Heidegger's 
Volk- and its correspondingly complicated relation to the Nazi doctrine of the purity of 
blood - is not permitted to become a question. 
If Heidegger joined the NSDAP without any prior dealings with the movement or 
for that matter with any political movement whatsoever, the step can nevertheless not be 
said to have been entirely unforeseeable. There was a shared privileging of historicality 
that, to begin with, concealed the divergence in the understanding of historicality. 
Heidegger's initial responsiveness to the Hitlerian demagogy was at once naive and 
calculated, because what Heidegger chose to hear in it was the long anticipated resolution 
of the impasse of Cartesian subjectivity. Within the anti-liberal and "folkish" 
pronouncements of the new regime he was prepared to hear an echo of his own 
philosophical demotion of the subject in favour of historicality. The self-assertion of the 
German people from under the imported and frail liberalism of the Weimar Republic took 
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on the appearance of the possibility of a disclosure of the ontological foundations of the 
'cogito sum' and of its certainty in self-presence. What Descartes, in the inauguration of 
the metaphysics of subjectity, leaves unthought, and yet nevertheless presupposes in 
abstracting from it, is what Heidegger discusses in Being and Time under the name of 
"world". It is the existential, historical thickness of world that is flattened to the 
monotony of the Cartesian res extensa and that must first be flattened in just this way if 
the a-historical and peopleless subject is to be able to reassure itself of its own 
ontological transparency. In a space that can pass for the substratum of every object 
because it is always and everywhere only ever present, the subject does not encounter any 
challenge to its understanding of Being as presence. 1933 was to repoliticise the space of 
metaphysics by reversing its suppression of historical world. However enthusiastically 
Heidegger declared his allegiance to the new regime, he was always cautious to interpret 
the Volk on parade in the streets as no more than the promise of a reversal of the 
suppression of historicality. Out of opposition to the flattening of the world of the people 
in the Cartesian foundations of liberalism, Heidegger aligned himself with National 
Socialism. Even beyond his disillusionment with the regime, his thinking undertook to 
grasp the historical thickness of the world of the German people. The "chauvinism" of 
the Volk was to be thought through to its essence. For Heidegger, this was a question of 
an understanding of historicality rather than eugenics. The conservatism of the regime 
had markedly less to do with the contestation of presence through an attention to 
historicality than with the preservation of breeding lines in the a-historical manipulation 
of genetic material. In its abstraction from historicality the regime amounted only to a 
variation on liberalism. Increasingly, for Heidegger after 1934 the singularity of the 
German people on which National Socialism insists is precisely that which contests the 
covert liberalism of the regime. The grounds for Heidegger's engagement with National 
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Socialism are the grounds for his disengagement: the people of the question of Being are, 
in the end, too political for the metaphysics that is Nazism. 
Heidegger's disillusionment with National Socialism is not a disillusionment with 
the notion of the Volk. What is the sense of Volk for Heidegger? And why should it be 
thought in conjunction with historicality and fundamental ontology? It is clear from the 
text "Ansprache am 11. November in Leipzig" that Heidegger in 1933 interpreted the 
self-assertion of the German people under National Socialism as a precondition of the 
knowledge of the Being of beings. The address in question, first published in the volume 
Bekenntnis der deutschen Universitaten und Hochschulen zu Adolf Hitler und dem 
nationalsozialistischen Staat, offers the coup d'etat an ontological vindication: 
We have renounced the idolatry of a rootless and impotent thinking. We 
behold the end of its servile philosophy. We are convinced that the 
luminous rigour and the befitting confidence of the inexorable and simple 
questioning concerning the essence of Being are returning. The originary 
courage either to grow or to shatter thereon in the confrontation with that 
which is constitutes the innermost impetus of the questioning of a folkish 
science.5 
The idolatry of a rootless and impotent thinking has been replaced with the questioning of 
a "folkish" science. Following this account, what distinguishes a "folkish" science 
(volkische Wissenschaft) is its rootedness. Heidegger does not say that a "folkish" 
science is rooted in a Volk. Instead he says that a "folkish" science places itself in danger 
in its confrontation with that which is. The two expressions are not synonymous. In his 
declaration of loyalty to the new regime, Heidegger adopts the National Socialist term 
"volkische Wissenschaft" and refers thereby, not to a science that with its rootedness in a 
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people has grown certain of its stability, but rather to a science that has become all the 
more vulnerable. Situating the rootedness of a "folkish" science in its originary courage 
either to grow or to shatter on the question of Being, Heidegger does not make of the 
"folkishness" of a "folkish" science an orienting frame of reference, a paradigm or 
Weltanschauung. The "folkishness" of a "folkish" science puts itself and the science as a 
whole in question, since for Heidegger the rootedness of a "folkish" science is the 
originarity that is conferred upon it in its questioning concerning the originarity 
understood throughout his writings as Being. Heidegger does not oppose to a rootedness 
in the Volk a rootedness in the question of Being because implicit in Heidegger' s address 
is a definition of the Volk that proceeds by reference to the question of Being. Heidegger 
ascribes the brittleness of a "folkish" science to its questioning concerning the essence of 
Being, rather than to its deficiencies according to the criteria of modern science. The 
rootedness of a "folkish" science is not a supplement appended to the notion of modern 
science whereby it is rendered more robust. It is the fragility intolerable to modern 
science whereby the latter would open itself (precisely in and by means of its,inability to 
begin by constitutively flattening the existential, historical thickness of world) to that 
which it could not otherwise think. This rootedness is the obscurantism with relation to 
the universality of correct claims in which the more pernicious obscurantism of modern 
science in its relation to Being might itself be surmounted. Here the question of Being 
becm;nes the matter of knowledge and the guarantor of a "folkish" science in the face of 
its cosmopolitan simulacra. And it is in the questionableness of Being that Heidegger' s 
exposition of "folkish" science differs from the racist doctrine of science advocated, for 
example, by Heidegger's Marburg coll~ague Erich Jaensch.6 
Having tied his notion of "folkish" science to Being rather than to the a-historical 
presence in which the race knows itself as race, Heidegger is not guilty of Jaensch's 
inconsistency in challenging the hegemony of a science whose exactitude and 
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universality rest on a suppression of the organic and the human while, nonetheless, 
desiring the unimpugnable, and thus universally recognisable, distinctness of the people 
that is racism's dream and clandestine cosmopolitanism. For Heidegger, the world of a 
people does not possess the atomistic quality that Jaensch attributes to it and by which he 
is bound to retain the cosmopolitan as the negative universal informing these distinct 
worlds. If "folkish" science is the science of Being as such, it is because it seeks, rather 
than the derivative correctness of a rootless thinking, the Being of the world that must be 
known - not ontically as race, values and character, but ontologically - if anything 
appearing against the background of world is to be known in its presence as well as in the 
abyssal foundations of its presence. The liberal conception of science, which bases its 
claim to scientific status on the darkness in which it remains with regard to its own 
rootedness, is never equal to the task of thinking Being in its worldliness. It is this 
worldliness of Being that favours the rooted thinking of a "folkish" science and whose 
appearance Heidegger wills to announce itself in the self-assertion of the national. The 
people of Heidegger' s "folkish" science is to appear without becoming present. 
Since Heidegger himself in the Leipzig address declares his allegiance to both 
Hitler and to the question of Being, the prehistory of his political engagement is but 
sketchily reconstructed by commentaries that fasten on the lone instance of the word 
"Volk" in §74 of Being and Time. It is within the question of Being that Heidegger 
addresses the notion of Volk in 1927 just as it is within the question of Being that he 
confesses his loyalty to Hitler in 1933. To clarify the sense of "Volk" in Being and Time 
by its sense in National Socialism is hence reductionist and of dubious worth polemically. 
An interpretation of the use of "Volk" in Being and Time that does not simultaneously 
consider the question of Being is, irrespective of its intention, even apologetic because it 
isolates a suspect lexical element in Heidegger' s thinking as a whole and delivers it up on 
its own to judgement. The step from "Volk" to Hitler is certainly one that Heidegger 
took, but schematised in this way Heidegger' s engagement ceases to be a scandal for 
philosophy because the distance between his thinking and the intellectual squalor of the 
regime has been minimised. The question of the relation between nationalism and 
fundamental ontology is thereby settled without having first been examined. 
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Heidegger' s nationalism is the nationalism of the rootedness of the Volk. It is not, 
however, an insurrection of the particular against the universal, if only because such an 
insurrection is always doomed to failure. Heidegger should not be seen to be translating 
Kierkegaard's anti-Hegelian individualism for the NSDAP. A Volk that insists on its 
singularity, on its condition as "this" Volk, is in the end, as Hegel had shown in his 
analysis of sense-certainty, always betrayed to the universal, by its very "thisness", by the 
abstractness of singularity as such. A reprise of the nominalist cult of the particular does 
not describe Heidegger' s reaction to Hegel' s panlogism, since his critique of the 
universal pursues another course than the beautiful soul's pathos-laden avowals of the 
particular' s independence. Heidegger' s rejection of cosmopolitanism and his 
engagement with a nationalistic political movement are grounded in his treatment of the 
universal within the question of Being. A demonstration of this can at least be attempted 
through a consideration, within the context of its critique of traditional ontology, of the 
following excerpt from the Introduction to Being and Time: 
Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no class or genus of entities; 
yet it pertains to every entity. Its 'universality' is to be sought higher up. 
Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and every 
possible character which an entity may possess. Being is the transcendens 
pure and simple. And the transcendence of Dasein's Being is distinctive 
in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical 
individuation. 7 
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Being is to be sought higher up than any class or genus because its "universality" places 
it beyond them. It transcends them because it is nothing else than transcendence. "Being 
is the transcendens pure and simple." In a marginal note to the Hiittenexemplar 
Heidegger clarifies this statement: "transcendens to be sure not - despite every 
metaphysical echo - scholastic and graeco-platonic xmvov, but rather transcendence as 
the ecstatic - as temporality."8 Being is to be sought higher up as that which transcends 
class and genus. For Heidegger, Being is that which transcends purely and simply, 
because it is time in its overreaching of the discrete "now" of Zeno' s paradoxes. Being 
nowhere comes to rest in identity with itself and can therefore scarcely be inferred from 
the categories as their "principle" and law. Only if Being is grasped as the presence of 
beings, as the honesty, so to speak, with which beings give themselves up as they are to 
the categories (e.g. as so much and neither more nor less, as in such and such a place and 
not elsewhere), does Being stand in a relation to the categories that leaves the latter 
intact. The questionability of Being as presence, and not the independence of the 
particular, is what Heidegger brings up against traditional logic. 
While Aristotle also denies that Being is a genus, it is nonetheless by means of a 
completely different argument. In Book B of the Metaphysics neither Being nor the One 
is admitted as the genus of what is, since the differences of each genus have to be just as 
each difference has to be one.9 Being and the One are both said in many ways. But the 
multiplicity by which Being distinguishes itself from a genus does not contest the 
legitimacy of the notion of genus. Being, for Aristotle, is to be sought higher up than any 
genus yet it is not to be sought higher up then than the One, since Being is not said in a 
way that would not also be one. Aristotle does not include among the many ways of 
Being a way in which Being is not one: the multiplicity of Being remains effectively 
under the sway of the understanding of Being as ouma, as the substance that is the 
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propriety and decidability of the genera. The Being of the differences that are always one 
is not Being as such in its transcendence and impropriety but rather Being reduced to the 
substantiality of presence and thereby to the propriety that it can share with the One. The 
difference that is, but is not one, is the unrecognised and unrecognisable difference of 
transcendence from the One. It is a difference that cannot be collected into its own 
oneness without ceasing to be transcendence. Such a difference, because it does not give 
itself up to be known in any unity, is unintelligible for Aristotle. The basis for 
intelligibility lies paradoxically in a blindness to the originary transcendence of time. 
That even the One is transcended by Being, by the Being of the time that exceeds 
and encompasses the presence in which the One is unequivocally one, is no more 
acknowledged by later thinkers. When Kant, in his refutation of the ontological 
argument for the existence ("Dasein") of God and within the understanding of logic laid 
down by Aristotle, says that existence is not a real predicate10, this distinction 
reformulates Being's difference from a genus but still in terms of a complementarity 
instead of an antagonism. For Kant, existence is not a real predicate whereby the 
possibility or actuality of a thing could be distinguished within the concept itself, but the 
bare positing of a thing. 11 Kant' s polemic against an aspect of medieval theology is the 
occasion for an exposition of Being within a theory of representation. Earlier in the 
Critique of Pure Reason Kant humbles the understanding in its claim to totality and sets 
bounds on the use of its concepts through an account of the non-conceptuality of the a 
priori intuitions. Kant grounds the a priori intuitions in human finitude and thus assigns 
to existence an essential role in the determination of knowledge. Yet that which is 
thereby shown to be irreducible to the concept is less an impetus for the question of 
' Being than the surety of representation and the propriety of the concepts of the 
understanding. In the Critique Kant thus devises a defence of the concepts of the 
understanding from their limitations regarding existence: 
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By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing -
even if we completely determine it- we do not make the least addition to 
the thing when we further declare that this thing is. Otherwise, it would 
not be exactly the same thing that exists, but something more than we had 
thought in the concept; and we could not, therefore, say that the exact 
object of my concept exists. 12 
The Kantian concept relinquishes existence as a real predicate and resigns itself to 
representing its object. By this modesty it acquires something exterior to it and in the 
correspondence to this object the concept lays claim to its truth. For the sake of the 
traditional understanding of truth as adequation, the thought of existence is to be kept 
simple, since, with the split between the existence that can be added to the concept of an 
object and the existence itself of the object, the concept ceases to be purely representative 
of its object: its pretended incorporation of existence is its rejection of truth. Like 
Aristotle's Being, Kant' s "Dase in" threatens the oneness of neither that which is to be 
subsumed nor that under which it is to be subsumed. In existence as the bare positing in 
the presence of the light of truth the Aristotelian parity of Being with the One does not 
become questionable. 
Through holding apart the "What it is" of a being from its "That it is", Kant 
wanted to place a check solely on the conceptual enthusiasm of theology, whereas 
Kierkegaard, in response to Hegel' s sublation of the distinction, set out to interpret the 
extra-logical character of existence as an antagonism towards logic. But with 
Kierkegaard the reformulation of the question of Being is stillborn, since the antagonism 
of existence towards traditional logic is not substantiated in an account of temporality and 
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the differentiality of Being but left to the inadequate resources of an obstinate 
nominalism: "Existence is always the particular; the abstract does not exist." 13 
Kierkegaard's nominalism, which is dictated by his attention to the Christian doctrine of 
the incommensurability of the human soul, is of less importance for Heidegger than what 
inspired it. By neglecting the philosophy of nature, Kierkegaard gave vent to his 
polemics against traditional logic entirely within the question of what it is to be human. 
The human existence that, in Kierkegaard, eludes the universal on account of its 
particularity becomes the human existence (Dasein) that, in Heidegger, eludes the 
universal on account of its finitude. As a result, Kierkegaard's confrontation with logic is 
renewed on a more originary ground. That which in the particular differentiates it from 
its universal - and differentiates it because in its transitoriness and perishability it is just 
as much not present in an identity with the universal - is traced back ex;plicitly to the 
finitude that Plato subordinated to the Ideas in the founding of metaphysics. Existence is 
to be understood by reference to another temporality than that in which the Ideas stand 
fast in the eternity of their presence. And it is to be understood as human because, for 
Heidegger, it is human beings alone that in their projects and in the determinative 
exposure to the truth of their outstanding deaths resist any description that would reduce 
them to what can be apprehended in presence. The human being, less as a particular than 
as the Being of ecstatic temporality, is the basis for a polemic against traditional logic. 
And yet in the excerpt from the Introduction to Being and Time Heidegger writes: 
"And the transcendence of Dasein's Being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility 
and the necessity of the most radical individuation". Is individuation here to be 
comprehended as a reprise of Kierkegaard's individualism and in opposition to the Volk 
of §74? To answer tentatively, indicating the line that is to be followed: No. Inasmuch 
as it is transcendence that is said to imply the most radical individuation, individuation 
cannot here be identified with the isolation and distinction of a being from other beings. 
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Heidegger attributes to transcendence a more radical individuation than the isolation and 
distinction of a being from other beings - the latter individuation is constrained in how 
much it can differentiate the individual from the universal by the understanding of Being 
as presence that it has in common with the universal. Dasein all the more individuates 
itself the less it holds itself aloof from the existential, historical thickness of world. It 
individuates itself by the corruption through which it eludes being apprehended in 
presence. The peculiar distinctness of the huma~ being, which necessitates a 
reassessment of the theorization of temporality in order to do justice to the anticipation of 
death and projects' implication of the future in the present, is obscured in the individual 
abstracted from the world in which alone he or she can exist. But does excluding the 
individual suffice to bring us to the Volk? Even if the transcendence of ecstatic 
temporality is overlooked in both the abstract individual and the universal of a-historical 
humanity, is the Volk alone what remains after the exclusion? 
Between the individual and humanity as a whole there are other social formations 
besides the Volk. Yet Heidegger' s conservatism expresses itself in an allegiance neither 
to the particularist interests of classes nor to the sentimentalist intimacy of the family. 
Heidegger's political engagement, which in the address in Leipzig as well as in other 
texts he ties to fundamental ontology, is an engagement with that which affords the 
chance of overcoming the metaphysics of presence. If Heidegger chooses the people -
and not just any people but the German Volk- it is because, in the Volk, temporality as 
such becomes a question. This is not to deny that other peoples have histories or that 
classes and families can be chronicled from their emergence to their disappearance. The 
German Volk is the agent of the question of the relations between Being and time, not 
because it is the people whose history is richest in incident, but rather because it is the 
people that, through wanting to distinguish itself as much as possible from the self-
evidence and positivism of the nation-states of its neighbours, long defined itself by its 
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absence. Whether such a characterisation of the essence of the Volk is but the hypostasis 
of its political backwardness is a question that seemingly does not arise for Heidegger. It 
is overruled by the question of Being. Heidegger's nationalism will be a nationalism of 
the assertion of the absence of the Volk that knows itself to be absent. In contrast to the 
classes that have either already come to power or whose diitlectical lot it is to realise itself 
as the universal class of the future, and in contrast to the family whose mythic immediacy 
hardly accommodates an interrogation of the understanding of Being as presence, the 
German Volk is an embarrassment for traditional ontology. It does not take its definition 
from its recognisability in the light of presence. Such an explanation of Heidegger' s 
nationalism, offered here in advance of a commentary on Heidegger' s various texts on 
the Volk, answers one question only to raise another. How is it that Heidegger of all 
thinkers could have aligned himself with a "folkish" movement that set itself the task of 
eliminating undecidability from the phenomenon of the Volk? Perhaps, as Heidegger 
wrote in his defence in December 1945, he believed that the movement could be led 
spiritually down other paths.14 He misinterpreted the prevailing involvement with the 
notion of the Volk as the possibility that the movement could be directed away from a 
pseudo-scientific elaboration and concretenenss towards an attempt to grasp that absence 
of the Volk which is its essential humanity. The people of the "folkish" uprising of 1933 
will tum out to have been, not the people of the recovery of the world flattened by 
Descartes to the presence of res extensa, but rather a humanity indistinguishable from a 
thing. 
Undoubtedly this was to be foreseen. Heidegger did not succeed in preventing it. 
He did not succeed in making Being and Time the bible of National Socialism. Far more 
clearly than his post-war critics, the ideologues of the movement were able to recognise 
( 
that Heidegger, lexical convergences aside, had not written a book in their spirit. The 
Volk that in 1933 inquires into the essence of Being is less the electorate of the former 
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Weimar Republic than the Dasein of the text of 1927. The Dasein of Being and Time has 
not passed from the singular to the plural, since its definition in the 1927 text as Being-in-
the-world precludes any differentiation of Dasein and Volk on the basis of traditional 
grammar. Dasein was already the transcendence of the Dasein of the Volk. 
In §74 of B~ing and Time, in a passage invariably scrutinised by his political 
commentators, Heidegger broaches the question of the people, distinguishing the Volk 
from a levelling aggregation of subjects: 
But if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-
with-Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as 
destiny [ Geschick]. This is how we designate the historizing of the 
community, of the people. Destiny is not something that puts itself 
together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another 
can be conceived as the occurring together of several Subjects.15 
It is destiny that stands here between the notion of the Volk and its formulation as a 
species composed of individuals agreeing in certain attributes. Destiny is therefore not 
interchangeable with the racial "type" (Art). It does not unify what is separate. The Volk 
that it designates knows neither unity nor disunity, because in the transcendence of its 
historizing it has always already reached beyond the isolation of the individual subjects 
as well as the isolation of the individual people. And yet, precisely because it reaches 
beyond the presence in which a people could recognise itself in its oneness, the Volk can 
just as little become the humanity that is the oneness of the peoples. For Heidegger, the 
Volk is not a point of indifference and the "anarchic attitude" that Hans Sluga discerns in 
the first division of Being and Time, §§9-44, cannot accordingly be said to retreat with 
the appearance of the Volk. 16 The discussion of the notion of the Volk acknowledges the 
21 
possibility and necessity of Dasein's radical individuation and, that is to say, "anarchy". 
The Volk does not pull the individual subjects into order since it is itself the anarchy of 
the fugitiveness of time. 
Certainly a suspension of disbelief is required before considering whether the 
German people is the people of time, but so long as Heidegger' s nationalism is taken to 
be utterly conventional the task of retracing the steps from Being and Time to National 
Socialism has simply not been addressed. Everybody knows who the Germans are, but 
for a certain strand of German nationalism, of which Thomas Mann's Reflections of a 
nonpolitical man can be taken as an expression, this is something that cannot be known 
without overlooking the Germans' distinctness from their positivistic neighbours. 
Heidegger's peculiarity within this strand of nationalism will have been to raise the 
Germans from being one question among others to being the questionable as such. 
Heidegger's philosophy does not find its way to the Volk as to the generality that would 
be its validating law. On the contrary, Heidegger attempts to think the utmost 
questionability and hence Being of Dasein by means of the Volk. The scandal of 
Heidegger' s declarations of the consistency between his philosophy and his affiliation 
with National Socialism is that he was able to countenance an authoritarian regime for the 
sake of a suspected shared devotion to such an understanding of "folkishness". These 
declarations of consistency imply, in defiance of the liberal subject, an understanding of 
the most radical individuation for which the Volk is the "proper" domain. 
Dasein's possibility and necessity of the most radical individuation rests with the 
Volk. Existing essentially as Being-with-Others, Dasein individuates itself as Dasein in 
the co-historizing that is the destiny of the Volk. This individuation is not one among 
others by which Dasein is differentiated. In §72 of Being and Time, Heidegger puts 
forward the thesis of the fundamental historicality of Dasein: 
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In analysing the historicality of Dasein we shall try to show that this entity 
is not 'temporal' because it 'stands in history', but that, on the contrary, it 
exists historically and can so exist only because it is temporal in the very 
basis of its Being. 17 
Dasein as Dasein stands in history and that is to say in co-history. It always individuates 
itself co-historically and thus, in line with Heidegger's explication of co-historizing, as 
the Volk. Other individuations are secondary. The accretion of exclusive properties 
whereby the individual persons "within" the Volk achieve distinctness simply obscures 
Dasein's radical difference from beings that are present-at-hand. Heterogeneity and 
homogeneity at the level of properties decide nothing with regard to membership in the 
Volk. The question of which individuals belong and do not belong to the Volk is not a 
question that can be raised without an inappropriate reliance on the individuation through 
properties. In §9, "The theme of the analytic of Dasein", Heidegger writes : 
The essence of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those 
characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' 
present-at-hand of some entity which 'looks' so and so and is itself 
present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no 
more than that. 18 
This disqualification of properties from expositions of Dasein is irreconcilable with the 
biologism of National Socialism. A people that is biologistically recognisable is always a 
people that is a class of individuals with common attributes, rather than a destiny. In 
1933, however, Heidegger allows himself to be swayed by the NSDAP's invocations of 
the Volk. Heidegger's engagement with National Socialism, which never expressed itself 
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in an endorsement of the latter's biologism, was inseparable from the ambition to reform 
its thinking in accordance with what Heidegger imagined to be its historical promise. 
Even after the end of the war Heidegger admitted a loyalty to this promise, denigrating 
everyone who was convinced of its unrealisability from the start and who thus 
contributed nothing to its realisation. 19 National Socialism, grounding its notion of the 
Volk in biology rather than history, remained a movement without a destiny, a populism 
without a people. The self-assertion of the German people as the self-assertion of the 
essential historicality of Dasein did not take place. 
But what for Heidegger is the Volk such that it can be missing, such that its self-
assertion should be necessary? How can there be any politics whatsoever if there is no 
assurance of a people? Is Heidegger's notion of the missing Volk a philosophically 
insignificant appropriation of a Romantic trope? A response to these questions can be 
extrapolated from his exposition of the differential modes of Being-with-one-another. In 
§74 of Being and Time, to continue an earlier quotation, Heidegger further delineates the 
notion of destiny by which he defines the Volk: 
Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, 
any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived as the occurring 
together of several Subjects. Our fates have already been guided in 
advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our 
resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communicating and 
struggling does the power of destiny become free. 20 
The power of destiny that is the co-historizing of the Volk cannot be taken for granted 
since it is conditional on communication and struggle. When there is no communication 
or struggle to confront Dasein with its essence in Being-with-one-another, then the power 
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of destiny remains inhibited - the historizing of Dasein, which is to say its co-
historizing and the historizing of the people, is covered over. In a note appended to this 
passage Heidegger refers the reader to §26 on "The Dasein-with of Others and Everyday 
Being-with". There he addresses the plurality of subjects from which he distinguishes the 
Volk and derives this plurality as an interpretation from a Being-with that is constituted, 
not in struggle and communication, but rather in disinterest: 
So far as Dasein is at all, it has Being-with-one-another as its kind of 
Being. This cannot be conceived as a summative result of the occurrence 
of several 'subjects'. Even to come across a number of 'subjects' [einer 
Anzahl von "Subjekten"] becomes possible only if the Others who are 
concerned proximally in their Dasein-with are treated merely as 
'numerals' ["Nummer"]. Such a number of 'subjects' gets discovered 
only by a definite Being-with-and-towards-one-another. This 
'inconsiderate' Being-with 'reckons' ["rechnet"] with the Others without 
seriously 'counting on them' ["auf sie zahlt"], or without even wanting to 
'have anything to do' with them.21 
Inasmuch as Dasein is Being-with-one-another, it is unable to isolate itself from others. 
Heidegger indicates the dubiousness of its disinterest with quotation marks. Dasein does 
not revoke, but conceals its concern. Appearing not to want to have anything to do with 
others, Dasein forswears the struggle and communication by which the power of its own 
destiny as Being-with-one-another becomes free. This superficial unconcern obstructs 
the co-historizing of the Volk. The Volk is missing, but that is not to say that in struggling 
and communicating it ceases to be missing. It is missing in another way. Dasein, 
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according to Heidegger, cannot concern itself with others as such, and thus with the Volk, 
by fixing its attention on subjects present-at-hand: 
When Others are encountered, it is not the case that one's own subject is 
proximally present-at-hand and that the rest of the subjects, which are 
likewise occurrents, get discriminated beforehand and then apprehended; 
nor are they encountered by a primary act of looking at oneself in such a 
way that the opposite pole of a distinction first gets ascertained. They are 
encountered from out of the world, in which concernfully circumspective 
Dasein dwells. Theoretically concocted 'explanations' of the Being-
present-at-hand of Others urge themselves upon us all too easily; but over 
against such explanations we must hold fast to the phenomenal facts of the 
case which we have pointed out, namely, that Others are encountered 
environmentally. 22 
The others, with whom in its concern Dasein is the co-historizing of the Volk, are not met 
as beings present-at-hand. They come forward out of the world of Dasein, and it is as 
this world that they come forward. The others can only be met in a manner appropriate to 
their humanity, which is to say that they can only be met as the transcendens 
encompassing the presence of the present-at-hand. The others are met as that which, 
strictly speaking, cannot be met, since they cannot be reduced to presence. They can only 
be met through meeting them as world, through thinking the absence that is not incidental 
and remediable, but essential and thus a provocation for the understanding of Being as 
presence. 
When Dasein does not want to "have anything to do" with others, it tries to ignore 
this provocation. The Volk that is missing- albeit missing in the sense in which the 
world in which Dasein, nonetheless, has its Being is missing - is then even missing as 
missing: the Yolk's difference from the present-at-hand is itself absent. In the place of 
the Volk, and in a way as its reverse, das Man makes its appearance: 
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'The Others' whom one thus designates in order to cover up the fact of 
one's belonging to them essentially oneself, are those who proximally and 
for the most part 'are there' in everyday Being-with-one-another. The 
"who" is not this one, not that one, not oneself [man selbst], not some 
people [einige], and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, the 
"they" [das Man].23 
Insofar as Dasein denies to itself its essential existence in Being-with-one-another, it 
denies its own transcendence. The distance that Dasein keeps from Others in its 
'inconsiderate' Being-with does not individuate Dasein, but rather levels it: 
This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into 
the kind of Being of 'the Others', in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as 
distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this 
inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the 
"they" is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they [man] 
take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see 
and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as they shrink 
back.24 
Here conformity is made an affair of individualism, rather than of membership in the 
Volk. Denying its transcendence, Dasein stands back from the Others and thereby stands 
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back from the question of Being. The neglect of the question of Being is the precondition 
of conformity, because, by not excluding the logical notion of the individual from 
discussions of the human, it simultaneously creates the possibility of a mass bringing into 
line. For Heidegger, the individual is already fundamentally conformist because he or 
she is faced in the utmost isolation of individuality only with that denial of the radical 
difference of transcendence which he or she has in common with every individual thing. 
In this conformity communication and struggle are drained of their vigour: 
Overnight, everything that is primordial gets glossed over as something 
that has long been well known. Everything gained by a struggle becomes 
just something to be manipulated. Every secret loses its force. 25 
The debasement of struggle and the vitiation of the secret are not the consequences of an 
encroachment of the "they" on the preserve of the individual. Struggle, as well as the 
possibility of the secret and its communication, presupposes Being-with-one-another and 
hence, contrary to the assertion of Lukacs26, Bourdieu27 and many others, these passages 
in Being and Time cannot be read as elitist cultural critique. The opposite of the "they" is 
not at all the autonomous subject by which it is merely differently designated. Heidegger 
writes: 
The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from 
the authentic Self- that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in 
its own way [eigens ergriffenen]. [ ... ]If Dasein discovers the world in its 
own way [eigens] and brings it close, if it discloses to itself its own 
authentic Being, then this discovery of the 'world' and this disclosure of 
Dasein are always accomplished as a clearing-away of concealments and 
obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein bars its 
own way.28 
This authentic self, as Heidegger explains, is not the autonomous subject: 
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Authentic Being-one's-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of 
the subject, a condition that has been detached from the "they"; it is rather 
an existentiell modification of the "they" - of the "they" as an essential 
existentiale. 29 
As an essential existentiale, the "they" is Being-with-one-another, and the authentic Self 
that is its existenfa~ll modification is the Dasein that understands itself as Being-with-one-
another. This understanding and its abstention disclose and conceal Being-with-one: 
another, but do not prove anything against it in itself. The power of destiny that can or 
cannot become· free is existentiell because as the co-historizing of the Volk it is a matter 
of disclosure, namely of the essential historicality of Dasein. The power of destiny in its 
unfreedom is the double absence of the Volk just as this absence is Dasein's obliviousness 
to its own Being. It could therefore be said that the Volk is not so much a being among 
beings as the understanding that raises the question of Being. 
The Volk is defined by its ontological mission. For Heidegger, the Germans in 
their antic conspicuousness under National Socialism quickly prove themselves to be a 
people in abeyance. In the lectures on Holderlin from the mid thirties and early forties, 
the self-assertion of the German people proclaimed by National Socialism is indefinitely 
deferred. Heidegger' s commentary from 1943 on Holderlin' s poem "Heimkunft" denies, 
for instance, that the inhabitants of the National Socialist fatherland can claim to have 
come home to the essence of Heimat: "this homecoming is the future of the historical 
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being of the German people."30 Not having yet come home to the essence of Heimat, the 
Germans cannot truly be said to be at home. They have still to assert themselves as a 
people. More precisely, they have to assert themselves as the people whose essence lies 
in the deferral of its assertion as a people present-at-hand. Heidegger does not say that 
the homecoming of the Germans will take place in the future, but rather that it is the 
future: the essence of the Heimat to which the German people is to come is not something 
that can ever be present-at-hand. In the 1934-5 lecture course on the poems "Germanien" 
and "Der Rhein", Heidegger speaks of the ignorance in which the German people persists 
with regard to itself as an ignorance with regard to its time: 
We do not know who we are so long as we do not know our time. Our 
time, however, is that of the people between the peoples. Who knows this 
time? No one knows it in the sense that he could point it out and "date" it. 
Even those creative ones [jene Schaffenden], who dwell on the peaks of 
time, do not know it. One thing alone they know, namely when the time 
of the event of the true is not. HOlderlin says this at the beginning of the 
poem "The Titans": 
It is not however 
The time. Still are they 
Unbound. The divine does not strike the indifferent.31 
In this passage Heidegger implies that the time of the people between the peoples is the 
time of the event of the true. Heidegger' s people cannot know itself because it cannot 
know a time that is not there to be known. Its coming to itself depends on the 
unforeseeable event of the true, rather than on Hitler's seizure of power, and it depends 
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on the event of the true because it is as the event of the true that this people is to know 
itself. National Socialism, with its efforts to secure the distinctness of the people in the 
findings of a compliant biology, was unwilling to think the people in terms of temporality 
as such. In the 1941-2 lecture course on Holderlin's poem "Andenken", Heidegger 
contends that a people finding itself in skull measurements and archaeological digs is 
unable to find itself as a people because it confounds that which is one's own (das 
Eigene) with something present-at-hand.32 Temporality, as Heidegger repeats again and 
again in Being and Time, is that which is one's own and the essence of Dasein. A people, 
as Dasein, can therefore only come to itself inasmuch as it does not come to itself, 
inasmuch as it knows itself as the temporality that can never be present to itself. With 
respect to knowing a people in its essential temporality and thus historicality, the peculiar 
scientism of National Socialism was, for all its taxonomical ingenuity, an evasion. 
National Socialism was only able to persuade itself that it grasped the singularity of the 
German people by paradoxically first suppressing even its difference from the present-at-
hand. The ontological mission of raising a question against the understanding of Being 
as presence on the basis of an insight into the unique temporality of human Dasein is not 
allowed to become the German mission. 
For Heidegger, the specificity of a people is reserved for the science of history 
and not for biology or the historiography that is archaeology. §76 of Being and Time 
offers the following negative definition of history: 
In no science are the 'universal validity' of standards and the claims to 
'universality' which the "they" and its common sense demand, less 
possible as criteria of 'truth' than in authentic historiology.33 
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The "authentic historiology" of Macquarrie and Robinson's translation is to be 
distinguished from the science of the "they". Universality is compatible with the "they", 
but incompatible with the historicality by which Heidegger defines a people. And it is 
incompatible, not because it misses the finer "nuances" of historicality, but because it 
rests on an understanding of temporality that presupposes historicality and likewise 
cannot make sense of it. Heidegger does not recite the nominalist objection to 
universality, since what he criticises is less the legitimacy of the subsumption of 
particulars than the discrete a-historical now in which the particular appears in its 
presence and thereby appears in the repeatability proper to the universal. The specificity 
of a people is not a particular in its irrevocable passage to the universal, but the 
specificity of time in its unrepeatability. A people apprehended in presence and analysed 
into a-historical properties is not "recognisable" as a people because its definitive 
historicality has been neglected. This historicality, inasmuch as it always sets itself at 
odds with universality, is therefore both the reason for the plurality of peoples and the 
impossibility of the proof of this plurality by exact numeration: the lone people would 
only be able to encounter its integrity in the oneness of presence, only therefore in that in 
which a people could never encounter the truth of its historicality. Overreaching 
, presence and its visibility, historicality individuates without the surety of a recognition 
for the differences it effects. Historicality bastardizes without cease, and yet it never 
results in the homogeneous. Instead, it always already fragments the peoples and 
prevents their recuperation into new unities. Historicality, which is less a property of a 
people than its world, is the impracticability of a demarcation of the horizons of a world. 
That is to say, world is only able to be world insofar as it is not whole and does not sever 
itself from the transcendence that is the historicality of a people. A people can never 
assert itself as one people among many because the world that it is can never fully present 
itself as something present-at-hand without ceasing to be world. A people is thus 
essentially a being that is missing and a self-certain nationalism is always an absurdity. 
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Heidegger's disillusionment with National Socialism was inevitable. The people 
that asserted itself under the regime did not insist on its essential difference from that 
which is present-at-hand. Instead it effaced that difference through its preference for 
biologistic properties. The chance of a contestation of the ontic determinability of Dasein 
was thus lost. In place of the bastardized specificity of a people National Socialism put 
forward the distinctness of a being present-at-hand. The particularism of the movement 
was, for all its vociferousness, at bottom too timid to break with the logic of the "type". 
In its scientistic formulations of the specificity of the German people, National Socialism 
wanted a specificity that nonetheless could be universally apprehended as such. The 
people is to be legitimated in its distinctness because it is to reveal itself incontestably as 
what it is in the clarity of presence, in the abstraction from its historicality. With the_ 
abstraction from historicality National Socialism retained the ontological basis of les 
Droits de !'Homme: the autonomous a-historical subject of liberalism is cut from the 
same cloth as the biologistically apprehended specimen of the Aryan race. It is thus hard 
to see how Goebbels, with his consistent reliance on biologism, could have proclaimed in 
the first months of the regime the eradication from history of the year 1789. The 
National Socialist revolution simply re-enacted the French Revolution's disavowal of that 
which is a people's own. While the Jacobin motto "Laforce de la raison et la force du 
peuple, c 'est la meme chose" substituted the "they" of the cosmopolitan voice of the 
liberal subject for a people, National Socialism similarly de-historized the people by a 
reification and dissection into properties. In both revolutions, history as such went 
unthought and the people failed to "appear". Heidegger's disillusionment with National 
Socialism cannot, therefore, be interpreted as a softening of his opposition towards 
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liberalism, since in its universalist misapprehension of the specificity of the Volk National 
Socialism had demonstrated the spuriousness of its own anti-liberalism. 
Heidegger's people "appears" neither in 1789 nor in 1933. What appears in the 
two revolutions is too intent upon its own manifestness and visibility as a people to be 
mistaken for such. The self-assertion of a people is an affair of modesty. A people 
appears in its undecidable and unnamable specificity as a caesura, as " ... ", since its 
appearance is always its withdrawal from the field of the ontic determinations of Dasein. 
It is the essence of a people to be absent. Heidegger, who renews the Romantic longing 
for the people, implicitly disputes the National Socialist readings of that longing: the 
people that is missing in Romanticism does not await its realisation under National 
Socialism.34 Heidegger's position should not, however, be characterised as a nostalgic 
depoliticisation of the Romantics' thinking of the German people.35 Heidegger defers the 
emergence of the Volk precisely in order to think its historicality and thus the political. 
The apoliticality of German Romanticism in comparison with the Jacobins is itself 
already deceptive. The people that, in the French Revolution, appropriates for itself the 
power of legitimation formerly embodied in the person of the king does not grasp the 
political as the site of the historizing of a community. In its pretensions to stand as 
arbiter, it grasps itself as the universal and confuses the political with the domain of the 
subsumptions of scholastic logic. The powerlessness of the Volk of Romanticism should 
not be too quickly explained, which is to say explained away, by the negative 
circumstance of Germany's still larval bourgeoisie. Powerlessness does not merely 
distinguish the Volk from the people that had come to power in the French Revolution; it 
distinguishes it from the very logic of power in which the essence of the human goes 
unthought. Renan, naming Germany a land without a people, seemingly laments this 
absence whereby the nation was reduced to seeking its legitimacy elsewhere in the titles 
of successor to the Roman Empire and founder of the Carolingian.36 A people, however, 
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as a people, can never be a power of legitimation since it can never gather itself into the 
recognisable unity that could impose its will on the political realm. The task for 
Heidegger is to lose, rather than to find the Germans. And it could be argued that the 
Romantics wanted nothing besides. Deleuze and Guattari propose that the absence of a 
people was not the circumstance of Romanticism, but its goal: 
What romanticism lacks most is a people. [ ... ]Germany, German 
romanticism, had a genius for experiencing the natal territory not as 
deserted but as "solitary," regardless of population density.37 
The people of Romanticism is scattered in its essential powerlessness. This can be noted 
even in the approach to publication: it is, in one respect, contrary to the intention of the 
Romantic folksong that it attract, instead of repel, an audience, as Lichtenberg was still 
able to perceive.38 The hermetism of Romantic poetry is by no means a denial of the 
political realm. On the contrary, it is the peoples' all too easy self-discovery in 1789 and 
1933 that constitutes a denial of the political realm, since the " ... " that is the site of the 
historizing of Dasein and its anarchy is buried beneath the onticality of an integral 
people. 
A people must beware of finding itself too easily. The existentiell modification of 
authentic Being-with-one-another that has here been heuristically identified with the Volk 
finds itself in understanding and not in its unified appearance as a being present-at-hand. 
The revolutions of 1789 and 1933 are thus not so much popular uprisings as inscriptions 
of the people in traditional logic. In both cases, the people is formulated in terms of a 
type or universal: in the French Revolution it becomes a power of legitimation over each 
individual, while under National Socialism it constitutes the common and distinct identity 
of the race. The people that, as an existentiell modification, is not a given, stands in need 
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of an uprising, but not of the kind in which its universalisation is substituted for an 
understanding of itself. Universalisation falls short of the essence of the Volk, since what 
is to be understood in and as the Volk is, for Heidegger, the co-historizing of Being-with-
one-another. This co-historizing is the temporality that eludes the presence of the 
discrete "now" of the universal because it is the more originary temporality of the 
ecstases of human Dasein. As Being-in-the-world, Dasein always already converges with 
Others, and hence this convergence cannot be set apart from anarchy and made to depend 
upon the mediation of a universal. If subject and Volk are set in opposition in 
Heidegger's writings, it is not an opposition of the individual and the universal, but rather 
of the a-historical and the historical: a people is not the universal of numerable 
individuals, and authentic Dasein is itself the Volk. Insofar as it is grounded in an 
understanding of Being as presence, the mediation of the universal, and the reified notion 
of the people it supports, are of an entirely other order than the struggle and 
communication associated with Heidegger's notions of destiny and the Volk. It is only in 
the cessation of both struggle and communication, in the cessation of its understanding of 
ecstatic temporality, that Being-with is able to be seduced by its a-historical image in the 
mediation of singular and universal. The conformity of a given people to a universal, and 
hence its homogeneity, never reaches its essence as Being-with, and never distinguishes it 
as a people among other peoples, because the plurality of peoples is less the extrinsic 
numerability of unities than the difference that a people carries within itself as the 
transcendence of its historicality and its non-universality. For the same reason, a people 
that presses its sovereignty over the political realm asserts something other than itself. 
The sovereignty of a people is at odds with its essential politicality since, through 
becoming a power of legitimation in the shape of a universal, it forgets the non-identity 
proper to itself as the transcendence of Being-with-one-another in the constitution of the 
political. But then a people that does not seize power does not thereby automatically 
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understand itself. It may simply be delivering power to a class, a clique or an individual, 
instead of understanding itself in the question of the very scope of power in the thought 
of that which in historicality is not present to be controlled. A people cannot find itself 
either in power or out of power, but only in that which is ontologically prior to power. 
With respect to the Wars of Liberation, this entailed that the Napoleonic 
dictatorship was not so much to be supplanted as philosophically overcome. Where the 
opposition of the Romantics to popular sovereignty is often seemingly de facto, Hegel's 
opposition, by contrast, is de jure and at first sight it might thus appear that Heidegger's 
notion of the people is closer to Hegel's than to the Romantics'. Hegel repeatedly 
addresses the contradictory notion of popular sovereignty, but as his analyses figure in an 
apologetics of sovereignty, so it is solely in its dissemblance of sovereignty that the 
people is exhibited and thereafter passed over. In the lectures on the philosophy of 
history, Hegel condemns the notion of the people in the French Revolution by judging it 
according to the universality to which this people had itself laid claim. Criticising the 
purely formal freedom propagated by the French Revolution for furnishing the popular 
state with no more substantial a foundation than a temporary enthusiasm, Hegel describes 
the people of this freedom as not so much investing the existing governmental structures 
as abolishing their concrete universality in favour of an abstract and thus contradictorily 
one-sided universal. 39 And in his very last text, "The English Reform Bill", Hegel 
disparages the phrase "the sovereign people" in the French opposition press for its 
vacuity .40 The people, through its inability to embody the concrete universal by which 
Hegel defines both knowledge and the state, consigns itself to the obscurantist margins of 
his political thinking. The Philosophy of Right is hence explicitly conceived as an 
attempt to set forth that which is but dimly and extrinsically foreshadowed in the 
universalist populism of the French Revolution: the Book of the State necessarily and 
excessively becomes the book of the truth of the people. Thereby any question as to 
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whether the truth of the people might not deliver itself in a refinement of the Napoleonic 
dialectic of the individual of les Droits de l'Homme and the universal state of the First 
Empire is suppressed. 
Hegel' s assessment of the French notion of popular sovereignty is ultimately 
faithful to his ideal of non-polemical criticism. However, with the people of German 
Romanticism, with the people that never comes to power, nothing tempers his hostility. 
Here it is a matter of simple rejection rather than of elaboration. In its refusal to press a 
claim to the universal, the people of German Romanticism sets itself wholly at odds with 
knowledge. J. F. Fries in the Philosophy of Right and E.T. A. Hoffmann in the 
Aesthetics are subjected to ridicule without compunction or concession, because the 
substantiality of ethical life is exchanged in their writings, not even for the enthusiasm of 
revolutionary paroles, but rather for immediate sense-perception, for magnetism and 
clairvoyance. Without recourse to the universal the Volk dissipates. But it is precisely in 
this dissipation that it displays its irreducibility and specificity. Hegel, for whom 
everything is a hieroglyph of the concrete universal, is incapable of granting that the 
essence of a people could be other than Spirit. 
Yet confronted with the self-assertion of the French people as the people of the 
universal, the German Volk of the Wars of Liberation could only truly maintain its 
specificity through its invention as the people of the unsublatably specific. At the hands 
of Romanticism, the abstract universals of the French Revolution were forced into a 
grotesque trial of strength with all that is most virulently parochial, antiquated and petty 
in German culture. Romanticism was never far removed from the art of the saboteur. 
Into the smooth space of a Europe that revolutionary imperialism first created, before 
sweeping across it in conquest, the Romantics injected a fatherland inaccessible beneath 
its garbage. Germany thereby reasserted itself in its barbaric specificity, in the idiocy by 
which the classical world named that which is inviolably and unenviably one's own. 
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Ahead of the invading armies the Romantics depopulated the countryside and the people 
that vanished left behind only the intractable and indigestible fragments of its 
superstitions. Tieck's Marc hen are not dissimilar in principle to the burning of Moscow. 
The Nature of Romanticism is, in this respect, a scorched earth. It is only in fleeing 
French civilisation that the German people comes upon Nature, and comes upon it, 
fittingly stripped back to Naturerscheinungen, as the dystopia of logical mediation. The 
propensity in later German nationalist circles for biologistic conceptions of the people has 
its roots in this political appropriation of Nature by the Romantics, no matter how little 
the appropriation was understood in its intended disruption of the reconciliation of the 
individual and the universal.41 The Nature of German Romanticism is less the ground on 
which the specificity of the people might be established and secured for universal 
recognition than the abyss in which it is scattered as hallucinations, secrets, magical 
interventions and somnambulism. In its inability to come to itself, this people is the 
abolition of the Enlightenment, rather than its sublation in Hegel's Absolute Spirit. The 
abstract universal of the autonomous subject does not give way to the Prussian State. 
Instead, the political stage is cleared for will-o' -the-wisps. Under Romanticism the polis 
is to be rethought from its very beginnings. 
The Volk is missing and in the 1920s, in conditions at once reminiscent and 
infinitely removed from the Wars of Liberation, National Socialism went looking for a 
people. Repudiating the possibility of democracy in the absence of a people, the 
movement insinuated into the political discourse of the Weimar Republic the topoi of 
Romanticism. As the populism of a people to come, National Socialism could deny itself 
any accommodation to the existing governmental structures and yet, through the citation 
of precedents, insist on a fundamental conservatism. In its indifference to matters of 
public doctrine and in its devotion to genealogy, the movement applied itself to the mass 
detection of forerunners. Hence, even as it declared the national revolution in 1933 and 
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set about the provision of schooling in Rassenkunde for the people that had come, the 
new regime still urged its consanguinity with incompatible previous formulations of the 
notion of the German Volk. That Heidegger could have sought admitttance to the 
NSDAP despite his rejection of its biologism is largely inexplicable without this 
amorphousness of the official ideology. Although in hindsight the openness with which 
the regime appeared to address the question of the people was unmistakably its 
indiscriminate responsiveness to the shibboleth of "Volk", Heidegger, for the sake of 
what he considered to be National Socialism's promise of a revelation of the absence 
proper to historicality, turned a blind eye to this lack of discrimination. 
But then the continuity of German nationalism was not in general subjected to 
criticism. Patriotic texts such as Fichte's Addresses to the German Nation from 1808 
could thus be interpreted by zealots of the movement as an anticipation of National 
Socialist thinking. Max Wundt, Alfred Baeumler, and various lesser figures in the 
Deutsche Philosophische Gesellschaft, all paid homage to Fichte. But what was the 
similarity, if any, between Fichte's definition of the Germans and the racist theories of 
the movement? In the seventh address Fichte famously passes over everything positive 
to arrive at his typology of the German people: 
All who either are themselves alive and creative and productive of new 
things, or who, should this not have fallen to their lot, at any rate definitely 
abandon the things of naught and stand on the watch for the stream of 
original life to lay hold of them somewhere, or who, should they not even 
be so far advanced as this, at least have an inkling of freedom and do not 
hate it or take fright at it, but on the contrary love it - all these are 
original men; they are, when considered as a people, an original people, 
the people simply, Germans.42 
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There is nothing of the biological in this definition. Whoever loves freedom is German. 
By 1808, le peuple of the French Revolution, which had defined itself by its love of 
freedom, rather than by national characteristics, had shown, through its submission to the 
Napoleonic dictatorship, the spuriousness of its love of freedom. In contrast, the 
Germans, so long as they combat their oppression, are seen as the people that loves 
freedom and are hence the people. And this people, in the singular, is also always "our" 
people because it is that which stands closest to us in the philosophically original freedom 
of humanity. Inasmuch as Fichte's Addresses to the German Nation were already 
established as canonical texts of German nationalism in Wilhelmine Germany, later 
nationalist movements invariably seemed more indebted to their disquisitions than was, 
in fact, the case. The genealogical legitimacy of the nationalism of National Socialism 
was a moot point on which ideologues of the movement expended a frantic ingenuity. 
The people that asserts itself in 1933 does not, and dares not, entirely renounce its 
Romanticism. 
Given the intellectual promiscuity of National Socialism, it is impossible, as is 
often noted, to set forth National Socialist thinking in anything like a comprehensive set 
of theses. The nationalism of the NSDAP eludes definition and has always already 
overtaken every critique directed at it from a nationalistic position. Heidegger' s 
engagement and disengagement with National Socialism are complicated by this 
equivocality. Deviations become indistinguishable from expansions and conformances 
take on the appearance of containments. Admitting, as it were, the interpenetration of his 
engagement and disengagement, Heidegger published in 1953 the following remarks on 
"the inner truth" of National Socialism: 
The works that are being peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of 
National Socialism but have nothing whatever to do with the inner truth 
and greatness of this movement (namely the encounter between global 
technology and modern man) - have all been written by men fishing in 
the troubled waters of "values" and "totalities."43 
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This passage from an Introduction to Metaphysics is almost as inscrutable as National 
Socialism itself. Its year of publication excludes at least one reading, namely, that 
Heidegger is here paying lip service to the regime. The parenthesis elucidating the "inner 
truth" of National Socialism is more than likely to date from a period subsequent to the 
1935 summer semester in which Heidegger delivered the text in a course of lectures. 
Absolute certainty on this point is, however, impossible because the page in question is 
missing from the otherwise intact manuscript in the Heidegger Archive at Marbach. 
Rainer Marten, privy to the consultations surrounding the publication of the lectures, has 
divulged that the parenthesis was Heidegger's concession to the editorial assistants 
advising him to delete the inflammatory sentence in its entirety. 44 When the parenthesis 
turned out not to forestall controversy, Heidegger saw fit in a letter reproduced in Die 
Zeit on September 24, 1953, to endorse an earlier reading by Christian Lewalter. On 
August 13, Lewalter had argued, in Die Zeit, that the sentence amounted to a 
condemnation of National Socialism. Heidegger' s clarificatory intervention was too 
exceptional a gesture, and its circumstances too obviously crucial to the casting of his 
post-war reputation, for anything here to be straightforward. Thirteen years later the 
interview with Der Spiegel, "Only a God Can Save Us", is perhaps even more tortuous. 
There the rectorship becomes a series of compromises with the NSDAP, and any tie 
between Heidegger' s thinking and the regime is pushed into the background: any attempt 
at an exposition of this tie is taken as little more than a foray into persecution. Was 
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Heidegger a Nazi? Was National Socialism Heideggerian? These questions, however, 
do not yet say anything, and hence it is imperative that those passages in which 
Heidegger is at least to some degree open about his engagement not be relinquished. In 
1953 Heidegger is still able to defend the "inner truth" of the movement against its 
usurpation in the value-philosophy of Bruno Bauch and the totality-philosophy of Ernst 
Krieck. The ambiguity in the doctrine of the NSDAP that permitted conflicting 
presentations of its unspoken truth likewise rendered impossible its own exhaustive 
realisation. Heidegger in 1953 stands by the "inner truth" of a movement too nebulous to 
have received its refutation in the Second World War. Unwilling to countenance the 
provocation of this fidelity, Silvio Vietta neglects the "inner truth" and fixes upon the 
"greatness" of the movement in his commentary on the text: 
Nobody who has read the Contributions to Philosophy will be able to say 
that the concept of "quantity", of the "gigantic" and therefore of 
"greatness" is being used here in a positive sense.45 
Vietta's dedication to apologetics represses Heidegger's (retrospective) insight into his 
engagement with National Socialism and offers - and then only implicitly, such is its 
reverence - the philosophical vacuity of an error of judgement. In 1953, after having 
carried out a protracted, if covert polemic against National Socialism in the wartime 
lectures on Nietzsche and Holderlin, Heidegger still maintains that the "inner truth" of the 
movement differed from what was, for him, its exoteric truth as the acceleration and 
intensification of technicism. Here the reality of the movement is being condemned by 
its promise. 
What Heidegger understands by the promise of National Socialism is set forth at 
greater length in an earlier, likewise notorious passage from An Introduction to 
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Metaphysics. Expounding the opposition between German nationalism and technicism 
and foreseeing a people that will as a people avert the destruction of Europe, Heidegger 
writes: 
This Europe, in its ruinous blindness forever on the point of cutting its 
own throat, lies today in a great pincers, squeezed between Russia on one 
side and America on the other. From a metaphysical point of view, Russia 
and America are the same; the same dreary technological frenzy, the same 
unrestricted organization of the average man. [ ... ] 
We are caught in a pincers. Situated in the center, our people 
incurs the severest pressure. It is the people with the most neighbours and 
hence the most endangered. With all this, it is the most metaphysical of 
peoples. We are certain of this definition, but our people will only be able 
to wrest a destiny from it if within itself it creates a resonance, a possibility 
of resonance for this definition, and takes a creative view of its tradition. 
All this implies that this people, as a historical people, must move itself 
and thereby the history of the West from within the center of their future 
"happening" into the primordial realm of the powers of Being. If the great 
decision regarding Europe is not to bring annihilation, that decision must 
be made in terms of new spiritual energies unfolding historically from out 
of the center.46 
With its definition of '.'our people" as "the most metaphysical of peoples", this passage 
employs a trope of German cultural nationalism.47 But Heidegger' s use of this trope 
involves a particular understanding of "metaphysics". Is the most metaphysical people 
here the most nationalistic? And is nationalism to be understood as metaphysics? 
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According to this geophilosophical excursus, America and Russia do not differentiate 
themselves. The specificity that would belong to them as peoples, and constitute the 
basis of a nationalism, is annulled in their programmatic standardisation of humanity and 
their immersion in technicism. Owing to their positions on a periphery flimsily 
characterised by its distance from Central Europe, America and Russia are poor in 
neighbours and thus not endangered. The people that is richest in neighbours is the most 
endangered people and also the most metaphysical. It confronts the danger, not of 
effacing itself in the identity of one of its many neighbours, but rather of losing itself in 
the anonymity in which its neighbours have already lost themselves. The nationalism to 
which Heidegger could be read as exhorting the people of the centre is thus less the 
assertion of a given people's distinct identity among the distinct identities of 
neighbouring peoples than the assertion of the non-universality of a people against global 
anonymity. What is at issue in this nationalism is not the identification and 
documentation of unique properties, but instead that which in a people as such sets it 
apart from the uniform organization of reified humanity. Such a nationalism must ask 
after that which is not present-at-hand. For Heidegger, this is metaphysics (it is only in 
subsequent texts that metaphysics is no longer interpreted as the question of Being, but 
rather as Seinsvergessenheit). The people of the centre remains as yet the Volk because it 
is metaphysical. The Volk thinks the difference of Being from that which is present-at-
hand and manipulable by technology, and it thinks this difference as the truth of its own 
historicality. The Volk is never anything other than spiritual because it is never other than 
thoughtful. In the language of Being and Time, the Volk is an existentiell modification. 
However certain Heidegger may be of the correctness of his definition (Bestimmung) of 
the Germans, it is, as a vocation (Bestimmung), also a definition whose time has not yet 
come: the definiendum has still to bring itself into agreement with the definiens. Only as 
the people of metaphysics will the Germans be able to fulfil their mission. Only as the 
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people that is nothing but a "folkish" science and an understanding of the worldliness of 
its Being-with-one-another, will they be able to transpose the West from the unchecked 
disposability and hence destructibility of beings under technicism into the originary realm 
of the powers of Being. The German mission thus reaches beyond the Germans by not 
reaching beyond their essence as a people. The scope of the German mission is not, 
however, a clandestine universalism. The Germans are to raise the promised question 
concerning the essence of Being less on behalf of other peoples than against the 
standardisation by which the various peoples have fallen away from the possibility of 
grasping their own essential historicality. 
The new spiritual energies of the centre are to unfold historically. Unless 
Heidegger' s juxtaposition of "spiritual" and "historically" is to be understood as an 
uncharacteristic subordination of "historicality" to "spirit", "spirit" is not here being 
given a sense in conformity with the metaphysics of subjectity. Derrida contends in Of 
Spirit that, with his opposition to the biologism of National Socialism, Heidegger lapses 
into the metaphysics of subjectity: 
One cannot demarcate oneself from biologism, from naturalism, from 
racism in its genetic form, one cannot be opposed to them except by 
reinscribing spirit in an oppositional determination, by once again making 
it a unilaterality of subjectity, even if in its voluntarist form. The 
constraint of this program remains very strong, it reigns over the majority 
of discourses which, today and for a long time to come, state their 
opposition to racism, to totalitarianism, to nazism, to fascism, etc., and do 
this in the name of spirit, and even of the freedom of (the) spirit, in the 
name of an axiomatic - for example, that of democracy or "human 
rights" - which, directly or not, comes back to this metaphysics of 
subjectity.48 
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Derrida's criticism turns upon a direct association of oppositional determination with the 
metaphysics of subjectity. Heidegger's "spirit" stands in opposition to biologism, but 
that is not to say that it is determined by this opposition as a being pre~ent in its 
distinctness. "Spirit" is in opposition to "matter", and yet it is not the spirit that comes to 
itself as the subject in opposition to matter, in a specious opposition to that which is 
present-at-hand. It does not come to itself because to do so, to be present before matter in 
its presence would denote precisely a mitigation of its opposition to the ontological 
foundations of matter in the understanding of Being as presence. Heidegger' s "spirit" 
does not stand in an oppositional determination to the biologism of Nazi Germany or the 
technological frenzy of Russia and America because it is defined rather by the . 
transcendence that precedes and ontologically encompasses all of them. The 
simultaneous opposition and contamination of "spirit" is to be explained less by reference 
to the "mistake" of a lapse into the metaphysics of subjectity than to the very nature of 
transcendence. Heidegger' s "metaphysical" people is anything but the unambiguous 
concomitant of a biologistically determined race. Its metaphysicality is not a property 
that it would possess in the manner of physical attributes such as levels of pigmentation. 
Its metaphysicality is not its identifiability, but on the contrary its historicality and hence 
undecidability. To be pure enough to be pronounced either guilty or innocent would 
constitute, for the Volk of Being and Time, a surrender to the understanding of Being as 
presence. 
The essence of the Germans is their mission and this mission is to be the Volk, to 
be the spirit that to the extent that it does not become universal is to unfold outward from 
the centre to America and Russia. In his study of the utterances of National Socialism, 
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Jean-Pierre Faye remarks upon the etymological association of "diutisk" and "volkisch", 
calling the Germans "the people of tautology" .49 It is nonetheless a tautology that 
Heidegger sets to work. The Germans are to be the people for the West as a whole, since 
they alone are still capable of preserving a distance from the "humanity" of the 
cosmopolitanism of the technologically undifferentiated. They preserve this distance in 
the questionability of metaphysics. This questionability, which is irreducible to the 
universal of the "they", is the element of the historicality of the Volk, of the struggling 
and the communicating of authentic Being-with-one-another. Running away from the 
vitiated inauthentic communication of the universal, a people always runs towards a more 
authentic confrontation in the question of Being. What is thereby communicated and 
brought to the fore is the transcendence essential to communication and not any content 
whose reiterability could be mistaken for the basis of communication. It is accordingly in 
terms of a dialogue, in which everything rests on the "between" of the parties, that 
Heidegger in 1937 treats the relations between France and Germany. In the essay "Paths 
to Dialogue", included in the volume Alemannenland. Ein Buch van Volkstum und 
Sendung, he warns against a too placid interpretation of communicating: 
Authentic understanding of one another does not engender that tranquillity 
which at once deteriorates into a mutual indifference. On the contrary, it 
is in itself the unrest of the reciprocal self-questioning out of concern for 
the shared historical tasks.50 
Understanding between peoples neither levels nor codifies their differences. It puts the 
identities of the peoples in question. Heidegger' s nationalism is neither pacifist nor 
isolationist, because a people asserts itself in its questionability against the self-evidence 
of that which is everywhere the same. National Socialism, which was likewise neither 
48 
pacifist nor isolationist, nonetheless betrayed its own "folkish" promise by not rigorously 
carrying through its assertion of the people to a global confrontation with technicism. 
For Heidegger, the Third Reich was ultimately too little of a pariah among the 
neighbouring nations of technicism. The regime's failure to differentiate itself is 
manifest even in the racial policies for which its military opponents reserved their 
greatest vilification. The National Socialist concept of race remains subject to technicism 
because the beings to which it applies are exhaustively defined by properties and present 
themselves as material for manipulation. For the sake of certainty and the transhistorical 
iterability of its judgements, the Rassenkunde of the regime situated its field of study in 
the present-at-hand. Unable and unwilling to contest the thinking of modern science in 
anything but details, the National Socialist ideologues of race brought to the question of 
the essence of a people an inapposite and paranoiac demand for certainty. The fancied 
self-evidence of the notion of certainty itself was the excuse for the open stifling of the 
questionability of the essence of a people as something negligently inexact. From the 
uncontestability of a distinction grounded in "facts", anti-Semitism, for instance, was to 
be invested with a semblance of consistency and realism. That the biologistic efforts of 
the movement in Rassenkunde were directed precisely against the questionability of the 
essence of a people can be inferred from the writings of Hitler himself. For the space of a 
moment in Mein Kampf, Hitler appears to acknowledge the irrelevance of properties 
when he recalls an episode from his youth in Vienna: 
Once, as I was strolling through the Inner City, I suddenly encountered an 
apparition in a black caftan and black hair locks. Is this a Jew? was my 
first thought. 
For, to be sure, they had not looked like that in Linz. I observed 
the man furtively and cautiously, but the longer I stared at this foreign 
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face, scrutinizing feature after feature, the more my first question assumed 
anew form: 
Is this a German?51 
It goes without saying that the uncanniness of this incident did not become the occasion 
for a deepening of the questionability of the question of a people. When National 
Socialism comes to put the question of a scientific basis, it is simply in order to avoid it 
as a question. The identity of the German people is resolved into the properties of 
something present-at-hand and rendered certain. The question that asks "Who are the 
Germans?" is rephrased to read "What are the Germans?", since reification is the 
safeguard of the people's purity against the contamination characteristic of existentialia. 
The question "What are the Germans?" is National Socialism's invitation to kitsch. 
Alpine panoramas and Nordic sagas, granite nudes and granite temples, blond braids_ and 
trench warfare are all swept up to be reinvented as fetishes of a people that is missing. 
This evidentiality of the Germans is simultaneously their bad faith, since what is adduced 
is never a people. National Socialism was thus incapable of disputing the etymology of 
"deutsch" that Nietzsche proposes in Beyond Good and Evil: the tiusche Volk is the 
Tiiusche-Volk, the people of deceit.52 In order not to deceive, in order to bring forward 
"das Deutsche" in absolute clarity, National Socialism courted recognition. Letting the 
question of the people lapse and thus maintaining world in its oblivion, the regime 
solicited the attentions of its neighbours through the mendacious positivism of its 
conception of the Germans. The self-determination denied at Versailles was not so much 
made good as exaggerated to the point of parody: National Socialism was kitsch 
transformed into imperialism. Having staked German identity on positive attributes, the 
movement was, in one sense, bound from the start to a military campaign for global 
domination. Berlin was to become the aggressive distribution hub for "folkish" 
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paraphernalia and everything bar the symbol and stereotype would be eradicated as an 
obstacle to recognition. Germany would be recognised at whatever cost. As such 
illusory self-determination dares ask no more of the recognising bodies than a mere 
acknowledgement of its compliance to cliche, Nazi Germany could at the same time not 
allow itself to be recognised. Its very recognisability was, in the end, an affliction and a 
sign of weakness to be remedied by the annihilation of the recognising bodies. The wars 
of aggression that National Socialism waged against its neighbours were, in this respect, 
reactive. Nazi imperialism was the hysteric regurgitation of the symbol and the 
stereotype, its racism- in both its affirmative and negative evaluations -its very 
acquiescence to the universal. 
Already in 1934 Levinas was in a position to expose the anti-cosmopolitanism of 
the new regime as a sham. In his article "Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism", 
first published in Esprit, there is the following exposition and analysis: 
Any rational assimilation or mystical communion between spirits that is 
not based on a community of blood is suspect. And yet the new type of 
truth cannot renounce the formal nature of truth and cease to be universal. 
In vain is truth my truth in the strongest sense of this possessive pronoun, 
for it must strive towards the creation of a new world. [ ... ] 
How is universality compatible with racism? The answer - to be 
found in the logic· of what first inspires racism - involves a basic 
modification of the very idea of universality. Universality must give way 
to the idea of expansion. 53 
A truth that is mine alone is a contradiction. In racism, according to Levinas, universality 
is modified rather than renounced, since it cannot be renounced without likewise 
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renouncing any claim to truth. The military operations of Hitlerian Germany can 
accordingly be viewed as a half-measure, as testimony to the apprehensiveness with 
which National Socialism set about breaking with the universal. Even before it declared 
war, the regime was in the wrong, and it was the sentence passed on its chauvinism by 
the universal that it sought to reverse by global conquest. Levinas, who, in the above 
quotation, sees the parallel between the 1,1niversality of an idea and the universalism of 
imperialist expansion, does not however hesitate in his subsequent anti-Romantic 
exoneration of the idea, "for the expansion of a force presents a structure that is 
completely different from the propagation of an idea."54 Contrary to his earlier analysis, 
National Socialism is thus to be understood as the unqualified alternative to the 
universality of the idea it nevertheless apes. The possibility of a genuine confrontation 
with the universal thereby remains unexamined. 
Levinas does not go beyond a morphology of the universal. What he musters 
against racist imperialism is the spreading of an idea: the conscience-salving myth of the 
cultural benevolence of French colonialism receives a new lease on life through the 
comparison with Hitler's territorial ambitions. Having no idea to propagate, and thus 
having nothing to offer the subject peoples in an "exchange", Hitler is able to aspire to 
nothing more than a universality maintained by an external and inscrutable force. Since 
for Levinas the desirability of universality is never doubted, the deliberate act of offering 
that which cannot be accepted and rendered universal is nonsensical. By this account, the 
people's detritus by means of which the German Romantics sought to resist the 
conquering French liberalism was, in its irreconcilability with the universal, simply 
detritus. In this text, Levinas displays a Hegelian disregard for the essential meagreness 
of a people. Isolating racism with regard to its simulation of the universality of the idea, 
he does not ask whether the question of the people is not similarly counterfeited in 
racism' s community of blood. Yet, as Levinas himself suggests, the logic of what first 
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inspires racism is not the question of a people but expansionism. Rather than the 
singularity of a people, the allegedly universal quantitative matter that, in its unequal 
distribution determines the inferiority and superiority of respective peoples, is the 
ultimate foundation of racism. Racism is already too removed from race, in the direction 
of the universal by which the necessarily inessential superiority of a people is judged, for 
its anti-cosmopolitanism to be substantial. Although it does not propagate an idea in 
Levinas' s sense of a cultural artefact, it does attempt to compel recognition of its own 
claim to instantiate the idea of the power of blood. The ferocity and clamorousness with 
which National Socialism pursued its ethnic policies should not consequently be 
misunderstood. Having come to signify the ne plus ultra of racism, the regime 
nonetheless did not surpass the Romantics in their dedication to the question of the 
people. The incompatibility of the question of the people with universality was not 
acknowledged. 
To draw a distinction between racism and the questioning with regard to the 
essence of a people does not of course establish the "innocence" of Heidegger' s 
engagement with National Socialism. This engagement is overdetermined. Confronted 
with its ambiguity, and indignant at a perceived neglect of the peopl~ in Being and Time, 
Ernst Krieck interprets Heidegger' s rectoral address as a cynical adaptation to the year 
1933.55 Similarly distancing Heidegger all too quickly from the regime, Jean Beaufret 
will embark after the war on an almost militant programme of exculpation.56 But that 
Heidegger would have applied for membership in the NSDAP, with a view to furthering 
his career, only once the party was in power seems implausible given his subsequent 
refusal of the more prestigious chairs at the Universities of Berlin and Munich. 
Strikingly, the explanation of his refusal, "W arum bleiben wir in der Provinz?", has less 
to do with ambition than with an inventory of the commonplaces of rustic literature. And 
that Heidegger's involvement with the regime was but a momentary lapse in judgement, a 
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blind spot unassimilable with his character and work, is a decreasingly tenable 
interpretation: the letter by Heidegger from 1929, published in Die Zeit by Ulrich Sieg57, 
expresses an anti-Semitism that the inordinate controls on the Marbach archive must be 
suspected of wishing to conceal. For Heidegger, more was at stake in 1933 than the 
question concerning the essence of the people. If this question can illuminate his political 
engagement, it nonetheless cannot fully account for it just as it cannot be conflated with 
every aspect of the Hitlerian regime: contiguity is other than identity. 
The absence of this reservation leads Habermas' s presentations of Heidegger' s 
thinking into the realm of caricature. In his defence of the universal, Habermas exploits 
the overdetermination of Heidegger' s engagement with National Socialism. Once the 
question concerning the essence of a people has been associated with anti-Semitism, or 
with any of the other enormities of the regime, then the task of a meticulous refutation of 
Heidegger's critique of universality readily appears superfluous. In The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity, Habermas is keen to suggest a connection between 
totalitarianism and Heidegger' s abandonment of Husserl' s definition of truth in favour of 
the rootedness that he attributes in 1933 to a "folkish" science. Habermas's argument for 
the philosophical restoration of global intersubjectivity proceeds by innuendo. Referring 
to the critique of reason that Heidegger grounds in the history of Being, he writes: 
It reserves the title of truth for the so-called truth occurrence, which no 
longer has anything to do with a validity-claim transcending space and 
time. The truths (emerging in the plural) of this temporalized 
Ursprungsphilosophie are in each case provincial and yet total; they are 
more like the commanding expressions of some sacral force fitted out with 
the aura of truth.58 
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Habermas sets forth the truths of the Heideggerian Ursprungsphilosophie as simulacra 
possessing no more than the aura of truth. The sacral force of these provincial, yet total 
truths is a mere substitute for the truth defined for Habermas by its transcendence of 
space and time. The Heideggerian truth occurrence (Wahrheitsgeschehen), with its mere 
aura of truth, becomes a travesty of the universal. To the extent that it no longer has 
anything to do with a validity-claim transcending space and time, the truth occurrence has 
to content itself, according to Habermas, with issuing decrees. Heidegger' s destruction 
of the correspondence theory of truth is made to arrive at the commanding expressions of 
ideology, rather than the clearing of beings. For Habermas, to break with the 
understanding of truth modelled on the conception of law and its transcendence of space 
and time, is to espouse a dubious understanding of truth modelled on the conception of 
decree. With this non sequitur, philosophy's fortunes are tied for ever to the State: only 
that which is modelled on the conception of law can be true. If Heidegger'.s so-called 
truth occurrence no longer has anything to do with a validity-claim that transcends space 
and time, it is not because it is satisfi~d with the narrower scope of a decree. Heidegger' s 
writings are remarkably lacking in the decrees that Habermas attributes to them. 
Heidegger does not choose between the law and the decree, between the eternally and 
momentarily binding truth, and he does not choose because this choice plays itself out in 
the presence of derivative temporality as the dilemma of the individual and the universal. 
Habermas's options presuppose the clearing of beings in originary temporality, which, as 
the ground of beings, is likewise their truth and the truth of Habermas's own 
understanding of truth. Defining truth by a static identity transcending time and space, 
Habermas does not admit the possibility of a truth that, in never ceasing to transcend, 
transcends even this transcendence of time and space. That by which Heidegger' s 
understanding of truth exceeds presence is, for Habermas, its deficiency, its dissipation in 
an aura. Habermas sets himself up as the apologist of the rule of law and, with the 
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innuendo of "provincial and yet total", "commanding expressions" and "aura of truth", 
implies a reducibility of Heidegger' s thinking to the regime to which he confessed an 
allegiance. It is as though, having been bundled under the rubric of National Socialism, 
whatever in Heidegger' s thinking challenges the universal could be ipso facto dismissed. 
To put it at its bluntest: Auschwitz again becomes a means of silencing minorities, since 
the argument that, with an air of probity, expends itself on the nationalism of genocide 
slyly takes in every configuration of the social field that would contest its 
homogenisation in Habermas's static identity. The question concerning the essence of a 
people is the question of the validity of the validity-claims that transcend space and time 
- as such it is suspect for Habermas. What Habermas misses in Heidegger's 
engagement is that which is essentially missing: he believes he "sees" the Volk when all 
he sees is Volkermord. 
In Nazi Germany the people is not that which makes itself visible everywhere. 
On this point Habermas is too credulous. Falling behind the Romantics, National 
Socialism also fell behind its own victims with respect to the modesty of the essence of a 
people. If this modesty was the "inner truth" of the movement, and hence the proof of its 
outer falsehood, the "folkish" politics by which it had characterised itself could not but 
have become an unbearable affront in the shape of the minorities existing under its 
dictatorship. Incapable of carrying through the rupture with the transnational, the regime 
visited genocide on the minorities from within whose powerlessness the question 
concerning the essence of a people still sounded. In the end the Umbruch of 1933, which 
had portended for the Germans the chance of a "folkish" science, was itself the 
obstruction standing between them and their vocation as the "metaphysical" people. 
Having asserted itself, only to be diverted at once through technicism and imperialism 
from its essence in the question of Being, the Volk had become nothing but its own 
impossibility. Giving itself up entirely to its visibility, it surrendered the modesty in 
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which it could have asked after the non-presence of Being. It had asserted itself as the 
Volk without becoming the understanding of temporality that defines the Volk. It is his 
attention to this contradiction that excuses the conspicuous alarmism with which 
Heidegger, in the years of Hitler's dictatorship, surveys the obliviousness of Being, since 
the obliviousness of Being, discussed with Spinozistic equanimity in 1927, is an essential 
possibility of Dasein, whereas it is the impossibility of the existentiell modification that is 
the Volk. When Heidegger speaks of a "folkish" science in 1933, he speaks of a science 
that knows itself, rather than of a science that stands over against the people that it takes 
for its object. Not every science is "folkish", because not every science knows its own 
rootedness. It is the knowledge of this rootedness rather than its mere actuality that 
constitutes for Heidegger the "folkishness" of a science and the consummation of 
knowledge. The Volk knows itself as the Volk, and that is to say it knows itself in its 
world in its difference from beings present-at-hand. A "folkish" movement that, 
notwithstanding its "folkishness", exacerbates the obliviousness of Being could 
accordingly have been viewed by Heidegger only with incredulity and dismay. 
And yet, at least to begin with, this is not the case. The people that is suddenly 
present everywhere is to be the occasion of the questioning concerning the essence of 
Being. Heidegger's engagement with National Socialism is clearly inextricable from his 
ontology. This thesis, which is familiar from innumerable polemics, remains superficial 
so long as it is not elaborated in an exposition of the philosophical course of this 
engagement. For Heidegger, in 1933, ontology was the affair of that which, in the jargon 
of National Socialism, was denominated "volkische Wissenschaft". This instance of 
linguistic submissiveness appears scarcely resuscitable. By using the loaded word 
"volkisch" and not "volklich", "volkhaft" or for that matter ''popular", Heidegger marries 
his notion of a people's science to the infamy preordained for National Socialism in its 
entirety. But, it must be asked, to what extent was Heidegger simply adopting a notion 
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already articulated by the ideologues of the movement? When Heidegger in the late 
thirties and early forties explicitly criticises the idea of a volkische Wissenschaft, it is 
without abandoning that conjunction of a people and understanding which in 1933 he 
endeavoured to think within the jargon of National Socialism: volkische Wissenschaft is 
criticised as a science not of the people but of the subject masquerading as a people. For 
an intimation of what was at stake for Heidegger in 1933, of what was to be won and of 
what was lost, the conjunction of a people and the understanding of Being has to be 
examined in its equivocal relations to National Socialism. The Urnbruch of the National 
Socialist revolution, inasmuch as it interpreted itself as the overthrow and elimination of 
Western liberalism at the hands of a "folkish" uprising, appeared to repeat on a larger 
scale the partisan response of the Romantics to the Napoleonic abstract universal. With 
the attempt to grasp the world of the Volk, the prevailing understanding of all beings as 
present-at-hand was no longer to be merely contested, but overcome in the questioning 
with regard to the unthought essence of Being. For this task the Volk of National 
Socialism proved however to be too Cartesian. 
The many scattered anti-Cartesian objections that, after his rectorship, Heidegger 
raises to the ideas of Volk and volkische Wissenschaft, are not alien to his early thought in 
their argumentation. It cannot, therefore, be assumed that through these objections 
Heidegger is disowning that which he himself had understood in 1933 by the term 
volkische Wissenschaft. 59 The objections can be plausibly read as clarifications, and even 
defences, of the latter notion. 
For example, in the Contributions to Philosophy of 1936-8, Heidegger denounces 
the expediency that renders a "folkish" science essentially cosmopolitan: 
Only a thoroughly modem (i.e., "liberal") science can be "a folkish 
science". Only on the basis of prioritizing procedure over the subject-
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matter and the accuracy of judgement over the truth of beings does 
modern science permit an adjustable shifting to various purposes, 
depending on need (implementation of extreme materialism and 
technicism by Bolshevism; introduction of four-year plans; usefulness for 
political education). In all of this, science is everywhere the same and 
becomes, precisely with these various goal-settings, basically and 
increasingly more uniform, i.e., more "international" .60 
By placing "a folkish science" (»eine volkische Wissenschaft«) in quotation marks, 
Heidegger indicates that the term is not to be taken at face value. In disregard of the 
National Socialist antithesis of "liberal" and "folkish", a "folkish" science is here said to 
be, at bottom, a modern science. Expediency for the Volk (expressed in the slogan, 
"Wahr ist, was dem Volke ntitzt") is only possible on the provision that the Volk has 
assumed the cast of the Cartesian subject and thus stands in an ontic opposition to that 
which is to be manipulated and exploited. By prioritising mathematical procedure over 
the matter of thought and certainty over the ecstatic truth of beings, Descartes flattened 
the phenonenon of world to what could be wielded in the service of the needs of the 
moment. The "politicisation" of science under National Socialism only made science 
still more liberal, because its subordination to the "good" of the Volk necessitated the 
hardening of the subjective, de-worlded, and hence cosmopolitan, starting point of 
modern science. In spite of its polemics against liberalism, National Socialism retained 
the place of the individual in science and saw to it that it was occupied by the people. 
The modern identity of expediency and science, which had come under threat in the 
demythologisation of the subject, was to be shored up by sheer weight of numbers. 
Through its notion of the people, National Socialism unwittingly revealed itself to be 
liberalism's response to its critics. 61 
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When, in the 1942-3 lecture course Parmenides, Heidegger dismisses the 
antithesis of Volk and individual, he thereby repeats a gesture from Being and Time but in 
order to deliver the Volk up at once to liberalism: 
The concepts of "people" [die Volkheit] and "folk" [das Volkische] are 
founded on the essence of subjectivity and Ego. Only when metaphysics, 
i.e., the truth of beings as a whole, has been founded on subjectivity and 
the Ego do the concepts of "nation" and "people" obtain that metaphysical 
foundation from which they might possibly have historical relevance. 
Without Descartes, i.e., without the metaphysical foundation of 
subjectivity, Herder, i.e., the foundation of the concept of a people [die 
Grundung der Volkheit der Volker], cannot be thought. Whether one can 
retrospectively establish historiographical relations between these two is a 
matter of indifference, since historiographical relations are always only the 
fac;ade, and for the most part the concealing fac;ade, of historical nexuses. 
As long as we know with insufficient clarity the proper essence of 
subjectivity as the modem form of selfhood, we are prey to the error of 
thinking that the elimination of individualism and of the domination of the 
individual is ipso facto an overcoming of subjectivity.62 
In this passage the Volk is seen to rest on the subject rather than to stand in opposition to 
the metaphysics of Seinsvergessenheit. Is Heidegger therefore criticising his earlier 
definition of Volk? It seems unlikely given that in Being and Time the individualism 
satirized in the chapter on the "they" does not make room for a Volk still determined by 
the self-identity of the modem subject. The Volk that apprehends itself in its certainty as 
a self is much more the Volk of National Socialism with its conviction of its oneness and 
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distinctness. Without a comprehension of the essence of subjectivity, the transition from 
the subject to the Volk, a transition which Heidegger defends in Being and Time and 
which he believes he later greets in the National Socialist revolution, runs the risk of 
being frustrated in a reconfiguration of the self. The subjectivity of the subject, and of a 
people, is the inability to suspect the certainty of the self and to question the givenness of 
beings, i.e. both their own givenness and that of the beings always already understood to 
be manipulable. 
The subject that can never think past its certainty to an interrogation of the 
undecidability of the transcendence that "grounds" the subject-object binary is replicated 
in the "nation" that defines itself by its "nature", by the positivity into which it was born. 
Dwelling on the common etymology of "nation" and "nature", Heidegger implicitly 
offers a restatement of his own understanding of Volk in the negations of the 1945 
dialogue "Evening Conversation between a Younger and an Older Prisoner of War in a 
Camp in Russia": 
THE ELDER: Nationality is nothing other than the pure subjectivity of a 
people that refers itself to its "nature" as the real from which all 
activity proceeds and to which it is to return. 
THE YOUNGER: Subjectivity has its essence in the uprising of the 
human being, the individuals, groups and peoples [Menschentilmer] 
in order to position themselves on themselves and to assert 
themselves as the ground and measure of the real. With this uprising 
to subjectivity the uprising to work, as that form of production 
through which the desolation of the earth is everywhere prepared and 
destined finally for the illimitable, has its source.63 
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A nation is here defined by its being subordinate to its own givenness, which is, for it, 
what is "natural" and thus self-evident. The subjectivity of a nation is this very certainty 
of itself from which it proceeds to impose itself on all things as their measure. Asserting 
itself as a self in its presence, and not as a people in its historicality, a nation rises up in 
work because it is in the spectacle of its own effect in the manipulation of the present-at-
hand that the nation assures itself of its own presence. The nation therefore works against 
itself as a people. It prepares the desolation of the earth by reducing everything to the 
present-at-hand. Work's greatest effect is negative and lies in a suppression of the 
question of Being. A people cannot come to itself in work. In its positivity, a nation is 
universally recognisable and thus essentially cosmopolitan. Internationalism, for 
Heidegger, is not the overcoming of nationalism. The nation is international out of its 
stolidity and torpor with regard to the question of Being; more precisely, the international 
itself is this stolidity and torpor: "The national and the international are the same".64 In 
the "Letter on 'Humanism"' Heidegger similarly writes: 
Every nationalism is metaphysically an anthropologism and as such 
subjectivism. Nationalism is not overcome through mere internationalism, 
it is rather expanded and elevated thereby into a system.65 
Presumably internationalism is the systematisation of nationalism because it transforms 
the anomaly of the single nation into the regularity of nations in the plural. The nation is 
confirmed in the recognition of other nations and whether it pursues a nationalism of 
either territorial expansion or "peaceful" economic development is irrelevant in the face 
of the neglect of the question of Being. Where Heidegger radicalizes the distinction 
drawn by Humboldt and others during the Wars of Liberation between "Volk" and 
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"Nation", National Socialism, for all its hostility towards the Latinate, was thwarted by 
the positivity of its racial conceptions in its attempt to think the "Volk" as anything other 
than a "Nation". 
In Nietzsche, Heidegger even suggests that National Socialism was much more 
the consummation of Cartesian metaphysics than a disavowal of French models. 
Subjectivity, on which the regime imagined it had turned its back through its supposedly 
anti-liberal immersion in biology, nonetheless informed its racial theories: 
Only where the absolute subjectivity of will to power comes to be the truth 
of beings as a whole is the principle of a program of racial breeding 
possible; possible, that is, not merely on the basis of continually evolving 
races, but in terms of the self-conscious thought of race. That is to say, the 
principle is metaphysically necessary.66 
The subjectivity that, with Nietzsche, becomes absolute is the sine qua non of eugenics. 
The absoluteness of this subjectivity is the absoluteness with which it is confronted by the 
present-at-hand in the final suppression of world. Everything has been submitted to the 
will to power and become an object to its subject. In the reification that has been carried 
as far as eugenics, subjectivity witnesses both its triumph as a determining principle of 
beings and its liquidation as humanity's distance from the thingly. Eugenics is thus more 
the science of a Nation than of Heidegger's Volk. In 1933 a volkische Wissenschaft is, for 
Heidegger, arguably that politicisation of science by which the reification initiated by 
classical ontology, and perpetuated by Descartes in the grounding of the metaphysics of 
subjectity, would be exposed to the task of destruction. 
To repeat: what Heidegger holds against National Socialism is its liberalism. The 
exceptional character of this objection has frequently entailed its summary dismissal.67 In 
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Adorno' s view, for instance, Heidegger never ceased to be a Nazi. And, indeed, on the 
basis of Heidegger' s comments concerning "the inner truth and greatness of this 
movement", it could be claimed that, in the context of his post-war reticence about the 
regime, his sole reproach against National Socialism was that it did not live up to 
expectations. For Heidegger, the NSDAP had turned out to be nothing but Cartesianism 
for the masses. The movement was too Herderian, which is to say, too Cartesian, to think 
the notion of the Volk through to the other ontology that would have been the fulfilment 
of its "folkish" promise. While F. M. Barnard disputes any connection between Herder 
and National Socialism on the grounds of the former's liberalism68, it is in liberalism that 
the Heidegger of the Contributions to Philosophy discerns the basis for the subordination 
of science to the "good" of the people. Evading an interrogation of the subjectivity of the 
subject, National Socialism remained dependent on Herder's own derivative formulation 
of the "Volkheit der Volker" and can thus be said to have been a monstrous relic of the 
Enlightenment. The movement did not spring from the sleep of reason but rather from 
the rationalism that would allow nothing to remain outside its light. At the expense of an 
understanding of world, it endeavoured to capture the essence of a people in the clarity of 
presence and thereby in the ontology of the present-at-hand. Certainly a biologistic 
conception of humanity cannot be discovered in Herder, yet with his thesis of the equality 
of peoples, he advances the notion of their commensurability and thus paves the way for 
the judgement passed upon them in the Nazi hierarchy of races. Herder's liberalism is a 
cosmopolitanism that sees beyond differences. The equality of peoples that he proposes, 
in his essay "Von Ahnlichkeit der mittleren englischen und deutschen Dichtkunst", as a 
principle for historiography, is more than simply contemporaneous with the equality of 
individuals found in the French Revolution. What the latter constitutes on the national 
level, Herder's principle constitutes on the global. Herder's open-mindedness toward 
other peoples, regardless how incompatible it is in many respects with National 
Socialism, is likewise a repression of what is specific to a people and thus of a people 
itself. For the sake of commensurability, Herder turns aside from the historicality of a 
people, and thereby from the inappropriateness of the universal to this historicality. 
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The essence of a people is, for Herder, its "humanity". This is evident in his 
conception of language. In the prize essay "Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache" Herder 
impoverishes the phenomenon of language to an unadduced common grammar in order to 
emphasise its planetary unity. The animal rationale is the planetary, and yet worldless, 
animal: it enunciates its distinctness from all the endemic species through the language 
that is declared to be only superficially differentiated by climate, terrain, diet and so 
forth. Herder thus acknowledges the differences between peoples merely so as to stage 
their disappearance in the ideal of humanity. Language becomes the universal under 
which the various peoples are subsumed. A people thereby ceases to speak as a people in 
its finitude and worldliness, because it always speaks away from itself and its historicality 
to the a-historical generality of its humanity. In rising above its world to its humanity, a 
people acquires an essence that is its transhistorical recognisability and, with this 
reformulation in eternity, it forfeits the chance to challenge the understanding of Being as 
presence and thereby to think its own Being. In contrast to Herder's language of 
humanity, Heidegger emphasises a language of the world of a people. In the 1934 lecture 
course Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, Heidegger writes of 
language: "Language is the sway of the world-shaping and preserving centre of the 
historical Dasein of the people."69 A people speaks as a people by speaking within the 
thought of its world and it is by this "inhumanity" that it musters the greatest opposition 
to the liberalism of the Nazi doctrine of race. 
"Nazism is a humanism."70 This sentence of Lacoue-Labarthe's faithfully 
condenses Heidegger' s account of the movement's degeneration and disaster. For 
Heidegger, the master race of National Socialism was defeated by its own liberalism long 
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before this defeat was revived as farce and referred to the overwhelming military, 
economic and technical superiority of its opponents. The expansionism that was the 
occasion of this secondary defeat was the regime's grotesque reprise of the ideal of 
humanity and the commensurability of peoples. The master race became the planetary 
animal, and its confrontation with other peoples had less to do with the self-questioning 
of authentic understanding of one another than with the self-confirmation of its positivity. 
German imperialism had always deliberately set itself apart from the specious altruism of 
the bearers of civilisation. But the egotism that Wilhelmine Germany expressed in its 
colonialist watchword "A place in the sun", and to whose exclusive satisfaction the Third 
Reich consigned the conquered territories, did not distance the German people from the 
ideal of humanity in any fundamental sense: the people, impossible to ignore in the 
saturnalia of its gluttony and terror, is not the Volk in Heidegger's formulation, but rather 
the aggrandised subject of liberalism. The catastrophe of National Socialism, as it is 
interpreted in Heidegger' s writings from the latter years of the regime, was this stillbirth 
of the people of the question of Being. A people's self-assertion can never be 
comparable with the self-assertion of the worldlessness of egotism. 
If Heidegger' s objection to National Socialism is that it was too liberal, then it 
may seem that he positions himself thereby to the right of the Far Right. The 
persuasiveness of such an appearance has led to a neglect of the similarities between 
Heidegger' s notion of the Volk and, for instance, Deleuze and Guattari' s notion of le 
peuple a venir and thus to the misapprehension that Heidegger' s Volk is of no importance 
for anything other than a reactionary politics. Indeed Deleuze and Guattari themselves 
overlook the similarities. In Qu 'est-ce que la philosophie? (whose title inevitably recalls 
the lecture "Was ist das, die Philosophie?" that in August 1955 Heidegger delivered to 
the colloquium in Cerisy-la-Salle at which Deleuze was a participant71), Deleuze and 
Guattari reject Heidegger's Volk in favour of minorities: 
/ 
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He got the wrong people, earth, and blood. For the race summoned forth 
by art or philosophy is not one that claims to be pure but rather an 
oppressed, bastard, lower, anarchical, nomadic, and irremediably minor 
race.72 
It must be asked whether Deleuze and Guattari, given their thesis in Anti-Oedipus 
concerning the fascism of the exclusive disjunction, can allow their notion of a bastard 
race to stand forth as clearly as this from Heidegger's people. Admitting that "it is not 
always easy to be Heideggerian"73, Deleuze and Guattari appear, however, to 
acknowledge the defensive character of their distinction. Heidegger's people, which in 
the lectures on Holderlin is summoned forth by poetry, and which, in Being and Time, is 
defined less by purity than by the impurity of its transcendence in co-historizing, is too 
unsettling a precursor. And it is unsettling because, in its impurity, it could not keep 
itself clear even of the people of the most fanatical purity of blood. The transcendence of 
Heidegger's Volk does not come to a halt before the NSDAP. Rather than confronting 
the new regime with a simple negation, Heidegger set about effecting a contamination 
between its notion of the people and his own. In terms of an immediate resistance to 
National Socialism, this was to do nothing, and whatever pe~secution Heidegger claims 
he suffered after resigning the rectorship is unmentionably trivial in comparison with the 
measures that the regime was all too willing to take against millions of others. The 
nimbus of philosophical integrity with which Heidegger sought to invest questioning as 
such is dispelled by the fellow traveller's question of 1933. 
Heidegger got it wrong, but, as Deleuze and Guattari concede, it is ultimately not 
a matter of getting it right or wrong: "Heidegger lost his way along the paths of the 
reterritorialization because they are paths without directive signs or barriers."74 
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Heidegger' s engagement is not excused, but explained, by the lack of models, and that is 
to say it is negatively explained in this way. Given the arguments against a biologistic 
conception of humanity that can be drawn from Heidegger' s own writings, his 
engagement is less to be understood in terms of a subscription to the model of National 
Socialism, than as a blind spot in the interpretability of his corpus. And if the 
Heideggerian corpus does not function as an endorsement of National Socialism, the 
inexcusability of Heidegger' s engagement, even in terms of his own thinking, functions 
to bring forth the inconsistency that prevents Heidegger' s thought from congealing into a 
model. Stupidity, instead of mystery, is what renders this thought indeterminate. The 
scandal of the rectorship scarcely serves to advertise the lack of models as a model in its 
tum. Heidegger' s self-confessed "greatest stupidity of his life"75 is the moment of his 
greatest failure as a thinker and yet, with this failure, Heidegger' s thought attains, as well 
as falls prey to, the radical questionability that would otherwise have been denied it. _The 
inconsistency between Heidegger's engagement with Nazism and his conception of 
humanity works against any attribution of coherence to his writings and thus against any 
claim to decide the sense of a given proposition in these writings by recourse to the 
coherence of the whole. Wanting to explain Heidegger's engagement, rather than to 
excuse it, Deleuze and Guattari comment: 
How could Heidegger' s concepts not be intrinsically sullied by an abject 
reterritorialization? Unless all concepts include this gray zone and 
indiscemibility where for a moment the combatants on the ground are 
confused, and the thinker's tired eye mistakes one thing for the other -
not only the German for a Greek but the fascist for a creator of existence 
and freedom. 76 
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For Deleuze and Guattari, the stain of Heidegger' s thinking is not so much unique as 
exemplary of the tiredness to which the thinker succumbs. But what is really explained 
by this physiological metaphor? Is an inevitability being attributed to Heidegger's 
engagement with the implicit reference to the inevitability of tiredness? And how does 
the tiredness that confuses the German and the Greek, the fascist and the creator of 
existence, differ from the joyful becoming that, for Deleuze and Guattari, is the transitive 
indeterminacy between polar identities? Interpreting Heidegger's engagement with 
reference to the inevitability of tiredness, Deleuze and Guattari excuse more than they 
explain and, by excusing, forego an attempt to explain Heidegger' s unsettling 
consanguinity. Heidegger's people in 1933 is a minority in Deleuze and Guattari's sense, 
because it does not come to itself. It is a minority because it can find itself neither in the 
present-at-hand people of a self-assertion of the national nor in the people that finds itself 
precisely in not finding itself. It is tom between a political and cultural nationalism. To 
clarify a non-positivistic notion Of the people, in explicit contradistinction to the 
biologistic Rassenkunde of the regime, can illuminate Heidegger' s own notion of the 
people in 1933 only to the extent that it establishes the terms of its confusion, which is to 
say, the terms of its transcendence. Within this confusion the minority of the Germans, 
both political and cultural, is prolonged. In the minority by which it overreaches the 
present-at-hand, the Volk touches uncannily on the Un-thought of metaphysics: Being is 
minoritarian. 
Was Heidegger's political engagement less an engagement with the self-assertion 
of the German people in 1933 than with the self-defeating stupidity of this self-assertion? 
How, if at all, can the two be distinguished? Deleuze and Guattari consider the 
possibility that Heidegger' s abdication before Hitler was still a philosophical move: 
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A great philosopher actually had to be reterritorialized on Nazism for the 
strangest commentaries to meet up, sometimes calling his philosophy into 
question and sometimes absolving it through such complicated and 
convoluted arguments that we are still in the dark.77 
Heidegger was reterritorialized on Nazism in the name, as it were, of the ambiguity and 
impurity of the people. That Deleuze and Guattari speak of Jews, gypsies and blacks in 
their treatments of the notion of a people, whereas Heidegger speaks of the Germans, 
ought not to conceal that it is the status of an ontological exception that comparably 
inspires these treatments. The people is missing whether it is in the works of Kafka and 
Rocha or in the Germany of Heidegger's National Socialism. In his reflections on 
minoritarian cinema, Deleuze writes: "The people exist only in the condition of minority, 
which is why they are missing."78 For Deleuze and Guattari, a people is always a 
minority because it defines itself by its inability to seize control of the State apparatus. It 
is too volatile to rally itself for the subjectity of the State, or even that of the republic of 
letters. This ontological volatility and undecidability is not the defect of a minority, but 
its essence, since a minority only acquires an identity through the frustrations, failures 
and deviations of its flight from the majority, either submitting to an alien characterology 
or fabricating its own in servility to extant models. A people, in Deleuze and Guattari's 
sense as in Heidegger' s, is a rupture of the identifiable. 
Heidegger' s "error", and its vertiginous ambivalence, was that he sought to effect 
the rupture at issue here by means of the State. Drawing their definitions of the State and 
the people from archaeological and ethnological descriptions of the despotic formations 
of Asia and the nomadic tribes intermittently breaking from them, Deleuze and Guattari 
shield themselves from a repetition of Heidegger's engagement. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, the State is fundamentally "capture" and a people is fundamentally "rupture". 
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In 1934, when any poorly specified opposition to "the Asiatic" could have been 
understood as an invitation to racism, Heidegger writes of the common enemy and task of 
the people and the European state: 
A state is only inasmuch as it becomes, as it turns into the historical Being 
of that being which is called a people. The true historical freedom of the 
peoples of Europe is after all the precondition for the West's coming once 
more to itself spiritually-historically and for its taking possession of its 
fate in the great decision of the earth against the Asiatic.79 
What is the Asiatic here that it composes a party in the decision of the earth? An answer 
that fails completely to make sense of the above quotation, but rather shows up its 
absurdity, is given twenty-five years later in Heidegger's critique, in "Holderlin's Earth 
and Heaven", of Valery' s assessment of the future of Europe: 
Immediately after the First World War (1919), Paul Valery published a 
letter under the title, "The Crisis of the Spirit". In it he poses two 
questions: 
This Europe, will it become what it is in reality (en realite), that is, 
a small cape of the asiatic continent? Or will this Europe, rather, 
remain as what it appears to be (ce qu'elle paraft), that is, the 
precious part of the whole earth, the pearl of the globe, the brain of 
a spacious body? 
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Perhaps Europe has already become what it is: a mere cape, yet as 
such, also the brain of the entire terrestrial body, the brain that manages 
the technological-industrial, planetary-interstellar calculation. 80 
Valery distinguishes from Asia a Europe that has assumed the office of planetary brain, 
whereas, for Heidegger in 1959, it is the assumption of this very office that recovers 
Europe for Asia. If Europe's position of global dominance belittles it by turning it into 
an appendage on the Asian continent, it is because an equation of the Asiatic and the 
hegemonic is implied in Heidegger' s text. However problematic this equation may be, it 
cannot be denied its longstanding mythic function in identifying the philosophical and 
political space known as Europe: coming to itself in Greece, in its twofold break with 
Eastern dogmatism and despotism, Europe has, by definition, always already succumbed 
to the temptation to absolutise its difference from Asia. Querying the absoluteness of this 
difference in 1959, Heidegger effectively queries whether the Volkerwanderung was 
anything more than an expedition of Asian colonialism. But, in 1934, it is a matter of 
securing the absoluteness of the difference. Allegedly at the service of this difference the 
state becomes the historical Being of a people. Yet the state that relinquishes its 
dominion over a people in order to become this people itself does not abjure the principle 
of the "Asiatic", since the struggle against the "Asiatic" is, in the despotism and 
dogmatism of its exclusive disjunction, a struggle within the "Asiatic" for the 
determination of the entities of its control. Having to think its ownness other than by the 
identifiable and controllable, Europe must reassess its stand on the pairing of authenticity 
and idiocy. Europe, if it is to be Europe, cannot risk becoming more than a phantasm, 
more than a site of undecidability beyond an unspecifiable river or mountain range. 
Europe as Europe cannot be defended. But is the absurdity in which the 1959 text reveals 
the text of 1934 not one of those absolutions that Deleuze and Guattari believe traverse 
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Heidegger's political engagement? Is it in the very absurdity of the struggle against the 
"Asiatic" to which Heidegger rallies the peoples of Europe that Europe as such unfolds 
its absolute difference from despotism? Everything becomes grey in the abyss of 
stupidity. 
Heidegger's hymns to the National Socialist state are too crass in comparison with 
his thinking as a whole for these texts not to arouse the suspicion that here the state is the 
object of a sombre, ignominious humour. In a speech delivered in August 1934, and thus 
after the resignation of the rectorship of Freiburg University, Heidegger appears to 
"forget" his authorship of Being and Time: 
The essence of the National Socialist revolution consists in the fact that 
Adolf Hitler has elevated that new spirit of the community to being the 
formative power of a new configuration of the people. The National 
Socialist revolution is thus not the superficial appropriation of the power 
of a state already in place by a party grown equal to the task but rather the 
inner re-education of the entire people towards the goal of wanting its own 
unity and oneness. Inasmuch as the people wills its own vocation, it 
recognizes the new state. The rule of this state is the responsible 
implementation of that commanding will to which the dedicated trust of 
the people empowers the leadership. The state is not a mechanical 
apparatus of law alongside the institutions of the economy, art, science 
and religion. On the contrary, the state signifies the living configuration 
pervaded by alternate trust and responsibility in which and through which 
the people realises its own historical Dasein. 81 
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Can a people, as authentic Being-with-one-another, want, without contradiction, its own 
unity and oneness? What could be the ontological basis for the unity and oneness of a 
people? Heidegger' s address makes no pretensions to an existential analytic: the people 
simply wills its own oneness.82 Recognition of the state follows upon this manipulated 
caprice of the people, and the metaphysics of subjectity in the cast of the people's 
oneness is perpetuated. Those relations between a people and its sovereign that Hobbes 
sees as a response to the violence of the state of nature, are here, for Heidegger, the 
consequence of a bluntly posited education and will. Indeed, Heidegger's address reads 
as a pastiche of Hobbes. The people whose unity Hobbes in Leviathan sees represented 
in the corporeal singleness of its sovereign83, and whose acceptance of a sovereign 
defines it in De Cive in distinction from a multitude84, is shadowed by a people for whom 
the realities of the English Civil War have been replaced by the tabula rasa of nihilistic 
voluntarism. Having dispensed with the externality of circumstances, and thus with the 
measure that they constitute in Hobbes, Heidegger, in 1933, is able to say of Hitler: "The 
Fiihrer himself and alone is the present and future German reality and its law."85 This 
proposition with its unqualified abasement before despotism, like the critique of Valery 
in 1959, declares the complete bankruptcy of the myth of Europe. Heidegger' s obeisance 
to Hitler marks the death of philosophy because it reverses the substitution of another 
ground than that of authority by which Hegel, for one, and with explicit awareness of the 
conventionality of the definition, defines philosophy in his lectures on its history.86 This 
reversal is in itself the death of Europe. The death of philosophy, of that which, in his 
What is Philosophy?, Heidegger says it is a tautology to call "Western"87, is nonetheless 
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what the necessarily phantasmic character of philosophy presupposes. The Europe that 
dies in 1933 is the Europe that, in the substantiality of its absolute difference from Asia, 
never existed as other than an Asian peninsula. Foundational to the identity of that which 
has escaped the despotic, the myth of Europe would only itself be European if it forewent 
74 
the capture and determination proper to the "Asiatic". The struggle against the "Asiatic" 
thus entails a struggle against the myth of Europe and where Heidegger rallies the 
European states against the "Asiatic", and at the same time preaches unquestioning 
submission to Hitler, it is the myth of Europe that yields. Heidegger, accordingly, makes 
of the state a means to rupture the identity of Europe. 
What must, but cannot, be rescued in Heidegger' s abasement before Hitler is this 
rupture. The intoxicated and unreserved acquiescence to dictatorship is inseparable from 
the suspicion of the contradictory reterritorialisation of European identity and yet cannot 
be vindicated by it. And that it cannot be vindicated by it is because this acquiescence 
raises the question as such, as the proper-improper site of Europe's difference from 
dogmatism, first of all against itself. Heidegger' s people is, and is not, the people of 
National Socialism. It is the people of National Socialism because it is the people that 
National Socialism courted through its promise to break with the despotism of the . 
cosmopolitan and the universal. And it is not the people of National Socialism because 
this promise was reneged. The distance of Heidegger' s Volk from the movement as well 
as its insuperable proximity lies in its ideality for the movement. The people that 
National Socialism courted as the self-assertion of the European essence is, in its truth as 
the question as such, the critical destruction of the Hitlerian dictatorship. This people 
always escapes despotism because as the phenomenon of world it is never simply a 
determinate being for manipulation and control. Heidegger's acquiescence to National 
Socialism was thus an acquiescence to a despotism grounding itself in the people of its 
own impossibility. The ambivalence of Heidegger's engagement is the ambivalence of 
National Socialism itself. What for Heidegger, in 1953, has not ceased to constitute the 
inner truth and greatness of the movement is the latter's own impossibility, since it is the 
same impossibility by which the manipulation of beings in technicism is confronted with 
its limitations and brought to a recollection of Being. If not National Socialism, so much 
as its impossibility, is what is equal to the encounter with 'tEXVll, then Heidegger's 
following remark from the interview with Der Spiegel is not a retraction of his 
clarificatory parenthesis in An Introduction to Metaphysics: 
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A decisive question for me today is: how can a political system 
accommodate itself to the technological age, and which political system 
would this be? I have no answer to this question. I am not convinced that 
it is democracy. 88 
Democracy here is not being denied as an option alongside other political systems - as 
though in the past Heidegger was convinced of the adequacy to the technical age of a 
given political system. Arguably, for Heidegger, National Socialism was not one 
political system among others. The undecidable excess of his engagement lies in its 
being an engagement with the political per se. It is the Volk in its irreducibility to 
reification, rather than any one political system, that is equal to the encounter with 'tEXVll. 
To the extent that a political system gives itself up to its differentiation from other 
political systems and thereby neglects the essential indeterminacy of the people, to that 
extent it is unequal to this encounter. Consumed with their differences from one another, 
liberalism and despotism are fundamentally the same in their neglect of the people. 
Heidegger' s rejection of democracy is inextricable from his attempt to think the people as 
such. Democracy, which for Kant is an oxymoron89, is for Heidegger a debasement of 
the people's transcendent finitude, a debasement that reduces it to the universal by which 
a people exerts authority over, and in spite of, the political domain. 
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I The Death of Hegel 
When Heidegger in §74 of Being and Time introduces the word "Volk", it is in the 
course of an exposition of the essential historicality of Dasein. This historicality, as 
he claims in the same section, has its ground in finitude: "Authentic Being-towards-
death - that is to say, the finitude of temporality - is the hidden basis of Dasein 's 
historicality."1 Here Dasein is said to be historical, not because of any participation 
in the events of a people's public life, but rather because of its finitude. In its 
authentic Being-towards-death, Dasein is already historical and thus, for Heidegger, 
already the historizing of the Volk. Situating the ground of historicality infinitude, 
and mentioning the Volk only to define its historizing by the destiny of Dasein, 
Heidegger aligns the people with the question of death. The people can rise up as a 
people only in and for its finitude; it does not face its death in order to overcome it, 
but on the contrary to run towards it and to think the temporality of this anticipation 
and of the Being thereby revealed as its own in its irreducibility to presence. 
From Being and Time Heidegger took into his engagement with National 
Socialism a grotesquely sophisticated receptiveness to its initially rhetorical calls for 
self-sacrifice. And he did so not out of simple ingenuousness. Having brought all his 
perspicacity to bear on the confrontation with Hegel over the question of death, 
Heidegger conceived a response to He~el that is not a response to National Socialism. 
The task of an Auseinandersetzung with Hegel, announced in the final sentence of his 
postdoctoral dissertation2, in the earliest extant notes of one of his lecture courses3, 
and then addressed throughout his entire corpus, did not prevent Heidegger from 
ostensibly emulating his "great adversary"4 in making his way to the State. In this 
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respect, Heidegger's reaction to Hegel could not be more different from either Marx's 
or Nietzsche's. Without ever elaborating a philosophy of the State, Heidegger will 
have become a State thinker. But a State thinker in what sense? Referring to 30 
January 1933, the date of Hitler's installation in power, Carl Schmitt writes: "On this 
day therefore one can say that 'Hegel died' ."5 Yet where Schmitt merely wanted to 
note the politicisation of the German bureaucracy, it is arguable that, for Heidegger, 
the National Socialist revolution signified much more than the abandonment of one 
facet of the Philosophy of Right. Hegel's "death", as the determinative negativity of 
the logic of Absolute Spirit, was itself to die in yielding to the State of the people of 
finitude. 
In order to ascertain the philosophical foundations of the understanding of the 
State in Heidegger's engagement with National Socialism, it is necessary to review 
Heidegger's objection to Hegel's assimilation of death and human finitude to an 
ultima~ely still conventional logic. As a result of this assimilation, the Hegelian State 
remains indifferent to the essence of Dasein. The famous passage on death from the 
Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit reads: 
The activity of dissolution is the power and work of the Understanding, 
the most astonishing and mightiest of powers, or rather the absolute 
power. The circle that remains self-enclosed and, like substance, holds 
its moments together, is an immediate relationship, one therefore 
which has nothing astonishing about it. But that an accident as such, 
detached from what circumscribes it, what is bound and is actual only 
in its context with others, should attain an existence of its own and a 
separate freedom - this is the tremendous power of the negative; it is 
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the energy of thought, of the pure 'I'. Death, if that is what we want to 
call this non-actuality, is of all things the most dreadful, and to hold 
fast what is dead requires the greatest strength. Lacking strength, 
Beauty hates the Understanding for asking of her what she cannot do. 
But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps 
itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and 
maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter 
dismemberment, it finds itself. It is this power, not as something 
positive, which closes its eyes to the negative, as when we say of 
something that it is nothing or is false, and then, having done with it, 
tum away and pass on to something else; on the contrary, Spirit is this 
power only by looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it. 
This tarrying with the negative is the magical power that converts it 
into being. This power is identical with what we earlier called the 
Subject, which by giving determinateness an existence in its own 
element supersedes abstract immediacy, i.e. the immediacy which 
barely is, and thus is authentic substance: that being or immediacy 
whose mediation is not outside of it but which is this mediation itself.6 
Death, for Hegel, is simply another name for the negative. Hegel does not spell out 
why death should be simply another name for the negative; he does not press the 
synonymity, but rather admits, in a subordinate clause, to its arbitrariness ("if that is 
what we want to call this non-actuality"). And yet this arbitrariness is far from 
denoting a relaxation in the philosophical rigour of Hegel' s text. Hegel imposes a 
sense on death only after death has been stripped of meaning by the very starting 
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point of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel' s pure ego, whose experience of its own 
consciousness is set forth in this work, cannot die because it is nothing other than 
Thought. In the above passage, Hegel clarifies almost at once that the purity of this 
ego is not the distance at which the life of the Spirit preserves itself from devastation. 
Death, in such a case, would retain its meaning for the pure ego in the form of a threat 
and a determinative opposite. Death cannot menace the ego that, as the thinkability 
of the thinkable, is the thought, and hence the rationality and sublation, of its own 
death. What in death is unthinkable is, for Hegel, merely a hypochondriac's fancy 
and the consequence of a refusal to think death. In its thinkability, death is not the 
extrinsic limit of thought, but rather one of its moments. It is identified with 
thought's own power of delimitation and hence with that which Hegel calls the 
Understanding. Hegel' s pure ego cannot die because it is already death itself, and it 
is thus as already torn apart that it finds itself. The pure ego comes to itself only in 
and as the limits along which the positive is sundered into individual entities. 
According to Hegel, the pure ego is not so much finite as finitude, since it is the 
negation by which all other entities are contained. As the finitude of what is, the 
Hegelian pure ego is the subject in both its ancient and modern senses. It is the 
subject that, as Aristotle's substance, stands outside determination and gives 
existence to the determinate, and it is the subject that, as thought, stands outside 
determination only because it is itself the power of determination. In the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Being is already Nothing since the existence (i.e. the 
Kantian irreducibility of what is to a set of determinations) that the subject bestows is 
the non-positivity of the determining negation. Hegel thus grasps the difference of 
Being from beings in the differentiation effected by negativity - thus in Spinoza's 
equation of determination and negation. With a provocative similarity to the thesis of 
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Being and Time, the truth of the Being that Aristotle thinks as substance is seen to lie 
in finitude. 
In response to Hegel's definition of the "I" as not merely finite but as finitude 
itself, Heidegger will ask whether, in this apotheosis of finitude, the genuine question 
of death is notwithstanding neglected. Heidegger' s exposition of death is informed 
by the question of Being. The polemic against Hegel enunciated in this treatment is 
hence trivialised if it is formulated as the opposition of a realist's account of death to 
a logician's account. Heidegger does not restore death as a possibility of the "I" 
simply out of fidelity to appearances. Indeed, adequacy cannot be the criterion 
because adequacy itself must first be grounded. And it is precisely such a grounding 
of the correspondence between an account and its object that Heidegger attempts in 
his analysis of the being-outside-of-itself of Dasein's Being-towards-death. The 
traditional understanding of truth as adequation is made an affair of the transcendence 
of Dasein. When Heidegger reproaches Hegel' s presentation of death with a lack of 
seriousness, he is therefore not suggesting that Hegel' s death is a simulacrum: 
Negativity as dismemberment and division is "death" - the absolute 
Lord; and "life of absolute Spirit" means nothing other than to bear 
death and see it through. (But with this "death" it can never become 
serious; no XCftCXO"tpoq:>r\ possible, no fall and overthrow possible; 
everything offset and evened out. Everything is already 
unconditionally secured and accommodated.)7 
Hegel's death is never in earnest, not because it is a counterfeit of death, but because 
it is not a catastrophe. The seriousness of death is, for Heidegger, its character as 
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catastrophe. But a catastrophe for whom? Hegel's death is not a catastrophe and 
cannot overthrow the pure ego, since it has always already been appropriated and 
reconciled. The pure ego is, by definition, that which cannot be overthrown. In its 
position of power over everything that is, the pure ego is not subject to any external 
fate. It is in no instance simply the patient of a verb. Desiring a catastrophe that is an 
event and not the element in which Spirit finds itself in being torn apart, Heidegger 
conceives the human being as patient, rather than as agent. In contrast to the 
permanent and thus feigned catastrophe of the death that is the self-certainty of the 
pure ego, Dasein is that which can suffer death as an event, and hence in its 
seriousness as downfall. Heidegger even makes of this possibility of suffering death 
the distinguishing mark of Dasein and, by the terms of the understanding of the 
human in Hegel's philosophy, he thereby dehumanises Dasein. 
For Hegel, it is Nature alone that can die and it must die in order for Spirit to 
realise itself. In the Zusatz to §376 of the Encyclopaedia, Hegel writes: 
The goal of Nature is to destroy itself and to break through its husk of 
immediate, sensuous existence, to consume itself like the phoenix in 
order to come forth from this extemality rejuvenated as spirit. 8 
Death is accordingly the event that befalls that which is not yet Spirit. In §375 Hegel 
portrays death as the inevitable lot of the animal: 
The universality which makes the animal, as a singular, a.finite 
existence, reveals itself in it as the abstract power which terminates the 
internal process active within the animal, a process which is itself 
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abstract. The ~isparity between its finitude and universality is its 
original disease and the inborn germ of death, and the removal of this 
disparity is itself the accomplishment of this destiny.9 
The animal thus dies because in its inadequacy to the universal it is able to die. 
Given that death has always already been overtaken by the self-consciousness of 
Spirit in which Hegel sees the essence of the human, when a human being dies it is 
therefore never as a human being: in the Zusatz to the preceding section, Hegel 
speaks of the physiological aspects of old age as a return to a simply vegetative life. 10 
In its adequacy to the universal, the human being is relieved of his or her mortality, 
which is to say, of a susceptibility to catastrophe. Nothing can ever happen purely to 
it, and it must therefore extract from itself its understanding of time. Time, for Hegel, 
takes its definition from Spirit. It is nothing other than Spirit's partial comprehension 
of itself. Insisting on death as an essential possibility of Dasein and denouncing the 
assimilation of catastrophe as simply a means to have done with the question of 
mortality, Heidegger seeks to contest the sublation of time in the immanent 
movement of the concept. Heidegger' s account of the human being as an entity 
delivered up defenceless to its own mortality is not dictated by pessimism or 
decadence. What is at stake for Heidegger is neither brute "fact" nor an aesthetic, but 
rather a critique of metaphysics on the foundation of a more originary understanding 
of time. Dasein must die, so that with its very frailty it might wrest the question of 
Being from the deficient seriousness of the logic of what is only ever present. 
Heidegger' s exposition of the catastrophic character of death cannot be 
comprehended apart from Hegel' s exposition of the conceptuality, and hence ultimate 
stasis, of time. On the strength of this exposition, of the panlogism that has 
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reappropriated the non-conceptuality of Kant' s a priori intuitions, Hegel is able to 
assert that finitude is, in truth, Spirit. Heidegger will not challenge this assertion 
merely to reinstate time in its Kantian complementarity to the conceptual. It is Spirit 
itself in its self-presence that is to be interrogated, for in raising time to the concept 
Hegel reduces it to presence. In the Zusatz to §258 of the Encyclopaedia Hegel 
asserts: 
But in its Notion [Begrif.fl, time itself is eternal; for time as such - not 
any particular time, nor Now-is its Notion, and this, like every 
Notion generally, is eternal, and therefore also absolute Presence. 
Eternity will not come to be, nor was it, but it is. The difference 
therefore between eternity and duration is that the latter is only a 
relative sublating of time, whereas eternity is infinite, i.e. not relative, 
duration but duration reflected into itself. 11 
For Hegel, the concept (Begrijf) of time cannot, as a concept, be other than eternal. 
By conceptualising time, Hegel does not dispute the eternity of the presence that 
Plato attributes to the Ideas. And yet the time in which concepts demonstrate their 
eternity through the subsumption of temporally divergent and finite particulars has 
always had to be distinct from eternity. Were the time in which concepts distinguish 
themselves from the transient itself the eternal and absolute present, then the 
distinction, and the proof of the eternity of concepts, would be impossible. In what 
way therefore can the concept of time amount to the truth of time? 
Given his panlogism and his axiom of the ubiquity of the concept, a proof of 
the eternity of concepts is something with which Hegel can dispense. It is clear that, 
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for Hegel, what is paramount in his exposition of time and space is the revelation of 
the infinity of Spirit. Space will give way to time, and time will give way to the 
concept that is Spirit. In §254, Hegel sets forth the nature of space in such a way that 
his ultimate goal is unmistakable: 
The first or immediate determination of Nature is Space: the abstract 
universality of Nature's self-externality, self-extemality' s 
mediationless indifference. It is a wholly ideal side-by-sideness 
because it is self-extemality; and it is absolutely continuous, because 
this asundemess is still quite abstract, and contains no specific 
difference within itself. 12 
Nature, which is not yet Spirit, and which is thus not yet self-reflection, is that which 
is outside itself. At its greatest remove from Spirit, Nature is this being-outside-of-
itself in its barest abstraction as the punctuality of space. And space is outside itself 
without thereby creating a difference within itself, since such a difference would be 
contrary to its abstraction from all determinations. Where Spirit, as the negativity of 
what is, is limitation, space is continuum. Between these parameters Hegel means to 
encompass the Whole in all the wealth of its articulations. In this his success has 
never really been doubted, because it is the determinable as such and alone that Hegel 
brings to thought. Space in its abstractness waits for nothing other than to be 
determined and, indeed, it cannot but be determined. Hegel's space is not so far 
removed from Spirit that it escapes the reach of the latter's power of determination. 
In its determinate indeterminacy, Hegel's space is already a continuum. That which 
does not stand fast, and does not appear in any determinacy, does not appear at all. 
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Hegel' s conception of the indeterminate is that which, standing fast in the light of 
presence, is consistent even before being determined. For Hegel, time is the truth of 
the continuity of space rather than the occasion for a question concerning the 
presence in which all beings stand fast. 
In §258, Hegel interprets time as the negative unity of the being-outside-of-
itself that he earlier names "space": 
Time, as the negative unity of self-externality, is similarly an out-and-
out abstract, ideal being. It is that being which, inasmuch as it is, is 
not, and inasmuch as it is not, is: it is Becoming directly intuited; this 
means that differences, which admittedly are purely momentary, i.e. 
directly self-sublating, are determined as external, i.e. as external to 
themselves. 13 
Time is the unity, and hence fundamental homogeneity, of space. It is a negative 
unity because it is through the negation of the disunity of being-outside-of-itself that 
space attains to its unity. Time is not a negative unity in the sense that it is a 
disruption of unity. On the contrary, time is the negativity in which being outside 
itself is for itself, and it is nothing other than this negativity. Time, for Hegel, is able 
to be the truth of space because it is characterised equally by the punctuality in which 
space is a being-outside-of-itself. Time is the being-outside-of-itself in which the 
indifference between one point and another in space becomes the negativity by which 
the points are related one to the other in an albeit abstract unity. 
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The point, which Hegel in §254 designates a being-for-itself and the negation 
of space, is negated in its negativity by time. On this first step towards the absolute 
negativity of Spirit, Heidegger comments in Being and Time: 
When punctuality as indifference gets transmuted, this signifies that it 
no longer remains lying in the 'paralysed tranquillity of space'. The 
point 'gives itself airs' [»spreizt sich auf«, or spreads itself apart] 
before all the other points. According to Hegel, this negation of the 
negation as punctuality is time. If this discussion has any 
demonstrable meaning, it can mean nothing else than that the positing-
of-itself-for-itself of every point is a "now-here", "now-here", and so 
on.14 
The now-sequence that Heidegger feels obliged to discover in Hegel's interpretation 
of time becomes the basis for a reproach: 
No detailed discussion is needed to make plain that in Hegel' s 
Interpretation of time he is moving wholly in the direction of the way 
time is ordinarily understood. When he characterizes time in terms of 
the "now", this presupposes that in its full structure the "now" remains 
levelled off and covered up, so that it can be intuited as something 
present-at-hand, though present-at-hand only 'ideally' .15 
But is the negation of the punctuality of space in time overlooked in this reading? 
How can Heidegger attribute to Hegel the vulgar understanding of time, in which one 
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discrete moment follows inexplicably on another, if this indifferent punctuality is 
precisely what Hegel negates in his account of time? In her essay, "The dialogue 
between Heidegger and Hegel", Denise Souche-Dagues takes issue with what she 
considers to be "the blindness of Heidegger towards the real meaning of Hegel's 
texts". 16 And yet, as obvious as it is that Hegel's account of time differs from the 
vulgar understanding that Heidegger criticises, it is not at all clear that, in the 
violence of his exegesis, Heidegger has missed Hegel's real meaning. Hegel's time 
negates the indifferent punctuality of the vulgar understanding of time only to remain 
itself present-at-hand in its ideality. Thus, Souche-Dagues unwittingly argues for 
Heidegger's reading when she writes: 
Furthermore, there is nothing like a 'fall' of Spirit into time, which 
would mean that Spirit descends from an eternity situated out of time. 
Eternity is for Hegel in its immanent totalization which is its true 
infinity. The present (Gegenwart) which is responsible for presenting 
this absolute unification indicates clearly that time is not in truth the 
indefinite and formal series of here-nows, cancelling themselves in the 
etc., etc., of indefiniteness. 17 
Time in Hegel is eternal neither outside of time nor within time, but, on the contrary, 
as time. It is time as the totality of all periods of time, and thus as the concept of 
time, that is present for Hegel and is present because there can be no period of time 
outside its unity in which it would not be present. The vulgar understanding of time 
is thus manifest in Hegel' s "elevation" of time to the concept. Time in the eternity of 
its concept is that which is present, and hence, although punctuality is negated in 
Hegel's account of temporality, the vulgar understanding of time remains 
determinative through the privileging of the present. 
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Even in its "elevation" to the concept, time constitutes a fall for the Hegelian 
Spirit. It is in this sense that Heidegger speaks of a fall of Spirit into time (Souche-
Dagues' s rejected descent from an eternity situated outside of time is simply 
irrelevant to Heidegger's text). Quoting Hegel himself from the concluding chapter 
of the Phenomenology of Spirit, Heidegger writes: 
Because the restlessness with which spirit develops in bringing itself to 
its concept is the negation of a negation, it accords with spirit, as it 
actualizes itself, to fall 'into time' as the immediate negation of a 
negation. For 'time is the concept itself, which is there [da ist] and 
which represents itself to the consciousness as an empty intuition; 
because of this, spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in 
time as long as it does not grasp its pure concept - that is, as long as 
time is not annulled by it. Time is the pure Self-external, intuited, not 
grasped by the Self- the concept which is merely intuited.' 18 
Time is the concept, i.e. that which mediates, in its immediacy. It is therefore a 
contradiction. Time is Spirit that has fallen away from itself, because it is that 
negation of a negation which is nonetheless not reflective. It apes Spirit in its self-
presence: it is the mediating negation that is external to itself as mediation. Negating 
the negativity of the point, time "finds" itself in the becoming that is, inasmuch as it 
is not, and is not, inasmuch as it is. And "finding" itself in the negativity of 
becoming, time already shares the infinite finitude in which Spirit is present to itself. 
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The absolute presence of time - its negative unity over the punctuality of being-
outside-of-itself- is, as the term indicates, a formulation of temporality from which 
transcendence has been shorn. Hegel's interpretation of time remains modelled on 
the discrete "now" and the vulgar understanding of time is perpetuated. 
The concept is able to become, for Hegel, the truth of time, because the 
legitimacy of unity, on which the concept relies, is not allowed to be challenged by an 
exposition of the essential ecstasy of time. 19 The transitions that negativity effects 
from one point to the other are not thought through to an interrogation of the unity of 
any concept of time - of that which Heidegger, in his 1924 lecture "The Concept of 
Time", calls meaningless.20 
Addressing time's place between the finite and the concept, Hegel states in the 
Remark to §258 of the Encyclopaedia: 
The finite is perishable and temporal because, unlike the Notion, it is 
not in its own self total negativity; true, this negativity is immanent in 
it as its universal essence, but the finite is not adequate to this essence: 
it is one-sided, and consequently it is related to negativity as to the 
power that dominates it. The Notion, however, in its freely self-
existent identity as I = I, is in and for itself absolute negativity and 
freedom. Time, therefore, has no power over the Notion, nor is the 
Notion in time or temporal; on the contrary, it is the power over time, 
which is this negativity only qua extemality.21 
Accordingly, Spirit, for Hegel, indeed falls away from itself into time, but in the 
sense of a fall from the concept to the externality of "intuition" rather than from an 
90 
eternity outside of time. The absolute distance that Kant opened between the a priori 
intuition of time and the concept is reformulated as simply an obstacle on the path of 
Spirit's self-realisation. Whereas, in the above passage, the finite is said to lie in the 
power of time because of its inadequacy to its concept, time, for its part, lies in the 
power of the concept because of its inadequacy to its own negativity. Having defined 
time by the negation of the indifferent externality of being-outside-of-itself, Hegel is 
able to recover time for the concept on the basis of a consanguinity: time, as the 
negation of the externality of punctuality, and hence as an external negation, is not 
yet the absolute negativity in which the pure ego is the determination of what is. 
Through defining time by negation and the concept by determinative negativity, 
Hegel brings together what Kant had held apart. The ostensible radicality of Hegel' s 
abandonment of the definition of the concept as the universal of finite particulars is 
thus ultimately conservative, since it is intended to stifle the question intimated by 
Kant in his treatment of the extra-conceptuality of time. What Kant had wrested from 
the sway of dogmatic metaphysics, Hegel returns. The Kantian affirmation of 
finitude is followed by a restoration of the concept. The Hegelian concept is installed 
as the power of time, and the eternal present reasserts itself over the transcendence of 
finitude. The Aristotelian One is secured against any suspicion of its propriety and 
primacy. Hegel's time stands guarantor for the foundations of traditional logic, 
because it underwrites, through its presence, the intelligibility of whatever is. That 
which falls under the power of time is accordingly never able to make of its finitude 
an affront to the unity in which time itself is collected in its negativity in the absolute 
present of Spirit. 
In his 1930-1 lecture course, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Heidegger 
reiterates his conception of the Auseinandersetzung with Hegel on the issue of 
finitude: 
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But one may ask whether setting up a confrontation with Hegel like 
this is not superfluous. Was it not Hegel, in fact, who ousted finitude 
from philosophy in the sense that he sublated it or overcame it by 
putting it in its proper place? Certainly. But the question is whether 
the finitude that was determinant in philosophy before Hegel was the 
original and effectivefinitude installed in philosophy, or whether it 
was only an incidental finitude that philosophy was constrained to take 
up and transmit. The question must be asked whether Hegel's 
conception of infinitude did not arise from that incidental finitude, in 
order to reach back and absorb it. 
The question is whether finitude, as the innermost distress at 
the heart of the matter in question, determines the necessity of 
questioning. If not, then the confrontation with Hegel is not in 
opposition to him, in the form of a defense of the finitude which he has 
surmounted, but is concerned rather with what he has surmounted and 
the way in which he did so.22 
Hegel evades the problem of finitude by grasping finitude in its essence, since he 
grasps it in that by which, as a concept, it is already infinite. He therefore surmounts 
that which cannot even emerge as a problem for the conceptualism, and that is to say 
eternalism, of metaphysics. Heidegger' s preoccupation with finitude does not entail 
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fixing upon temporality in Hegel prior to its sublation in Spirit. The temporality in 
which Spirit misapprehends itself is by no means the temporality in which the self-
presence of Spirit is rendered genuinely questionable. Spirit errs in time without ever 
straying from the path to its self-realisation. It cannot truly err in time because time 
itself does not err for Hegel. Time's inadequacy to the self-presence of Spirit is not 
ascribed to the ecstases of originary temporality, but rather to the partiality of time's 
negativity with respect to the Absolute. The failure of adequation is situated in a 
falling short within presence and not in an overreaching of presence. Hegel' s time 
does not transcend the One. Time, for Hegel, is the unity whose deficiency is not to 
know itself as unity. It is a subordinate element that testifies to the unity of the self-
knowledge of the Absolute even in the obstinacy of its error. 
For Hegel in his predestinarianism, every error corrects itself in advance and 
every distress is always already assuaged. By holding to the distress and privation 
(Not) of finitude explicitly as transcendence, Heidegger prosecutes a critique of the 
unitary. Here the confession of lack is not a confession of servility. On the contrary, 
it stems from an ambition to think Being as such and not merely Being as presence. 
However much Heidegger's "Not" recalls Christian disquisitions on the indigence of 
humanity, it cannot be said to be theological, since Heidegger is not concerned with 
inculcating an awareness of a dependence on God. It is dependence pure and simple 
that is at stake, and that, in its lack of the contentment and self-containment of 
presence, is being opposed to traditional ontology. The neediness in Heidegger's 
conception of humanity is far less an affliction imposed by an external power, than it 
is the ecstatic essence of the being that he defines by originary temporality. 
Heidegger thus defends a finitude that has not been surmounted by Hegel because it 
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was never admitted, and could not be admitted without a fundamental interrogation of 
logic. 
In the same 1930-1 lecture course on Hegel, Heidegger suggests that it is not a 
case of a mere revision and reform of logic: 
With respect to the title "Being and Time," one could speak of an 
ontochrony. Here xpovos stands in the place of A.oyos. But were both 
of these only interchanged? No. On the contrary, what matters is to 
unfold everything anew from the ground up, by taking over the 
essential motive of the question of being. It is important to show -
formulating it with Hegel- that it is not the concept which is "the 
power of time," but it is time which is the power of the concept.23 
"Here xpovoc; stands in the place of A.oyos." The gathering together in the One of 
the A.oyoc;, by which the entire history of the metaphysical treatment of the question 
of Being has been governed, is contrasted with the unrecuperated being-outside-of-
itself of xpovos. Hegel' s infinitude, which pretends to be a sublation of finitude, 
overcomes limits only to be arrested in its transgression, assuming the shape of 
delimitation itself. The uprising against finitude will have left the structuration of the 
real intact. Spirit's insurrection against theology will not pass beyond its own 
investiture as the One that lets each and every entity be seen in its determinate unity. 
Is Heidegger, through identifying the A.oyos in Being and Time with "a letting-
something-be-seen"24, therefore proposing xpovos as its antithesis, as a letting-
nothing-be-seen? Heidegger warns against reading the substitution mechanically. 
The nothing that xpovos lets be "seen" is not an entity that withholds itself from 
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apprehension in a moment that is no longer or not yet now, that remains 
distinguishable in the peculiarity of its comportment and hence still subject to the 
One. What xpovoc; lets be "seen" is the indeterminacy that is the originary 
dissolution of the stable identities of what is only ever apprehended in the derivative 
temporality of presence. Time is the "power", i.e. the condition of possibility of the 
concept, inasmuch as it is within time and an inadequate understanding of time that 
the concept - the Hegelian A.oyoc; that is self-comprehending Spirit - is able to 
assert itself in its presence as the Being of beings. Hegel' s Spirit is the Being of 
beings in the Greek sense of their visibility and determinacy, which is to say their 
presentability. 
Moreover, that the Being of beings is identified with nothingness in the Logic 
does not involve a questioning of the understanding of Being as presence, since it is 
nothingness in the sense of determinative negativity that is for Hegel the very ground 
of the presentability of what is. Distinguishing the identity of Being and nothingness 
in "What is Metaphysics?" from their identity in Hegel, Heidegger writes in the 
Contributions to Philosophy: 
When the sentence from Hegel' s Logic is quoted in "What is 
Metaphysics?" - 'Being and nothing are the same' - that means, and 
can only mean, an analogue for bringing together Being and nothing as 
such. However, for Hegel "Being" [Seyn] is exactly not only a certain 
first stage of what in the future is to be thought as Being [Seyn], but 
this first stage is, as the un-determined, un-mediated stage precisely 
already pure negativity of abjectness and of thinking (beingness and 
thinking). 25 
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Hegel' s nothingness is no more than the negation of determinacy that determinacy as 
such already is. Nothingness is already a moment in whatever is, inasmuch as every 
being is determinate, for Hegel, in some way or another. In such an understanding of 
nothingness, time's difference from the visibility of the present-at-hand- its 
nothingness - is not thought beyond the presence in which beings are present and 
hence conceptualisable. The invisibility of time thereby ceases to be the occasion for 
a question of the primacy of the concept. Dasein, as the being that is essentially 
wedded to its finitude, cannot but be misunderstood by Hegel and subordinated to the 
concept. Plato's depreciative interpretation of finitude as µ11 ov remains 
determinative. Solely from the vantage point of the concept and the unthinkability of 
the unpresentable is the finitude of the being that has not overcome xpovoc; to find 
itself in the eternity of the concept the condition of inadequacy to its own conceptual 
determination. From the vantage point of xpovoc;, this conceptual inadequacy is, 
however, the "adequacy" to the more originary power of the indetermination of time. 
With the exposition of the primacy of finitude, Heidegger stands the 
metaphysical notion of the freedom of the philosopher on its head. Freedom no 
longer lies in the concept and slavery no longer lies in finitude. What for an 
"ontochrony" accordingly turns out to be subaltern is not that which is finite but the 
power of limitation itself, since it is the latter that has not passed to an identity with 
the highest power. What has risen to become the A.oyoc; has not become independent 
of time. As the power that is the unity of that which is, the A.oyoc; falls short of the 
non-unity that is ecstatic temporality and remains subordinate to it. Preserving its 
metaphysical cast, the freedom toward which the Hegelian philosophy directs itself, 
and in which it is to be a sublation of finitude, is an identification with the 
determinacy of what is. 
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It is this interpenetration of positivism and infinitude that informs Hegel's 
political thinking. It also informs the notorious sentence from the Preface to the 
Philosophy of Right: "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational."26 
Certainly other passages in the work make it clear that Hegel is not rejecting all 
possible alterations to the status quo as irrational, but the sentence can 
notwithstanding be considered positivistic in its aligning of the determinate with the 
thinkable. Hegel's political positivism has nothing to do with a naivety in the face of 
the "facts" and everything to do with a panlogism and the suppression of the extra-
conceptual. Through surmounting finitude, Hegel cannot but arrive in paradise, and 
yet, as he nonetheless cannot disguise from himself that he has become an official of 
the Prussian State, he has no choice other than to take on the role of its apologist. 
Hegel' s Philosophy of Right is marked by gullibility only to the extent that it is 
marked by wisdom. Cancelling out the distance from the truth of what is, Hegel has 
made his way to the croqna to which the philosopher merely aspired. He has become, 
in Kojeve's words, the Wise Man. Nothing is alien to him (i.e. to his reformulation 
of traditional logic). The Prussian State assumes ineluctably the aspect of the 
concrete universal, and the bureaucracy is revealed as the mediation between the 
particulars of the corporations. Where Socrates in the Phaedo awaits wisdom after 
death, Hegel is already death itself and thus already wise. The former flees the State 
through death; the latter becomes the State through death. The infinite and 
determinative negativity of Hegel' s death reveals more than a mere kinship with the 
State's immanent organisation of the social body. Whatever is not fundamentally at 
one with Spirit would amount to an objection against Hegel's claim to wisdom. 
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If Hegel's passage to the State is through in-finitude, Heidegger's is through 
finitude. The death that Heidegger defers and thinks as an event opens a space for a 
critique of the One of metaphysics, but it did not prevent his abasement before Hitler. 
Drawing back from the wisdom that ushered Hegel into the service of the State, 
Heidegger exempted himself, through the reserve and emphatic <pt/...ta of his 
philosophy, from a repetition of Hegel' s panegyrics. He did not extol the State whose 
essence is realised in logic, yet he nonetheless proceeded to a State with little interest 
in a conception of humanity at odds with the present-at-hand. The human being that, 
as an individual in the logical sense, admits of sublation in the universal of the 
Prussian State, will have simply been replaced by the specimen of biological material. 
In both cases, beings remained determined in their discreteness and identifiability by 
the metaphysics of presence. 
Heidegger' s conception of the National Socialist State cannot however simply 
be read off from the historiographically verifiable reality of the regime without a 
neglect of his condemnation of biologism. A surer indication of the basis of 
Heidegger's conception of the Nazi State is a passage in the 1934-5 lecture course 
Holderlin 's Hymns "Germanien" and "Der Rhein". In a reflection on the possibility 
of community, it juxtaposes Heidegger's own treatment of Being-towards-death with 
the nationalist idealisation of the soldier at the front: 
The camaraderie of the soldiers at the front has its foundation neither 
in the fact that they had to get along because others who were far away 
were missing nor for that matter in the circumstance that they met up 
through a shared enthusiasm. On the contrary, its foundation lies 
solely and at its deepest therein that before all else the proximity of 
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death as a sacrifice placed them all in the same nothingness, so that 
this became the source of unconditioned solidarity 
[Zueinandergehoren]. Precisely the death that each and every human 
being must die on his or her own, that isolates each individual to the 
utmost, precisely this death and the readiness to its sacrifice are what 
first creates the space of community out of which camaraderie arises. 
Does camaraderie arise therefore from fear? No and yes. No, if like 
the petty bourgeois one understands by fear only the helpless trembling 
of a cowardly panic. Yes, if fear is comprehended as the metaphysical 
proximity to the unconditioned that is bestowed solely on the highest 
independence and readiness. If we do not force powers into our 
Dasein that, just as unconditionally as death in the shape of free 
sacrifice, bind and isolate, i.e. attack at the roots of the Dasein of each 
individual, and stand just as deeply and utterly in a genuine 
knowledge, then there will not be any "camaraderie"; at best what will 
come about will be an altered form of society.27 
The authentic Being-towards-death that, in 1927, is named the concealed ground of 
the historicality of Dasein is identified seven years later with the experience of the 
trenches. Heidegger is not speaking here at first hand, since during his brief period of 
military service in World War One he was never engaged in fighting at the front. 
Nonetheless, he is not simply paraphrasing a passage from Hinger, for example. 
Keen to uncover an imperialist politics in Heidegger's writings, Fritsche attributes to 
the above text the proposition that war is the ground of community.28 Heidegger, 
however, says nothing of war as such and, in a gesture of continuity with Being and 
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Time, concentrates instead on fear. War is certainly the precondition of this fear, but 
that does not of itself render it the ground of that ground of community which is fear. 
Fritsche's interpretation endeavours to reduce Heidegger's text to an apology for the 
wars of imperialism, even though territorial conquest and supranational recognition 
are not what is at stake in the trenches for Heidegger. That Heidegger offers a 
justification of war is, nonetheless, indisputable. As war is the juncture of 
circumstances in which human finitude becomes a concern, Heidegger underwrites 
ontologically the deployment of the Wehrmacht, and Being and Time is thereby 
pulled into the German mythopreism of the military after WWI. In one respect, 
Heidegger' s account of war is still more objectionable than the imperialist apologies 
to which Fritsche assimilates it, because it remythologises war by means of the very 
elements through which it had been demythologised. The realism of the many post-
war narratives, which had been received as denunciations of the experience of trench 
warfare, becomes simply grist to the mill of Heidegger' s affirmation of fear. Fear has 
turned into an argument for war. It becomes the task, rather than the evasion, of the 
soldier at the front. In the Marburg lecture course History of the Concept of Time, 
Heidegger speaks accordingly of a "courage for dread in the face of death".29 What 
Heidegger asks of the soldier is that he not steel himself in the face of death and 
thereby grow numb to the question of his own finitude through a leap into the infinite. 
For Heidegger, the enemy that the armed forces must confront in the trenches is 
Hegelian sublation. Given the very different task that Heidegger sets the soldier at 
the front, his notion of sacrifice in the 1934-5 text has to be seen to sit uneasily beside 
the customary right-wing eulogies of the volunteers who fell at Langemarck and 
elsewhere. Heidegger does not so much valorise sacrifice, therefore, as valorise the 
readiness for such sacrifice. No doubt this is already to go too far towards 
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accommodating a militarist politics. In the readiness for the fear of the impending 
self-sacrifice, the soldiers at the front are to experience the transcendence and 
incommensurability of finitude. Through the fear it instils, war contests the fixation 
on the "now" in the vulgar understanding of time, bringing home to Dasein the truth 
of its being-outside-of-itself. Beside itself with fear, Dasein is a Being-with-others 
just as it is completely isolated as the unrepeatability of the uncontainable. Its free 
sacrifice is the event that awaits it as its own and that thus carries it beyond itself 
without delivering up its transcendence to an external entity. That for which Dasein 
sacrifices itself is irrelevant in comparison with the fact that Dasein sacrifices itself. 
Here in Heidegger' s lectures on Holderlin, the provocation of the National Socialist 
policy of rearmament is accordingly endorsed, since war is intimated to be 
indispensable to the fulfilment of the movement's promise to ground community. 
The Reich will not be the being present-at-hand that pre-exists Dasein's self-sacrifice 
and whose defence is the rationale of sacrifice. Instead, community will be that 
which arises in the readiness for free sacrifice. Heidegger' s community of the 
trenches does not stand above its members in arbitration over their lives and deaths, 
because it is not cast in the nineteenth century's pseudo-religious conception of the 
State. This community is the bond of finitude itself. Death, which for Hegel tears 
apart and mediates everything that is, necessarily grounds a State of another order 
than that which arises in the isolation and binding of Heidegger' s anticipation of 
death. Heidegger' s community does not situate itself in death but rather in the 
shadow of death. It arises in the expectation of death. 
To anticipate death, even to run ahead into death (to translate literally 
Heidegger' s expression "in den Tod vorlaufen"), is not the same as to desire death. 
Heidegger's community exists in a courtship of death. Nonetheless, it can only exist 
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if it simultaneously defers death. It can therefore be said that what both attracted 
Heidegger to National Socialism and repulsed him was the bare physiological reality 
of corpses toward which the movement was hurrying. In Being and Time, the basis 
of Heidegger's future politics of a flirtation with death is clearly enunciated: 
But Being towards this possibility, as Being-towards-death, is so to 
comport ourselves towards death that in this Being, and for it, death 
reveals itself as a possibility. Our terminology for such Being towards 
this possibility is "anticipation" of this possibility. But in this way of 
behaving does there not lurk a coming-close to the possible, and when 
one is close to the possible, does not its actualization emerge? In this 
kind of coming close, however, one does not tend towards 
concernfully making available something actual; but as one comes 
closer understandingly, the possibility of the possible just becomes 
'greater'. The closest closeness which one may have in Being towards 
death as a possibility, is as far as possible from anything actual. The 
more unveiledly this possibility gets understood, the more purely does 
the understanding penetrate into it as the possibility of the impossibility 
of any existence at all. Death, as possibility, gives Dasein nothing to 
be 'actualized', nothing which Dasein, as actual, could itself be.30 
The reality of death is, by definition, not the reality of Dasein (existence). As 
Heidegger writes: "The end of the entity qua Dasein is the beginning of the same 
entity qua something present-at-hand."31 With death, the ontological exception that 
Dasein constitutes for the understanding of Being as presence is annulled. Hegel's 
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courage in looking death in the face - in leaping into death to become one with it -
lies exactly in his refusal to brook this exception to the understanding of Being as 
presence. It is a courage that, according to Heidegger, is much more a lack of 
seriousness with respect to the question of Being. 
With respect, however, to National Socialism, Hegel's assimilation of death 
renders him invulnerable to the regime's promise of catastrophe. Death always 
comes too late for it to have any philosophical importance for Hegel, whereas, for 
Heidegger, that it should cease to be impending, and finally arrive, is not the 
fulfilment of a philosophical promise but its revocation. 
If Heidegger, in his confrontation with Hegel, understands death as a 
catastrophe rather than as the element in which Spirit thinks itself, he does not mean 
to construe death as an event that takes place at its given time within a sequence of 
"nows". Such a construction of death would merely delay the attainment to the 
presence of death in which Hegel establishes his thinking from the very beginning. 
Setting out from death, Hegel's system encompasses the whole of life, but the price 
of its totality is an inability to grasp the Being specific to Dasein. Hegel sees 
everything, but thereby misses that what characterises Dasein is that "there is always 
something still outstanding".32 
In §48 of Being and Time, Heidegger writes of the positive nature of this 
deficiency: 
That Dasein should be together only when its "not-yet" has been filled 
up is so far from the case that it is precisely then that Dasein is no 
longer. Any Dasein always exists in just such a manner that its "not-
yet" belongs to it.33 
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The "not-yet" of Dasein is the space of its possibility. Death, as the impossibility of 
Dasein, cannot be viewed as the realisation of this possibility: 
With its death, Dasein has indeed 'fulfilled its course'. But in doing 
so, has it necessarily exhausted its specific possibilities? Rather, are 
not these precisely what gets taken away from Dasein? Even 
'unfulfilled' Dasein ends. On the other hand, so little is it the case that 
Dasein comes to its ripeness only with death, that Dasein may well 
have passed its ripeness before the end. For the most part, Dasein ends 
in unfulfilment, or else by having disintegrated and been used up.34 
Death is a catastrophe that happens, so to speak, against Dasein. It is not assimilated 
to Dasein and it does not realise Dasein's possibilities. The "not-yet" is consumed in 
the moment of death simply by being torn away from Dasein. But with this moment 
of death, the vulgar understanding of temporality as a sequence of "nows" does not 
reassert itself in a containment of the transcendence of Dasein's "not-yet", since 
Dasein cannot be at its end, but only towards its end. Death, in this sense, is itself the 
"not-yet" of Dasein. The catastrophic character of Heidegger' s conception of death is 
its pure possibility. It is the event that does not take place - its "presence" is always 
only ever a "not-yet". 
And yet death, for Heidegger, is nonetheless certain. But on what grounds? 
That such a certainty could be derived from the overwhelming spectacle of the 
trenches is excluded by Being and Time: 
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We cannot compute the certainty of death by ascertaining how many 
cases of death we encounter. This certainty is by no means of the kind 
which maintains itself in the truth of the present-at-hand. When 
something present-at-hand has been uncovered, it is encountered most 
purely if we just look at the entity and let it be encountered in itself. 
Dasein must first have lost itself in the factual circumstances 
[Sachverhalte] (this can be one of care's own tasks and possibilities) if 
it is to obtain the pure objectivity- that is to say, the indifference-
of apodictic evidence. If Being-certain in relation to death does not 
have this character, this does not mean that it is of a lower grade, but 
that it does not belong at all to the graded order of the kinds of 
evidence we can have about the present-at-hand. 35 
Death is not certain in the same way that one can be certain of the veracity of the 
proposition that the battlefield is strewn with corpses. It is of a different order of 
certainty, since it is the ground of the certainty of propositions relating to the present-
at-hand. The "not-yet" of death constitutes the very essence of Dasein and the basis 
for its identification with ecstatic temporality. Heidegger accordingly speaks of the 
certainty of death as "indefinite". 36 Death is at once certain and indefinite because, as 
the "not-yet" of originary temporality, it is the ground of the certainty of the present-
at-hand without being itself present-at-hand. Foreshadowing his argument in "On the 
Essence of Truth", Heidegger will make the certainty of a proposition - its 
correspondence to a state of affairs - depend upon a relation that he assigns to the 
transcendence of Dasein. All certainties come to rely on the indefiniteness and 
excess of the "not-yet" of Dasein's inevitable death: 
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Therefore the evidential character which belongs to the immediate 
givenness of Experiences, of the "I", or of consciousness, must 
necessarily lag behind the certainty which anticipation includes. Yet 
this is not because the way in which these are grasped would not be a 
rigorous one, but because in principle such a way of grasping them 
cannot hold for true (disclosed) something which at bottom it insists 
upon 'having there' as true: namely, Dasein itself, which I myself am, 
and which, as a potentiality-for-Being, I can be authentically only by 
anticipation. 37 
Anticipating its death, Dasein anticipates itself because, in thinking that which can 
only be thought in its character of a "not-yet", it thinks the impossibility of its own 
full disclosure. As a result, it thinks its non-assimilability to the understanding of 
Being as presence. Running ahead into death it runs away from the thanatography of 
National Socialism. In its anxiety before nothingness, it becomes an iconoclasm with 
respect to every presentation of death. Nourishing itself parasitically on the images 
of death that it destroys, Heidegger' s authentic Dasein comes to an "arrangement" 
with the morbidity of the regime. It comes to a fragile "arrangement" with 
commitment to the regime, to the possibility of sacrifice conceived purely as 
possibility. 
In 1933, and with little resistance, Heidegger transforms himself into an 
advocate of nationalistic sacrifice. On January 23, 1934, in the text "The Call to the 
Labor Service", he is able to write: 
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Those who are lame, comfortable, and effete will "go" into the Labor 
Service because it will perhaps jeopardize their degree and 
employment prospects to stay away. Those who are strong and 
unbroken are proud that extreme demands are being made of them: for 
that is the moment when they rise up to the hardest tasks, those for 
which there is neither pay nor praise, but only the "reward" of sacrifice 
and service in the area of the innermost necessities of German Being 
[deutschen Seins]. 38 
What is, for Heidegger, the "reward" of sacrifice? If this "reward" lies in an 
understanding of the essence of Being, a willingness to sacrifice has less to do with 
the maintenance of the Germany of National Socialism than with fundamental 
ontology. The willingness to die for a fatherland present-at-hand becomes a pretext. 
The passage on the camaraderie of the front, from the lecture course on Holderlin of 
1934-5, indicates that community, for Heidegger, does not pre-exist the readiness for 
sacrifice, but rather arises from it. The first stage of the National Socialist revolution 
- the stage of the conventionality of its nationalism - is arguably to give way to a 
second stage in which the nation, as the pseudo-religious recipient of sacrifice, will 
be revealed to be a makeshift for that bond of community that is itself the readiness 
for sacrifice. If Heidegger' s nationalism, like that of many others, was informed by 
the Fronterlebnis, it also bore the mark of his own meditations on finitude. The 
community born from the "courage for dread in the face of death" in the readiness to 
sacrifice does not shy away from its own finitude. Seeing through the eternal's 
pretensions to originarity, it sees through the logicist nationalism of the pseudo-
religious State. Such a State is inappropriate to the being that can die. Dasein's 
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deviation from the logic of the universal and the particular is that which, for 
Heidegger, constitutes the insight of the experience of the Angst of trench warfare. A 
nationalism that grounds itself in the Fronterlebnis cannot but confront the 
metaphysics of presence. It could be said that it is in order to participate in this 
confrontation that Heidegger enlisted in the NSDAP. Heidegger's nationalism in 
1933 was not, therefore, the "psychological solution" to the Angst of 1927, but, on the 
contrary, its formulation as a philosophical-political programme. For the sake of the 
reward of the disclosure of the originarity of finitude in sacrifice, Heidegger will 
commit himself to a dictatorship. But where Heidegger incorporated in his 
conception of nationalism the terror of the Fronterlebnis, the regime will reject the 
accounts in which it is depicted and have them publicly burnt. However correct 
Marcuse may be in his thesis in Reason and Revolution concerning the 
irreconcilability of Hegel and National Socialism, for Heidegger the dictatorship will 
prove to be all too Hegelian in its logicist nationalism of the repression of finitude. 
Its promise of a continuation of the revolution will have been reneged. 
National Socialism is the State that runs ahead into death, but it is not the 
State that extracts from the experience of the impending catastrophe of mortality an 
insight into Dasein's status as an ontological exception. It is the State of control, that 
is, of the essential controllability of the present-at-hand. As an apparatus of State 
terror, it conforms itself far more conspicuously to Hegel's knowability of everything 
that is, than to Heidegger' s essential unpresentability of Dasein. The regime applies 
itself to the task of uncovering all secrets, cataloguing all anomalies and tracking all 
movements. Aspiring to a dictatorship of absolute surveillance, it wants to be the 
light of knowledge in which beings are apprehended as they are in the full truth of 
their presence. Inasmuch as it refuses to any being an intrinsic unknowability, 
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National Socialism overleaps the constitutive "not-yet" of Dasein, and exercises its 
terror on a population that it cannot distinguish ontologically from the mere presence-
at-hand of the dead. The regime's obsession with death will amount to a 
theatricalisation of Hegel's understanding of death as the determinative negativity of 
what is, since it will be the State that explicitly and concretely conceives itself as 
death. 
This is not to suggest that Hegel was a proto-Nazi. The genealogical line is 
not so narrow. What is at issue in Heidegger's exposition of death is, however, an 
alternative to traditional ontology as it was brought to its ultimate expression by 
Hegel and as it underlies and unites National Socialism and all the doctrines of the 
State that were to stress their opposition to Hitler's dictatorship. Hegel's philosophy 
of the State, from out of whose sway the ideologues of the regime were unable to 
extricate themselves, is a philosophy that can praise the State in its identity with 
knowledge because it has first identified knowledge with control. Even if it is only 
later that Heidegger elaborates his critique of 'r£XV11 as the reduction of knowledge to 
the art of the manipulation of beings, the existential analytic of Being and Time 
already raises an objection against defining knowledge by control. The essence of 
Dasein, and thus that which above all must be known with respect to Dasein, is the 
"not-yet" by which it withholds itself from an apprehension of its totality. Already 
dead, and hence already present-at-hand, Hegel's Spirit is not frustrated in its self-
knowledge by anything outstanding to it. And knowing itself, it knows the 
knowability of what is, of that which in his inaugural lecture in Berlin Hegel says 
cannot help delivering itself up to be known.39 Hegel's philosophy of the State, as the 
philosophy of Spirit in one of its manifestations, will necessarily place no restrictions 
on that which it is given to the State to know. 
In the Remark to §209 of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel spurns 
cosmopolitanism for its refusal to press beyond a knowledge of the universal in its 
one-sidedness: 
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It is part of education, of thinking as the consciousness of the single in 
the form of universality, that the ego comes to be apprehended as a 
universal person in which all are identical. A man counts as a man in 
virtue of his manhood alone, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, 
Protestant, German, Italian, &c. This is an assertion which thinking 
ratifies and to be conscious of it is of infinite importance. It is 
defective only when it is crystallized, e.g. as a cosmopolitanism in 
opposition to the concrete life of the state.40 
Hegel here advances his thought as the reconciliation of liberalism and nationalism. 
Where liberalism is criticised for the one-sidedness of its universalism, nationalism is 
likewise criticised for the one-sidedness of its particularism. In line with such a 
scheme, it could be said that, in its ambitions to become the State of total 
surveillance, National Socialism was checked by its exclusively racist 
Weltanschauung. With its imperialism and its adoption of strength as the universal 
measure of peoples, the regime found its own way to the cosmopolitan. The casting 
of the human as a biological sample under National Socialism is certainly a 
degradation with respect to Hegel's determinative negativity, yet, for Heidegger, both 
interpretations of the human essence are already degraded in being grounded in the 
ontology of the present-at-hand, rather than in an "ontochrony". In the Hegelian 
philosophy, as well as in the Hitlerian dictatorship, it is a logic of control that is at 
work. 
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But at once it might be contested that this is simply not a just description of 
Hegel. What does control have in common with the bacchanalian revel of the 
Absolute? Is there not a glaring disparity between the notion of certainty applied by a 
police state and the self-certainty of Spirit? Does not the comparison between 
National Socialism and Hegel indefensibly conflate the certainty of the mere 
understanding and the certainty of dialectical reason? And are not the frequent 
concessions that Heidegger makes to Hegel in their Auseinandersetzung sinply being 
passed over here for the sake of the caricature of a struggle between diametrically 
opposed philosophies? 
The reductionism of the present reading has, however, its rationale, namely, to 
draw attention to the foundations of a logicist politics in Hegel' s treatments of, 
finitude and time. By addressing the avowed consistency of Hegel' s politics and his 
philosophy, it is possible to perceive the consistency of Heidegger' s critique of 
Hegel's philosophy and his own political engagement. The tenability, for instance, of 
Jacques Taminiaux's thesis in his article "Finitude and the Absolute: Remarks on 
Hegel and Heidegger"41 is thereby subjected to a number of reservations. Taminiaux 
quotes passages selected from Hegel for their affinities to certain Heideggerian texts, 
but whatever similarities can be rendered conspicuous between isolated propositions 
on truth and on nothingness, these propositions diverge in their sense when construed 
in connection with other statements dealing with politics. In other words, if the 
difference between Hegel and Heidegger is to be established, it is better sought in the 
discourses surrounding their respective acquiescences to the State than in the 
inconclusive playing off of the Infinite against finitude. That in which Hegel's 
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Infinite distinguishes itself from Heidegger' s finitude - notwithstanding their shared 
territory in respect of nothingness, death and the acquiescence to the State - is the 
logicist conception of humanity with which it is bound up. Hegel dies, as it were, and 
overtakes his death in order to bring logic to politics. This could not be demonstrated 
more clearly than in his definition of the people in the System of Ethical Life: 
A people is not a disconnected mass, nor a mere plurality. Not the 
former: a mass as such does not establish the connection present in 
ethical life, i.e., the domination of all by a universal which would have 
reality in their eyes, be one with them, and have dominion and power 
over them, and, so as they proposed to be single individuals, would be 
identical with them in either a friendly or a hostile way; on the 
contrary, the mass is absolute singularity, and the concept of the mass, 
since they are one, is their abstraction alien to them and outside them. 
Also not the latter, not a mere plurality, for the universality in which 
they are one is absolute indifference. In a plurality, however, this 
absolute indifference is not established; on the contrary, plurality is not 
the absolute many, or the display of all differences; and it is only 
through this "allness" that indifference can display itself as real and be 
a universal indifference.42 
Hegel's Volk is a concrete universal, neither a purely abstract unity nor a 
heterogeneous series of individuals. No matter how much the members of this Volk 
may differ among themselves, their identity with one another is never completely 
annulled. For Hegel, this identity is ethical, rather than biological. Such a 
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qualification of the nature of the Volk's identity, as much as it is a necessary 
acknowledgement of Hegel's irreducibility to the Rassenkunde of the NSDAP, cannot 
disguise the fact that, in Hegel's logicist conception, humanity remains equally under 
the influence of the Dingbegriffe of classical ontology. 
Against this influence, whose interrogation Heidegger declares a continuing 
task in the closing pages of Being and Time, the earlier analyses of Being-with-one-
another are explicitly conceived. Rather than in an aggregate of subjects, in namely 
the apprehension, comparison and juxtaposition of distinct entities within the terms of 
the metaphysics of presence, Heidegger situates Being-with-one-another in 
historicality. Being-with-one-another is an affair, not of the mediation of the 
universal and the particular, but of the "not-yet" by which Dasein always overreaches 
itself. With this "not-yet", Heidegger attempts to secure the possibility of an 
understanding of the essence of the human without the interference of Dingbegriffe. 
In going further than Heidegger - in consuming the "not-yet" to arrive at death itself 
- Hegel is able to differentiate his conception of the human as the infinite negativity 
at one with death from the merely positive of the natural world. Yet this 
differentiation, for all the starkness of its opposition between the positive and the 
negative, is not a differentiation that delimits the scope of Dingbegriffe, since in the 
self-knowledge of its absolute negativity Spirit is present to itself and thus 
perpetuates the mode of Being that classical ontology ascribed to things. The positive 
in Hegel thus proceeds in its dismemberment (Zerrissenheit) only to be re-membered 
in this very violence. It does not scatter to become a being-outside-of-itself without 
return. In this respect, Heidegger' s restraint before death is a more effective step 
against the hegemony of Dingbegriffe in the understanding of the human. The threat 
of death, and not its reality, scatters Being in the transcendence of the "not-yet" and 
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thereby allows for a thought of community that is not an assemblage of discrete 
entities under a universal. In the outstanding totality of its "not-yet", Dasein is 
always outside of itself and always a Being-with. It is thus always within the Volk. 
Heidegger introduces the word "Volk" in §74 of Being and Time in order to 
align it with the essential Being-with-Others and Being-in-the-world of Dasein, but in 
doing so he says nothing of that which could exclude Dasein from the Volk. Where 
Hegel's logicist conception of "Volk" explains both inclusion and exclusion by the 
scope of the ethical universal, Heidegger' s transcendence cannot, by definition, come 
up against a limit. This absence in Heidegger' s text of a criterion for distinguishing 
the identities of various peoples is by no means an oversight to be rectified by the 
supplement of the exclusive disjunctions of Nationals Socialism's Rassenkunde. 
Heidegger' s engagement in 1933 cannot be interpreted as providing the correction to 
his earlier "one-sidedness". The concentration on transcendence throughout his 
writings is simply too emphatic for it to be plausible that he should ever have 
straightforwardly subscribed to a containment of transcendence and a restoration of 
the metaphysics of presence. What is at stake in Heidegger' s refusal, in 1927, to 
furnish a criterion for distinguishing peoples is not so much an inclusive humanism, 
than it is his effort to rethink the traditional understanding of Being on the basis of the 
transcendence of Dasein. Without any means to limit itself, Heidegger' s Volk does 
not recoil into the unity of humanity in general, because it is against unity as such that 
it defines itself as transcendence. Transcendence is an excess inasmuch as it presses 
beyond the one, and it is a restraint inasmuch as it never arrives at the other to the one 
it has left. 
In his 1955 critique of Hinger, Heidegger will characteristically stress that it is 
this "in between" which more than anything else needs to be thought in the 
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confrontation with the nihilism of metaphysics. Jtinger, who wants to leap from the 
age of nihilism to "a new turning of Being", passes by transcendence, when, for 
Heidegger, it is precisely by remaining within transcendence that the nihilism of the 
oblivion of Being is to be brought to the sobriety of reflection. With an unmistakable 
Hegelian resonance, Heidegger writes: 
The human being not only stands within the critical zone of the line. 
He himself- but not taken independently, and especially not through 
himself alone - is this zone and thus the line. In no case does the 
line, thought as a sign of the zone of consummate nihilism, lie before 
the human being in the manner of something that could be crossed. In 
that case, however, the possibility of a trans lineam and of such a 
crossing collapses.43 
For Heidegger, the human being is the limit just as, for Hegel, the human 
understanding is the delimitation of what is. To be that which faces the limit as 
something external to it, irrespective of any success in "crossing the line", is trivial 
beside the truth of being this limit itself. Jtinger is thus much further from the Un-
thought of classical ontology than Hegel - he literally passes over transcendence. 
For this reason, the Auseinandersetzung with Jtinger is not complicated by the 
exaggerations, concessions and ambiguities of the Auseinandersetzung with Hegel. 
Given the shared privileging of the limit over that which it delimits, the question in 
Heidegger's confrontation with Hegel is what becomes of the limit. The political 
discourse that follows from its privileging is not unequivocal. There have been both 
revolutionary and reactionary politics of the limit. Renaming Heidegger' s 
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"transcendence", Foucault, for instance, sounds uncomfortably like the author of the 
Philosophy of Right when he nonetheless speaks of the role and nature of 
transgression: 
Its role is to measure the excessive distance that it opens at the heart of 
the limit and to trace the flashing line that causes the limit to arise. 
Transgression contains nothing negative, but affirms limited being -
affirms the limitlessness into which it leaps as it opens this zone to 
existence for the first time. But correspondingly, this affirmation 
contains nothing positive: no content can bind it, since, by definition, 
no limit can possibly restrict it.44 
Transgression is the limitlessness of the limit itself and, in this identity with Hegel' s 
Spirit, it merges paradoxically and inadmissably with the State. If there is to be a 
difference from Hegel, and another politics than that of the Wise Man, it can only 
come from a transgression that transgresses itself, from a transcendence that does not 
cease to transcend. Thinking that which Heidegger was to term "transcendence", and 
Foucault "transgression", Hegel attributes an absolute power to the delimiting activity 
of the understanding. But with this enthronement of Spirit, its transcendence and 
transgression are not unleashed, but rather curtailed. In its absolute power, Spirit 
transcends and transgresses whatever is, and yet it stands in need of the positive for 
the demonstration of its power. Spirit differs from the positive only to the extent that 
it amounts to the universal that glues together the entities whose definition has been 
inherited from classical ontology. The opportunity for an interrogation of the 
metaphysics of presence is thereby lost, because Spirit's distance from the positive is 
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interpreted as its authority over - and hence responsibility for - whatever is. 
Power over the positive becomes nothing more than the duty to justify the positive. 
Crudely put, Hegel's response to the Un-thought of classical ontology is the 
conviction that he must justify to himself the existence of the Prussian State. As a 
result, Heidegger' s objection to Hegel is not that he purely and simply neglected the 
question of Being (any number of passages can be cited from his works for their 
"anticipations" of Heidegger' s thinking), but, on the contrary, that he did not allow 
his insight into the originarity of transcendence to call the positive into question. 
Hegel, in effect, assimilated transcendence to presence. 
Yet why is it that Hegel throws the self-evidence of the present-at-hand into 
crisis only to rediscover the security of classical ontology in this very crisis? As far 
as this decision regarding the crisis of the metaphysics of presence is political, it can 
be traced back to Hegel's horror of the vacuity that he perceived in Romanticism. In 
his predilection for the substantial, Hegel is drawn to the concrete life of the State. 
In §257 and its Remark from the Philosophy of Right, Hegel writes: 
The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea. It is ethical mind qua the 
substantial will manifest and revealed to itself, knowing and thinking 
itself, accomplishing what it knows and in so far as it knows it. The 
state exists immediately in custom, mediately in individual self-
consciousness, knowledge, and activity, while self-consciousness in 
virtue of its sentiment towards the state finds in the state, as its essence 
and the end and product of its activity, its substantive freedom. 
The Penates are inward gods, gods of the underworld; the mind 
of a nation [Volksgeist] (Athene for instance) is the divine, knowing 
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and willing itself. Family piety is feeling, ethical behaviour directed 
by feeling; political virtue is the willing of the absolute end in terms of 
thought.45 
The State is the manifestation and revelation of the ethical Idea. It is the means 
whereby the ethical Idea knows itself and likewise the end as which it knows itself. 
Through negating the actuality and substantiality of the State, the ethical Idea knows 
itself in its difference from the positive. And through knowing itself only by this 
negative relation, it simultaneously takes up this actuality and substantiality as an 
essential moment in its self-knowledge. Knowledge in Hegel could thus be said to 
betray itself even as it exhibits the greatest fidelity. Hegel's insight into the Un-
thought of the understanding of Being as presence constitutes an advance in the 
knowledge of beings, and yet it is not a knowledge that can know itself as an advance 
and enrichment of know ledge without reinstating the understanding of beings that its 
insight had overthrown. It is perhaps in reaction to Hegel that Heidegger formulates 
the imperative in the Contributions to Philosophy to think Being by itself. 
That Hegel does not think Being by itself- that he thinks it with respect to 
beings and hence politically with respect to the concrete life of the State - is not, of 
course, the grounds of the apparent National Socialist polemic. In Mein Kampf, it is 
the theorization of the State as the end of activity that Hitler rejects: 
The state is a means to an end. Its end lies in the preservation and 
advancement of a community of physically and psychically 
homogeneous creatures.46 
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But Hitler is not referring to the State as such. It is the existing apparatus of the 
racially indifferent state of liberalism that he has in view and to whose exploitation in 
the service of the new, racially grounded state he aspires. Hegel's thesis in regard to 
the state as the consummation of the self-knowledge of consciousness is neither 
affirmed nor denied. It is thus difficult to discern in such a statement by Hitler any 
genuine Auseinandersetzung with the Philosophy of Right, which is to say that it is 
difficulat to discern any continuity between National Socialism's denunciations of the 
Weimar republic and Heidegger's commentaries on Hegel. Were it not for the fact of 
Heidegger' s engagement and the importance of his confrontation with Hegel, there 
would be little incentive to try to find in the regime any encouragement of an anti-
Hegelian politics. 
What is it, then, in the NSDAP that could have drawn Heidegger to it? More 
cautious than many of Heidegger' s critics, Cassirer suggests, in The Myth of the State, 
that Heidegger's relationship to National Socialism has more to do with a lack of 
resistance than any obvious attraction and convergence: "a theory that sees in the 
Geworfenheit of man one of his principal characters [has] given up all hopes of an 
active share in the construction and reconstruction of man's cultural life."47 Cassirer 
notes in the Geworfenheit of Dasein the abjectness of resignation, but he misses its 
own specific, ontological task. Was Heidegger's engagement with National 
Socialism an engagement in truth with the abjectness of such an engagement, with its 
affront to the self-collectedness of the liberal subject? Insofar as the regime's 
spurious anti-statism furnishes nothing for an Auseinandersetzung with Hegel, it is a 
matter of looking elsewhere for any polemical inspirations that may lie behind 
Heidegger' s engagement. 
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In 1933, the disgusting submissiveness to Hitler that Heidegger enunciates in 
propositions that otherwise appear at variance with Heidegger' s earlier thinking, does 
not leave untouched the question of his relation to Hegel. There is in these texts a 
slavishness that outstrips anything in Hegel, as though Heidegger were wanting to 
arrest the dialectic of Master and Slave. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel's 
slave proceeds too quickly from the fear of death to self-certainty: 
For this consciousness has been fearful, not of this or that particular 
thing or just at odd moments, but its whole being has been seized with 
dread; for it has experienced the fear of death, the absolute Lord. In 
that experience it has been quite unmanned, has trembled in every fibre 
of its being, and everything solid and stable has been shaken to its 
foundations. But this pure universal movement, the absolute melting-
away of everything stable, is the simple, essential nature of self-
consciousness, absolute negativity, pure being-for-self, which 
consequently is implicit in this consciousness. This moment of pure 
being-for-self is also explicit for the bondsman, for in the lord it exists 
for him as his object. Furthermore, his consciousness is not this 
dissolution of everything stable merely in principle; in his service he 
actually brings this about. Through his service he rids himself of his 
attachment to natural existence in every single detail; and gets rid of it 
by working on it.48 
The Hegelian bondsman (Knecht) or slave does not rid himself of his fear of death by 
work. Work is rather the actuality of the fear of death and the dissolution of 
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everything stable. It is thus no longer the lasting monument that cheats mortality. 
Hegel breaks with the tradition that considers the fear of death something to be 
surmounted. The ataraxy of the Stoics, The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius 
and Montaigne's essay "That to study philosophy, is to learn to die"49 have less in 
common with Hegel's text than do Heidegger's writings from the 1920s and '30s. 
But the resemblance should not be overestimated. The "fear" of Hegel's slave 
receives its definition from the metaphysical understanding of knowledge: 
Without the discipline of service and obedience, fear remains at the 
formal stage, and does not extend to the known real world of existence. 
Without the formative activity, fear remains inward and mute, and 
consciousness does not become explicitly for itself.50 
Fear, for Hegel, is most truly fear when it is realised, i.e. rendered concrete in the 
work. It is not fear as such that is surmounted, only its formalism and mute 
inwardness. By contrast, in Heidegger' s account of fear in §40 of Being and Time, 
this formalism and mute inwardness will be set forth as the very essence of fear - its 
"realisation" in the experience that the thingly is that which is precisely missing. 
Hegel's fear becomes objective because, within the understanding of Being in which 
it occurs, the decision has already been made for the present-at-hand. Not even the 
nothingness of fear is allowed to withstand the pull of the actual, since that which is 
fully known is that which is known in its concreteness. If the fear of death is here 
embraced as the starting point of philosophy, whereas prior to Hegel philosophy was 
considered to begin from its repression, it is because finitude no longer arises as an 
issue. The absolute, and thus non-impending, negativity of self-consciousness is the 
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sole experience of this fear. Hegel's slave is incapable of an abasement that would 
involve even his self-certainty. He works for the master only to the extent that he 
works against him and fashions with the product the reality of his independence. 
In the collection of notes "Overcoming Metaphysics" Heidegger is blunt in his 
appraisal of work: 
The still hidden truth of Being is withheld from metaphysical 
humanity. The laboring animal is left to the giddy whirl of its products 
so that it may tear itself to pieces and annihilate itself in empty 
nothingness. 51 
Without a relation to the truth of Being, Dasein is no more than a labouring animal. 
The work by which the Hegelian slave raises himself to the element of thinking is 
that by which humanity, according to Heidegger, is tumbled towards its ruin. But is 
this note from the years 1936-46 to be interpreted as a self-criticism? Is it simply a 
retraction of the 1934 text "The Call to the Labor Service" with its differentiation 
between the animal and the spirituality of work? Can the earlier text be read at face-
value? If Heidegger's engagement truly constituted an adoption of the Hegelian 
position on work, then a Marxist party would seem a much more obvious choice than 
the NSDAP. The nationalsozialistische deutsche Arbeiterpartei is however a party of 
the workers who do not work in Hegel's sense. They work without ever finding in 
work their independence from the decrees of the Lord, and their fear of death is 
correspondingly never "realised". The Nazi worker is the slave who has been left 
behind by the dialectics of the history of Spirit. The charge cannot be dismissed out 
of hand that, in his engagement with the NSDAP, Heidegger seeks to become, as it 
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were, the mouthpiece of the Lumpenproletariat. That which, from a Marxist-
Hegelian point of view, is repulsive in National Socialism - namely the aborted 
emergence through work of class consciousness - is not that which in itself attracts 
Heidegger to the movement.52 This aborting of class consciousness is, however, the 
corollary of the challenge raised to the metaphysics of presence by the being-outside-
of-itself of fear. 
If asserting that Heidegger' s political engagement was directly grounded in 
his Auseinandersetzung with Hegel seems implausible, then it should at least be 
remembered what Heidegger explicitly stated with regard to communism, in a letter 
to Marcuse after the war: 
Concerning 1933: I expected from National Socialism a spiritual 
renewal of life in its entirety, a reconciliation of social antagonisms 
and a deliverance of Western Dasein from the dangers of 
communism. 53 
And that communism was, in Heidegger' s eyes, by no means an illegitimate 
descendent of Hegel is clear from the "Letter on 'Humanism"'. Beneath its 
superficial generosity54, the more famous text is a restatement of the belligerent 
position expressed simultaneously in the letter to Marcuse and formulated with 
respect to the Hegelian principle of "work" in "Overcoming Metaphysics". The merit 
of Marx is not distinct from the dangers of communism, since his merit is to provide 
the philosophical exposition of that fundamental, metaphysical danger of which 
communism is but one, albeit overwhelming, manifestation. This danger is the 
danger of 'tEXV11, namely that danger which, according to the contentious parenthesis 
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from An Introduction to Metaphysics, it is the "inner truth and greatness" of National 
Socialism to encounter. Marx's status in the "Letter on 'Humanism"' is thus similar 
to Jiinger' s in "On the Question of Being" in that Marx brings a problem to light 
without understanding it as a problem: 
What Marx recognized in an essential and significant sense, though 
derived from Hegel, as the estrangement of the human being has its 
roots in the homelessness of modern human beings. This 
homelessness is specifically evoked from the destiny of being in the 
form of metaphysics, and through metaphysics is simultaneously 
entrenched and covered up as such. Because Marx by experiencing 
estrangement attains an essential dimension of history, the Marxist 
view of history is superior to that of other historical accounts.55 
Marx is here praised for placing the experience of estrangement at the centre of his 
account of history, just as "On the Question of Being" pays compliment to Jiinger for 
his focus on the phenomenon of nihilism. Although Marx's whole critique of the 
expropriation of labour under capitalism, and the reduction of humanity to 
manipulable material, rests on the notion of estrangement, he does not recognise, in 
Heidegger' s judgement, the roots themselves of estrangement in homelessness. Marx 
correctly grasps estrangement as the essence of the history of metaphysics, but he 
does not grasp that this essence is an evasion with respect to the question of Being. 
Continuing to speak of Marxism and its Hegelian legitimacy, Heidegger 
aligns communism with 'CEXV'fl, and thereby indicates what he saw as the essential 
danger of communism: 
124 
The modern metaphysical essence of labor is anticipated in Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit as the self-establishing process of 
unconditioned production, which is the objectification of the actual 
through the human being, experienced as subjectivity. The essence of 
materialism is concealed in the essence of technology, about which 
much has been written but little has been thought. Technology is in its 
essence a destiny within the history of being and of the truth of being, 
a truth that lies in oblivion. For technology does not go back to the 
'rEXVT) of the Greeks in name only but derives historically and 
essentially from 'rEXVT) as a mode of a.A.rt8EUEW, a mode, that is, of 
rendering beings manifest. As a form of truth technology is grounded 
in the history of metaphysics, which is itself a distinctive and up to 
now the only surveyable phase of the history of being. No matter 
which of the various positions one chooses to adopt toward the 
doctrines of communism and to their foundation, from the point of 
view of the history of being it is certain that an elemental experience of 
what is world-historical speaks out in it. Whoever takes 
"communism" only as a "party" or a "Weltanschauung" is thinking too 
shallowly.56 
Communism is inadequately described as a party or a Weltanschauung because in 
communism there takes place a primordial experience of beings in their 
objectification through labour. Unless it is believed that Heidegger's preference for 
the NSDAP over Marxism can be fully explained by the attitudes prevalent among 
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the provincial petty bourgeoisie of the 1930s, then such statements with regard to the 
philosophical significance of communism have to be taken seriously as a confession 
of what Heidegger thought was at stake in his political engagement. As much as 
communism is an insight into the essential estrangement of the human being, it is also 
a danger because its insight does not reach far enough into the ground of 
estrangement. Derived from Hegel' s understanding of labour, Marx's insight remains 
metaphysical. The homelessness of modern human beings is not experienced as such, 
since it is experienced as the expropriation of labour rather than as a falling away 
from the equation of the human essence with originary temporality. Whereas both 
Marx and Heidegger criticise the reification of humanity, Marx, unlike Heidegger, 
does not argue that any logicist conception of humanity amounts to a reification. 
Marx's response to estrangement is thus inspired by a definition of the human 
essence that is still governed, according to Heidegger, by the Dingbegriffe of classical 
ontology. 
That to which Marx objects in capitalism, and in Hegel' s theory of the State, 
is that the logicist conception of humanity has not yet come to its full flowering. In 
his Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right', Marx thus condemns Hegel for 
deviating from his logic in order to accommodate the political constitution of his day: 
It is not a question of developing the determinate idea of the political 
constitution, but of giving the political constitution a relation to the 
abstract Idea, of classifying it as a member of its (the Idea's) life 
history. This is an obvious mystification.57 
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Hegel' s mystification of the positive is, for Marx, an obfuscation of his own 
recognition of the absolute negativity of the human being. Hegel' s philosophy 
becomes the expression of the inconsistency of capitalism and its "hypocritical, 
bourgeois cosmopolitanism"58 • Having emerged into history through the dissolution 
of the positive in the slave's fear, the universality of human Spirit still lacks the 
immanent determinative power that Hegel himself attributes to it. Under capitalism it 
remains the extrinsic universality of homo oeconomicus, i.e. the universal of 
quantifiable labour that regulates trade and allows the disparities in the living 
conditions of concrete human beings to persist unchecked. It is accordingly against 
the speciousness of bourgeois cosmopolitanism that Marx expostulates, reserving for 
a genuine cosmopolitanism the deliverance of humanity from its reification. The 
reduction of workers to the commodity of their labour is to be reversed by a 
substantive dissolution of the particularity of the positive in the element of the 
universality of self-consciousness. In Hegel, this dissolution was merely 
"ideological". Hegel, for Marx, is too little a logician, since his philosophy retains 
much that is irrational and obscurantist. The task that Marx sets himself in his own 
Auseinandersetzung with Hegel is a perfection of the universalism of the latter's 
thought, rather than its ontological destruction. The estrangement of modem human 
beings is to be countered in communism by a recovery into the universality of the 
human essence. 
But such a recovery will decide nothing with regard to Heidegger's notion of 
homelessness, because even in its universality the human essence continues to be 
thought inauthentically. Communism cannot effect a deliverance of humanity from 
the sway of reification, since the equality of a genuine cosmopolitanism is grounded 
in the understanding of Being as presence. Without the apprehensibility of the 
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distinctness of beings in presence there is no foundation for the claim of their 
equality. Under communism, Dasein will have been disentangled from its 
identifications with the commodity only to be still thought as a being present-at-hand 
in the iterable distinctness of its logicist essence. 
But is the "Letter on 'Humanism"' really, at bottom, a criticism of Marx? To 
overlook the antagonism of its position involves any commentary on Heidegger in a 
number of difficulties. The remark on the dangers of communism in the 
contemporaneous letter to Marcuse cannot be reconciled with any endorsement of 
Marx, just as Heidegger' s enlistment in a political party vociferously opposed to 
Marxism must itself be considered to indicate, at least, a mistrust of the latter's tenets. 
But if Heidegger was wanting to distance himself from National Socialism after the 
war, could he have found a better means than an appeal to the resurgent Marxism of 
the French intelligentsia? And yet, as this appeal would consist in a textually 
unfounded identification of Marx's account of estrangement and Heidegger' s account 
of homelessness, it is hard to imagine that Heidegger, as a historian of philosophy, 
could so forget himself. To dwell here on the unacceptability of the identification 
may illuminate a negative reason for Heidegger's political engagement, namely his 
rejection of Marxism. This can be done by addressing a reading of the two thinkers 
that does not notice the fundamental difference between their conceptions of 
alienation and confounds the universalism of the one with the other's suspicion of the ~ 
well-foundedness of the ontic. 
Kostas Axelos, in Einfiihrung in ein kiinftiges Denken: Uber Marx und 
Heidegger, seemingly takes for granted Lucien Goldmann's thesis that Being and 
Time ends with an exhortation to elaborate and deepen Lukacs's (and not, more 
plausibly, Husserl's59) theory of reified consciousness.60 Drawing attention to a 
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distinction in the young Marx with the purpose of "radicalising" Marx and bringing 
him closer to his own equally peculiar understanding of Heidegger, Axelos writes: 
He speaks of the "presupposition" of Socialism-Communism and even 
writes on a badly ripped and scarcely legible page of the Paris 
Manuscript: "If we still characterise communism itself- because as 
negation of the negation, as the appropriation of the human essence 
that mediates itself with itself through negation of private property, 
accordingly not yet as the true [Marx's emphasis] position that begins 
from itself but, on the contrary, from private property" (p. 264), then 
that must mean that estrangement is not actually sublated. 61 
But is it the object per se that Marx wants to overthrow or simply the institution of 
private property? Is any object whatsoever an obstacle to genuine cosmopolitanism? 
Or merely reified humanity in its particularity? For Axelos, in 1966, the quoted 
passage from the Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts is, extraordinarily, a 
reservation on Marx's part with respect to communism, as though Marx considered 
an absolute recuperation of the human essence - the true negation of that negation 
which is the extemality of, among other things, private property - to be the highest 
political good. 
In his 1967 preface to History and Class Consciousness, Lukacs confesses 
that it was precisely under the impact of reading in 1930 this text by Marx that he 
repudiated his earlier blanket opposition to objectification: 
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In the process of reading the Marx manuscript all the idealist 
prejudices of History and Class Consciousness were swept to one side. 
It is undoubtedly true that I could have found ideas similar to those 
which now had such an overwhelming effect on me in the works of 
Marx that I had read previously. But the fact is that this did not 
happen, evidently because I read Marx in the light of my own Hegelian 
interpretation. 62 
Axelos, who translated History and Class Consciousness into French, is perhaps 
under the sway of the Hegelian Marxism of Lukacs' s text when, in the Economic-
Philosophical Manuscripts, he takes the true sublation of extemality to be desirable. 
A true sublation of externality, as Lukacs later argues, could only be desirable from 
"a failure to subject the Hegelian heritage to a thoroughgoing materialist 
reinterpretation."63 The consequence of such a sublation is the very impossibility of 
materialism: 
But as, according to Hegel, the object, the thing exists only as an 
alienation from self-consciousness, to take it back into the subject 
would mean the end of objective reality and thus of any reality at all. 
History and Class Consciousness follows Hegel in that it too equates 
alienation with objectification [Vergegenstandlichung] (to use the term 
employed by Marx in the Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts). This 
fundamental and crude error has certainly contributed greatly to the 
success enjoyed by History and Class Consciousness.64 
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The crude error of History and Class Consciousness is that the object was to be taken 
back into the subject without remainder: the destruction and preservation of Hegel's 
Aufhebung is reduced to destruction. That which in Hegel is ideological, namely the 
reappropriation of the human essence that nonetheless leaves existing conditions 
intact, is also that which constitutes the realism of his philosophy. Lukacs 
acknowledges his own earlier lack of realism when he compares the identical subject-
object in Hegel with the messianic proletariat of History and Class Consciousness: 
Of course, in Hegel it arises in a purely logical and philosophical form 
when the highest stage of absolute spirit is attained in philosophy by 
abolishing alienation and by the return of self-consciousness to itself, 
thus realising the identical subject-object. In History and Class 
Consciousness, however, this process is socio-historical and it 
culminates when the proletariat reaches this stage in its class 
consciousness, thus becoming the identical subject-object of history. 
This does indeed appear to 'stand Hegel on his feet'; it appears as if 
the logico-metaphysical construction of the Phenomenology of Mind 
had found its authentic realisation in the existence and the 
consciousness of the proletariat. [ ... ] But is the identical subject-
object here anything more in truth than a purely metaphysical 
construct?65 
In 1967, Lukacs answers in the negative. He has made his peace with objectification, 
"for objectification is indeed a phenomenon that cannot be eliminated from human 
life in society."66 When Axelos attributes to the young Marx the political ambition of 
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a complete reappropriation of objective reality, it is thus in defiance of what Lukacs 
will have come to view as the essence of Marxist materialism. And by virtue of his 
socio-historical recasting of Hegel, Axelos is likewise in defiance of Heidegger. The 
solution that Axelos proffers to estrangement is the reappropriation of o~jective 
reality, whereas for Heidegger the oneness of such a delivered humanity would still 
denote an estrangement from the ecstases of originary temporality. 
Heidegger does not attempt to overcome estrangement in the wisdom that is at 
one with all that is, i.e. in Lukacs's words to "out-Hegel Hegel".67 Instead Heidegger 
attempts, one might say, to "out-die" Hegel. Heidegger's critique of Hegel is, 
accordingly, informed by a stricter adherence, not so much to universalism, as to 
mortality. Hegel' s philosophy is a philosophy of death that is at once a philosophy of 
eternity. It begins at a point beyond death and, as it is born in the ruin of sensuous 
immediacy, it faces from the outset the universal and its absolute present. For Hegel, 
the Whole is the True because he begins at the point at which everything is 
unconcealed. That which is essentially concealed, and still announced itself for the 
Greeks in the genuine contest between aA.118cta and forgetfulness, simply does not 
exist in his philosophy. Hegel is unable to think the catastrophic character of Dasein. 
Being is already resolved into the totality of the mediation between the universal and 
the particular, between the subject and the object. It is at least in part Heidegger's 
understanding of death that renders him insusceptible to a politics that defines itself 
by the goal of genuine cosmopolitanism or the totality of subject and object. 
Heidegger' s rejection of the universalism of Marxism cannot be wholly ascribed to 
provincialist prejudices, but must be appraised also in the context of his interrogation 
of the appropriateness of the universal to Dasein. In the essential "not-yet" of its 
Being-towards-death, Dasein never ceases to die and thus never ceases to defer the 
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moment in which it would be sundered from the ontological undecidability of 
sensuous immediacy and handed over definitively to the absolute present of the 
universal. What is handed over in death is not Dasein, but a being present-at-hand. 
By its elevation to the universal, humanity is tricked, as it were, into accepting the 
authority of the Dingbegrif.fe of classical ontology. The realisation of the universal 
class in early Marx is, for Althusser, a "'religious"' concept of the proletariat,68 and, 
indeed, there is something numinous in a substantive cosmopolitanism. But more 
than simply for its religious analogy, the universal class is to be criticised for 
obscuring Dasein' s status as an exception to the ontology of the present-at-hand. The 
humanity that has come to itself in its universality is no longer the being-outside-of-
itself that transcends the metaphysics of presence. Where, for Marx, estrangement 
lies in reified humanity's being outside of its own universalist essence, for Heidegger 
the estrangement of reification lies, by contrast, in humanity's being outside of its 
essential being-outside-of-itself. And because being-outside-of-itself is originary for 
Heidegger, estrangement can never be recuperated. Fallenness (Velfallenheit), as 
Heidegger stresses again and again in Being and Time, is not a condition to be 
rectified or deplored. It is, however, a condition to be understood - and understood 
despite the metaphysical determination of understanding - in its foundations in the 
essential being-outside-of-itself of Dasein. In its lostness in the "they'', in its 
fallenness and inauthenticity, Dasein is still essentially and conspicuously a being-
outside-of-itself, even as it takes itself for something present-at-hand. Furthermore 
- and herein Heidegger' s account attests to its irreconcilability with Hegelianism -
it is still closer to its essential being-outside-of-itself in its lostness, than in the self-
collection and containment of its self-understanding. Marx's critique of alienation 
notes the being-outside-of-itself ofreified humanity, but inasmuch as Marx interprets 
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it as a condition to be made good in the regulated transcendence of the universal, 
Marx's critique remains true to its Hegelian roots in its relation to the Un-thought of 
classi~al ontology. In communism everything is pulled back to the centre of the 
absolute present of the death of Spirit. 
While it is not easy to discover what could have attracted Heidegger in the 
biologism of the NSDAP, he was clearly receptive to the movement's hostility 
towards Marxism. It goes without saying that this hostility did not develop in the 
direction of a questioning concerning the truth of Being. National Socialism broke 
with the consciousness of Hegel' s pure ego, and the class consciousness of the 
Marxist proletariat, but it did not escape the sway of the metaphysics of presence. In 
the Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger censures a notion of the Volk that still 
admits the model of the "I": 
It is only on the basis of Da-sein that the essence of the people can be 
grasped and that means at the same time knowing that the people can 
never be goal and purpose and that such an opinion is only a "folkish" 
[>volkisch<] extension of the "liberal" thought of the "I" and of the 
economic idea of the preservation of "life". 69 
Situated in Dasein's Being-there in a world, the essence of the Volk is situated in that 
which is lost to view with the abstraction of the "I". The people can never be made a 
goal or a purpose in, for instance, the propaganda of a "folkish" state, because the 
abstraction presupposed for the setting of any goal or purpose never comes up with 
anything that could properly be called the Volk. Defined by the historicality, i.e. the 
transcendence of Dasein, the Volk is too indefinite to fulfil the role of a purpose. It 
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transcends itself and thus lacks the stability to constitute a measure. The ontic 
instability of the Volk is not a shortcoming, but rather a necessary consequence of its 
originarity. The Volk cannot be modelled on the "I", because it precedes it in the very 
same sense that the transcendence of Dasein precedes the presence and self-identity 
of the subject. Nothing needs to be added to Dasein in order to arrive at the Volk. 
Without distorting matters too much, it could therefore be contended that Heidegger's 
people can be traced back to Husserl' s demotion of the epistemological subject of 
Neo-Kantianism, since it is in his critique of psychologism and anthropomorphism 
that Husserl opened Heidegger' s eyes to the primacy of intentionality and what he 
was to call "transcendence". With the early theory of the categorial intuitions, 
Husserl short-circuits the transcendental subject in the Logical Investigations. He 
raises the possibility of no longer conceiving knowledge as the commerce between 
the individual intuitions of the phenomenal world and the categories that have their 
seat in the stability and unity of the subject. Hegel's pure ego is to be displaced from 
its position of authority over what is, and being-outside-of-itself is not automatically 
to fall under the rule of the One in being known. The self-presence of death ceases to 
be as desirable as its anticipation and deferral. For Heidegger, his political 
engagement will be determined in part by this courtship of death. 
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II Ontological Opportunism 
Everywhere he goes, Ortega y Gasset encounters the masses. Suddenly, and without 
anyone knowing why, the hotels, waiting rooms, theatres, railways and seaside resorts 
have become overcrowded. And yet, as Ortega y Gasset notes in his report on the 
circumstances of European demagogy, the population has not increased: "Approximately 
the same number of people existed fifteen years ago."1 For Ortega y Gasset in 1930 the 
masses do not define themselves in terms of a quantitative result, just as for Heidegger in 
1927 a people is not the sum of many subjects. The congestion with which the masses 
have enveloped the public places is not a consequence of a numerical excess, since, for 
Ortega y Gasset, it is as the quality of numerical excess per se that the masses appear at 
all. Endemic to public places, they necessarily resist the analysis and decomposition into 
isolated individuals by which their numerability could be assured. They are a number 
that cannot be counted. In their character of a pure "too much", the masses push 
the111selves forward as perverse suitors for the Kantian sublime. At every tum, Ortega y 
Gasset witnesses the collapse of the spectacle of the individual before the monolithic 
quantity of homogeneous humanity. For Ortega y Gasset, lacking Heidegger's suspicion 
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of the antithesis between the individual and the "they", and thus lacking any insight into 
the appeal of his individualism for a fascist readership, the uprising of the masses is 
nothing but the failure of individuation. It is thus a population at a loss what to do with 
itself that overruns the public places. Heidegger's political engagement, and National 
Socialism itself, was an attempt to assume the leadership of this uprising. 
For Heidegger in 1933, the masses were not to be urged to retreat from the public 
places. On the contrary, the uprising of the masses, once it had been led beyond a 
satisfaction with the externality of "folkish" accoutrements, was expected to become the 
136 
Volk of the question of Being. This transformation of the masses was to coincide with a 
transformation of the German university. From his position as rector of Freiburg 
University, Heidegger wanted to bring the university into line with the ontological 
mission of the German Volk. This did not entail imposing a general framework on 
faculties that had previously been autonomous. The apparent autonomy of the faculties 
was, in Heidegger' s judgement, nothing other than their homogenisation in the liberal 
conception of science. The "crisis" of the specialisation of the sciences was a 
consequence of the fundamental aimlessness of this homogenisation. This question of 
the aim of the sciences, and of the Volk, is the question that Heidegger raises in "The 
Self-Assertion of the German University". In his essay "But Suppose We Were to Take 
the Rectorial Address Seriously ... Gerard Grauel' s De l 'universite", Christopher Fynsk 
accordingly writes: 
Heidegger posed the[ ... ] question to the German university: were the' 
sciences to be? He [ ... ] posed it from the basis of the [ ... ] conception of 
the university's founding function, asserting that if the sciences were to 
assume theii: possibility, they would have to recapture their essence in a 
renewal of the Greek concept of 'tEXVfl (what Heidegger named " ... the 
innermost center of the entire Dasein as a people in its state," "the power 
that hones and embraces Dasein in its entirety"). Finally, he asked this 
question with [a] revolutionary design. For he argued that only by . 
recovering their originary "revolutionary" essence would the sciences be 
able to serve-in the sense of guiding and impelling-the National 
Socialist revolution.2 
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The sciences were to guide and impel the National Socialist revolution by renewing the 
Greek concept of knowledge ('tEXVYJ). Fynsk, who does not take the rectoral address 
seriously enough, omits asking after the aim of a renewal of 'tEXVYJ. That which was to 
be known in this renewal - and could be known only by the Volk- was Dasein itself. 
To the mobilised population of Hitler's Germany the truth of Dasein, and thus the 
fundamental truth of all the sciences, was to reveal itself. And that is to say, it was to 
reveal the impossibility of its revelation in the light of presence. 
"The Self-Assertion of the German University" is addressed to a popular uprising, 
but it is concerned with concealment. What interests Heidegger in the sudden publicness 
of the masses is not the privacy of Ortega y Gas set's individual, but rather the 
concealment that is the essence of the German Volk. In "The Self-Assertion of the 
German University", Heidegger arguably aspires to involve the "folkish" uprising in his 
own confrontation with the metaphysics of presence. Incited in their nationalism and 
drilled in the definition of the non-positivity of German Volk, the masses were to be led 
to a collision with what is. 
In hindsight, it is easy to see that Heidegger expected too much from the masses. 
The cynicism of hindsight, as it rests on the positivism with which it views the past, is 
incapable of appreciating the task that Heidegger set himself and the "folkish" uprising'. 
For hindsight, Heidegger will always have come too late to direct the uprising down 
another path. Once the philosophical ambition of the rectoral address has been 
overlooked, Heidegger's political engagement loses any distance from National 
Socialism. 
In the name of the Volk of the question of Being Heidegger appealed to the 
masses of a nationalist uprising. If Heidegger' s appeal was to have a chance of success, 
the masses had to be nationalistic. The masses had to be open to an appeal to their 
nationalism, and inasmuch as an appeal needed to be made, the masses had to differ as 
138 
yet from the Volk of the question of Being. Heidegger did not confuse the masses of 
National Socialism with the Volk of the question of Being, but he failed to bring about a 
transformation of the masses. 
As a result, Heidegger's people in 1933 does not conspicuously differ from the 
populations public by default in which the various fascist movements took root. The 
possibility of the Volk of the question of Being is overshadowed by the reality of a racist 
mobilisation. But who were these masses that had no means of resisting the public 
spaces of National Socialism? On their own, the unemployed were too meagre a 
constituency. The fascist movements arose with the masses and simultaneously 
presented themselves as a solution to the masses. The masses were to be given 
something to do. And whereas, for Deleuze and Guattari, the people is born in the 
intermittent deterritorialisations of surplus labour3, for fascism, the people was born only 
in the reterritorialisation of surplus labour. The people of fascism defined itself by its 
work in the service of the nation. Surplus labour was absorbed, yet neither through the 
emergence of new modes of production (by which, for example, the cessation of popular 
unrest after the breakdown of feudalism can be explained) nor through one of the cyclic 
recuperations of global capitalism. The expediency of fascism is manifest in the 
makeshift with which it responded to the initial tes~ of its popularity: work, which had 
been the obstacle to the inundation of the public places by the masses, was itself 
transformed into a political act. Under fascism, production became immediately a 
monument to the nation and a dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie masqueraded as a 
Greek polis. The politicization of work, which is to say the subordination of production 
to the national good, was fascism's response to the ambulatory masses thrown up by 
economic depression. This response nonetheless simply displaced the problem of surplus 
into the realm of distribution. By virtue of its industrial superiority, Germany was in time 
subjected through this displacement to far fiercer pressures than Italy - rearmament 
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under the NSDAP did not run up against the restrictions of a still largely agrarian work 
force. Invoked in order to restore surplus labour to its origins within the people, the 
nation was never wholly able to suppress the doubt that it was itself a matter of surplus 
and of excess. Assigning as its measure and truth an origin solicited from expediency, 
fascism set against the alienation of the masses under capitalism a rootedness in the 
fatherland of the lie. When Heidegger stepped forward as rector of Frei burg University 
to preach the fulfilment of the promise of ancient Greece, it was thus among the 
grandiose and yet likewise shabby stage scenery of Blut und Boden. The scandal of 
Heidegger' s rectoral address is that the juxtaposition of ontology and demagogy is never 
ordered in a moment of ironic "revelation". 
What could Heidegger have seen in the nation of fascism? That the nation was to 
be seen constituted an imperative of the fascist movements. The nation is a result, rather 
than the starting point of fascism. It has to be produced. In his speech "The Tasks of the 
German Theatre", delivered on 8 May, 1933 in the Hotel Kaiserhof in Berlin, Goebbels 
notoriously pressed the movement's claim to creativity: 
I am even of the opinion that politics is the highest art there is, since the 
sculptor shapes only the stone, the dead stone, and the poet only the word, 
which in itself is dead. But the statesman shapes the masses, gives them 
statute and structure, breathes in form and life so that a people arises from 
them.4 
A people is the work of art for which the masses are the material and fascism the artist. 
For Goebbels, as for Heidegger, a people cannot be taken for granted. Yet, for Goebbels, 
a people that is missing is not Being-with-one-another in its inauthenticity, but dead, 
unindividuated matter. The people that is brought to life through the artistry of 
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politicians is not essentially at odds with reification. To the extent that it comes to itself 
only inasmuch as it furnishes proof of the will to power of the politician as creator, the 
people does not come to itself at all, remaining an object over against an absolute 
subjectivity. Hence the fascist aestheticisation of politics acquires a more sinister 
meaning than the diremption of public discourse from the workings of government. In 
fascism the masses cannot even be duped because outside the fiction of the politician-
aesthete, in which alone they become animate, they lack the means to be gullible. Here 
politics as the highest art - as that through which according to Democritus (Fragment 
157) human beings come to praiseworthy successes - is reduced to taking its cue from 
Shaw's Pygmalion. 
Less than three weeks after Goebbels' speech in Berlin, on 27 May, 1933 
Heidegger delivered his inaugural address as the newly elected rector of Freiburg 
University. The stance taken in this address towards National Socialism and the "glory" 
and "greatness of this new beginning" is by no means unambiguous, and not least 
because after the war Heidegger insisted on a recognition of the defiance in its title -
"The Self-Assertion of the German University". This defiance is better understood, 
however, in terms of Heidegger' s ontological opportunism. Grounds for such an 
interpretation can be drawn from the address itself, and even from Heidegger's own 
apologetics. Heidegger was always too convinced of the philosophical superiority of his 
motivations to hide completely what was at stake. 
In the text "The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts", Heidegger writes that a 
rector who had joined the NSDAP - but, unlike himself, not out of "defiance" - would 
have chosen another title than "Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universitat". But in 
pressing the case for his opposition to the new regime, Heidegger makes a slip: 
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One could excuse oneself from reflection and hold onto the seemingly 
obvious thought that, shortly after National Socialism seized power, a 
newly elected rector gives an address on the university, an address which 
"represents" National Socialism [welche Rede »den« Nationalsozialismus 
»vertritt«] - that is to say, proclaims the idea of "political science," 
which, crudely understood, says "True is what is good for the people." 
From this one concludes, and rightly so, that this betrays the essence of the 
German university in its very core and actively contributes to its 
destruction; for this reason, the title should be "The Self-Decapitation of 
the German University" [»Die Selbstenthauptung der deutschen 
Universitat«]. 5 
What jars with the exculpatory reasoning in this passage is the use of scare quotes around 
the definite article before "National Socialism". It is as though Heidegger in 1945 only 
wishes to distance himself from the National Socialism of convention. To another and 
"private" National Socialism, such as that with which Wacker, the Baden minister of art, 
education and justice, charged him after hearing the address6, he seemingly retains his 
loyalty in the face of the full revelation of the regime's atrocities. "The Self-Assertion of 
the German University" is thus a title that restricts its defiance to "the" NSDAP. Even in 
1945, Heidegger's "private" National Socialism did not cast aside its obvious mask in 
order to present itself unequivocally as an expression of opposition to the regime. No 
doubt the motif of a "private" National Socialism was Heidegger's compromise between 
exculpation and plausibility. Heidegger's National Socialism must be said to have 
always been private. Being and Time had not been repudiated by 1933, and its emphatic 
distinction of the human from the present-at-hand is inconsistent with the conception of 
humanity as manipulable material formulated in Goebbels' speech to his audience in the 
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Kaiserhof Hotel and later put into practice in breeding programmes and extermination 
camps. This "private" National Socialism of Heidegger's constitutes a grey zone of 
servility and resistance. In "The Self-Assertion of the German University", Aeschylus, 
Nietzsche, Clausewitz and Plato are referred to by name, but not Hitler, and yet this 
appearance of a rebuff is contradicted by the assiduity with which Heidegger as rector 
oversaw the Gleichschaltung of Freiburg University. Heidegger, who boasts in his 
interview with Der Spiegel in 1966 that no other rectoral address of the period dared as 
much with its title7, nonetheless telegrammed Hitler on 20 May, 1933 to ask for a 
"postponement of the planned reception of the executive committee of German 
universities until the moment when the direction of the university association 
[HochschulverbandJ has been brought about in the sense of the Gleichschaltung that 
precisely here is especially necessary."8 It would be easy and, within a certain context, 
justified to dismiss as merely verbal the defiance that in a frantic post-war apologetiGs 
Heidegger uncovers in the title of his address. To do so, however, entails foregoing any 
convincing reconstruction (which is not the same as a defence) of the terms on which 
Heidegger could align himself with a movement whose understanding of humanity was 
irreconcilable with his own. What is involved in a convincing reconstruction is more 
than the continuity and coherence of a biography .. The irreconcilability with National 
Socialism of the understanding of humanity set forth repeatedly in Heidegger' s writings 
is, for its own sake, what must be defended in the face of ad hominem arguments. 
The defiance of "The Self-Assertion of the German University", insofar as it is 
the text itself that is in question and not just its free-floating title, lies in an excess, rather 
than in an opposition. Heidegger does not set himself against the movement, but seeks to 
follow it through to the point of exhaustion where it must give way to something else. In 
this sense, Heidegger is comparable to the Stalinist critics of the 1920s and '30s who all 
but welcomed fascism as the catastrophic preamble to socialism. That Heidegger situates 
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the merit of the "new beginning" in its chance of failure is evident from the extraordinary 
interpretation that he offers in the address of a verse by Aeschylus: 
Among the Greeks there circulated an old report that Prometheus had been 
the first philosopher. It is this Prometheus into whose mouth Aeschylus 
puts an adage that expresses the essence of knowledge: 
Techne d'anangkes asthenstera makro 
"But knowledge is far less powerful than necessity." That means: all 
knowledge of things remains beforehand at the mercy of overpowering 
fate and fails before it. 
It is precisely for that reason that knowledge must develop its· 
highest defiance, for which alone the entire might of the concealedness of 
what is will first rise up, in order really to fail. Thus what is reveals itself 
in its unfathomable inalterability and confers its truth on knowledge. This 
adage about the creative impotence of knowledge is a saying of the 
Greeks, in whom we all too easily see the model for knowledge that, 
taking its stand purely on itself and thereby forgetting itself, counts among 
us as the "theoretical" attitude. 9 
Failure is, for Heidegger, not simply a method that knowledge has at its disposal in 
uncovering what is. Knowledge must fail in earnest, and in its every method, so that 
what is will reveal itself in its truth. Prior to its failure, knowledge is not strictly 
knowledge, but rather an unwitting collusion with the concealedness (Verborgenheit) of 
beings'. 
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But why in the first months of the National Socialist regime did Heidegger 
expound this failure as the mission of the German university? Curiously, Heidegger 
declared in 1966 that he would be willing to repeat the rectoral address, and with a still 
greater vehemence than before. 10 The untimeliness with which he no doubt wanted this 
confession to imbue the text - an untimeliness that he believed would likewise have 
marked the text's repetition in the BRD - is, in the circumstances of Heidegger' s 
engagement, the untimeliness less of the apolitical than of the opportunistic. In the name 
of the failure of knowledge, Heidegger was prepared to disregard the long and public list 
of Nazi acts of brutality under the Weimar Republic and assume the office of rector after 
the social democrat von Mollendorff had been dismissed by the new regime as 
unsuitable. Even if other motivations can be adduced for Heidegger' s engagement, in his 
most significant text as rector, it is on knowledge defined by failure that he fixes his 
attention in the altered conditions. Heidegger's "private" National Socialism is the 
National Socialism of the openly exhorted failure of knowledge. Bewitched by his own 
definition of the movement and assured of its superiority, Heidegger is not cynical in his 
opportunism. He is not even able to see his engagement as opportunistic. For Heidegger, 
the failure of knowledge, by virtue of its status as the limit towards which knowledge 
must strive in order to be what it is, cannot be anything other than the truth of knowledge 
and, ipso facto, of a political movement, whether in 1933 or 1966. The excess of "The 
Self-Assertion of the German University", and its equivocal defiance, is the excess by 
which it reaches beyond everything that lies unconcealed before knowledge in order to 
founder against the concealedness of necessity. In reaching beyond whatever lies 
unconcealed, "The Self-Assertion of the German University" reaches beyond an 
empirical National Socialism to the meta-National Socialism that is the truth of the 
movement. It is this meta-National Socialism that will be known when necessity itself is 
known and knowledge is truly knowledge of what is. 
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Heidegger' s politics is a politics of concealedness. The conception of politics 
underlying Heidegger's engagement in 1933 is inseparable from the pre-eminence of 
failure before concealedness in his account of knowledge. If Heidegger, in his address, 
exhorts the university to genuine failure, it is because only in genuine failure does 
knowledge exchange the presumption of its "theoretical" attitude for the truth of its 
ground in beings. 8£CDpta., as the visibility of what is, comes to grief on the fate that is 
both essential and essentially concealed. With the proposition of the superior power of 
fate, Heidegger participates in the National Socialist demotion of the concepts of pure 
science and academic freedom. 11 But Heidegger' s understanding of fate should not be 
identified with the National Socialist understanding of fate and the accompanying 
supremacy of the "political". The regime's complacent efforts to render the political 
visible suffice to indicate a distinction. The regime did not seek to founder on the 
invisibility of the political; instead, it sought to pass off the pervasiveness of its 
paraphernalia as the politicisation of the Gesellschaft of liberalism. The NSDA.e was-too 
positivistic in its understanding of fate. In the rectoral address, Aeschylus becomes the 
mouthpiece of Heidegger' s own repeated criticism of the ontological presuppositions of 
the positivism of modern science. Founded in classical ontology's inability to think 
Being as other than that which is present and visible to the gaze of 8Ecopta, modern 
science does not see that Dasein cannot be seen. 
Genuine failure, as it were, politicises knowledge, since it tears knowledge from 
the abstractness in which, forgetting its Being and thus forgetting itself, it beHeves it 
stands purely on itself. The event, and not the act, of genuine failure is the worlding of 
the world always tacitly presupposed by knowledge. As the historicality that is arrested 
when a being becomes visible in its presence and is known, fate cannot itself become 
visible. It cannot do so because it cannot reveal itself to knowledge, so long as 
knowledge, in a disavowal of failure, keeps within the limits of presence. Fate is the 
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concealedness of the world that is the site of all political occurrences. It is the possibility 
of knowledge (objective genitive) and the impossibility of knowledge (subjective 
genitive). In order really to fail, knowledge must develop the highest defiance of the 
necessity (Notwendigkeit) of its failure. It must fail utterly and, that is to say, without 
guile. Following through its ambitions on the infinite, it must seek to encompass world 
even as knowledge of world is never a knowledge encompassing world, but rather a 
knowledge encompassed by world. Knowledge that merely counterfeits failure - that 
mistakes for example its wilful abdication of the concept for an immediate intuition of 
what is - retains the limitations of the "theoretical" attitude. In the conviction of the 
authority of its caprices, it secretly still believes it stands on itself. Such knowledge plays 
its voluntaristic irrationalism off against the rationalism of Descartes and his successors, 
but thereby only varies the Seinsvergessenheit of the metaphysics of subjectity. Such 
knowledge is illusory because it cannot think the transcendence that is its own ground. 
Unable to think the worldliness of its Being, it is excluded from the truth of its essential 
politicality. 
Heidegger' s political engagement can, therefore, be said to have been ~n 
engagement for the political, namely, for that which will come solely at the 
consummation and defeat of the knowledge of the metaphysics of subjectity. 
Heidegger's National Socialism was divided without remainder between the ancient 
saying of the Greeks on the impotence of knowledge and the future realization of the 
truth of this saying. In "The Self-Assertion of the German University", the actuality of 
the movement resolves into the possibility of an authentic politics. And it is as the task of 
the German people that Heidegger puts forward this possibility: 
But neither will anyone ask us whether we will it or do not will it when the 
spiritual strength of the West fails and the West starts to come apart at the 
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seams, when this moribund pseudocivilization collapses into itself, pulling 
all forces into confusion and allowing them to suffocate in madness. 
Whether such a thing occurs or does not occur, this depends solely 
on whether we as a historical-spiritual Volk will ourselves, still and again, 
or whether we will ourselves no longer. Each individual has a part in 
deciding this, even if, and precisely if, he seeks to evade this decision. 
But it is our will that our Volk fulfill its historical mission. 12 
The historical task and possibility of the Germans is that they will themselves, not as 
individuals within the metaphysics of subjectity, but as a people. According to the above 
quotation, only the German people's will to self-assertion stands in the way of the 
collapse of the West. 13 But here the will is to be differentiated from the voluntarism and 
vulgar Nietzscheanism propagated by ideologues within the NSDAP. Precisely because 
Heidegger never disowned the rectoral address, the polemic against the will to power in 
his lectures from the late thirties and early forties cannot be interpreted as self-criticism. 
The German people's will to self-assertion is not its will to take on the role of the 
politician-aesthete among the masses of the globe. It is not its will to absolute 
subjectivity, but its will to the genuine failure of knowledge, and thus to the failure of 
will and its forgetfulness of world. Dasein's Being-in-the-world is to be recovered from 
oblivion. 
That the self-assertion of a historical-spiritual people is better understood in terms 
of failure, than in terms of success, is the import of an earlier passage from the rectoral 
address: 
This Volk is playing an active role i n shaping its fate by placing its history 
into the openness of the overpowering might of all the world-shaping 
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forces of human existence and by struggling ever anew to secure its 
spiritual world. Thus exposed to the extreme questionableness of its own 
existence, this Volk has the will to be a spiritual Volk. 14 
Understandably the Volk cannot win its spiritual world from a superior power. Through 
its defeat at the hands of the superior power, the Volk wrests its world from its own 
forgetfulness. The spiritual world that is secured is secured, not against the utmost 
questionability of a people's own Dasein, but, on the contrary, as this very questionability 
in the openness of the superior power of fate. The seeming paradox of Heidegger' s 
rectoral address is that the German people comes to itself in its ruinous collision with 
fate. It comes to itself and knows itself as other than a being present-at-hand in coming 
to its ground in the unknowability of world. 
As the university's will to knowledge is the means to this collision, it is the means 
to the eruption of the political from under the metaphysics of subjectity. It is the 
university that founds a people. In favour of such a definition, Heidegger does not 
hesitate in rejecting the "negative" notion of academic freedom proper to an autonomous 
institution within the liberal state. Instead, in a sentence at once imperious and 
subservient, he contends: "The will to the essence of the German university is the will to 
science as the will to the historical spiritual mission of the German Volk as a Volk that 
knows itself in its state." 15 The prospects of the National Socialist revolution are thereby 
tied up with the prospects of Heidegger's own rectorship. Already, in the 1928-9 lecture 
course Introduction to Philosophy, Heidegger speaks of the Filhrerschaft of the 
university and of its role in guiding the destiny of the people.16 The political self-
assertion of the German people does not merely coincide with the self-assertion of 
knowledge, since the political, in the broadest sense as the site of the clearing of beings, 
is the truth towards which knowledge aspires. 
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In 1933 Heidegger did not want a "private" National Socialism. He did not want 
to come across merely as an opportunist and a fellow traveller. Born in the same year as 
Hitler, Heidegger alters even his moustache in his aggressive design to become Hitler's 
doppelganger. Under the cover of the euphoria of his commitment and the peculiarly 
dogmatic haziness of the official doctrine, Heidegger endeavoured to foist his "private" 
National Socialism on the new Germany as its thought. But when the attempt foundered 
and the regime disintegrated in obloquy and murder, Heidegger quickly redrew the 
boundaries of his "private" National Socialism. 
In a letter from 15 December 1945 to the chairman of the university committee 
investigating political activities under the Nazis, Heidegger urges against taking his 
dealings with the regime, such as the telegram to Hitler, at face value: 
When the word "Gleichschaltung" is used in the telegram, I intended it in 
the sense in which I also understood the name "National Socialism". It 
was never my intention to deliver the university up to the doctrine of the 
party, but quite the reverse to try from within National Socialism and in 
relation to it to initiate a spiritual transformation. 17 
Accordingly, in the language of Heidegger' s unintentionally private National Socialism, 
the Gleichschaltung of Freiburg University is not the bringing of the university into line 
with the regime, but rather the bringing of the regime into line with the university under 
Heidegger's leadership. 
Whether a Gleichschaltung of any kind was needed is not a doubt that Heidegger 
could have entertained, given the conception of the political underlying his "private" 
National Socialism. Wanting the concealedness of fate to reveal itself, Heidegger wanted 
the German Volk to reveal itself. The Volk was to be the consequence of 
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Gleichschaltung, rather than that which was to be brought into line. All efforts were to 
be directed towards the ontological mission of the German people, since it is on a 
fulfilment of this mission that the knowledge of the truth of beings depends. Heidegger' s 
vision in the rectoral address is of the university with which the state has been brought 
into line and mobilized for the highest of all tasks. The concealment of fate is to be 
defied, so that the truth of the historicality of Dasein might be understood in its originary 
character. In other words, and in the language of the regime, the truth of the Volk is to be 
placed above the truth of the abstract subject. 
With regard to Heidegger' s veritable totalitarianism of the university, the rectoral 
address is timelier in 1933 than it would have been in 1966. But whereas the 
totalitarianism of the Hitlerian dictatorship sought the liquidation of the abstract subject 
by ultimatum, and on account of such decisionism was thus unable to break with the 
metaphysics of subjectity, Heidegger, in 1933, advances an utterly singular strategy of 
epistemological exhaustion. Heidegger's "private" National Socialism was to be the 
National Socialism at least capable of attempting to carry out its programme of 
politicisation, since it remained considerably more faithful to the movement's distinction 
between the political and the subject. As the foundations of the subject are, for 
Heidegger, philosophical, it is only by a painstaking, philosophical confrontation with 
these foundations that the subject might be overcome and the political inaugurated. If 
Heidegger intimates to Hitler in his telegram that he is going too fast, he thereby voices 
nothing but his assessment of the movement as a whole. 
What is frequently overlooked in "The Self-Assertion of the German University" 
is this sobriety. The afflatus of Heidegger's "private" National Socialism blows very 
coolly on the triumphalist reckoning that the revolution had already taken place. Having 
implied that the revolution against liberalism and the metaphysics of subjectity rests with 
the failure of knowledge, Heidegger cautions: 
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If, however, the Greeks needed three centuries just to put the question of 
what knowledge is on the proper footing and on the secure path, then we 
certainly cannot think that the elucidation and unfolding of the essence of 
the German university can occur in the present or coming semester. 18 
The German university, which is to demand more of itself than simply the question of 
what knowledge is, needs time. Through dispensing with the development of 
knowledge's highest defiance, a revolution by fiat amounts solely to a variation of the 
terms laid down in the metaphysics of subjectity. The National Socialism of Hitler (if 
such a locution can be permitted for the moment) was unequal to the task of overcoming 
the subject, since the domain of the subject must first be accurately delimited before it 
can be overcome. 
For Heidegger, the revolution has, first and foremost, to be an enquiry 
into the foundations of knowledge 'and the ontological presuppositions of the 
epistemological subject. Translated as "knowledge", the 'tEXVTl of Aeschylus' verse thus 
signifies in 1933 something quite different from the manipulative ingenuity of advanced 
industrial societies by which Heidegger would later understand technicism. In "The Self-
Assertion of the German University", 'tEXVll is characterized by its defiance of the 
superior power of fate, rather than by any obliviousness to fate. 'tEXVTl does not aspire to 
the mastery of material, but to the impossible illumination of its own blind necessity, to 
the unconcealedness of what is essentially concealed in its difference from the present-at-
hand. To borrow more than an image from What Is A Thing?, 'tEXVTl seeks to jump over 
its own shadow. 19 The necessity that is the unacknowledged ground of the theoretical 
attitude is, in unavailing defiance of this definition, to become the object of the 
theoretical attitude. In 1933, Heidegger accordingly repeats speculative idealism's 
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project of absolute knowledge precisely in order to come up to its failure. He endeavours 
to seize hold of the finitude of knowledge, where Hegel jumped away from it into the 
metaphysical sun of the dialectic. Heidegger's "private" National Socialism, in one 
- respect and in contrast to the Blut und Boden mysticism of the regime, wants to be more 
Hegelian than Hegel, since it wants to think rigorously the finitude of world that Hegel 
ultimately evaded through its conceptualisation. And if it wants to be more Hegelian 
than Hegel, it is nonetheless so as to have done with Hegel. Heidegger' s longstanding 
desire to outdo Hegel in sobriety complements his derision for the subaltern antics of 
irrationalism. -Both can be derived from his appraisal of the scope of metaphysics and the 
corresponding magnitude of the exclusively philosophical task of its destruction. As it is 
formulated in Heidegger's "private" National Socialism, the revolution is the self-
assertion of sobriety within metaphysics. 
Sobriety, rather than the intoxication of blood, is Heidegger' s response to the 
metaphysics of subjectity. The idea of a "folkish" science (volkische Wissenschaft) that, 
under National Socialism, circulated as the repressed truth of the cosmopolitan notion of 
science lacked sobriety and the stringent enquiry into the foundations of knowledge. It 
could scarcely hope to pass off its irrationalism -- by which it fell short even of the 
cosmopolitanism of the concept, and thus avoided a confrontation with the concept - as 
the understanding of world before which the concept falls short. In such a "folkish" 
science, knowledge does not so much fail as hold itself aloof. It cannot "really" fail 
because it cannot put its own determinacy in question. Knowledge is accepted as 
knowledge only inasmuch as it is an expression of the German Volk. 20 The German Volk 
has become the truth of the cosmopolitan notion of science, but only in the sense that it 
has arbitrarily replaced it. 
The embarrassment in which the various Aryan sciences ignominiously expired 
cannot be said to possess in Heidegger' s rectoral address its unambiguous apology before 
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the fact. In one respect, the failure of these sciences has little in common with 
Heidegger's understanding of failure. The object of defiance in "The Self-Assertion of 
the German University" is not the global community of scientists, but necessity - not 
the liberal notion of science, but its Un-thought. When Heidegger in 1933 uses the term 
"folkish science", it is not to denote a contraction in the range of the liberal notion of 
science as though a science is "folkish", i.e. German, only to the extent that it forfeits its 
claims to validity outside an identifiable people. Such a relativistic doctrine of science is 
alien both to Heidegger and National Socialism. Five months after the rectoral address 
Heidegger states in Leipzig: 
We have renounced the idolatry of a rootless and impotent thinking. We 
behold the end of its servile philosophy. We are convinced that the 
luminous rigour and the befitting confidence of the inexorable and simple 
questioning concerning the essence of Being are returning. The originary 
courage either to grow or to shatter thereon in the confrontation with that 
which is constitutes the innermost impetus of the questioning of a folkish 
science.21 
Here "folkish" qualifies a science not in the restriction of its range, but rather in the 
enhancement of its scientificity. It is the science that endeavours to think that rootedness 
in a historical world disavowed, but nonetheless presupposed, by the internationalism of 
the liberal notion of science. It brings its sobriety to bear on the repressed of the liberal 
notion of science and defies its repression. That which Heidegger names "necessity" 
("Notwendigkeit") in the rectoral address is the originary in its necessity. It is that which 
is always presupposed and always forgotten in a knowledge that fixes upon beings, but 
never strictly upon the world in which beings first appear. 
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A "folkish" science, inasmuch as it more than pretends to seek to be the truth of 
the liberal notion of science, must make itself a party to the latter at the scene of its 
determination through the forgetting of world. And as it is through the concept that the 
liberal notion of science forgets world, recoiling from its rootedness into the a-historical 
repeatability in presence with which it equates knowledge, it is only by holding to the 
concept, and to the violence of its retreat, that a science might still confront its world and 
become the truth of its own "folkishness". A "folkish" science, therefore, dares not 
renounce the concept. One year after the rectoral address, in the lecture course Logic as 
the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, Heidegger declares: 
What is at stake is the overcoming of the definition of the concept as a 
husk. Consistent with this is not the deposing of the concept, but rather the 
higher necessity of conceptual questioning.22 
For Heidegger, the romantic objection to the lifelessness of the concept is itself 
objectionable. Deposing the concept in favour of an immediate intuition of what is does 
not solve the problem presented by the concept's lifelessness. The absolute and 
voluntaristic subjectivity that convinces itself of its ability to issue binding decrees on the 
concept perpetuates the abstraction from world for which the concept is reproached. 
Wherever the concept is said to have been deposed, the forgetfulness of world rather 
lords it all the more peremptorily in the absence of proper criticism. A truly "folkish" 
science does not begin with the Volk in the manner of a perspective or as the guarantor of 
its immediate intuitions. Instead, only at the very end does it come to its people as the 
world that reveals itself in its concealedness in the genuine failure of knowledge. 
What a "folkish" science awaits from the concept is the birth of the Volk that 
would be thought's own. This people would be the world as it has always eluded thought 
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and preceded it as its ground. Understood in its irreducibility to the metaphysics of 
subjectity, the people of a truly "folkish" science is not identifiable by physical properties 
or cultural practices, but is rather the world as the broadest dimension of the political. 
Such a people is the transcendence of Being-with-one-another and can thus never fully 
reveal itself in the presence of knowledge. Knowledge, in its metaphysical 
determination, has always proceeded from an ignorance of the people. The loyalty of 
Heidegger's "folkish" science to the concept is necessarily a tactical loyalty, since what 
this science sets out to know with the concept is that which is not conceptualisable 
because it is not knowable within the limits of presence. A "folkish" science must fail in 
its conceptualisation of the Volk. It awaits from its failure an unrecognizable people. 
Heidegger' s "folkish" science is the science of the absurdity of German nationalism, 
because it is the science of the reserve of the world of the Volk, of that which is never 
present-at-hand. As such, it has the most to gain from the failure of nationalism and· from 
the rebuff to the latter's claims on the world of the Volk. Spying its chance in a nation 
that mistakes its integration in a people-subject for the uprising of world, Heidegger' s 
"folkish" science cynically incites this nationalism to grasp fate itself in order that it 
. might fail all the more thoughtfully. A "folkish" science is essentially opportunistic. It 
always seeks to outwit nationalism, but in the end it is perhaps too clever: on account of 
its philosophical sophistication it is taken for the truth of what it attempted to exploit. 
Contributing to the Gleichschaltung of the German nation under Hitler, Heidegger sees 
beyond the unification of the masses in a people-subject to the collision of this people-
subject with necessity. Heidegger' s extreme, yet nonetheless tactical, nationalism merges 
with an anti-nationalism. But as the one sober participant at the saturnalia of German 
nationalism, it is Heidegger .after the war who will be asked for an explanation. 
Given the meta-National Socialism of "The Self-Assertion of the German 
University", it would be inexact and therefore misleading to ascribe Heidegger' s 
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resignation of the rectorship in April 1934 to his disillusionment with the regime as such. 
In and for itself, the regime was not the object of his engagement. Strictly speaking, 
Heidegger' s disillusionment was with the regime's amenability to his leadership. That 
which was never expected to turn out well had within a year proved itself intractable to 
an unfolding of the philosophical possibilities of its inevitable failure: Hitler was no more 
Heidegger's puppet than he had been Papen's. In his letter of 15 December, 1945, 
defending to the university what he could of his rectorate, Heidegger scrambles to muster 
a still broader appearance of na'ivety: 
Already in 1933-4 I stood in the same opposition to the National Socialist 
Weltanschauung teachings. I was, however, then of the belief that the 
movement could be led spiritually down other paths and considered this 
attempt compatible with the social and general political tendencies of the 
movement. I believed that, after assuming in 1933 responsibility for the 
entire people, Hitler would rise above the party and its doctrine and that 
everything would come together on the basis of a renewal and rallying to a 
responsibility for the West. This belief was an error: I recognised it as 
such from the events of 30 June 1934.23 
On what grounds could Heidegger have believed that Hitler was destined to undergo a 
change of heart after seizing power in January 1933? Such credulity verges on the 
implausible. That many other adherents of the regime expressed a similar credulity does 
not render Heidegger' s statement any more plausible: it rather indicates the 
conventionality of his defence. And if, by his reference to 30 June, 1934, Heidegger is 
implying that his engagement was an innocent dream from which he was awakened only 
by the bloodbath of the Night of the Long Knives, then the SA itself would have had to 
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have been known in its time as something other than organized thuggery. In his post-war 
apologetics Heidegger frequently overreaches himself. As much as its distance from the 
regime must not be overlooked, Heidegger's meta-National Socialism cannot be 
converted into a position of resistance. 
After 1934 Heidegger is considerably more wary of nationalism's prospects of 
failure. The failure that is quickly seen to lie beyond the grasp of National Socialism 
now becomes the affair of poetry. In this respect, Heidegger' s commentary from 1939 on 
HOlderlin's poem "Wie wenn am Feiertage ... "reads as an epilogue to "The Self-
Assertion of the German University", and as a repudiation of its opportunism. The 
defiance to which the university and the state as a whole are admonished in the rectoral 
address is, in the later text, the duty of the poet. Aligning "the Open" of HOlderlin with 
that which he terms "world"24, Heidegger arguably retains the same understanding of the 
concealedness of the superior power: 
The open mediates the connections between all actual things. These latter 
are constituted only because of such mediation, and are therefore 
mediated. What is mediated in that way only is by virtue of mediatedness. 
Thus, mediatedness must be present in all. The open itself, however, 
though it first gives the region for all belonging-to and -with each other, 
does not arise from any mediation. The open itself is the immediate. 
Nothing mediated, be it a god or a man, is ever capable of directly 
attaining the immediate. 25 
The Open mediates and, by virtue of its mediating, is that which itself cannot be 
mediated. Like necessity, it is at once immediate and intangible. Through its immediacy, 
the Open humbles gods and human beings in their ambition to mediate it. In the face of 
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the impossibility of mediation, the poets nonetheless cannot resign themselves: "The 
poets must leave to the immediate its immediacy, and yet also take upon themselves its 
mediation as the unique. "26 And if the poets are able to mediate the immediate, the 
success of this defiance of their limitations does not fall to their credit: 
When the grasping and offering of their hands is permeated by a "pure 
heart," these poets are capable of the task that has been entrusted to them. 
[ ... ] The "pure heart" is not meant here in a "moralistic" sense. This 
phrase means one kind of relation, and one manner of correspondence to 
"all-present" nature. 27 
The "pure heart" is not a property of the poets. It names their relation of correspondence 
to "omnipresent" Nature. In this commentary on Holderlin, where the impossible 
mediation of the immediate is said to begin at the point of the poets' reconciliation with 
the Open (or omnipresent Nature), the defiance that is to fail before fate in the rectoral 
address is still discernible. The agonistics of the earlier taxonomy, however, are missing. 
In place of the violent rupture between the theoretiCal attitude and necessity, there is not 
even so much as a transition from the poet to omnipresent Nature, since it is only within 
the latter that the poet, for Heidegger, truly becomes a poet. This tranquillity in the 1939 
text does not follow from any intervening peace with the subject, because the poet has 
nothing in common with the theoretical attitude's abstraction from world. Heidegger's 
tranquillity is more calculating than resigned. In 1933, on the basis of his anti-
subjectivism and its accompanying Manicheism, Heidegger is able to make concessions 
to a voluntaristic political movement with an opportunist's eye to its other side. Yet the 
beyond to which he aspires remains - by the logic of reversal he would later expound in 
his lectures on Nietzsche - determined by the metaphysics of su~jectity. With time, 
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Heidegger' s wariness of nationalism's prospects of failure gives way to a wariness of 
failure's prospects. Where early Heidegger seemingly wishes to push everything to its 
point of crisis, late Heidegger will no longer be prepared to break even a jug.28 
Heidegger' s disengagement with the regime has to be thought through as a 
disengagement with his own meta-National Socialism. As National Socialism itself was 
not the object of his engagement, it often seems that Heidegger is closer to the movement 
after 1934 than he ever was during his rectorship. A virulent suspicion of the ontic, for 
instance, renders early Heidegger proof against kitsch. With the interrogation of this 
suspicion's entanglement in the metaphysics of subjectity, there emerges in later texts a 
susceptibility to the charms of Bodenstandigkeit painfully redolent of the idylls of Nazi 
literature. 
In dissolving the agonistic taxonomy of his rectoral address, Heidegger dissolves 
precisely that which, in 1937, Clemens August Hoberg finds incompatible with National 
Socialism. At the start of his polemic against Heidegger, Hoberg declares that his 
objections issue "not from a philosophical system, but rather from the simple, 
straightforward attitude of a young German"29; in short, that it is his intention to play 
misere. Reducing the passage on failure in the rectoral address to a personal admission of 
the author3°, Hoberg proceeds to situate National Socialism in that same relaxation of the 
exclusive disjunction towards which Heidegger likewise directs his thinking after 1934. 
For Hoberg, National Socialism is not itself a crisis: 
The decisive difference between Heidegger and us consists in the fact that, 
in everyday life, we create and make ourselves felt, rather than lose 
ourselves in mere bustle. So long as we are active in the work assigned to 
us, Heideggerian dread cannot possibly rise up in us and compel 
everything to appear for us in its nullity.31 
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The work stands between self-absorbed bustle and the Nothing, and thus against the 
volatility of their alternation. What might further determine the work is, for Hoberg's 
purposes, superfluous information. For Hoberg, the National Socialist revolution 
resolves the Heideggerian "dilemma" of triviality and dread. By assigning work, Hitler 
showed himself to be the answer to the Manicheism of early Heidegger. On the strength 
of Hoberg's polemic, it could be contended that National Socialism comes to the jargon 
of authenticity, and its bathos of unquestioning obedience, before Heidegger and in 
opposition to him. Having sought to outwit the movement, Heidegger thus renounces the 
dualism of his meta-National Socialism only to find himself ostensibly recuperated. 
After .the war, it is similarly the very terms on which he withdrew from his 
engagement that prevent Heidegger from dedicating himself to his rehabilitation. 
Certainly, for many, Heidegger never offered a satisfactory statement of repentance, but 
then no mere statement of repentance could have been commensurate with the allegiance 
pledged to a genocidal regime. Complicity with National Socialism becomes, on account 
of the latter's enormity, effectively irrevocable. In Heidegger's case, however, the 
statement of repentance was withheld less out of shame over its inadequacy than out of 
shamelessness. There is no question that Heidegger suffered deeply the ignominy of this 
shamelessness32, but he was bound to it as his defence against National Socialism. To 
concede responsibility, which, without offence to the dead and the tortured, could not 
have been other than to concede an absolute responsibility, would only have been 
possible on the basis of the absolute subject. And yet in refusing responsibility, 
Heidegger could not but appear to invoke the independence of the absolute subject from 
ethical norms. This appearance of absolute subjectivity derives, ironically, from 
Heidegger's equanimity before the metaphysics of subjectity. The philosophical 
ambition of this equanimity, given its timing, risks being overlooked. 
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In 1933 Heidegger joined the NSDAP out of a philosophically motivated shame, 
and his inaugural address as rector turns upon the hope of a failure of the theoretical 
subject. As an obstacle to the truth of that which is, this subject is consumed with shame 
of itself and works towards the fulfillment by which it is not entrenched, but overcome. 
In Heidegger's commentary on the verse by Aeschylus, the self-consciously 
supernumerary masses that gladly received from fascism, first, ideological repatriation 
and then death are thus transfigured without being saved from themselves. The 
epistemological failure that is offered the theoretical attitude is not an offer by means of 
which the notion of the subject could be saved. 
Even if the address was immediately criticized for its "private" National 
Socialism, insofar as it demoted the subject it was utterly conventional. To be sure, 
National Socialism did not inaugurate the prevailing mistrust of the terms of liberalism. 
The parliamentary successes of the various fascist movements are incomprehensible 
without the pervasiveness, as well as pre-existence, of a dissatisfaction with the spurious 
autonomy of the subject. The politician-aesthete only creates a people in conspiracy with 
the ashamed, and the theatricals of the cult of personality owed their effect perhaps less to 
innovations in the art of propaganda, than to the humiliation of the subject that was 
staged in their manipulativeness. National Socialism arrived at a concept of human 
material by which it might account for, and thus seem to get the better of, the waves of 
fellow travellers attracted by the despotism of its doctrinal vacuity, rather than by the 
doctrines themselves. Accordingly, to interpret Heidegger as a fellow traveller does not 
position him on the periphery of National Socialism, since the centre of the movement 
was not a catechism or a programme, but rather its appeal as an occasion for self-
effacement. Under National Socialism, the liberal myth of the autonomous subject is 
vociferously condemned and carried notwithstanding to its point of utmost fraudulence. 
The subject that, out of weariness with itself and shame, effaces itself in the movement 
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clings, nonetheless, to the capriciousness with which it chose the vehicle of its 
effacement, thereby persuading itself of its independence even in the midst of 
degradations. With respect to overcoming the abstraction of the subject and removing the 
possibility of private National Socialisms, the movement miscarried in its 
Gleichschaltung. From this foundering of its totalitarianism, it nevertheless knew how to 
draw still greater benefits. Fascism in general fell in with the vanity of the autonomous 
subject, correctly sensing behind its plea for a liberation from itself the desire for an 
"adventure" that would no longer pull back before madness and death. Opportunism was 
therefore involved on both sides. Heidegger was not the only fellow traveller willing to 
consider his or her engagement with the NSDAP as an exchange between independent 
parties. A delimitation of the phenomenon of fascism has in the end to emphasise what 
was not "there" - that vacuity in which a multilateral opportunism could have free play 
and the abstract subject could realize itself in desperation.33 
In his 1930 text The Worker, Ernst Hinger, heralds the nihilism that, in 
Heidegger' s judgement, was subsequently manifested under National Socialism. 
Notwithstanding his contempt for Hitler, Hinger provides an insight into the grounds of 
fascism by detailing conditions of possibility for an engagement with an authoritarian 
mass movement. As much as he stresses the irrelevance of the subject for the Gestalt of 
the Worker, Jtinger only arouses the suspicion that this declaration of irrelevance is the 
half-hearted disguise of an absolute subjectivity. In passing from the individual human 
being to the Gestalt of the Worker, Hinger does not overcome the subject. Instead, he 
discovers that configuration of the subject in which its abstraction and autonomy could 
escape the commonly perceived debunking of the liberal subject. The myth of the 
subject, which a lone individual cannot maintain in the face of the reality of technical 
civilization, is to find its defence in the unified masses. Jtinger's Worker is the subject 
that can work and still maintain its abstraction as a subject. Rather than working on 
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account of any subordination to circumstances, it works because it lies in its declaimed 
transcendental definition as the Worker to work. Why the Worker should periodically 
have to embark on war for the purpose of destroying what it has produced - and as a 
Worker it does not do anything else but produce - cannot be explained without 
admitting that the product threatens the reactively transcendental definition of the 
Worker. It threatens the Worker with a return to a Marxist-Hegelian recognition of its 
own mediation in the product. 
In comparison with the rectoral address, the sleight of hand in Jlinger's 
"overcoming" of the subject is risibly clumsy. Through the absoluteness with which he 
distinguishes knowledge and necessity in 1933, Heidegger nonetheless seeks from 
necessity a revolution in which the subject might also retain its externality, even if only in 
being swept aside. The anti-liberalism that expresses itself in shame over the subject is 
still too liberal. It continues to forget world as the clearing of beings, because it does not 
make it as far as the world in which the subject also has its Being for itself. Heidegger' s 
shamelessness after the war, his appearance as an unrepentant Nazi, is not only his 
disavowal of the grounds of his engagement with the regime, but also a manifestation of 
the rigorous anti-liberalism that remained out of fascism's reach. 
"The Self-Assertion of the German University" is, in one respect, a liberal text. 
Defining itself by its opposition to liberalism, it renounces the possibility of developing 
an anti-liberalism that would not at once be dialectically reappropriated. It wants to think 
the superior power of necessity through the failure of the theoretical attitude and thus 
wants to think necessity in its absence from the knowledge yielding itself to the 
theoretical attitude. Necessity, which had been forgotten by the autonomous subject of 
liberalism, is to take its revenge without ceasing to be forgotten. Instead of remembering 
its world, the subject shatters on the emergence of its world that is properly a non-
emergence. The subject comes to grief on the severity with which world withholds itself 
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from that which is present (das Anwesende). On the one hand, world, as that which, for 
Heidegger, is not present because it is the presencing (Anwesung) of that which is 
present, cannot be sufficiently distinguished from that which is present. Its distinctness, 
on the other hand, cannot be made distinct, since as the presencing of beings in the light 
of knowledge, world is the possibility and domain of distinctions. In 1933, Heidegger's 
choice within this dilemma - and the crux of his inverted liberalism - is to insist on the 
distinctness and to think the presencing of world by itself as absence. "The Self-
Assertion of the German University" concentrates on the forgetfulness in the 
forgetfulness of Being and thus concentrates on the philosophical tradition's relation to 
Being, rather than, as it were, on Being itself. That which is forgotten by the subject is to 
be remembered as forgotten, and thereby remembered in a distinctness alien to Being as 
such. The theoretical subject, in its shame, is not so much to heed the voice of 
conscience as it is analysed in §§54-60 of Being and Time, as provoke its wrath. The 
subject is not called back to the authenticity of its Being-in-the-world and thus to the 
transcendence by which Dasein undecidably differentiates itself from that which is 
present. Instead, the subject suffers defeat for the sake of the "clarity" of the ontological 
difference. 
Heidegger's anti-subjectivism in 1933 was intended to contest classical 
ontology's understanding of Being as presence. This contestation, in the very radicality 
with which it ventured to think absence and to seize hold of it in its distinctness, 
solidified into being simply the complement of the Seinsvergessenheit of classical 
ontology. As such, it was an "error" - one, however, that can be recognised but not 
rectified. The error can only be committed differently: in late Heidegger it appears in the 
serenity before classical ontology that, by comparison, refrains ab ova from a 
contestation. If, in 1966, Heidegger declares that he would repeat the rectoral address 
with a still greater vehemence, it is more with a regard to the necessity of thinking 
through its error than out of a protectiveness for any of its discernible truths. It is the 
inevitability of the error of not thinking Being as such that is, for late Heidegger, 
thought's innermost provocation. 
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In 1933, Heidegger's error in relation to classical ontology is that he endeavours 
to overcome it by a reversal. Heidegger's concomitant error in relation to National 
Socialism is that, without however any unavoidability, he chooses not to foresee how the 
movement would quash a contestation of classical ontology. National Socialism failed, 
but its failure was not the failure of knowledge exhorted in the rectoral address. From the 
overtaxing of the regime's paranoiac classifications and monitoring of the social field, 
Heidegger was to await in vain the presencing of that which is present, the revelation of 
the Being of beings in its precedence to governmental control. Even in its failure, 
National Socialism refused to allow the question of Being to become the overt and 
pervasive question of Germany. It ensured that Dasein would either quickly find itself in 
its everydayness in the task of the reconstruction of an occupied Germany or not find 
itself in death. World was not permitted to light up in the failure of the regime, since the 
question of the state, of its relation to its context, was not revived in response to the 
collapse of the National Socialist dictatorship, but settled in advance by the occupying 
powers. A Germany outside the control of a state, and thus outside the understanding of 
Being as presence fundamental to control, was not something to which either the Nazis or 
the Allies aspired. In a sense, the dictatorship was a failure of failure and, on that 
account, it was perhaps the exemplary system of control. Having in 1933 wagered on the 
worlding of the world in the regime's failure, Heidegger after the war can only rue his 
opportunistic hopes for an exposure of the ontological foundations of control. 
Heidegger's engagement with National Socialism rests on a misprojection. In 
Hitler's seizure of power he insanely managed to see the chance of a fundamental 
redefinition of the political. The ontology presupposed in the classical understanding of 
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the polis was to be contested by the simultaneous emergence and non-emergence of the 
German Volk. Heidegger wants to stand the polis on its head and to ground the new 
Germany in concealedness. To the Greek polis of the full visibility of the glorious deed, 
of the deliverance from anonymity and the establishment in the lasting fame of presence, 
Heidegger opposes the polis that, by its failure to defend rigorously its claim to self-
groundedness, lies open to Being in its essential withdrawal. Heidegger' s polis is the 
polis that knows its own essential unknowability. It is the polis whose self-knowledge 
reaches the point of the failure of knowledge. Implicit in the rectoral address, and 
therefore unobtrusive in its absurdity, is the conception of a National Socialism that 
would reach beyond the controllability of beings - their recognisability in presence as 
the bearers of such and such properties, and thus their trackability - to their truth in the 
transcendence of Being. The polis of the recollection of Being is the polis of 
concealment, rather than of control. It is without glory but not privatively. In An 
Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger sets forth the relations between the Greek notion 
of fame and the understanding of Being as presence: 
To glorify, to attribute regard to, and disclose regard means in Greek: to 
place in the light and thus endow with permanence, being. For the Greeks 
glory was not something additional which one might or might not obtain; it 
was the mode of the highest being. For modems glory has long been 
nothing more than celebrity and as such a highly dubious affair, an 
acquisition tossed about and distributed by the newspapers and the radio 
- almost the opposite of being. 34 
Heidegger does not disparage the celebrity of radio and newsprint simply out of nostalgia 
for the Greek notion of glory. Greek glory is here suggested only to be preferable.35 
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Heidegger dismisses celebrity as almost the opposite of Being: the understanding of 
Being as presence is inherited without being appropriated, let alone contested in a 
questioning concerning the essence of Being. If Heidegger, in 1933, evokes a tragic 
conception of the polis as a whole and an accordingly anonymous catastrophe before 
necessity, it is because the question of Being can only be raised anew by putting glory 
itself into question. The aim of the Gleichschaltung under Hitler was not to bring about 
the unity of the public realm and its reformation as the site of the full visibility of the 
glorious deed. Instead, its aim, according to Heidegger, was the mobilisation of the 
masses for the knowledge of the concealment at the heart of unconcealment, of the 
inglorious essence of glory. Heidegger's polis is to ask more of itself than glory, because 
it is to ask after that which is never merely present. Raising the question of Being, this 
other polis endeavours to think Dasein in its uncontrollability. Control is to be overcome 
for the sake, not of a pacifist utopia, but of the violence of time tearing identity away 
from itself in presence. The Being of Dasein, which for Heidegger is temporality, is no 
longer to go unthought. In glory's understanding of Being as presence the debasement of 
Dasein has its inconspicuous, and thus insidious, beginnings. From the glorious deed of 
the Greek polis a genealogical line can be traced down to the breeding programmes dear 
to National Socialism. Heidegger, in the rectoral address, thus goads Hitler to failure, so 
that Dasein might be recovered for its world from the derivative certainty of self-
groundedness. Within the new regime's prospects of failure, Heidegger believes he 
makes out, if there alone, an understanding of the transcendence of Dasein at variance 
with the espoused biologism. Out of an attention to failure, the praiseworthy deed, in 
which Aristotle situates the causafinalis for the institution of the polis36, comes under a 
suspicion that is likewise the most arrant gullibility with respect to the truth of the failure 
in store for Nazi Germany. 
168 
As much as National Socialism failed, it did not thereby usher in the era of 
Dasein's authenticity. The understanding of Being as presence, in which the glorious 
deed enjoyed its recognisability and recognisability deployed itself as state control, did 
not yield to an understanding of the transcendence of Dasein. Dasein was delivered up to 
death and the administrative measures of the occupying powers, since the regime refused 
to be survived by its failure. Not unlike Heidegger, but out of hypochondria rather than 
opportunism, it ultimately viewed its failure as its work and achievement. Once the 
regime could no longer appropriate its own failures, it strove instead to assimilate itself to 
the catastrophe that was befalling it. National Socialism would make this disaster its own 
by contributing to it. As it had created everything, everything would have to accompany 
it in its destruction. The fatherland that the regime had invented as a sponge for surplus 
labour was not to remain behind. In the name of national defence, the NSDAP had 
preached rearmament and courted military disaster for the purpose of an immediate · 
economic remedy. In the event, the regime was not prepared to defend its ad hoe 
fatherland by a surrender on conditions. National Socialism was state suicide. It is by 
this aspect that Deleuze and Guattari, following Virilio, distinguish it from Stalinism: 
Unlike the totalitarian State, which does its utmost to seal all possible lines 
of flight, fascism is constructed on an intense line of flight, which it 
transforms into a line of pure destruction and abolition. It is curi9us that 
from the very beginning the Nazis announced to Germany what they were 
bringing: at once wedding bells and death, including their own death, and 
the death of the Germans.37 
L 
The Nazi regime knew how to turn away from the understanding of Being as presence, 
but only by carrying all beings with it into a black hole. From the insight into its own 
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unviability as an enduring state it grasped that if it was to prove its control over life and 
death, it had to do so as quickly as possible through destruction. National Socialism 
cannot be said to have been an anti-state simply because it was suicidal. It was rather the 
grotesque parody of a state, a state that runs fast. The war will thus not have been over 
the question of the state as such, but over its tempo, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest: 
Conversely, if capitalism came to consider the fascist experience as 
catastrophic, if it preferred to ally itself with Stalinist totalitarianism, 
which from its point of view was much more sensible and manageable, it 
was because the segmentarity and centralization of the latter was more 
classical and less fluid. 38 
If dissolution was finally perceived by capitalism as the real danger, it was not because it 
announced the re-emergence of the stateless and borderless Germany of literary myth. 
No Romantic Volk of poets and thinkers was about to raise the question of Being against 
the very possibility of control. The collapse of the Hitlerian regime was the dissolution 
of a state apparatus too "Western", and hence too deeply embedded in the social body, to 
be dismantled other than through catastrophe.39 National Socialism did not go quietly. It 
was not prepared for the State to retreat to a minimal threshold of control, let alone to 
yield to the transcendence of Being-with-one-another. Where societies without a state 
have been observed to hold a festival to sacrifice the stockpile resulting from periods of 
surplus, rather than allow it to mount an invitation to exclusive ownership and thereby to 
tyranny, the Hitlerian dictatorship went further. Consistent with its reified notion of 
humanity, it threw on the bonfire of its Walpurgisnacht its stockpile of peoples. The 
problem, not of the state as such, but of overproduction, which had arisen from an 
improvised solution to the problem of surplus labour, was ruthlessly solved through 
waste.40 
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That Heidegger, in 1933, could have harboured any expectations of a survival 
from the failure of the Western state is perhaps in the end less a sign of his na'ivety than 
of his desperation. It may have been that, with none of the confidence that follows from 
a scrupulous assessment of existing conditions, Heidegger joined the NSDAP, doing so 
on the off-chance that the course of the movement might be directed towards the failure 
in which Dasein would be recovered for its world. Inasmuch as the NSDAP was a 
German nationalist movement, its course, in Heidegger' s eyes, was already set for the 
failure of knowledge in the encounter with the truth of the Volk. It was a matter of 
maintaining its course. However unfathomable Heidegger' s engagement was with regard 
to the divide between his conception of humanity and the regime's, it was not arbitrary. 
Heidegger mistook the fragility of National Socialism for the weak point in the 
hegemony of reification, and he chose its insanity over the insanity of doing nothing. No 
doubt the choice was for Heidegger, in his cruder sympathies, a little too easy. The 
object of his choice, moreover, did not simply perpetuate the nihilism of the reification of 
humanity, but dedicated itself to its aggravation. 
As the regime had no intention of playing the role of the weakest link, it thus 
ignored the cues Heidegger was to keep repeating in the mid thirties. With the 
resignation of the rectorship, Heidegger does not abandon the question of the political. 
The polis of the recollection of Being, for whose sake Heidegger sought to get the better 
of National Socialism, remains arguably the fundamental concern in the subsequent 
lectures on art. In these lectures it stands forth all the more clearly in the absence of 
concessions to the regime. As a result, what Heidegger wanted in 1933 gains in 
comprehensibility, if also in incredibility. In the 1934-5 lecture course Holderlin's 
Hymns "Germanien ~'and "Der Rhein", Heidegger names the creator of the state 
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alongside the poet and the thinker as those who ground the historical Dasein of a 
people.41 But the equation is not to be read as a flatterer's revision of Hegel's 
subordination of the state to art and philosophy. The blandishment is much more an 
admonition to ground the state that has never yet been grounded, since the state can only 
truly be grounded, is only truly originary, if it is ground~d- like poetry and thought -
beyond presence in the originarity of Dasein's authentic understanding of Being. In "The 
Origin of the Work of Art", Heidegger' s introduction of the act that founds a state as a 
further site of the event of truthhas to be interpreted similarly. 42 He is not referring to the 
historiographically recorded coup d'etat of three years earlier, but to the state that is 
founded as such because it is founded with its world in the clearing of beings in the event 
of truth. National Socialism's only response to these proposals for a polis of Being was a 
hardening of the understanding of Being as presence and an intensification of control 
through the erection of an apparatus of terror. 
Heidegger's intimations of a polis of Being in the rectoral address are exposed to 
misinterpretation through contiguous passages. "The Self-Assertion of the German 
University" does not always abstain from employing the motifs of the NSDAP. But then 
nor does it restrict itself to bare citation. Unlike other, less heterodox texts from his term 
as rector, Heidegger did not disown the address. He did not disown it, just as he did not 
disown his "private" National Socialism. The rectoral address is, for Heidegger, the point 
of continuity between his writings before and after 1933. As such, it is the most overt 
expression of that "private" National Socialism which arguably is to be discerned 
elsewhere in his work. This "private" National Socialism is the politics of the failure of 
knowledge, of the truth that confers itself as the punishment of the defiance of 
concealedness. In his engagement with the Nazi regime, Heidegger did not interrupt the 
thinking on the essence of truth that runs through his writings of the thirties. What 
Heidegger all too cursorily sets out in the commentary on Aeschylus in the rectoral 
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address can thus be read in conjunction with his more expansive treatments. Indeed, it 
must be read in this manner if the radicality of his other understanding of the political is 
to be ascertained. 
In speaking of a defiance of concealedness in the rectoral address, Heidegger is 
not referring to knowledge's quantitative progression into the unknown. Concealedness 
is not to retreat before knowledge, but is itself to become the matter of knowledge. 
Concealedness is to reveal itself as concealedness and thereby confer on knowledge the 
truth of beings. In his 1931-2 lecture course On the Essence ofTrutht: Plato's Parable of 
the Cave and Theaetetus, Heidegger contends that the Greek definition of truth rests on 
an evasion of the task of a knowledge of concealedness: 
The signification of Being in the sense of presence is the reason that 
a/..:r18Ela (unconcealment) is ground down to mere presence-at-hand (not 
gone), and concealment correspondingly to mere being-gone. This means 
however: the classical understanding of Being prevents the already 
dawning foundational experience of the concealment of beings from being 
able, at its origin, to unfold itself in its proper depth.43 
Concealedness, according to this early reflection on the dilemma of any exposition of the 
ontological difference, is neither present nor absent. For classical ontology, 
concealedness is, by contrast, the condition of that which is not present. Whatever does 
not stand determinate in the light of knowledge is, for classical ontology, nonetheless 
able, inasmuch as it is, to stand in the light of knowledge - the obstacles to a being's 
unconcealedness are extrinsic to what it is in itself. Concealedness thus does not become 
the occasion of a questioning of the understanding of Being as presence, because it is 
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subordinated to presence and defined negatively by it as absence. Never permitted to 
confront knowledge with that which essentially cannot stand in its light, with that which 
is absent even as it is present, concealedness does not reveal itself as concealedness to 
classical ontology. 
Classical ontology does not ask after the secret of concealedness, which for 
Heidegger is the being that he names Dasein. It shies away from a meditation on its 
uncanniness such as that which Heidegger reads in Greek tragedy. In his lectures on 
Holderlin's hymn "Der Ister", Heidegger addresses the chorus from Antigone in order to 
confront the ontological exception that is the human being: 
Uncanniness does not first arise as a consequence of humankind; rather, 
humankind ermerges from uncanniness and remains within it - looms out 
of it and stirs within it. The uncanny itself is what looms forth in the 
essence of human beings and is that which stirs in all stirring and arousal: 
that which presences and at the same time absences.44 
The uncanniness of Dasein is its undecidability with respect to the understanding of 
Being as presence. As the ecstases of originary temporality, Dasein essentially conceals 
itself from the presence in which knowledge stands fixed. Dasein conceals itself from the 
knowledge that only comes to itself by falling away from a knowledge of the temporality 
from which its presence is derived. Knowledge can thus only fail in its defiance of the 
superior power of concealedness and, in its failure, it must open up presence to the truth 
of Dasein. Only in that failure of knowledge which is likewise a failure of presence will 
an authentic understanding of humanity arise. Within such an understanding, the 
transcendence of Being-with-one-another at the basis of the polis would no longer be 
reduced to the controllable identity of the subjects of a state. The autonomy of the 
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subject, the abstraction by which it won to the independence that was likewise and still 
more its controllability, is exchanged for the anarchy of time. 
In the failure of the German university the state itself is to fail. Through 
committing itself to the mission of the German university, the state commits itself to a 
knowledge of that which cannot be known and which notwithstanding, as the foundation 
of knowledge, is that which knowledge must above all seek to know. For all its 
invocations of the superior power of fate, the National Socialist regime had no desire to 
push through to a knowledge of fate that would have put all its taxonomies into question. 
The historicality to which the regime appealed in its notion of a "folkish" fate was not the 
historicality of the transcendence of Dasein. It was only the petulant excuse with which it 
answered objections to its misapplication of the universalist principles of modem science. 
In National Socialism, historicality was the imported defence for a superficially 
relativistic Weltanschauung, for that in which knowledge continued to be understood as 
an apprehension of beings in the eternal present. 
Insofar as the rectoral address speaks of defying fate to reveal itself, the regime's 
notion of an already revealed historicality is not being accepted as definitive. By drawing 
back from a revelation of historicality out of a preference for the non-originary truth of 
beings apprehended in their presence, National Socialism drew back likewise from the 
truth of the truth by which it sought to abide. Unable to think the concealedness of 
Dasein the regime was unable to think the transcendence that is the essence of truth. It 
was thus unable to think that which Heidegger, in his 1930 lecture "On the Essence of 
Truth" with its exposition of Dasein as the essence of truth, calls freedom. Refusing to 
see this inability or, more precisely, refusing to foresee that it would prove irremediable, 
Heidegger in the rectoral address awaits freedom from the Nazi dictatorship. The crass 
absurdity of this expectation is not mollified by Heidegger's abandonment of the 
conventional definition of freedom. The absurdity is intensified, since it is only through 
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having defined freedom as the essence of truth - and no longer as the property of the 
autonomous subject - that Heidegger obtains for the notion of freedom a radical 
irreconcilability with the National Socialist understanding of humanity. The freedom that 
Heidegger awaits from National Socialism differs from the calculating tolerance with 
which liberal democracies view harmless eccentricities. Before the vision of freedom 
that is the polis of the recollection of Being and the accompanying destruction of the very 
possibility of control, Heidegger in 1933 does not hesitate in eschewing simulacra: 
National Socialism is the state most likely to fail, and it is to fail into the truth of the 
freedom of Dasein. 
In the rectoral address, the desirability of this failure is assumed, rather than 
proved. Why the truth of what is should resist being known, and why it should confer 
itself on the knowledge that fails, precisely as knowledge, is set forth in "On the Essence 
of Truth". In its reliance on the argument of the earlier text, "The Self-Assertion of the 
German University" can be seen to resolve into an exhortation to freedom. 
The apparent arbitrariness of Heidegger' s adoption of the word "freedom" for an 
enquiry into the essence of truth is belied by the exposition of Dasein in which it occurs. 
The lecture "On the Essence of Truth", properly speaking, does not adopt the meaning of 
the word "freedom", but rather defines it with an originarity from which the freedom of 
the autonomous subject at once derives and deviates. The freedom of the latter, as the 
freedom of a subject determined by an abstraction from its world by fiat, presupposes an 
understanding of Being in which beings have been established in their distinctness. 
Heidegger' s enquiry into the essence of truth is an enquiry into the claim to originarity of 
this understanding of Being. In the conventional definition of truth as adequation, the 
distinctness of beings ensures the plurality in which the referentiality of both true and 
false judgements is deployed as well as the unequivocality in which true judgements 
176 
consist. But the referentiality itself of adequation goes unexplained in an understanding 
of beings in which each being is held apart in the fullness of its presence. 
Discussing adequation in the example of a statement and a coin, Heidegger 
stresses the convergence alongside the divergence: 
How can what is completely dissimilar, the statement, correspond to the 
coin? It would have to become the coin and in this way relinquish itself 
entirely. The statement never succeeds in doing that. The moment it did, 
it would no longer be able as a statement to be in accordance with the 
thing. In the correspondence the statement must remain - indeed even 
first become - what it is. In what does its essence, so thoroughly 
different from every thing, consist? How is the statement able to 
correspond to something else, the thing, precisely by persisting in its own 
essence?45 
The statement, according to Heidegger, is adequate to its object only inasmuch as it 
remains in its distinctness and does not converge with it. Yet by remaining in its 
distinctness, it is unable to converge with its object and state its truth. 
This convergence is not the matter of the distinctness of beings, but rather of that 
which Heidegger calls the Open: 
As thus placed, what stands opposed must traverse an open field of 
opposedness [Entgegen] and nevertheless must maintain its stand as a 
thing and show itself as something withstanding [ein Standiges]. This 
appearing of the thing in traversing a field of opposedness takes place 
within an open region, the openness of which is not first created by the 
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presenting but rather is only entered into and taken over as a domain of 
relatedness. The relation of the presentative statement to the thing is the 
accomplishment of that bearing [Verhaltnis] that originarily and always 
comes to prevail as a comportment [Verhalten]. 46 
The adequation of a statement to an object is a relation consummated in neither the 
statement nor the object. Truth has to be sought elsewhere, namely, in the comportment 
that brings about the relation because it alone is free to do so: 
The openness of comportment as the inner condition of the possibility of 
correctness is grounded in freedom. The essence of truth, as the 
correctness of a statement, isfreedom.41 
The essence of truth, as the condition of possibility of reference, is the ontological 
freedom that transgresses the distinctness of beings. 
Heidegger immediately cautions against interpreting this proposition as ascribing 
the essence of truth to human caprice. Certainly the human being is introduced in the 
discussion with the notion of comportment, but the human being is to be first defined by 
the notion of comportment in the essence of truth: 
Consideration of the essential connection between truth and freedom leads 
us to pursue the question of the human essence in a regard that assures us 
an experience of a concealed essential ground of the human being (of 
Dasein), and in such a manner that the experience transposes us in advance 
into the originarily essential domain of truth.48 
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It is with a notion of freedom obtained through a meditation on truth that Heidegger 
comes to the question of the human in the sense, as he clarifies in a parenthesis, of 
Dasein. Heidegger's ontological notion of freedom is not simply imposed as a further 
attribute on the human, but rather brings to the fore that ontological freedom which is 
proper to Dasein itself in its transcendence. Emphasizing that the human being is to be 
understood as Dasein, Heidegger is emphasizing in this passage that which has 
traditionally been considered as other than an attribute, namely, existence. The human 
being is to be understood in its relation to originary temporality, i.e. to the finitude of its 
existence, rather than in terms of the attributes by which it is apprehended as a being 
present-at-hand. For Heidegger, only the human being exists and is Dasein, because only 
the human being - in his or her projects and Being-towards-death - has a definitive 
relation to temporality as such, and not simply to the present. 
The enquiry into the essence of truth turns to the human being as a being that 
exists and must exist because the understanding of truth as adequation remains 
inexplicable on the basis of beings that are present-at-hand and whose identity is defined 
without recourse to the temporality that reaches beyond the discrete "now". The actuality 
of adequation is accordingly a proof of existence, of mortality and of the freedom of 
existence. It is a proof of a being that is able to hold together two distinct beings and 
overcome even the greatest separation in the moments of their apprehension. The 
synthesis in adequation, which is the achievement of memory and projection, cannot be 
ascribed to a faculty of a being present-at-hand without at once relinquishing any insight 
into the role of ecstatic temporality in the traditional understanding of truth. Dasein is the 
freedom of time itself. Freedom, as it is disclosed in the essence of truth, is not the 
familiar freedom of the subject. It is not a property that accrues to the subject in the 
abstraction from its world and that, given the questionable feasibility of this abstraction, 
must always remain a tenuous possession. The freedom of the essence of truth is the 
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truth of the vitiated freedom with which the subject raises only a feeble protest against its 
reification. This other, originary freedom does not belong to a humanity whose definition 
already does not essentially distinguish it from an object. Freedom, according to 
Heidegger, is transcendence: 
The human being does not "possess" freedom as a property. At best, the 
converse holds: freedom, ek-sistent, disclosive Da-sein, possesses the 
human being - so originarily that only it secures for humanity that 
distinctive relatedness to beings as a whole as such which first founds all 
history. Only the ek-sistent human being is historical.49 
Freedom is not a property of the human being. As existence, as the existence grasped 
etymologically in its standing outside of itself, freedom belongs to a different 
understanding of Being than that according to which beings stand within themselves and 
deliver themselves up to a recognition of their properties. For classical ontology, the 
presence of beings is their unconcealment and thus their truth. But the properties of that 
which is unconcealed can, for Heidegger, never constitute the truth of Dasein. Dasein is 
freedom. It is the freedom of originary temporality as it makes sense of the now-
sequence by which the conventional understanding of time issues in aporias. For 
Heidegger, the freedom of humanity is not its "elevation" above history into the presence 
that is simply the neglect of originary temporality. Instead, humanity is freedom 
precisely to the extent that it is historical. The historicality of humanity, and thus its 
freedom, is its rootedness in the world of a people. By adhering to this rootedness, and 
not by repudiating it, Dasein escapes the identifiability consequent on an abstraction from 
its world and the reduction to a being present-at-hand. A people is Dasein's power of 
indetermination and the basis of its title to the essence of truth. The freedom that as the 
truth of adequation transgresses the distinctness of the statement and its object is the 
historicality of Dasein. 
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Only inasmuch as Dasein is historical, only inasmuch as it is always being carried 
beyond the presence that can never be its own but is rather the presence of the things in 
its world, is adequation between a statement and an object possible. Adequation takes 
place in the openness of Dasein, in the openness that is its Being-with. But this openness, 
which is the essence of truth, of unconcealment (a/..:r18£ta.), is not itself open, since it 
always transcends the presence in which it could be apprehended in its openness. After 
isolating the attunement of beings in adequation from these beings themselves, Heidegger 
thus suggests that the essence of Dasein is concealment: 
Letting beings be, which is an attuning, a bringing into accord, prevails 
throughout and anticipates all the open comportment that flourishes in it. 
Human comportment is brought into definite accord throughout by the 
openedness of beings as a whole. However, from the point of view of 
everyday calculations and preoccupations this "as a whole" appears to be 
incalculable and incomprehensible. It cannot be understood on the basis 
of the beings opened up in any given case, whether they belong to nature 
or to history. Although it ceaselessly brings everything into definite 
accord, still it remains indefinite, indeterminable; it then coincides for the 
most part with what is most fleeting and most unconsidered. However, 
what brings into accord is not nothing, but rather a concealing of beings as 
a whole. Precisely because letting-be always lets beings be in a particular 
comportment that relates to them and thus discloses them, it conceals 
beings as a whole. Letting-be is intrinsically at the same time a 
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concealing. In the ek-sistent freedom of Da-sein a concealing of beings as 
a whole comes to pass [ereignet sich]. Here there is concealment.50 
In the freedom of Dasein there is concealment. This freedom is the essence of cx).:r18c:ta, 
but it is also that which refuses to be unconcealed. As such, freedom is the originary un-
truth of <XAYJ8cta. It is the error that is inextricably both the failure and fulfilment of 
knowledge. 51 In the concealment of Dasein, the revelation of beings as a whole occurs 
and thus does not occur. The revelation of beings as a whole reveals itself as 
concealment. Truth, understood in its essence, merges with the darkness of error. If to 
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know the truth of a given being presupposes a knowledge of the essence of truth, beings 
can only be known in the presence of truth by first being known in the failure to 
apprehend Dasein. It is as the world intangible to everyday reckoning, and not as 
subjective caprice, that Dasein is the truth - and essential error - of beings. Dasein' s 
freedom is that which never fell within the scope of classical ontology, because it 
constituted the Un-thought of its understanding of Being as presence. Metaphysics did 
not set itself the task of failing before a knowledge of time. The enduring dissatisfaction 
of metaphysics with the definition of truth as adaequatio rei et intellectus (already 
disputed, as it were in advance, by Plato in the Theaetetus) never passed beyond 
dissatisfaction. An inquiry into the essence of truth - in which an understanding of 
humanity irreducible to reification could have gained ground - was not undertaken. 
In 1933 Heidegger believed the opportunity had arisen for a confrontation with 
the truth of Dasein. "The Self-Assertion of the German University" is testimony to that 
conviction. How could National Socialism- and not merely in retrospect- have 
encouraged such a conviction? Even if this question is unavoidable, it does not excuse 
reading the rectoral address simply for what it says in the jargon of the regime. Beyond 
what it all too clearly says in "the worst of rhetorics"52, "The Self-Assertion of the 
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German University" speaks of a defiance of concealment that in all likelihood has no 
counterpart outside Heidegger' s own writings. The interpretation of the verse by 
Aeschylus is Heideggerian, rather than National Socialist. But Heidegger's refusal to 
keep his philosophical utterances separate from his utterances as a proselyte of the 
NSDAP means that he himself was persuaded of the convergence between his thinking 
and the regime. Inasmuch as what is at issue is a convergence and not an identity, the 
relations between jargon and philosophy in the rectoral address are not without a 
noticeable friction. This friction was seized upon by Heidegger after the war and 
exaggeratedly depicted as antagonism. The trade-offs and the insane stratagems that 
unify the text, and rendered possible its attempt at a redefinition of National Socialism, 
were thereby pushed to the rear. 
Under Heidegger' s leadership, the German university was to assert itself in 
accordance with its essence as the will to knowledge. It was to assert itself as a defiance 
of concealment, rather than as a defiance of Hitler. National Socialism was to be incited 
to participate in the failure that is reserved for the defiance of concealment. In the 
rectoral address, the only enemy of National Socialism is invisibility. Even after 1933 
Heidegger, in his criticisms of the regime's nihilism, does not admit any other opponent. 
Whatever stands in the presence of the light of knowledge stands already in the 
forgetfulness of the concealment of Being, and as it shares this with National Socialism, 
it is never able to mount an opposition on the basis of an alternative. Heidegger's 
"private" National Socialism in "The Self-Assertion of the German University" is the 
substitution of the regime's fundamental alternative for the regime itself: the essence of 
National Socialism ceases to be an apparatus of control resting on classical ontology and 
becomes the chance of an encounter with the concealment from which control 
definitively retreats. 
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This substitution in the rectoral address explains the laudatory tone in which 
Heidegger greets the new_ era and for which he has been both justly and unjustly 
reproached. The justice and the injustice of the reproach involve, not Heidegger's 
person, but the question of a response to the enduring reality of fascism. To wish to hear 
nothing in the rectoral address of the other National Socialism that is the other of 
National Socialism is to wish to hear nothing of the ambiguity that is arguably the 
element of a fundamental confrontation with fascism. "The Self-Assertion of the German 
University" offers concealment by way of an alternative to National Socialism and, in a 
sense, thereby offers nothing by way of an alternative. What the rectoral address rallies 
against National Socialism is the power of the false. Only with the inexplicablity - the 
un-truth and error - of his engagement does Heidegger resist Hitler. An alternative to 
the regime that stood against it in the clarity of an exclusive disjunction would have 
mitigated its opposition through its very distinctness. The principle of the control of 
beings, of which National Socialism was the exemplary implementation, would not have 
been contested. 
Heidegger's "private" National Socialism is the alternative to National Socialism 
that is at the same time the essence of its truth. It is the thought of the originary 
concealment of beings on which the regime rested and on which it could not, in its 
certainty as to the controllability of beings, acknowledge itself to rest. Heidegger' s 
"private" National Socialism is not so much the theory of the fascist revolution of 1933 
as the thought of the polis that is always already founded in concealment before it is 
brought to light and established in its identity within presence. This other polis is "other" 
only inasmuch as it is the polis that is never other, since, in the transcendence by which it 
is a Being-with, it never fully reveals itself as one polis set apart from another. It is the 
polis that is the community of the erring of transcendence. According to the lecture 
course Holderlin's Hymns "Germanien" and "Der Rhein", the polis is comparable in its 
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originarity to poetry and thought. With the comparison to poetry, Heidegger' s polis is 
distinguished from Plato's conception. It is distinguished for the sake of that ambiguity 
(i.e. the concealment, not the polysemy) of the poetic word which led Plato to banish 
poets from the polis that is to be founded in presence. Heidegger' s polis is the 
inconspicuous polis that precedes foundation in presence, because it is the polis of the 
transcendence that is the originary concealment of Dasein. In its failure, knowledge is to 
open itself up to this other polis. It is to open itself up to the authentic Being-with-one-
another by which Heidegger understands the German Volk. 
"The Self-Assertion of the German University" is a "folkish" text. Its 
"folkishness" does not confine itself to a few terminological concessions made to the 
regime, but rather reaches into the heart of Heidegger's thinking. In 1933, Heidegger 
attempts to lead the masses of National Socialism to the confrontation with classical 
ontology from which the Volk might have been born. The opportunism of Heidegger's 
engagement marks even the peroration of the rectoral address. Heidegger concludes: 
We can only fully understand the glory and greatness of this new 
beginning, however, if we carry within ourselves that deep and broad 
thoughtfulness upon which the ancient wisdom of the Greeks drew in 
uttering the words: 
ta ... me gala panta episphele ... 
"All that is great stands in the storm ... " 
(Plato, Republic, 497d, 9)53 
Heidegger's translation of Plato's text is infamously inaccurate. But the storm that 
replaces with the jargon of National Socialism what is better rendered by "thought-
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provoking" is similarly the storm of a total mobilisation for the task of provoking thought 
to its failure before fate. 
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III The Feast 
Heidegger' s resignation of the rectorship of Freiburg University in 1934 cannot be 
understood as a simple withdrawal from politics. The question of the essence of the 
German people, which Heidegger raises repeatedly in the months of his open engagement 
with National Socialism, does not sun-ender its sudden prominence in his writings with 
the transfer of office. Instead, this question becomes the site of a confrontation with the 
regime and its understanding of the political, because it becomes entwined for Heidegger 
with the question of the essence of poetry. The alleged apoliticality of the latter - "this 
most innocent of occupations"' - assumes a critical force. 
It is, however, in the nature of this confrontation to risk being overlooked. In 
Heidegger's lectures on Holderlin, poetry is not presented in rivalry with National 
Socialism. It is not shown to contend with National Socialism for power. What poetry 
disputes, according to Heidegger, is not so much the regime's possession of power as the 
very definition of the political underlying disputes over the possession of power. 
Refusing to dispute the possession of power, poetry refuses the commensurability with 
National Socialism that a common object would guarantee. And through this refusal, it 
rebuffs the claim of the universal to arbitrate over politics. Poetry challenges National 
Socialism by not challenging it. It cannot contend with it for possession of the German 
people, because only within a deracinated politics does a people cease to be the political 
itself and become an object of struggle. The more originary politics of poetry, and its 
auspiciousness for the question of the essence of the Volk, consists in its in-educibility to 
the Dingbegriffe of classical ontology. Poetry is itself the political: Heidegger' s texts in 
the thirties and early forties think through this identity in distinction from a politics of the 
present-at-hand. 
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That Heidegger' s question concerning the essence of poetry, as it is formulated in 
numerous lectures in the years following the resignation of the rectorship, is a question 
against National Socialism appears to be Heidegger's own estimation in the interview 
conducted with Der Spiegel. There he says: 
After I stepped down as rector I limited myself to teaching. In the summer 
semester of 1934 I lectured on "Logic." In the following semester I gave 
the first Holderlin lecture. In 1936, I began the Nietzsche lectures. 
Anyone with ears to hear heard in these lectures a confrontation with 
National Socialism.2 
Out of impatience with the delay in his "rehabilitation", Heidegger pronounces the 
confrontation in his lectures unmistakable. This declared unmistakability can, 
nonetheless, scarcely be brought into agreement with the conventional sense of 
"confrontation". What is unmistakable after the lecture course Logic as the Question 
concerning the Essence of Language is that Heidegger elaborates its treatment of 
language and the Volk into a critical destruction of aesthetics. It is in the meditations on 
art - without any clear precedent in the texts composed before the resignation of the 
rectorship - that Heidegger' s disaffection with National Socialism is to be discerned. 
For Heidegger, with the question of art the question of the essence of the Germans is 
raised. 
The confrontation in the lectures on Holderlin and the confrontation in the lectures 
on Nietzsche, however closely related in their focus on art, are by no means reducible to 
the one stratagem. Although Holderlin did not escape appropriation by the regime (in 
1943, the one-hundredth anniversary of his death was the occasion of a visit by Hitler to 
his grave and the founding of the Holderlin Gesellschaft under Goebbels' patronage), 
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Heidegger never asserted that there was an ultimate consistency between Holderlin and 
National Socialism. But, as Heidegger wrote on 4 November, 1945 to the new Rector of 
Freiburg University, with Nietzsche it was another matter: 
Beginning in 1936 I embarked on a series of courses and lectures on 
Nietzsche, which lasted until 1945 and which represented in even clearer 
fashion a declaration of spiritual resistance. In truth, it is unjust to 
assimilate Nietzsche to National Socialism, an assimilation which - apart 
from what is essential - ignores his hostility to anti-Semitism and his 
positive attitude with respect to Russia. But on a higher plane, the debate 
with Nietzsche's metaphysics is a debate with nihilism as it manifests itself 
with increased clarity under the political form of fascism. 3 
Whether even on a higher plane the assimilation of Nietzsche with National Socialism is 
justified has become a familiar question through the commentaries of Deleuze, Derrida, 
Klossowski and others. For Heidegger, the higher plane on which Nietzsche reveals his 
affinity with National Socialism, his essential truth as a thinker, is the doctrine of the will 
to power. The interrogation of the preconditions in this reading, such as its reliance on 
the magnum opus manufactured by Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche, its deficient suspicion of 
the admissability of the National Socialist appropriations and its systematization of a 
corpus that owes more to the feuilleton than to Scholasticism, has not of itself diminished 
the force of Heidegger' s critique of National Socialism. In certain respects, Nietzsche 
functions largely as an expedient cipher in this critique. 
"Nietzsche" becomes the proper name of nihilism just as "HOlderlin" becomes, as 
is explicit in the title of the 1936 lecture in Rome, the proper name of poetry. As such, 
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Heidegger views them, in the lecture course Holderlin 's Hymn "Andenken ", as poles in 
the question of the essence of the people: 
'Nietzsche and Holderlin' - an abyss separates the two. In abyssally 
different ways, both of them determine the nearest and the most distant 
future of the Germans and of the West.4 
The abyss that divides Holderlin and Nietzsche is the abyss that divides poetry and 
National Socialism. And it is in this abyss, rather than on a common ground, that the 
confrontation takes place. If Heidegger claims that his lectures on HOlderlin amount to a 
confrontation with the regime, it is because he exhibits Holderlin as the poet who 
promises another Germany than that of National Socialism, the more originary Germany 
portrayed by Holderlin as the priestess at the feast of the peoples. This other Germany is 
not present-at-hand. As the question concerning the essence of poetry involves, for 
Heidegger, a destruction of the understanding of Being as presence, it is a question that 
involves the ontological mission of the German Volk. Raising the question of the Un-
thought of nihilism, the lectures on Holderlin inform the critique offered in the lectures 
on Nietzsche. Heidegger' s resignation of the rectorship is not an abdication before the 
political as such. In his subsequent lectures he undertakes a critique of the politics of the 
present-at-hand and its constitutive inability to question the will to power and, hence, to 
think the Un-thought of nihilism. To attempt a repetition of Heidegger' s thinking on the 
essence of poetry is thus to seek to understand the nature, and positive inspiration, of his 
disavowal of National Socialism. 
For Heidegger, his confrontation with nihilism in the thirties and early forties was 
a confrontation with National Socialism. Yet clearly, inasmuch as he was permitted to 
lecture until the end of the war and at the height of the terror, the confrontation can be 
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said to have been ambiguous. National Socialism itself was expressly a confrontation 
with nihilism in the guise of liberal democracy. In his 1936 lecture course on Schelling, 
Heidegger still subscribes to this view, praising Hitler and Mussolini for introducing 
counter-movements to nihilism.5 The nihilism that Heidegger, in the reigning atmosphere 
of denunciation, disputed in Holderlin's name came to encompass National Socialism 
because it encompassed a general conception of the political. Although the regime is 
criticised, it is never on account of its particularity as one political formation among 
many. Heidegger's confrontation with National Socialism is likewise ambiguous because 
Heidegger retained the Nazi topoi of German renewal and the lament over nihilism. 
Everything thus depends on the way these topoi are used. Yet a reconstruction of their 
deployment does not necessarily presuppose a desire to exonerate Heidegger. That 
Heidegger might be exonerated by a removal of the confrontation's secrecy is, in a sense, 
not even to be desired, since the notion of the political contained in such a desire - the 
Platonic field of the arbitration of claims to the ethical and onto-theo-logical idea of the 
politeia - represses the question that Heidegger raises against the will to power as an 
avatar of Platonism. 6 
In order to establish poetry's irreducibility to nihilism and thus the people's 
irreducibility to National Socialism, it must be asked in what Heidegger's conception of 
nihilism consists. How does it differ, if at all, from the National Socialist caricature of 
liberal democracies? In his 1942 lecture course Holderlin's Hymn "The lster'', 
Heidegger subscribes to this caricature of the declared enemies of Germany: 
We know today that the Anglo-Saxon world of Americanism has resolved 
to annihilate Europe, that is, the homeland [Heimat], and that means: the 
commencement of the Western world. Whatever has the character of 
commencement is indestructible. America's entry into this planetary war 
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is not its entry into history; rather, it is already the ultimate American act 
of American ahistoricality and self-devastation. For this act is the 
renunciation of commencement, and a decision in favor of that which is 
without commencement. The concealed spirit of the commencement in 
the West will not even have the look of contempt for this trial of self-
devastation without commencement, but will await its stellar hour from 
out of the releasement and tranquillity that belong to the commencement.7 
It is difficult to see a confrontation with National Socialism in such a passage. Indeed, 
Heidegger' s "spiritual resistance" never formulated itself, in either his lectures or even 
his posthumously published private notes, in terms of a solidarity with the enemies of the 
regime. Heidegger suggests that the entry of Roosevelt's America into the war does not 
pose a threat to the Europe of National Socialist imperialism. Nihilism, which the 
movement never failed to attribute to Anglo-Saxon America, is manifest in the latter's 
self-devastation just as the originarity of Europe ensures its invulnerability. Heidegger' s 
thesis is that victory lies with the originary, and hence danger arises not from an 
opponent's military and industrial superiority but from an inability to remain within the 
origin. Such reasoning appears little more than propaganda. But is the origin the 
Germany of National Socialism? Heidegger's confrontation with the regime enacts itself 
as the drawing of a distinction between the two. 
In the 1941-2 lecture course Holderlin's Hymn "Andenken", Heidegger is explicit 
on the character of the origin and the danger it faces: 
The sporadic abandonment of the German essence to Americanism already 
reaches the disastrous point at which Germans are ashamed that their 
people was once called "the people of poets and thinkers". 8 
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The essence and originarity of the German people is to be the people of poets and 
thinkers. And that this should be their essence and originarity is not because they are, 
ineluctably, a people of poets and thinkers, but rather because they will be essential and 
originary only as such a people. In 1941-2, the Germans are surrendering their essence 
and hence the essential - Germany itself threatens the people of poets and thinkers. It is 
in fidelity to the essential that the Volk attests to its originarity and thus to its 
invulnerability. By breaking with the definition of the German people as the people of 
poets and thinkers, by mobilising the population as workers and soldiers, by emulating 
that which Hinger in The Worker considers Anglo-Saxon America's pre-eminent 
achievement, National Socialism relinquishes its only possibility of withstanding 
invasion. National Socialism mistakes what is to be defended and surrenders the very 
moment it begins preparations for war. 
For Heidegger, invulnerability rests with the maintenance of the essence of a 
people and not with the survival of the biologically determined entities of which it is 
seemingly composed. Nihilism, rather than death, is the danger that lies in wait for a 
people and its historical, i.e. mortal, essence. As the people of poets and thinkers, 
Germany is made perfect in military and industrial weakness. In Holderlin's Hymns 
"Germanien" and "Der Rhein", Heidegger accordingly favours Holderlin's image of 
Germany as a maiden lost in reverie and hidden in the forest over the Niederwald 
monument's bloodthirsty figure with a giant sword.9 On the assumption that its distance 
from the perceived practices of Anglo-Saxon America preserves the Volk because it 
preserves its essence, Heidegger regards the motorisation of the armed forces with the 
hostility towards technology characteristic of his works of this period. In a note from the 
incompletely delivered lecture course Nietzsche: European Nihilism, he writes: 
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Within the horizon of bourgeois culture and "intellectualism" one might, 
for example, view the complete, i.e. fundamental "motorisation" of the 
military from the ground up as a manifestation simply of untrammelled 
"technicism" and "materialism". It is in truth a metaphysical act that in its 
range certainly surpasses, for instance, the abolition of "philosophy". 10 
The devastation that Heidegger fears is a withdrawal of the essence of the Volk. This 
devastation by which nihilism announces itself can occur as much through military 
success as through military defeat. 
In 1943, while lecturing on Heraclitus, Heidegger refers to the devastation of the 
cities on the Rhine and the Ruhr and proclaims that the real disaster lies elsewhere. 
Everything pales before the calamity of nihilism: 
Let us, however, posit the moment when the possibility of saying and 
understanding "is" is withdrawn from human beings. Let us attempt to 
. think through, even if only for a few minutes, what would then become of 
humanity. No catastrophe that could break over the planet can be 
compared with this most inconspicuous of all events in which the relation 
to "is" is suddenly taken from humanity. But this catastrophe has already 
taken place; it is simply that no one has yet noticed it in its essence. 
Historical humanity has gone so far as to forget "is" and "Being", 
renouncing all thought of that which is named in this word. Indifference 
towards "Being" lays siege to the planet. Humanity allows the flood of the 
forgetfulness of Being to wash over it. In truth, however, there is no 
longer even a diving within this flood, since for that to be the case the 
forgetfulness of Being would still need to be experienced. This 
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forgetfulness of Being is itself already forgotten, which, of course, 
conforms with the essence of forgetfulness, drawing down into itself like a 
whirlpool everything that enters its vicinity. 11 
Another name for this obliviousness of Being is given in An Introduction to Metaphysics: 
To forget Being and cultivate only beings - that is nihilism. Nihilism 
thus understood is the ground of the nihilism which Nietzsche exposed in 
the first book of The Will to Power. 12 
Nihilism, by which the essence of the Volk is surrendered, shows itself in the inauthentic 
captivation with beings. In losing sight of Being for that which is and which as such 
inhabits the repeatability of the now, classical ontology was itself nihilistic - its legacy 
places itself between the Volk and its essential mission of the question of Being. 
Classical ontology is the ground of the nihilism that Nietzsche analyses in various 
contemporary manifestations without ever grasping it in itself. Heidegger thus comes to 
Nietzsche's assistance by furnishing both a single foundation for nihilism and the 
possibility of thinking its Un-thought. 
A note from 1887 included in The Will to Power confesses: 
Nihilism. It is ambiguous: 
A. Nihilism as a sign of increased power of the spirit: as active 
nihilism. 
B. Nihilism as decline and recession of the power of the spirit: as 
passive nihilism. 13 
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Taking the term "nihilism" from Turgenev, Nietzsche extends its range but, in doing so, 
renders the term ambiguous - Nietzsche does not grasp that which Heidegger will name 
the essence of nihilism. For both Heidegger and Nietzsche, and in contrast to many 
National Socialist pronouncements, nihilism is everywhere. And yet it is everywhere 
precisely because it names the derivative structure of the repeatable: "nihilism" is the 
fundamental meaning of "everywhere". In itself the ubiquity of nihilism betrays the 
irreducibility of Being. Being is forgotten and must, as Being, be forgotten by nihilism. 
The people of poets and thinkers that disappears within nihilism is the people of Being 
and, that is to say, of the alignment of the definitions of poetry and thought with the 
question of Being. 
Heidegger' s analysis of the planetary catastrophe of nihilism in the passage from 
the lecture course Heraclitus quoted above does not, therefore, need to be understood as a 
retraction of Heidegger' s defiant remarks a year earlier. The indestructibility that in 1942 
Heidegger attributes to the originary is not the spurious indestructibility of the untried, 
since the intervening military offensives of Anglo-Saxon America have no bearing upon 
the hidden spirit of the originary. The originary is indestructible because, as the Un-
thought of a ubiquitous nihilism, it cannot be found and hence cannot be destroyed. That 
the originary withholds itself is, in 1942, grounds for disregarding the escalation of 
hostilities, whereas, in 1943, it is itself the catastrophe. The one proposition does not 
contradict the other, and it is from within their coherence that Heidegger asserts: 
The planet is in flames. The essence of humanity is out of joint. Only 
from the Germans, assuming that they find and defend what it is that is 
German, can the world-historical sobriety [Besinnung] come. 14 
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That which is German (das Deutsche) is hidden from the Germans themselves and in its 
secrecy it consigns the planet to ruin. National Socialism is, properly speaking, a 
consequence, rather than a cause of the ruin of the age that is alternately called the 
forgetfulness of Being and the withholding of what it is that is German. 
In the same lecture course, Heidegger explains that the sobriety that is to come 
from the Germans will only come from them in their as yet unattained specificity as the 
people of Being: 
Irrespective of the substance and manner in which the external fate of the 
West may be articulated, the greatest and proper test of Germans still lies 
ahead, that test in which, at the hands of the ignorant, they are perhaps to 
be tested unwillingly as to whether they, the Germans, are in harmony with 
the Truth of Being, whether they are strong enough - over and above a 
readiness to die - to save the originary in its inconspicuous brilliance 
against the small-mindedness of the modem world. 
The danger in which the "holy heart of the peoples" of the West 
stands is not that of a decline; it is rather the danger that, in confusion 
ourselves, we will capitulate to the will of modernity and be driven along 
with it. 15 
HOlderlin' s "holy heart of the peoples" faces a test in which it is to prove itself properly 
German through the defence of the originary. The National Socialist topos of German 
renewal is cited here without simply being replicated. The originarity of the German 
people, by which they stand in a contestation with modernity, is not, for Heidegger, the 
rustic gloss of a programme of industrialisation, but rather the priority of Being as it 
presses on them its claim as the Un-thought of modern technicism. Heidegger advocates 
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a willingness to die in the defence of this Un-thought in a war necessariliy other than the 
one being waged by the regime, because a Germany defined as this Un-thought and 
defended by the means of modem technicism is a Germany left undefended before 
nihilism. The campaign against nihilism by which his writings recall National Socialism 
is likewise what distinguishes Heidegger from the regime. 
In "Overcoming Metaphysics", a collection of notes from this period, Heidegger 
refuses the world war, on account of the nihilism of its parties, any fundamental 
oppositionality or crisis. He thus suggests that the confrontation will not take place 
between National Socialism and the alliance of its military opponents, but between power 
and that which is forgotten in power: 
The struggle between those who are in power and those who want to come 
to power: on every side there is the struggle for power. Everywhere power 
itself is what is determinative. Through this struggle for power, the being 
of power is posited in the essence of its unconditional dominance by both 
sides. [ ... ] This struggle is [ ... ] in its essence undecidable. 16 
In What Is Called Thinking?, Heidegger will reiterate that the war has decided nothing. 17 
The decision must come from elsewhere. As the war has not issued from a conflict, there 
is no dispute that could be resolved in order to arrive at a peace. The difference between 
war and peace, according to a further note from "Overcoming Metaphysics", is 
inessential to the nihilism of the manipulation of beings: 
There are effects everywhere, and nowhere is there a worlding of the world 
and yet, although forgotten, there is still Being. Beyond war and peace, 
there is a mere erring of the consumption of beings in the plan's self-
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guaranteeing in terms of the vacuum of the abandonment of Being. 
Changed into their deformation of essence, "war" and "peace" are taken up 
into erring, and disappear into the mere course of the escalating 
manufacture of what can be manufactured, because they have become 
unrecognizable with regard to any distinction. The question of when there 
will be peace cannot be answered not because the duration of war is 
unfathomable, but rather because the question already asks about 
something which no longer exists, since war is no longer anything which 
could terminate in peace. War has become a distortion of the consumption 
of beings which is continued in peace. 18 
As the originary, and thus as that which is inconspicuous within the manufacture and 
consumption of beings, Germany is not at stake in such a war, just as it falls to none of 
the parties in such a peace. It is this other Germany that must be defended and yet, as this 
other Germany, it cannot be defended, at least not in the sense of safeguarding the 
integrity of geographical borders. As the Un-thought of modern technicism, Heidegger's 
Germany is not a being among beings, which might thus be preserved rather than 
exploited. Its defence involves the defence of the people within Being. In order to 
defend this other Germany the people must first find themselves within Being. The 
Germans must defend themselves through becoming the people of poets and thinkers that 
they never were except in literary journalism. Needless to say, it is not a matter of 
producing verses and treatises in place of armaments. The people of poets and thinkers is 
the people that defines itself otherwise than through production. It is the people that does 
not produce, because it does not tear beings away from nothingness and place them in the 
light of presence and the possibility of their manipulation. In Heidegger' s confrontation 
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with National Socialism, poetry and thought are attributed an irreducibility to the nihilism 
of production. 
For Heidegger, the Germans will only survive the war as well as its peace if they 
become the people of HOlderlin. In the 1934-5 lecture course Holderlin 's Hymns 
"Germanien" and "Der Rhein", Heidegger calls Holderlin the "founder of German 
Being". 19 As it is Holderlin who grounds the people of the Un-thought of nihilism, it is in 
the commentaries on HOlderlin that Heidegger attempts to think the confrontation 
between art and National Socialism. What is brought to the fore in this confrontation is 
the originary Germany forgotten by Nietzsche, National Socialism and its military 
opponents. 
Poetry, for Heidegger, does not exhaust itself within nihilism. Such a claim as yet 
says too little. Its resemblance to certain formulations of Nietzsche's on art's relation to 
nihilism should not be overestimated. A passage that Heidegger himself quotes from 
Nietzsche's literary remains (and, again, it is solely Heidegger's Nietzsche who is at 
issue) imputes a distance between art and nihilism. But significantly it is as the power of 
enervation, and not as the obliviousness of Being, that Nietzsche here understands 
nihilism: 
Very early in my life I took the question of the relation of art to truth 
seriously: even now I stand in holy dread in the face of this discordance. 
My first book was devoted to it. The Birth of Tragedy believes in art on 
the background of another belief - that it is not possible to live with truth, 
that the "will to truth" is already a symptom of degeneration.20 
The decadence of the "will to truth" is its opposition to "life". Heidegger quotes this 
passage in a reading of Nietzsche's exposition of Platonism as nihilism. Summarising 
this exposition, Heidegger writes: 
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The major debility of the basic force of Dasein consists in the calumniation 
and denigration of the fundamental orienting force of "life" itself. Such 
defamation of creative life, however, has its grounds in the fact that things 
are posited above life which make negation of it desirable. The desirable, 
the ideal, is the supersensuous, interpreted as genuine being [das eigentlich 
Seiende]. This interpretation of being is accomplished in the Platonic 
philosophy. The theory of Ideas founds the ideal, and that means the 
definitive preeminence of the supersensuous, in determining and 
dominating the sensuous.21 
To overcome nihilism is here, for Nietzsche, to overturn Platonism. Heidegger 
continues: 
Overturning Platonism means, first, shattering the preeminence of the 
supersensuous as the ideal. Beings, being what they are, may not be 
despised on the basis of what should and ought to be. But at the same 
time, in opposition to the philosophy of the ideal and to the installation of 
what ought to be and of the "should," the inversion sanctions the 
investigation and determination of that which is - it summons the 
question "What is being itself?" If the "should" is the supersensuous, then 
being itself, that which is, conceived as liberated from the "should," can 
only be the sensuous. But with that the essence of the sensuous is not 
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given; its definition is given up. In contrast, the realm of true being, of the 
true, and thereby the essence of truth, is demarcated; as before, however, 
already in Platonism, the true is to be attained on the path of knowledge.22 
With respect to the question of Being, Nietzsche's inverted Platonism is as reductionist as 
the metaphysics it overturns, since both ground themselves in the conviction that the truth 
of beings is a matter to be expounded in theories of knowledge. As a result, truth 
remains, with Nietzsche, that which must be isolated from its doubles. Nietzsche's 
affirmation of the sensuous, of what he terms "life" and "art", constitutes simply a further 
variant of the nihilism of the obliviousness of Being. It is an affirmation that is 
fundamentally a negation, and not simply because the sensuous that is affirmed defines 
itself as the negative of the supersensuous. The negation is the continued exclusion of 
Being as such through forgetfulness. Nietzsche retains the antithesis of the sensuous and 
the supersensuous and thereby retains the ontology of the Platonic doctrine of ideas. The 
confrontation with the reductionism of nihilism cannot, for Heidegger, take place through 
the sensuousness of the work of art. It is not by a single aspect that the work of art 
presents this confrontation; it is not even by its entirety, since this entirety - as the 
distinct assemblage of qualities - falls within the understanding of truth as adequation. 
The work of art, which for Heidegger is essentially poetry, enacts a confrontation with 
nihilism because it restores truth as adequation to its other origin in the concealment and 
unconcealment of the question of Being. 
Yet why should this be the privilege of the work of art? To what extent does 
Heidegger thereby replicate the nihilistic one-sidedness of Platonism and its Nietzschean 
inversion? These objections are addressed in Heidegger's most explicit response to the 
task of defining the work of art. In "The Origin of the Work of Art", composed in the 
period of the lectures on Nietzsche and Holderlin, Heidegger writes: "The work as work 
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sets up a world. The work holds open the open region of the world."23 The privilege of 
the work of art thus disappears into the world it establishes. That, for Heidegger, the 
work of art is never simply "itself' can be read in his commentary, in "The Origin of the 
Work of Art", on an inexactly specified painting by van Gogh: 
Van Gogh's painting is the disclosure of what the equipment, the pair of 
peasant shoes, is in truth. This being emerges into the unconcealment of 
its Being. The Greeks called the unconcealment of beings aletheia. 24 
Van Gogh's painting discloses what the pair of peasant shoes truly is. This is not to 
disclose the peasant shoes in conformity with the understanding of truth dominant in the 
natural sciences. What emerges into unconcealment in the painting is not the 
comprehensive set of the properties of a being present-at-hand, but rather the Being of the 
peasant shoes. What is thus unconcealed in van Gogh's painting is the very 
questionability of unconcealment. Van Gogh' s painting reveals the limits of revelation. 
Through depicting an object, it remains within the within the conventional understanding 
of representation and yet it likewise depicts the unrepresentable. In being depicted, the 
peasant shoes step beyond their ontic self-evidence into the truth of their Being and the 
Being (Da-sein) of their truth. The painting, Heidegger continues, restores to the shoes 
their world: 
But above all, the work did not, as it might seem at first, serve merely for a 
better visualizing of what a piece of equipment is. Rather, the 
equipmentality of equipment first expressly comes to the fore through the 
work and only in the work.25 
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The true object of depiction in the work of art is the object's otherwise overlooked 
equipmentality. In van Gogh's painting, equipmentality is the peasant's world of the 
open fields in which the use of the shoes is sustained. That the disclosure of 
equipmentality is not being identified in "The Origin of the Work of Art" with an insight 
into the optimal use of a piece of equipment is clear from Heidegger' s own expansive 
description: 
From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread 
of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly mgged heaviness of the shoes 
there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-
spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On 
the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles slides 
the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the 
silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its 
unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field. This 
equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining worry as to the certainty of 
bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling 
before the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of 
death.26 
Van Gogh's painting discloses the peasant woman's Being-in-the-world. That which 
defines the peasant shoes as equipment, i.e. that which is their equipmentality, is the 
phenomenon of world in all its fullness. In van Gogh's painting of a pair of peasant 
shoes, a world "appears". 
But why should a pair of peasant's shoes become so voluble through being 
depicted in the work of art? In what way is the equipmentality that, according to "The 
Origin of the Work of Art", comes to light only in the work of art different from the 
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equipmentality disclosed, according to Being and Time, in the broken, inappropriate or 
missing tool? Perhaps the exclusiveness of the emergence of equipmentality claimed for 
the work of art in the later text is not to be interpreted as a revision of the treatment in the 
earlier text. Perhaps the work of art is nothing other than a broken, inappropriate or 
missing tool and can be nothing other if it is to be the means of a confrontation with 
technicism. The Volk of the Un-thought of nihilism and the immersion in the 
manipulation of beings would therefore more clearly be the people of the poets. 
In Being and Time, art does not feature as a matter for exposition. In what way is 
the argument of "The Origin of the Work of Art" prefigured, if at all, in Heidegger' s 
earlier examination of the disclosure of the equipmentality (Zeugsein) of the equipment 
(Zeug)? In §15 of Being and Time, Heidegger writes of the character of readiness-to-
hand that is proper to the tool: 
The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its 
readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw [zurlickzuziehen] in order 
to be ready-to-hand quite authentically.27 
That which is ready-to-hand, and can thus be used as a tool (Zeug), is only ready-to-hand 
by means of the withdrawal whereby, as Heidegger explains, the context of its readiness-
to-hand effaces itself. Without this context a tool ceases to be a tool and yet this context 
must also withdraw if the tool is to be a tool: 
Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as an equipment. To the Being of 
any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it 
can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially 'something in-
order-to ... ' ["etwas um-zu ... "].28 
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In presenting itself immediately for use, a tool cannot present the mediation of the 
equipmental totality whereby it is what it is as something ready-to-hand. The totality of 
equipment is not the sum of interrelated tools, but rather the context, in the fullest sense, 
of the use of a given piece of equipment. Absorbed in the use of a tool, Dasein overlooks 
its context and ignores the open-endedness of its in-order-to .... So long as it is 
employed, the tool keeps the world in which it is employed secret. Alongside its 
individual function as a given piece of equipment, equipment as equipment that is 
employed has the function of warding off threats to Dasein' s immersion in the realm of 
that which Heidegger in Being and Time describes as the everyday: 
To the everydayness of Being-in-the-world there belong certain modes of 
concern. These permit the entities with which we concern ourselves to be 
encountered in such a way that the worldly character of what is within-the-
world comes to the fore. When we concern ourselves with something, the 
entities which are most closely ready-to-hand may be met as something 
unusable, not properly adapted for the use we have decided upon. The tool 
turns out to be damaged, or the material unsuitable. In each of these cases 
equipment is here, ready-to-hand. We discover its unusability, however, 
not by looking at it and establishing its properties, but rather by the 
circumspection of the dealings in which we use it. When its unusability is 
thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous. This conspicuousness 
presents the ready-to-hand equipment as in a certain un-readiness-to-
hand.29 
Here the inappropriate or damaged tool, just as the unwearable peasant shoes of van 
Gogh's painting in "The Origin of the Work of Art", discloses its world. 
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But is world in Being and Time to be understood differently from world in "The 
Origin of the Work of Art"? Certainly the style in which they are described is different, 
but the prose of the earlier text does not imply that it is a prosaic world that is at issue. If 
Heidegger in 1927 had meant by "world" only the systematic interrelations of a 
production process, then Being and Time would be a work of pragmatism, rather than of 
fundamental ontology. Reflecting on the misinterpretations of his work, Heidegger 
writes in 1941: 
For Heidegger, the world consists only of cooking pots, pitchforks and 
lampshades. He has no relationship to "higher culture", not to speak of 
"Nature", because none of that is to be found in Being and Time. 
The actual basis for this misinterpretation does not lie however in the 
sheer superficiality of the "reading'', but rather in the fact that one takes it 
for granted that the author can be ascribed a desire to put forward a 
"system of the world", while something nonetheless quite different is 
being asked. 30 
The conspicuousness of equipment in the text of 1927 is not the clarity with which it 
presents itself to the skilled eye of a time-and-motion expert. This conspicuousness has 
to be understood more radically, as a rupture in the very understanding of Being. 
The claim in "The Origin of the Work of Art" that it is only in the work that the 
equipmentality of equipment first comes to the fore does not contest the radicality of the 
rupture in Being and Time. The work of art does not exclude broken, inappropriate or 
missing equipment and nor is it simply interchangeable with such equipment. Instead, it 
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is its truth. The work of art sets up the world that broken, inappropriate or missing 
equipment merely discloses. The disclosures of broken, inappropriate or missing 
equipment are thus dependent on the work of art. Such a claim is, of course, no less 
peculiar than the claim that the work of art is nothing other than a broken, inappropriate 
or missing tool. But with the assertion of the priority of the work of art, Heidegger 
endeavours to overcome the incidentality and fortuitousness of the disclosures of broken, 
inappropriate or missing equipment. The work of art becomes the truth of these 
disclosures inasmuch as it is essentially that which the tool is only accidentally, namely, 
the occasion for the question of Being. The work of art is, as it were, the tool that is at 
once broken, inappropriate and missing in its very essence. 
In van Gogh's painting, the equipment of the peasant woman's shoes is missing 
and it is a loss that can never be made good and can never be overlooked. Readiness-to-
hand does not withdraw behind the ready-to-hand. The missing tool - and it is its 
absence that the work of art presents through the non-presentation of depiction - never 
reveals merely itself. In Being and Time, Heidegger writes: 
Similarly, when something ready-to-hand is found missing, though its 
everyday presence [Zugegensein] has been so obvious that we have never 
taken any notice of it, this makes a break in those referential contexts 
which circumspection discovers. Our circumspection comes up against 
emptiness, and now sees for the first time what the missing article was 
ready-to-hand with, and what it was ready-to-hand for. The environment 
announces itself afresh.31 
The absence of the object of depiction is never a simple defect of the work of art, because 
it exposes the object's transcendence (its in-order-to ... ). Van Gogh's painting does not 
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show a pair of peasant's shoes, so much as the environment (Umwelt) in which they are 
worn. The shoes present themselves to circumspection (Umsicht), insofar as the painting 
does not present a tool for use. The work of art frustrates the call for a tool in offering 
only its image and yet by this frustration it gives more than the tool itself: it gives the 
world from which technicism sustains itself in forgetfulness. 
In conformity with his critical destruction in the 1930s of the nihilism of the 
traditional understanding of truth, Heidegger is emphatic in "The Origin of the Work of 
Art" that the truth of the work of art is not to be measured by the accuracy of the image of 
its object. More is at stake: 
Agreement with what is has long been taken to be the essence of truth. 
But then, is it our opinion that this painting by van Gogh 
depicts a pair of peasant shoes somewhere at hand, and is a work of art 
because it does so successfully? Is it our opinion that the painting draws a 
likeness from something actual and transposes it into a product of artistic 
- production? By no means.32 
In painting the peasant shoes, van Gogh paints more than their mere image - and the 
measure of the work of art is thus not the measure of its representational accuracy. The 
above extract does not banish the notion of representation from discussions of art.33 
Heidegger's rejection of the view that the truth of art lies in its adequation to an extant 
object does not amount to an appeal against the sentence that Plato lays upon mimesis in 
The Republic. In order to follow Heidegger's confrontation with Platonism and its 
Nietzschean offshoot, the common underestimation and superficial rebuttals of Plato's 
thinking of mimesis must first be dismissed. 34 
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In Book X of The Republic, Plato contends that mimesis is not the preserve of the 
artist but characterises also the product of the manual worker in its distance from the idea 
and thus from truth: 
And what of the maker of the bed? Were you not saying that he too 
makes, not the idea which according to our view is the real object denoted 
by the word bed, but only a particular bed? 
Yes, I did. 
Then if he does not make a real object he cannot make what is, but 
only some semblance of existence; and if any one were to say that the 
work of the maker of the bed, or of any other workman, has real existence, 
he could hardly be supposed to be speaking the truth. 
Not, at least, he replied, in the view of those who make a business 
of these discussions. 
No wonder, then, that his work too is an indistinct expression of 
truth. 35 
As truth does not lie with the extant object, the truth of the work of art is for Plato 
likewise not defined by its adequation to an extant object. Heidegger writes therefore in 
Nietzsche: 
The distance from Being and its pure visibility is definitive for the 
definition of the essence of the mimetes. What is decisive for the Greek-
Platonic concept of mimesis or imitation is not reproduction or portraiture, 
not the fact that the painter provides us with the same thing once again; 
what is decisive is that this is precisely what he cannot do, that he is even 
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less capable than the craftsman of duplicating the same thing. It is 
therefore wrongheaded to apply to mimesis notions of "naturalistic" or 
"primitivistic" copying and reproducing. Imitation is subordinate pro-
duction.36 
It is not its distance from the extant object, but its distance from Being determined as 
presence in the idea that is decisive for Plato's thinking on the work of art. With 
I 
differing inspirations, both Plato and Heidegger consider art as a relic of a non-
metaphysical understanding of Being.37 Heidegger, for whom the possibility of a 
confrontation with the nihilism of Platonism rests with this distance from metaphysics, 
thus proposes mimesis as the definition of art. In what is other than an impartial citation 
of Plato, he asserts: "But mimesis is the essence of all art."38 
It is worth noting that this sentence does not express a blindness to non-
representative art, since the disavowal of an adequation with an extant object that such art 
practises does not affect its subordination to its t8£cc The t8£a of a non-representative 
work of art, as of any work of art, is its appearance, its £t8oi;. It is thus not because 
mimesis is the essence of all art that Heidegger later queries, in The Principle of Reason 
with its analysis of an age of the total manipulation of material, whether abstract art is 
indeed art: 
That in such an age art becomes objectless testifies to its historical 
appropriateness, and this above all when nonrepresentational 
[gegenstandlose] art conceives of its own productions as no longer being 
able to be works, rather as being something for which the suitable word is 
lacking.39 
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Such nonrepresentational art still appears and is thus, for Platonism, still subordinate to 
its t8Ecc Yet it endeavours to suppress the question that mimesis offers to the 
understanding of Being as presence.40 Such art seeks to erase its distance from its t8Ea. 
In "Plato's Doctrine of Truth", a reading of Plato almost as frequently contested 
as his reading of Nietzsche,41 Heidegger clarifies the meaning of appearance in 
Platonism: 
Plato does not regard this "visible form" as a mere "aspect." For him the 
"visible form" has in addition something of a "stepping forth" whereby a 
thing "presents" itself. Standing in its "visible form" the being itself 
shows itself.42 
That which is presents itself in its appearance as it is, and it is the t8Ea that presents 
itself: 
The "idea" does not first let something else (behind it) "shine in its 
appearance" ["erscheinen"]; it itself is what shines, it is concerned only 
with the shining of itself. The t8Ea is that which can shine [das 
Scheinsame]. The essence of the idea consists in its ability to shine and be 
seen [Schein- und Sichtsamkeit]. This is what brings about presencing, 
specifically the coming to presence of what a being is in any given 
instance.43 
Every work of art appears as its presence but also fails to appear as its presence. It falls 
short of its own t8Ea and, therefore, cannot be said to be true even to itself. And that it 
fails to appear as its presence is because it does not emerge into the constancy of 
knowledge. 
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Already in the 1924-5 lecture course Plato's Sophist, Heidegger expatiates on the 
relation between presence and knowledge: 
And the pure letting the world be encountered is a making present. As 
such, it is only temporally that it can express itself in the appropriate 
speaking about the world: the Being of the world is presence.44 
Knowledge in Platonism is explicitly defined .as encounter. Mimesis is the frustration of 
the encounter. The work of art, for Plato, is obscure because it does not fully give itself 
up to be known. It cannot do so because its perishability is its essential possibility of 
absence. The work of art deceives, but the substitution of a depiction for an extant object 
is incidental to the deception of mimesis. The work of art offers itself but never ceases to 
offer itself because its offer is never accepted, its subordination to the t8£a is never 
revoked in consummation. The act of offering, as its distance from presence, deprives it 
of Being and, that is to say, of appearance. In one respect, the essence of the work of art 
is, for Plato, the threat of invisibility. The work of art, contrary to Nietzsche's 
complementary readings of art and Platonism, refuses itself to the senses - it withdraws 
from the gaze of knowledge. 
The truth of metaphysics has to be won in the face of this secretiveness, as 
Heidegger writes: 
Everything depends on the op8on1i;, the correctness of the gaze. Through 
this correctness, seeing or knowing becomes something correct so that in 
the end it looks directly at the highest idea and fixes itself in this "direct 
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alignment." In so directing itself, apprehending conforms itself to what is 
to be seen: the "visible form" of the being.45 
The gaze has always, as it were, to look beyond the work of art in order to behold the 
truth that the work of art itself is, because appearance grants its immediacy solely to 
presence. That which is not present deludes. Being, as that which is, retracts in 
Platonism into the opposite of the false. Rediscovering the alternative to presence in the 
work of art, Platonism defines the work of art by the indigence that can but compel the 
work of art to seek adequation with that which is present. The representation of an extant 
object becomes the sum of the truth of the work of art. 
This contraction of Being into presence is, for Heidegger, the ground of nihilism 
that Nietzsche himself failed to recognise and thus failed to challenge in his overturning 
of Platonism. Nietzsche adheres fundamentally to the notion of truth that arises with the 
contraction of Being: 
Nietzsche's determination of truth as the incorrectness of thinking is in 
agreement with the traditional essence of truth as the correctness of 
assertion (A.oyrn;). Nietzsche's concept of truth displays the last glimmer 
of the most extreme consequence of the change of truth from the 
unhiddenness of beings to the correctness of the gaze. The change itself is 
brought about in the determination of the Being of beings (in Greek: the 
being present of what is present) as t8c:a.46 
By following Plato in defining truth within an antithesis with the false, Nietzsche does 
not see beyond the contraction of Being. For Heidegger, Nietzsche is "the most 
unrestrained Platonist in the history of Western metaphysics"47 because his opposition to 
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Plato never develops into a confrontation on the basis of an alternative. Nietzsche's 
maintenance of truth in an antithesis prevents him from raising a question against the 
determination of Being as presence and against the nihilistic conception of art dependent 
on this determination. Nietzsche, according to Heidegger, abolishes the distance that 
falsehood opens between the work of art and the Platonic determination of Being. In so 
doing, he ostensibly affirms art when it is precisely art's failure within Platonism that 
carries the possibility of thinking through nihilism. Nietzsche's conception of art as the 
true remains nihilistic, in Heidegger' s sense, because it is, so to speak, too affirmative. 
The will to power hinders Nietzsche from grasping failure as such. Everything becomes 
a manifestation of will to power. Even the false is absorbed into the presence of its 
appearance. Heidegger' s response to Plato, by contrast, does not involve disputing the 
definition of art as the failure of presence.48 Heidegger, however, wishes to grasp this 
failure as failure, since it is an understanding of this failure that puts into question the 
entire metaphysics of presence from Plato to Nietzsche. 
To this end, Heidegger repeats the judgements of metaphysics on the failure of 
art.49 The afterword to "The Origin of the Work of Art" acquiesces to Hegel' s judgement 
on the supercession of art in order not to lose sight of art's distance from metaphysics. 
The passage is worth quoting at length, not merely on account of its implicit critique of 
Nietzsche's affirmation of art: 
In the most comprehensive reflection on the essence of art that the West 
possesses - comprehensive because it stems from metaphysics -
namely, Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics, the following propositions occur: 
Art no longer counts for us as the highest manner in which truth 
obtains existence for itself. 
One may well hope that art will continue to advance and perfect 
itself, but its form has ceased to be the highest need of spirit. 
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In all these relationships art is and remains for us, on the side of its 
highest vocation, something past. 
The judgment that Hegel passes in these statements cannot be 
evaded by pointing out that since Hegel's lectures on aesthetics were given 
for the last time during the winter of 1828-29 at the University of Berlin 
we have seen the rise of many new artworks and new art movements. 
Hegel never meant to deny this possibility. But the question remains: Is 
art still an essential and necessary way in which that truth happens which 
is decisive for our historical existence, or is art no longer of this character? 
If, however, it is such no longer, then there remains the question as to why 
this is so. The truth of Hegel's judgment has not yet been decided; for 
behind this verdict there stands Western thought since the Greeks. Such 
thought corresponds to a truth of beings that has already happened. 
Decision upon the judgement will be made, if at all, from ,and about this 
truth of beings. Until then the judgement remains in force. But for that 
very reason the question is necessary as to whether the truth that the 
judgement declares is final and conclusive, and what follows if it is.50 
Hegel' s judgement remains binding in spite of Nietzsche. Hegel' s judgement that art has 
ceased to be the highest form in which truth attains existence does not incite Heidegger to 
restore art to its alleged earlier dignity, since the sentence expresses a thoroughly 
metaphysical reading of art's irreducibility to metaphysics. As it is only with 
metaphysics, and its contraction of Being to presence, that truth begins to attain existence 
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in higher and lower forms, neither art nor anything else is able to yield pre-eminence to 
metaphysics. Art is thus not so much superseded by metaphysics, as obscured in its other 
understanding of truth. The constitutive absence of a highest form, rather than its 
historical loss, defines this other understanding, which within metaphysics can only be 
recalled as failure. This "failure" has to be grasped as what it is in itself- and not 
merely as an incidental negation of the highest form -if the truth of Being is not to be 
overlooked in the preoccupation with presence. The "failure" of art is Being's failure to 
be merely present. To grasp the "failure" of presence as the essence of art is to grasp art 
as indeterminate. It is to grasp art as the questionability of the apprehension of beings in 
the light of presence. Through distinguishing itself from the originary understanding of 
Being, the highest form of truth establishes that from which it distinguishes itself as the 
distinct entity known as "art". Metaphysics hence reifies even that from which it 
distanced itself for the sake of the reification of beings in the light of presence. It is the 
distinctness of the entity known in metaphysics as "art" that risks interposing itself and 
reformulating Heidegger' s question here concerning the essence of truth as the property 
of a superseded form in which truth attains existence. Once art becomes a being among 
beings, the question of Being loses its urgency because the originary understanding of 
truth has become regional. Heidegger' s thinking on art seeks to answer to the essence of 
truth by grasping failure in its originarity as a contestation of the determination of Being 
as presence. For Heidegger, what is at stake in the Auseinandersetzung is a disclosure of 
the modesty of Being in contrast to the triumphalism of the will to power. 
Art's distance from nihilism is its failure before presence. It falters in the 
reproduction of its idea and through its faltering it shows more than its idea: it shows the 
world that the idea otherwise conceals. With the example of the van Gogh painting in 
"The Origin of the Work of Art", Heidegger is not proposing that the work of art is 
necessarily the depiction of a tool, but rather that any object of depiction, as t8Ea, is 
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restored in the work of art to the world suppressed in its presence. Heidegger' s example 
recalls the exposition of equipmentality in Being and Time, but in the later text there has 
been a shift from the accidental to the essential. The work of art sets up the world that 
the broken, inappropriate or missing tool discloses in deviations from their use. That the 
work of art sets up a world is not because it is a distinct entity, falling within the purview 
of metaphysics, but rather because it is the understanding of the Being of the 
phenomenon of world. Quarantined in the metaphysical entity known as "art", this other 
understanding still announces itself in its transcendence. Art's failure before presence 
recovers beings for Being and in this uncontained failure it is the originary failure of 
Being.51 The failure is ecstatic and transcends presence. Failing before presence art is 
never itself, never a distinct identity and thus the privilege of truth with which Heidegger 
endows the work of art is never an exclusive privilege in a further variation of Platonism. 
In short, it is not as any given extant and identifiable work of art, but rather as the failure 
of presence that the work of art restores adequation to the Open of the essence of truth. 
That which in its distance from the idea is understood within Platonism as failure 
cannot, however, in its ecstasy be derived from presence. For Platonism, the distance 
from the idea becomes a frustrated movement towards the idea. The mimetes is unable to 
create, because mimesis is, by definition, the inability to overcome the distance from 
presence. The works of the mimetes remain shadowy and insubstantial (µT] ov). They do 
not enunciate a clean break with nothingness and hence waver in undecidability between 
presence and nothingness. It is the inability of the mimetes, this failure that Heidegger 
retains and formulates as the originarity of art. The work of art does not create because 
world as world cannot be severed from nothingness in order to be created. World fails; it 
is the suppression of this failure that constitutes the essence of creation as the ascendancy 
of presence over nothingness. 
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In The Symposium, Diotima's definition of poetry and all the crafts mistakes the 
derivative for the originary and offers a speciously anti-Platonic appraisal: 
By its original meaning poetry means simply creation, and creation, as you 
know, can take very various forms. Any action which is the cause of a 
thing emerging from non-existence might be called poetry, and all the 
processes in all the crafts are kinds of poetry, and all those who are 
engaged in them poets.52 
The opportunity to interrogate presence is forgone. Here "poetry" is exhibited as the 
essence of handicraft because, more than the names of the other arts, it signifies creation. 
In "The Origin of the Work of Art", Heidegger retains this precedence of poetry, but for 
other reasons: "All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of beings, is as 
such, in essence, poetry."53 It is its relation to the truth of beings, and not its creativity, 
that establishes poetry, in Heidegger's view, as the essence of art. As the historical name 
of that from which metaphysics had to disentangle itself in order to come to itself in 
presence, "poetry" is, for Heidegger, the name of a non-metaphysical understanding of 
truth. It is in this sense that Heidegger is able to speak of poetry as the essence of art in a 
text whose chief examples are a van Gogh painting and a Greek temple. And that 
"poetry" is not to be interpreted in the sense of creation is the admonition in a note from 
Metaphysics and Nihilism from 1940-1: "Poetry- no longer as art; with the end of 
metaphysics the end of 'art' - 'tEXVYJ".54 As poetry (Dichtung) is neither n:otrimc; nor 
'tEXVYJ, as it neither creates nor produces, its status as the essence of the arts must have 
another, more originary foundation. 
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And, for Heidegger, it is because "poetry" is "language" that it constitutes the 
internal condition of possibility of the other arts. In "The Origin of the Work of Art" he 
asserts of language: 
It not only puts forth in words and statements what is overtly or covertly 
intended to be communicated; language alone brings beings as beings into 
the open for the first time.55 
"Poetry" is the essence of the arts and "language" is that which alone brings beings as 
beings into the open. The work of art, inasmuch as it is language, reveals beings as such 
and thus reveals them in their Being. Revealing them not merely in the presence of their 
apprehensibility, it reveals them in their truth. The essence of all art is poetry because 
poetry, in its turn, is defined, for Heidegger, by language's foundation of world. In 
comparison with its foundation of world, all other characteristics of language are 
inessential. Insofar as it founds a world, the work of art is language. 
Language founds because it fails to create. If the work of art functions - and 
thus does not function - as a broken, inappropriate or missing tool, is language itself a 
tool of this kind? Heidegger in "Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry" denies, however, 
that language is a tool at all: 
Language is not merely a tool which man possesses alongside many 
others; rather, language first grants the possibility of standing in the midst 
of the openness of beings.56 
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As the precondition of every tool, language cannot be a tool among others that the human 
being possesses. It is, nevertheless, of the concealed essence of language that Heidegger 
writes, as a remark from the "Letter on 'Humanism'" emphasises: 
Language still denies us its essence: that it is the house of the truth of 
Being. Instead, language surrenders itself to our mere willing and 
trafficking as an instrument of domination over beings.57 
Language itself becomes a tool to be restored to its world through the work of art. In 
"Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry", it is the work of art that is the precondition of 
language: 
Poetry is a founding: a naming of being and of the essence of all things -
not just any saying, but that whereby everything first steps into the open, 
which we then discuss and talk about in everyday language. Hence poetry 
never takes language as a material at its disposal; rather, poetry itself first 
makes language possible. Poetry is the primal language of a historical 
people.58 
What is essential to the work of art, to language, and to poetry is the foundation of world. 
But that the foundation of world is essential does not mean that it is an invariant of the 
positivistic entities known as the work of art, language and poetry. The foundation of 
world is the highest task and that by means of which the work of art, language and poetry 
are essential. Poetry as poetry, which is to say, in its essence as the foundation of world, 
precedes language understood as a material at its disposal. Poetry is language's condition 
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of possibility and as such it sustains, regardless of whether it is acknowledged or not, not 
only every discourse, but also every activity. Poetry itself is the clearing of beings. 
Heidegger' s turn to poetry after the resignation of the rectorship was not a turn 
away from any given being. As the turn to poetry was an engagement with the essential, 
it cannot be equated with a renunciation of the political. Poetry is itself the truth of the 
1w/..1c;. The decision that delimits the domain of the political as one domain among 
others presupposes the grounding of beings in poetry. Every essence becomes poetic 
with the establishment of the originarity of its understanding of Being. In addressing the 
question of the essence of poetry, Heidegger addresses the question of the essence of the 
political. But why should poetry be a privileged point of access to the essence of the 
political? It is because, in the context of National Socialism, the essence of the political 
had withdrawn from politics. In his confrontation with Nietzsche and the Hitlerian 
dictatorship, Heidegger has recourse to a notion of poetry as the Un-thought of the will to 
power. Poetry becomes that which hesitates and it thereby founds world in the openness 
that nihilism suppresses in its drive to the absolute presence of beings. Judged by the 
criteria of nihilism, poetry is a failure. Only when language fails, i.e. only when it is 
more than the unambiguous transmission of items of information, does it disclose its 
essence and show itself to be poetry. That language is essentially not a tool in the 
mobilisation of the masses is the suspicion initiated through its being "broken" as a tool 
in poetry. The disclosure of the essence depends on an abuse of mere serviceability, 
since use in general, for early and middle Heidegger, is opposed to a revelation of 
essence. The essential is the unmanageable. A tool displays its essence - the world 
within which it is employed and "explained" - when it is broken, missing or 
inappropriate, and thus its use always presupposes a neglect of the task of understanding 
its essence. It is, in a sense, always a broken, missing or inappropriate tool that is 
unwittingly being used. To the extent that the work of art has been traditionally defined 
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by being at odds with unmanageability, by the fashioning of its material, by its creating 
and bringing forth, it is less a work of art, for Heidegger, than a figure of the secondary 
realm of TEXVYJ: only the inessential knows perfection. Where National Socialism evaded 
the foundational failure composing, in the shape of poetry, the essence of the political and 
the ground of a historical people, it promulgated the nihilism of the obliviousness of 
Being under the cover of its achievements. TEXVYJ can never be the essence of a people; 
the essence of a people is always to be a people of the "failure" of world to reduce itself 
to presence. 
It is on account of the priority of failure over TEXV11 that the ultimate foundation 
of a people is poetry. In Holderlin's Hymns "Germanien" and "Der Rhein", Heidegger 
writes: 
Poetization is foundation, it is a realising [erwirkend] grounding of the 
enduring. The poet is the one who grounds Being. That which, in the 
everyday, we name the real [das Wirkliche], is, at bottom, unreal. Because 
the sign of the gods is, as it were, built by a poet into the foundation walls 
of a people's language (perhaps without the people's suspecting this at 
first), Being is founded in the historical Dasein of the people, and in this 
Being a directive and a dependence are laid and left behind.59 
Poetry composes the historical ground of a people, inasmuch as it is not reducible to the 
a-historicality of presence. Its distance from presence - and it is distant from presence 
only inasmuch as it always overreaches presence - is its distance from the unreal. That 
which we are accustomed to call real is ultimately unreal, because its transparency and 
familiarity is the consequence of its abstraction from world. TEXVYJ, realising itself in the 
obliviousness of world, does nothing but produce its own realisation and yet all the 
223 
proofs it creates of its reality are, for that very reason, insufficient. It merely proves its 
remoteness from Being and thereby, for Heidegger, its "unreality". 
In the 1941 lecture course Basic Concepts, Heidegger traces back to Nietzsche the 
retreat of the originary poetic foundation of the people in favour of the mobilisation of 
the worker and the soldier and the hegemony of 't£XV11: 
In the interim, it has been decided that "the worker" and "the soldier" 
completely determine the face of the actual, all political systems in the 
narrow sense notwithstanding. These names are not meant here as names 
for a social class or profession. They indicate, in a unique fusion, the type 
of humanity taken as measure by the present world-convulsion for its 
fulfillment, giving direction and foundation to one's relation to beings. 
The names "worker" and "soldier" are thus metaphysical titles and name 
that form of the human fulfillment of the Being of beings now become 
manifest, which Nietzsche presciently grasped as the "will to power".60 
The "worker" and the "soldier" are distinguished by their engagement in reality, but 
Heidegger queries whether such experience can satisfy its claims to essentiality: 
But do "workers" and "soldiers", in virtue of this experience, also know 
the Being of beings? No. Yet perhaps they no longer need to know it. 
Perhaps the Being of beings has never been experienced by those who 
directly shape, produce, and represent beings. Perhaps Being was always 
brought to knowledge merely "by the way," like something apparently 
"superfluous."61 
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Inasmuch as they are absorbed solely in that which is, the "worker" and the "soldier" 
disavow Being and hence the ground, i.e. the "reality" of their engagement. Being lies 
elsewhere. A people, if it is to ground itself, must ground itself within Being and, for 
Heidegger, it is within the failure of production that is poetry that Being offers itself as 
ground. 
Here Heidegger' s critique of metaphysics is the elaboration of a topos of German 
conservatism.62 That the essence of the people rests with the Un-thought of 't£XVYJ is a 
contention not at all alien to the strain of German nationalism that sought to make a virtue 
of the country's economic backwardness, and even of its defeat in war. 63 Expounding the 
contingency of momentary underdevelopment as spiritual resistance to industrialisation, 
this nationalism prided itself on the absence of any achievements outside the very 
constricted sphere defined as culture. Modernisation, insofar as it challenged the 
preponderance of this sphere and involved levelling differences between Germany and its 
Western neighbours, was demonised as an assault on the national character. Economic 
development was cultural regression and an aping of the foreign. Even though Heidegger 
is perhaps the most eloquent and profound advocate of this version of German 
nationalism, its tone and principles are to be heard in Thomas Mann's Reflections of a 
nonpolitical man, Hofmannsthal' s address "Literature as the Spiritual Space of the 
Nation" and - notwithstanding its corrective cynicism -Adorno's brief text "On the 
Question: What is German?". What is peculiar to Heidegger's critique of 
industrialisation is that he does not hypostasise the nation's backwardness as its essence, 
but rather defines its essence in relation to a future other than modernisation.64 That 
Germany has not yet realised itself is an assessment that Heidegger shares with the 
exponents of industrialisation. But, for Heidegger, Germany is to realise itself in the 
future as such, i.e. in the future as ecstasis rather than as a present whose time is yet to 
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come. Germany awaits itself and it must await itself if it is to maintain a distance from 
presence and the nihilism of 'tEXVll. 
In the "Evening Conversation between a Younger and an Older Prisoner of War in 
a Camp in Russia" from 1945, Heidegger accordingly draws together the notions of the 
people, poetry and waiting: 
THE ELDER: My supposition is that the poetic character of your 
thinking lies rather in its nature as a waiting and that basically 
your thinking already was a waiting even before it was raised 
for you today into clear knowledge. 
THE YOUNGER: Perhaps the poets and thinkers of a people are 
nothing other than those who are waiting in the noblest sense, 
through whose presence [deren Gegenwart, whose wait 
towards ... ] toward the coming the word is reached into the 
answer of the human essence and thus brought into language. 
THE ELDER: Then indeed the people of poets and thinkers would be 
in a unique sense the waiting people. 65 
The Volk waits because of its poeticality and it waits in relation to the essence of the 
human. It is, however, essentially backward with regard to its own essence. As it is 
always awaiting itself, it is unable to submit itself in its presence to the manipulation of 
'tEXVll and thus preserves the human in its essential distance from reification. Heidegger 
suggests that the inviolability of this people lies in its absence: 
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THE YOUNGER: The people that is waiting would necessarily be for the 
others even quite useless, because that which always simply waits 
and forever awaits the coming, yields nothing tangible that could 
be of use for progress and the upswing of the performance curve or 
for the expeditious course of business. 66 
This people is not so much waiting for something as waiting away from something. It is 
a people that waits precisely in order not to be the people whose essence is present-at-
hand. Heidegger's Volk is the people of mimesis and of the treason of Holderlin's "false 
priest". 67 It waits in order not to produce. It waits against presence in order not to 
emulate its neighbours' obliviousness to the undecidability of Being in the prosecution of 
the extant. A people that does not wait - that Being abandons to presence - is a people 
without a future and without a past. For Heidegger, industrialisation is not a plan for the 
future of a people, but rather a means for abolishing the future in favour of the nihilism of 
that which is solely present. Being is lost to view behind material, which remains 
fundamentally the same whether it is accumulated in "peace" or devastated in "war". 
In a lecture delivered in Konstanz at the end of 1934, "The Current State and the 
Future Task of German Philosophy", Heidegger reserves the notions of mission and task 
for the people that does not simply occupy itself with the extant: 
Been-ness [Gewesenheit] is the might of the mission, the future is the 
might of the task. Only if, intimating our mission, we grapple to ourselves 
our task, are we truly able to be contemporary [gegenwartig]. Whoever 
simply cultivates that which is at hand, and has forgotten the mission and 
thus falsified the task into a quantifiable profit, he is not contemporary -
on the contrary, he is merely lost within the prevailing today.68 
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The conservatism that voices itself in such passages is, strictly speaking, a conservatism 
of the Nothing, of the non-reified. The German people must recover itself in the 
originarity of the Nothing in ecstatic temporality. 
Heidegger' s disillusionment with National Socialism issues arguably from a 
disappointed faith in the movement's ability to bring about an understanding of Dasein as 
the "Platzhalter des Nichts". All its proclamations of opposition to modernity and to the 
materialism of its neighbours were, in the end, merely "aesthetic". National Socialism 
aestheticised politics, but it did so in the service of the forgetfulness of Being. The 
distance that opened between its proclamations and the reality of its materialism was not 
the distance that opens in the work of art as the possibility of understanding Being other 
than as presence. The lies of the regime were all too easily followed back to their "idea". 
In other words, their distance from their reality was only comprehensible as their 
subordination in a politics of expediency. The "aestheticism" attributed to the NSDAP 
belongs to a vulgar Platonism. 
Habermas, in his preface to the German translation of Farias' Heidegger et le 
nazisme, is too eager to mistake the nature of Heidegger' s "aesthetic" conservatism and 
to override the question of its assimilability with National Socialism. He writes: "The 
crude nationalism Heidegger openly sustained even after 1933 remains, in a form more or 
less sublimated through Holderlin, an invariant feature of his thought."69 But how can 
that which is sublimated remain crude? What does "sublimation" mean here? For 
Habermas, the crudity of Heidegger' s nationalism in 1933 is its compatibility with the 
nationalism of the regime. National Socialism is peremptorily presented as the 
intrinsically crude essence of German nationalism and, inasmuch as Heidegger addresses 
the notion of the German people in his commentaries on Holderlin, he is said to retain his 
allegiance to the NSDAP. The criticisms that Heidegger directs at the regime on account 
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of its deficient sense of the specificity of the German people are thereby dismissed. Yet, 
for Heidegger, the commentaries on Holderlin do not constitute a sublimation of his 
nationalism, but rather its most lucid expression. By refusing a nationalist critique of 
National Socialism, Habermas is seemingly (and characteristically) only able to object to 
the regime on the basis of its insufficient universality. Whereas for Heidegger the regime 
is not specific enough, for Habermas it was not universal enough. Habermas here 
repeats an objection that already sounded within the party during the last days of the 
war.70 Given the global self-conception of the movement, it could be said that, in the 
frustration of its territorial ambitions, National Socialism was for itself insufficiently 
National Socialist. It had always been an unwilling simulacrum of itself, because it was 
forever having to will the execution of its self-conception against its own partiality. In 
siding with the universal, Habermas implicitly has recourse to an understanding of the 
will to power scarcely less degraded than that propagated by the National Socialists. 
Everything is to be judged by its powers of expansion, its universalisability. The crudity 
of a nationalism such as that of National Socialism is much less a matter of purity than of 
a carelessness with respect to its own opposition to the international. This crudity, as 
Habermas terms it, furthermore does not admit of sublimation in the Freudian sense, 
since in its incoherence there cannot be discerned the immediate object from which desire 
might be more or less comfortably diverted to the "cultural" phenomenon of Holderlin's 
poetry. By not questioning the immediacy (crudity) of the political and the mediacy 
(sublimation) of the poetic, Habermas foregoes a criticism of the universalist foundations 
of the nationalism of the NSDAP. 
Once the political has been demarcated as the field of the struggle for recognition 
as the universal, the essential specificity of the Volk becomes apolitical. The resulting 
apoliticality of the specificity of the Volk denotes, not simply a neglect of the question of 
the essence of the Volk, but also an impoverishment of the concept of the political itself. 
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A politics of the universal is political only in spite of itself, since the universality towards 
which it strives constitutes the extirpation of the political: the openness of the polis is to 
be replaced with the constrictedness of the oikos in which the universal exercises its 
paternalism unchallenged.71 The people composing the public realm, and in its essential 
specificity forever opening a distance from the universal, is the Un-thought of the 
struggle for power. The openness of the people is likewise its furtiveness, because the 
definitive politicality of its historical specificity renders it invisible within the nihilistic 
struggle for power. 
Of the uncanny guardians of the openness of the political - the poets and 
thinkers, priests and rulers who are the true founders of the State - Heidegger writes in 
An Introduction to Metaphysics: 
Pre-eminent in the historical place, they become at the same time apolis, 
without city and place, lonely, strange [Un-heimliche], and alien, without 
exit amid the entirety of beings, at the same time without statute and limit, 
without structure and order, because they themselves as creators must first 
create all this. 72 
Occurring in a commentary on Antigone, this passage defines the creator of the polis 
rather than reflects on the amoralism of the tyrant. The creators of the polis stand outside 
the polis as the field of the struggle for power. Their creativity is negative: they found 
the polis, but they found it in the openness of that which has not yet been created, i.e. 
fully determined and rendered positive. The "apoliticality" of these creators is the 
condition of possibility for the statutes and limits, structures and orders under which the 
openness of the political nonetheless disappears from view. They are apolis, without city 
and place, but for that very reason they are not at the mercy of the homelessness of the 
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universal. The polis first grounds itself in their refusal of the struggle for power just as 
the universal grounds itself in the refusal of the polis. The strangeness of the creators -
their Un-heimlichkeit - is the corollary of their originarity and unrecognisability within 
the universalist light of presence. 
Heidegger' s commentaries on HOlderlin in the thirties and early forties address 
the uncanniness of the originary. In these texts, Heidegger's nationalism, as an attention 
to the uncanniness of the originary, is at odds with the self-certain nationalism of the 
NSDAP. Habermas is by no means alone in not drawing the distinction between these 
two nationalisms. Thus a commentator such as Kommerell, forgetting his reservations 
concerning the regime, can write of the notion of the people in Holderlin: 
The doctrine that a century finds intolerable is the doctrine of which it 
stands in the greatest need. In ours Holderlin's occupies this position: 
when a people is truly a people, its war is a holy war. Just as the 
individual through beauty or great deeds enters upon its higher reality, so 
does a people through war; indeed it requires an opponent in order to 
glorify itself.73 
Holderlin here becomes the poet of Hitlerian nationalism. The poetry that, for Heidegger, 
promises the nationalism of the Un-thought of nihilism, promises, for Kommerell, 
military expansion and the struggle for recognition. Irrespective of his affection and 
esteem for Kommerell, Heidegger is consistent in his antagonism toward such 
"politicisations" of the work of art. 
In the collection of notes published under the title Besinnung, Heidegger asserts 
that the work of art is as alien to the National Socialist realm of the struggle for 
recognition as it had been earlier to the interiority of bourgeois criticism: 
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It remains essentially withdrawn as much from the "public" as from 
"private" play, belonging solely to the persistence in the decline 
[Untergang] that alone can become a history in keeping with the essential, 
and that leaves in its wake a clearing of Being.74 
The work of art commits itself neither to internal migration nor public spectacle. It is 
withdrawn from the choice between the individual in its Cartesian isolation and the 
universal of the deracinated masses. Persisting in its decline and thus its finitude, the 
work of art eludes the abstraction from historicality by which the autonomous subject and 
the "they" are alike determined. The essential decline of the work of art is the originarity 
of its other understanding of Being. It declines in transcending its presence and, through 
decline, it retires from the struggle for recognition. The work of art never gives itself up 
to be apprehended in the light of presence. It is originarity that renders it too frail for the 
struggle, because power, as Heidegger continues, is the property of the derivative: 
Only now in the history of humanity does the obliviousness of Being come 
to its position of total power. But what if this abandonment of beings by 
Being were the beginning of an originary history in which Being [Sein] is 
Beyng [Seyn], so that the actual in its ever greater actuality would be ever 
more hopelessly cast out from Being, from Beyng as refusal, to which no 
power and no supremacy could be equal because they must necessarily and 
always mistake the essence of the utterly power-less. The powerless can 
never be deprived of power. This, however, is not attributed to it as a 
deficiency. On the contrary, it is merely a consequence - and one not 
even necessary and fitting - of its nobility.75 
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The originary is always misjudged in its powerlessness because it has not the "strength" 
to reduce itself to presence. HOlderlin, who speaks of tragedy as a revelation of the 
originary in its weakness76, speaks likewise of the revelatory caesura of tragedy77 : the 
originary shows itself in letting "nothing" appear. By the criteria of technicism, the 
originary is deficient because beings have not yet come to the presence on which their 
manipulability rests. Holderlin, as the poet of weakness, is, for Heidegger, the poet of the 
impossibility of National Socialism. He is the poet of the Un-thought of the movement's 
nihilism. In the 1931-2 lecture course On the Essence of Truth: Plato's Parable of the 
Cave and Theaetetus, Holderlin is not even included in a list of great poets.78 Although 
Heidegger had been familiar with Holderlin's texts since 190879, it is only after 1933 that 
the poet of modesty becomes the essential poet. 
In this regard, Heidegger' s reading of Holderlin displays less of an affinity with 
Kommerell than with Benjamin's early text "Two Poems by Friedrich Holderlin", with 
its depiction of the passivity at the centre of the hymns. 80 Moreover, a complementarity 
could be said to exist between Benjamin's and Heidegger's readings: for the one, 
passivity alone is able to serve as a point of mediation and occupy the centre, because, for 
the other, weakness is the essence of the originary. Inasmuch as the centre is reserved for 
the weak, a nationalism unavailable to National Socialism is to be heard in the 
concluding strophe of Holderlin' s hymn "Germanien" with its interpretation of the 
geographical centrality of Central Europe: 
Yet at the centre of Time 
In peace with hallowed, 
With virginal Earth lives Aether 
And gladly, for remembrance, they 
The never-needy dwell 
Hospitably amid the never-needy, 
Amid your holidays, 
Germania, where you are priestess and 
Defenceless proffer all round 
Advice to the kings and the peoples.81 
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The paranoia and megalomania of National Socialism are missing from Hi:ilderlin's 
patriotism. Germany occupies the centre neither as the common object of the rapacity of 
her neighbours nor as the seat of a military empire. Instead, defencelessly Germany gives 
counsel to the kings and the peoples assembled around her in the feast. 
Germany is the priestess among the nations and must remain such for their sake as 
much as for her own. For Heidegger, the essence of the German people is not to be one 
people among others, but rather to be the people of the essential. The eschatological 
pretensions of National Socialism concerning the German people are shadowed in 
Heidegger' s writings by the elaboration of the mission of the German people in the 
history of Being. To repeat an excerpt from the lecture course Heraklit: 
The planet is in flames. The essence of humanity is out of joint. Only 
from the Germans, assuming that they find and defend what it is that is 
German, can the world-historical sobriety come. 
The German essence is to be found in the task of "priestess" among the nations. Through 
bringing themselves into conformity with their essence, the German people serve the 
other peoples as their "priests". 
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But that which is specific to the Germans seemingly becomes a universal in the 
context of their world-mission as priests of the peoples. The world-mission of the 
Germans defines itself, however, against the universal and defines "das Deutsche" 
without concession to the recognisability of the people of National Socialism. Since the 
universal is that which presupposes a neglect of "das Eigene", of namely that by which 
Heidegger defines "das Deutsche", the "universality" of the world-mission of the 
Germans is entirely negative and is to be situated properly in the target of its 
consternation. The sobriety that will come over the world from out of a discovery and 
defence of that which is German will not be the sobriety of unlimited rational 
communication. It will be the sobriety of an insight into "das Eigene", into the 
transcendence proper to Dasein as it is secured in the mimesis and technicist 
incompetence of the holy heart of the peoples. The world-mission of the Germans is to 
"instantiate" the transcendent, and hence the unrepeatable and non-global, in a 
confrontation with the globalism of 't'EXV'fl. In his commentary on Holderlin's hymn 
"Germanien", Heidegger develops his notion of the priest as the tender of the Un-thought 
of i-i::xvri: 
Just as at the beginning of the flight of the gods it is the priest who is first 
affected (it goes without saying that it is not ministers of the established 
churches who are in question), likewise for a new advent of the gods a 
priest or a priestess must again be the first affected, awaiting, hidden and 
unknown, the messengers of the gods, so that temple, image and custom 
might lovingly follow them. If that does not occur, then regardless of 
aircraft, radio and conquest of the stratosphere the peoples will tumble 
irretrievably towards their end. If matters are to turn out differently, then 
the gods-lessness [Gotterlosigkeit] of historical Dasein in its entirety must 
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first be experienced, i.e. Dasein must be open to such experience and if it 
is not, it must be made so, precisely by those who truly endure the flight of 
the gods. They are the ones who doubt, the legend of that which has been 
dawns and darkens [dammert] about their heads, and they are those of 
which not one of them knows what is happening to them, while the self-
certain and robust know-alls always know what happens to them, as they 
punctiliously take care that nothing at all can happen to them. 82 
The sobriety that will come from the German people is the questioning of the priest. 83 
The priest introduces hesitation into the self-assurance of technicism, but not in order to 
temper this self-assurance, to see it vindicated in a more encompassing success. The 
doubt of the priest restores 'tEXVll to its essence in the originarity of doubt. This involves 
less the abolition of the tool than its fracture, since the doubt of the priest is not a call to 
return to an ethnologically fantastic toolless society, but is instead the anticipation of the 
recovery from the reductionism of 'tEXVll into its essence as world. 84 
Germany is the priestess among the nations only so long as she is the 
"incompetent" among the nations. Her hesitation before 't'EXVll is the feast day on which 
the nations assemble around her. In the lecture course Holderlin 's Hymn "Andenken ", 
Heidegger reviews the conventionally negative definitions of the holiday: 
Celebrating the feast [feiern] means in the first place: not working. It can 
thus come about that the feast days stand in exclusive relation to 
workdays, that they are an interruption in the time of work and a change in 
the routine of labour, and ultimately a pause introduced solely for the 
benefit of work.85 
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The cessation of labour is however an inessential definition of the holiday: 
Now the cessation of work is no longer essence and ground of the 
celebration of the feast. On the contrary, it is already a consequence of 
that catching of oneself which seemingly brings human beings back only 
to their egos, but which in truth transposes them out into that region to 
which their essence clings. Wonder begins or else terror. 86 
The feast day is recuperative, not because it allows human beings to replenish the stores 
of energy expended in labour, but because it exposes Dasein to its essential possibilities 
of wonder and terror in the face of the worlding of the world. Like the work of art, the 
feast day is the essence of that which the broken, missing or inappropriate tool is only 
accidentally. Alluding to the sun in Plato's parable of the cave, Heidegger· writes: 
At the time of the festival and on feast days, the proper [das Eigene], the 
ground itself of history, comes purely to appearance; but that which 
appears is there not an object for observation, that which appears [das 
Erscheinende] is a shining [ein Scheinen] in the sense in which we say: the 
sun shines.87 
The sun that shines on the feast day is the Un-thought of 'tEXVYJ. World, in its originary, 
weakness illuminates Dasein and every tool discovers itself as essentially broken, missing 
or inappropriate. No longer ready-to-hand, the tool reveals its essence in the temple. The 
temple is the work of art that raises itself on the feast day in its distance from labour's 
immersion in presence. In this distance from presence lies its title to mimesis and thus to 
the name of art. The feast day, with its focus on the temple, is the recollection of the 
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unsettling origin of the everyday: "Celebrating the feast is a becoming free from the usual 
through a becoming free for the unusual."88 This becoming free for' the unusual is the 
beginning of wonder or terror. The feast day is never entirely distinguishable from 
misfortune, from the uncanniness of the originary rupture in which the world of a people 
worlds. 
Heidegger' s definitions of the work of art and the feast day are both directed 
towards the Un-thought of 'tEXV'll. The work of art and the feast day are a failure of the 
self-certainty of tEXV'll and it is within this failure that a people becomes the people of 
poets and thinkers. Incompetence is the essence of art's revelation. This proposition, 
implicit in Heidegger, is explicit in Kafka. Josephine in the tale "Josephine the Singer, or 
the Mouse Folk" cannot sing, yet it is precisely her failure as an artist - the discrepancy 
between her claims and her achievement - that reveals her people to themselves and 
binds them to her. Kafka writes of the nature of her performances: 
And indeed this is all expressed not in full round tones but softly, in 
whispers, confidentially, sometimes a little hoarsely. Of course it is a kind 
of piping. Why not? Piping is our people's daily speech, only many a one 
pipes his whole life long and does not know it, where here piping is set 
free from the fetters of daily life and it sets us free too for a little while.89 
Josephine's voice rediscovers the world in which the piping of the mice has its place. It 
does so, not because it is more than a piping, but because it claims to be more. It is an 
instrument that is inappropriate to its task, and in this distance from its concept, in its 
abject subordination to its t8Ecx., Josephine's piping is, in Plato's sense, art. Josephine is 
able to impose on not a single one of the listeners gathered around her. She is even 
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encouraged in the extravagant claims of her art, regardless of the danger to which she at 
times exposes her people: 
Josephine exerts herself, a mere nothing in voice, a mere nothing in 
execution, she asserts herself and gets across to us; it does us good to think 
of that. A really trained singer, if ever such a one should be found among 
us, we could certainly not endure at such a time and we should 
unanimously tum away from the senselessness of any such performance. 
May Josephine be spared from perceiving that the mere fact of our 
listening to her is proof that she is no singer.90 
Josephine is considered an artist among the mice only so long as she fails to sing. The 
failure is the essence of her art. For Plato and Kafka, the artist is the one who fails the 
most conspicuously. 
Certainly National Socialism failed to substantiate its claims, but inasmuch as its 
failure came through its defeat at the hands of other powers, its distance from its idea did 
not become the occasion of the question of the Un-thought of metaphysics. Instead, this 
failure became the (still prevailing) argument for the claims of its Western conquerors: 
liberal democracy, within a politics unavowably indebted to Nietzsche's inverted 
Platonism, proceeded to consummate its relations with its idea. To be the Volk of poets 
and thinkers is to be the people that fails - as clearly as possible - of itself. Germany, 
as the land of poets and thinkers, is the land of industrial backwardness. Its poetry and its 
thought are not to be registered in any accumulation of volumes in the world's libraries, 
but rather in its failure to execute the actions by which the economies of other nations are 
sustained. Heidegger and Kafka are both of the conviction that if failure is to be grasped 
as such, it can be neither contemptuously dismissed nor blunderingly affirmed. 
It is between these two misinterpretations that Heidegger' s commentary on 
Holderlin's understanding of Germany inHolderlin's Hymns "Germanien" and "Der 
Rhein" must be read: 
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The poet does not mean that Germany of those poets and thinkers as the 
rest of the world imagines and wishes them: the simple dreamers and 
innocents who then at decisive moments are easily persuaded and made 
into fools for everyone else; rather he means that poetizing and thinking 
which plunges into the abysses of Being, not content with the shallow 
waters of a universal world-reason, that poetizing and thinking which in 
the work brings the being new and primordially to appearance and to a 
stand.91 
Germany is the land of poets and thinkers because it is the land that can only ever dream 
of what it might be. Heidegger is not arguing against the discrepancy so much as against 
the inability of nihilism to grasp and maintain the discrepancy. Nihilism mistakes for the 
validation of 't8XVll the failure of poetry and thought that as failure is to contest the 
hegemony of -ri::xvri. This ambiguity is a consequence of the undecidable ontological 
status of failure. It is in this ambiguity that Heidegger' s nationalism exhibits its 
irreducibility to National Socialism and likewise forgoes an open confrontation. It limits 
itself to failing before the will to power. 
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IV Towards the Uncanny Homeland 
In a manuscript from 1796 Hegel delimits the mythologies then acceptable to the tastes of 
the German reading public and concludes with the question: 
Is Judaea, then, the Teutons' Fatherland?1 
For National Socialism, such a question was strictly unutterable. But that the question 
could never have been enunciated does not mean that it went unanswered. Finding itself 
incapable of establishing the living national mythology upon whose absence Hegel 
reflects, National Socialism declared that the Germans indeed possessed a fatherland that 
lay elsewhere and that the name of this unheimliche Heimat was Greece. At the very 
time when the Greece that had been degraded into the paradise of anti-Semites 
announced itself in the sullen clumsiness of Speer' s architecture, in the callisthenics of an 
embryonic Wehrmacht and in a bookish and expedient paganism, Heidegger was 
lecturing upon the necessity for the German people of a confrontation with classical 
Greece. The simultaneity is not fortuitous. Heidegger' s texts of the late thirties and early 
forties are distinguished by a heightened tone of opposition towards the legacy of Greek 
thought: Greece, without ever being confounded with its National Socialist travesties, is 
set forth as that which must be overcome. Since the imperialism and spectacle by which 
National Socialism recreated for itself a distinctly Roman antiquity were, according to 
Heidegger, nothing but a consequence of an increasingly pernicious complacency 
regarding Greek thought, it is in an interrogation and destruction of the latter that "the 
other beginning" (der andere Anfang) might be anticipated and the forgetfulness of Being 
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retrieved. In itself, a return to Greece would not be a solution to nihilism. Greece is to be 
made to give way to its Un-thought. 
For Heidegger, the name of this Un-thought is Being. Asking after that which 
was not revealed in Greece, Heidegger does not ask simply after that which was revealed 
elsewhere. That which has been revealed elsewhere is still too Greek by virtue of its 
having been revealed at all. To bring to the confrontation with classical Greece a positive 
content with a different genealogy is to conceive the confrontation within the terms of the 
Greek privileging of the visible. Such a confrontation is decided in advance in the favour 
of Greece. And as the confrontation with Greece implies a confrontation with the 
neoclassicism of the NSDAP, nobody should be surprised that Heidegger did not oppose 
a warmed-up liberal humanism to the movement's warmed-up paganism. What 
Heidegger ranges against the legacy of Greece is the concealed as such. In place of the 
visibility of beings in CXAYJ8Eta, Heidegger invokes the prohibition on images. 
By asking after the non-Greek, Heidegger puts the whole of the West in question, 
and yet he does so with a question by which the West has likewise come to define itself. 
The question, as it has been raised against metaphysics by Luther and Kierkegaard as the 
definitive question concerning the essence of Christianity, is the question of the other, 
namely, Judaic origin of the West. Denying this other origin and endeavouring to 
demonstrate its independence from Judaea, National Socialism slavishly courted a 
resemblance to Greece. Anti-Semitism can be suspected not only in the movement's 
neoclassicism, but also, beyond its aesthetics, in the general, obsessive cultivation of the 
visible. The dilemma of National Socialism was that the German people could assert 
themselves, in their originarity as a people of the West, solely as either Greek or Jewish. 
National Socialism did not invent this dilemma: it is prefigured in the eighteenth century 
in that bifurcation of the national literature into Weimar classicism and Christian 
romanticism on which Hegel, among others, comments. At stake in the contest between 
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the visibility of Greece and the invisibility of Judaea is the definition of the German Volk. 
The Volk is the people of the impossibility of the West. That which is specific to this 
people, that which it can receive as a possession neither from the Greeks nor from the 
Jews, is the contradiction itself between the visible and the invisible. To attend to its 
specificity, this people has to grasp, without mitigation, the unity of this discord. The 
Volk finds itself in the confrontation with Greece, not as the Other of Greece, but as the 
confrontation itself. If it is "at home?' in the non-Greek, it is in order, however, to enact 
the confrontation with Greece that is proper to it. The Volk must become Jewish in order 
to become itself. In defiance of National Socialism, it must counterbalance the fixation 
on the visible by plunging into the invisible: it has to think the unnamability of Judaea.2 
As little as it understood Greece, National Socialism was still too Greek to be 
German. That the movement failed to be German had less to do with its neoclassical 
aesthetics and anti-Christian rhetoric than with its ensnarement in the categories of 
classical ontology. National Socialism was too Greek to grasp the irreducibility of the 
world of the Volk to metaphysics. The movement's trumpeted rootedness in a self-
evident homeland does not differentiate it from Greece, since this rootedness was not 
seen to be incompatible with the extendable space of Lebensraum. The quantifiable and 
culturally indifferent territory of the National Socialist Heimat remained modelled on the 
homogeneous space of classical geometry. Heidegger's question in the late thirties and 
early forties concerning "the other beginning" does not issue, as might have been 
expected from its precedents, in a moral or religious critique of National Socialism. 
Instead, it gives rise to an immanent critique of National Socialism's abortive 
nationalism, since it is with "the other beginning" and the overcoming of metaphysics 
that the homeland can at last be thought. The otherness of "the other beginning" is the 
chance it provides, in the context of the prevailing homelessness of nihilism, of thinking 
the homeland as such. 
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Is Judaea to become the fatherland of the Germans? Heidegger does not speak of 
a confrontation with the Jewish people, but ina~much as he speaks of a confrontation with 
the Greeks, he aspires to the radical differentiation of the German people that would 
render a confrontation practicable. The Germans are to become other than Greeks, when 
within the history of the West it has always been the Jews who have counted as the 
definitive non-Greeks. Heidegger's Germans resemble the Jews not only in their 
character of being different from the Greeks, but also in the way that they are different. 
Through defining the Volk by its resistance to the positivism of its neighbours, Heidegger 
brings the essence of the Germans into contact with the people of the prohibition on 
images. And yet Heidegger does not acknowledge the contact. He does not admit that 
his conception of the Volk has a model, but then the possibility of an Auseinandersetzung 
with Greece requires a disavowal of the Platonic logic of the subordination to the Idea. 
Once the Volk has a model, once Judaea is a model, positivism and the Greek privileging 
of the visible and the present reassert themselves. 
Certainly it cannot be said against Heidegger that he was an open advocate of the 
extermination (to have erased the Jewish model physically would not have liberated the 
Volk from its last trace of positivism, since the definition of the Volk would then have 
been dependent, implicitly if not explicitly, on the fact of Auschwitz). What remains in 
question is whether Heidegger's silence on the Jews positions them alongside the many 
other peoples who, viewed within the history of Being, are seemingly expendable or 
whether that silence functions as a disavowal of the Jews' excessive proximity to his 
conception of the Volk. Lyotard in Heidegger and "thejews", his response to the 
controversy provoked by Farias' publication Heidegger et le nazisme, ascribes to Europe 
as a whole a constitutive disavowal of the "jews", of which Auschwitz would be the 
absolute manifestation. Lyotard recognises that he himself cannot therefore escape this 
disavowal and that he must admit this continually through the use of scare quotes. But 
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the senses in which Lyotard speaks of disavowal are inconsistent. Auschwitz will always 
have come too late for its disavowal of the "jews" not to be superfluous, since it can 
mount only a grotesquely ontic re-enactment of the West's initial scene, substituting 
European Jewry for the unnameable " ... " of the constitutive disavowal of primal 
repression: the "jews", in Lyotard's account, become (once again) a scapegoat. When 
Lyotard writes that "Vernichtung, the Nazi name for annihilation, is not so different from 
foreclosure, Verleugnung"3, he overlooks the incompatibility of the respective "objects" 
of extermination and primal repression. The hubris of National Socialism, and the error 
in which Lyotard fails to catch it out, was that it sought to achieve a transformation of the 
ontological ground of the West by an eradication of the ontic traces of a people and 
culture. National Socialism underestimated the proximity of Judaea. It believed that the 
Being of the West was not contaminated and that the work of purification - because it 
need concern itself only with the domain of beings present-at-hand- was therefore 
feasible. Properly speaking, the regime did not disavow Judaea. Instead, it insisted on 
its reification, on its maintenance as a stable object within the field of perception in 
defiance of the prohibition on images by which Judaea has marked the West. Disavowal 
is not incidental to the Judaea that has created the West and that the West has created for 
itself, since Judaea exists as the exception to the ontic. Christianity's irreducibility to 
metaphysics harbours itself in this exception and thinks it as interiority. The existential 
analytic of Dasein in Being and Time will constitute a critique of the subjectivization of 
this exception, but it will stop short of abandoning the proximality attributed to it in 
Judea-Christian thought. That which is ownmost, for Judea-Christian thought and for 
Heidegger, is that which is not assimilable to the thingly. The exception to the hegemony 
of the ontic carries with it in its Judea-Christian definition the chance of understanding 
the nearness of the homeland. Heidegger's nationalism depends thus for its viability on 
Judaea. An exposition of Heidegger' s Semitism cannot mitigate the odiousness of his 
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occasional anti-Semitic utterances. At best it can announce the nature and problematic 
provenance of the question that Heidegger sought to address in his meditations on the 
Volk and on the fatherland. 
Under the cover of the agonistic Hellenism he shares with Holderlin, Heidegger 
writes of the fatherland in terms more suggestive of the Jewish Diaspora than of the 
National Socialist uprising.4 In the 1941-2 course on Holderlin's poem "Andenken", 
there appears the following: 
That which is most our own [das Eigenste], the Fatherland, is the highest, 
but it stands for that reason under the heaviest prohibition. Thus only at 
the end will it be found, after protracted searching, after many sacrifices 
and severe exertions. [ ... ]The national [das Vaterliindische] is found only 
if the highest is sought. Seeking the highest means keeping quiet about it.5 
The fatherland, as the highest, stands under the heaviest prohibition. For Heidegger, it is 
prohibited to find the fatherland too easily. The fatherland is the highest because it is that 
which is most proper to us, and as that which is most proper to us it can never be found in 
the way that something merely present-at-hand is found. It will be found, if at all, as 
missing from the realm of the thingly. In the realm of the thingly, the fatherland is found 
as that for which we must seek - the goal of the Germans is, for Heidegger in the 1937-
8 lecture course Grundfragen der Philosophie, the search itself.6 
Inasmuch as Heidegger's fatherland lies outside the scope of classical ontology, it 
recalls the missing homeland of Franz Rosenzweig's The Star of Redemption: 
To the eternal people, home never is home in the sense of land, as it is to 
the peoples of the world who plough the land and live and thrive on it, 
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until they have all but forgotten that being a people means something 
besides being rooted in a land. [ ... ] In the most profound sense possible, 
this people has a land of its own only in that it has a land it yearns for - a 
holy land. And so even when it has a home, this people, in recurrent 
contrast to all other peoples on earth, is not allowed full possession of that 
home. It is only "a stranger and a sojourner."7 
The land of this people never fully surrenders itself to possession. It is to be found as 
yearning and not as property, as ouma. At the end of the First World War, Rosenzweig 
writes from within the millenary absence of a Jewish state, whereas Heidegger, two 
decades later, employs the same topos of the missing homeland at the zenith of German 
imperialism. How is the similarity to be understood? As an instance of the expropriation 
of Jewish property under Hitler or as sabotage of the objectives of the Wannsee 
Conference by means of a Verjudung of the essence of the fatherland? Both, in a 
secondary sense, are at issue. And that both might be at issue is because Heidegger, 
following Holderlin, believes that the Germans are compelled to seek out a way to 
differentiate themselves from the Greeks. Holderlin's texts and Heidegger's 
commentaries can be read for what they say regarding the necessary and promised non-
Hellenism of the German people. Only once this task of differentiation has been outlined 
will it be possible to query to what degree both Holderlin and Heidegger admit of 
rediscovery within the literature of the Jewish Diaspora. Of course, such an admittedly 
strained interpretation simply inverts Rosenberg's fatuous image of HOlderlin as a proto-
Nazi8: what is properly at stake is a treatment of the essence of the national overlooked 
by the Greeks and never even suspected by National Socialism. 
Heidegger' s reiterated objection to National Socialism was that it was 
insufficiently national. The so-called politicisation of every sphere under the regime did 
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not hesitate to style itself as Greek and to assume that the essence of the political 
exhaustively revealed itself in classical Greece. In the 1942 lecture course Holderlin's 
Hymn "The lster", Heidegger criticises the classical scholarship of the period for 
conflating the Greeks and the NSDAP: 
Today - if one still reads such books at all - one can scarcely read a 
treastise or book on the Greeks without everywhere being assured that 
here, with the Greeks, "everything" is "politically" determined. In the 
majority of "research results," the Greeks appear as the pure National 
Socialists.9 
For Heidegger, these works are unjust both to the Greeks and to the National Socialists. 
The specific task of a German nationalist uprising is overlooked and Greece is 
misrepresented as the model of the Nazi mobilisation. It is simply assumed in these 
works that the political determination of everything that is draws the Greeks and the 
National Socialists together. The failure to understand the political, notwithstanding its 
compulsive invocation, that Heidegger observes in his contemporaries is a deficiency that 
he then proceeds to attribute, albeit to a lesser degree, to the Greeks themselves. The 
authentic understanding of the essence of the political depends on a revelation of the 
essence of the noA.tc;: 
Who says that the Greeks, because they "lived" in the noA.tc;, were also in 
the clear as to the essence of the noA.tc;? Perhaps the name noA.tc; is 
precisely the word for that realm that constantly became questionable 
anew, remained worthy of question, made.necessary and indeed needed 
certain decisions whose truth on each occasion displaced the Greeks into 
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the realm of the groundless or the inaccessible. If we therefore ask: What 
is the 1w.A.is of the Greeks? then we must not presuppose that the Greeks 
must have known this, as though all we had to do were to enquire among 
them. 10 
The no.A.is resists historiographical reconstruction from the utterances of the ancient 
Greeks; it resists it because the no.A.is is the precondition of these utterances. Heidegger 
further writes of the no.A.is: 
It is neither merely state, nor merely city, rather in the first instance it is 
properly "the stead" ["die Statt'']: the site ["die Stiitte"] of the abode of 
human history that belongs to humans in the midst of beings. 11 
The no.A.is is thus that which, for Heidegger, has to understood more fundamentally as 
the clearing of Being: 
The pre-political essence of the no.A.is, that essence that first makes 
possible everything political in the original and in the derivative sense, lies 
in its being the open site of that fitting destining [Schickung] from out of 
which all human relations towards beings - and that always means in the 
first instance the relations of beings as such to humans - are determined. 12 
Again, in the 1942-3 lecture course Parmenides, Heidegger speaks of the no.A.is in this 
way: 
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The noli.ts is the essence of the place [Ort], or, as we say, it is the 
settlement [Ort-schaft] of the historical dwelling of Greek humanity. 
Because the noli.ts lets the totality of beings come in this or that way into 
the unconcealedness of its condition, the noli.is is therefore essentially 
related to the Being of beings. Between noli.ts and "Being" there is a 
primordial relation. 13 
This interpretation of the noli.is as the clearing of Being follows from and illuminates a 
fragment by Holderlin that Heidegger quotes: 
do you think 
It will proceed 
Along the course of old? Namely they wanted to found 
A realm of art. But thereby 
The national [das Vaterliindische] was neglected 
By them and pitifully 
Greece, the fairest of all, was destroyed. 
Now presumably matters 
Stand otherwise. 14 
For Holderlin, the Greeks neglected the national. For Heidegger, that which the Greeks 
neglected, namely the essence of the nofi.ts as the site of their historical Dasein, they 
could not but have neglected without a contestation of classical ontology. In the 1934-5 
lecture course Holderlin's Hymns "Germanien" and "Der Rhein", the conjunction 
receives its sharpest form: 
250 
The "Fatherland" is Being [das Seyn] itself. 15 
The imperative that informs Heidegger' s destruction of the ontological tradition is the 
task of addressing the national. So long as the hegemony of the ontic remains 
unchallenged and Being unthought, even the most vehemently proclaimed patriotic 
renewal will amount to a dereliction of the fatherland. In the history of Being, National 
Socialism figures as cosmopolitan. 
As the fatherland is explicitly associated with the central question in Heidegger' s 
thinking, it cannot be interpreted as a non-philosophical residue in an otherwise stringent 
corpus. 16 However aphoristically Heidegger speaks of the fatherland, he does so within 
the context of his elaboration of the question of Being, rather than in the form of asides. 
Having been identified with Being (das Seyn), and thus with the Un-thought of the 
Greeks and the hegemony of the ontic, the word "Fatherland" is differentiated from the 
jargon of the regime. The degree of difference is easily underestimated given the cursory 
nature of Heidegger' s presentation, and it is thus not redundant to set out this difference 
at greater length. It has first to be asked on what grounds Heidegger identifies the 
fatherland with Being. Between the discourses of nationalism and metaphysics there is 
no obvious transition. Heidegger is clearly saying more than that the fatherland is the 
central term of nationalism in the same way that Being is the central term of metaphysics 
- he does not point out a structural symmetry that would keep the discourses at issue 
here distinct but names Being as that which defines the fatherland. The fatherland is 
what it is only as Being, because whatever originarity to which the fatherland can lay 
claim, it claims as the originarity of Being. The fatherland of conventional nationalism, 
which marks itself off straightforwardly from other countries as the country of origin, has 
to dispute with Being for the title to the originary. In this dispute, conventional 
nationalism finds its claims rebuffed. 
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Why this should be so and why the fatherland has in the end to be understood as 
Being is the import of Heidegger's treatment of Being-in-the-world in Being and Time. 
Already in the text of 1927 the origin of Dasein is shown to lie elsewhere than among 
beings. As Being-in-the-world, Dasein cannot have its origin - in the sense of its 
ground - in any being present-at-hand. In the distinctness of a geographically 
determinate fatherland Dasein would be unable to recognise the ground of its own status 
as an exception to the ontology of the distinct. It has to tum instead to the world in which 
the distinct first appears and that thus precedes the fatherland of conventional 
nationalism. Where National Socialism neglected the ontic indeterminability of world in 
favour of a fatherland with border controls and commissions for cartographers, it 
subscribed to classical ontology and the apprehensibility of what is. The fatherland, in 
the thingliness whereby it was recognisable, was also discovered to be manipulable and 
to lend itself to expansion. For the purpose of thinking that which is most our own, -
National Socialism had at its disposal only relics of the Dingbegrijfe of classical 
ontology. Heidegger, by contrast, conceives that which is most our own as the Un-
thought of '!EXVll and hence of that planetary domination under which the "inner truth" of 
National Socialism was forgotten. The inner truth of the movement was the truth 
constituted by the ownmost (das Eigenste). Since neither among the Greeks nor among 
the later peoples sustained by their legacy was the originary ever grasped in its essence, it 
cannot justifiably be interpreted as the preserve ofreactionaries. The originary, in the 
incomprehensibility with which it haunts '!EXVll, is less the reassuring habitat of 
backward Luddites, than the still indiscernible site of the disclosedness of beings. 
If, for Heidegger in 1934-5,the fatherland is Being itself, it is because the 
fatherland is the world of the Volk. The world in which the German people carries out its 
mission of thinking the question of Being is itself the clearing of Being. The conspicuous 
untimeliness of Heidegger's dictum in Holderlin's Hymns "Germanien" and "Der 
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Rhein" is not explained away by equating Being with the world of the Volk, since the use 
Heidegger makes elsewhere of "world" and "Volk" is itself untimely with relation to the 
nationalist discourse of the Nazi regime. Even though Heidegger never speaks of the 
fatherland in Being and Time, the basis for his definition of the fatherland in 1934-5 is to 
be discerned in the earlier text with its discussions of the ontological status of world and 
the worldliness of the Being-with-one-another of the Volk. Only as Being, i.e. only as the 
untimely Un-thought of the age of metaphysics is the fatherland truly the world of the 
Volk and not, for instance, an intraworldly (innerweltlich) object of exchange in the 
territorial struggles of Social Darwinism. As the world of the Volk, the fatherland is that 
which is at once closest and least tangible. Its proximity cannot be grasped as the 
proximity of an object present-at-hand, since as the clearing of beings in which an object 
first appears it is closer than any object. It is the condition of possibility for the closeness 
of an object. The proximity of the fatherland has to be grasped differently from the 
proximity of one object to another. It is in the way this difference is worked out, and in 
the question that thus arises concerning the scope of Dingbegriffe, that the fervour of 
Heidegger's nationalism reveals itself as inimical to the Nazi regime and its metaphysical 
foundations. 
The proximity of the fatherland is its originarity. For conventional nationalism, 
this originarity is unambiguously manifest in one's country of origin. But does one's 
country of origin truly stand on itself in distinction from that which is derivative and not 
originary? For Heidegger, the fatherland does not lie at any given moment at a greater or 
lesser distance in space from the Volk, since what is at issue is not a fixed point on the 
globe from and towards which one might move at will. The fatherland is originary not in 
the sense that it constitutes the backdrop of an act of parturition, but rather in the sense 
that its proximity is insuperable. In its originarity, the fatherland is that which is 
essentially nearest. The fatherland is the origin and thus whatever can be shown to be 
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derivative is, ipso facto, not the fatherland. Heidegger's idiosyncratic nationalism is, 
accordingly, already in evidence in his destruction of the philosophical tradition. Once 
the tradition has been destroyed, once the ground of all previous philosophy has been laid 
bare, the originary, which is to say the fatherland, will have been secured. Nationalism, 
inasmuch as it takes the notion of originarity seriously, cannot evade the task of 
philosophical genealogy and must exclude the derivative from its definition of the 
fatherland. 
In this respect, Kant' s cosmopolitanism is a more rigorous nationalism than the 
territorial bigotry of the Nazis because it is more originary: the measurable Lebensraum 
of the latter presupposes the homogeneous space in which the Kantian subject asserts its 
rights as a citizen of the world. If Heidegger rejects this most philosophical of 
cosmopolitanisms, in tum, as derivative, it is without disputing its philosophical 
superiority over the sundry aborted nationalisms postdating the Critique of Pure Reason. 
For Heidegger, the insuperable proximity of the fatherland is not spatial because the 
fatherland is nearer than space itself, let alone any object contained within space, and it is 
nearer because, as Being (Seyn), it is ontologically prior. 
Heidegger' s nationalism, and its pertinence to his thought as a whole, lies in an 
attempt to think the nearness of the nearest. As the nearest, the fatherland is necessarily 
Being in its originarity. Advancing such a definition, Heidegger is by no means 
ransacking the vocabulary of philosophy simply in order to furnish the Heimat of 
National Socialism with an ontological gloss. On the contrary, Heidegger thereby 
concisely states his opposition to the nationalism of the regime. Inasmuch as the Heimat 
of National Socialism - in its ready convertibility into Lebensraum - was the 
quantifiable territory of an organism and not Being, that which is essentially nearest to 
the Volk, and hence that which is the Volk itself, became a quantum. The reification of 
Dasein propagated in the biologism of the regime thereby had its counterpart in an 
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understanding of the fatherland as an object in space. Whatever the quantitative 
aggrandisement of the fatherland through military expansion, the fatherland's initial 
debasement to an object within space, and thus to that which is doubly derivative, was 
not redressed. The fatherland of imperialist discourse, as it is more a geometrical figure 
than a Heimat, is inseparable from the theorisation of space established by the Greeks: 
both rest upon classical ontology's neglect of the essence of the no/..,i<;. This is why an 
opposition to imperialism that simply falls back upon the cosmopolitanism of the 
spatially indifferent is always inadequate. Where Heidegger criticises homogeneous 
space in the name of the many ways of Being, he does so, not in order to ground 
philosophically the otherwise rhetorical immediacy of a fetishised fatherland, but rather 
in order to interrogate in homogeneous space the ontological presuppositions of a reified 
fatherland. Since what identifies a Heimat is not a spatial immediacy but the nearness by 
which it is one's own, this nearness must be the matter of an existential analytic before it 
is, if at all, the matter of geometry. 
The question of Being, as that which is existentially nearest, is the question of the 
Heimat of Dasein. Being-at-home, by which a Heimat is recognised as such, is thus, for 
Heidegger, an orientation within the question of Being. In this sense, orientation is not an 
orientation among objects but an orientation within the non-thingly. Heidegger's Heimat 
is recognisable as such by that which is not recognisable in it, by that which is uncanny. 
Orientation becomes an orientation by that which stands too close to be an object, and 
then not because it is the subject itself, since it is still closer than the subject. Any 
orientation that is a finding of oneself as a subject among and over against objects is thus, 
properly speaking, a disorientation, because the exception to the understanding of Being 
as presence, which is nearest to Dasein and by which Dasein has first of all to orientate 
itself, is forgotten. Orientation within the fatherland of Being is, conversely, a 
disorientation with regard to the objectivity of the objects in one's vicinity. Orientation 
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within a fatherland that has been reified and subordinated to geometry proceeds by a 
mensuration between objects: it is less a being-at-home in what is closest to Dasein than 
an inclusion of Dasein in an inventory of the present-at-hand. 
But, then, orientation within the homogeneous space that is the cosmopolitan 
subject's native element is also a forgetting of Dasein's Being, because homogeneity in 
general is inconceivable without a suppression of transcendence. Heidegger already 
formulates this objection to the originarity of homogeneous space in the covert treatment 
of the notion of the fatherland that is the existential analytic. To see how much of 
Heidegger's nationalism was in place by the late 1920s, and how little he received from 
the hands of the Nazis, the existential analytic can therefore be reread for what it says on 
orientation and that which is nearest to Dasein. Heidegger criticises there the 
cosmopolitanism of homogeneous space but without offering a premature defence of the 
parochialism of the Nazi regime. Criticising this cosmopolitanism in the course of his 
exposition of the phenomenon of orientation, Heidegger does not have recourse to the 
"realism" on which National Socialism prided itself and on which the practicality of 
orientation is conventionally believed to rely. On the contrary, Heidegger's criticism 
follows from a completely novel definition of orientation. Orientation within the 
question of Being replaces orientation within the "reality" of objects and the 
homogeneous space into which this "reality" must, as Kant had argued, collapse. 
Heidegger' s reading of Kant' s text "What is Orientation in Thinking?" can easily 
give the impression of obtuseness because it does not share Kant's definition of 
orientation and cannot, accordingly, be seen to improve on it. For Heidegger, Dasein as 
Being-in-the-world is always already oriented and orientation, as it is set forth by Kant in 
his friendly critique of Mendelssohn's metaphysics, is but one mode of Dasein's Being-
in-the-world. To explain orientation with reference to the subject is to risk all 
understanding of the worldly constitution of Dasein. In Being and Time, Heidegger 
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repeats his objections from History of the Concept of Time to the meaningfulness of 
Kant' s reconstruction of orientation from the difference between the left and right sides 
of the body: 
Left and right are not something 'subjective' for which the subject has a 
feeling; they are directions of one's directedness into a world that is ready-
to-hand already. 'By the mere feeling of a difference between my two 
sides' I could never find my way about in a world. The subject with a 
'mere feeling' of this difference is a construct posited in disregard of the 
state that is truly constitutive for any subject- namely, that whenever 
Dasein has such a 'mere feeling', it is in a world already and must be in it 
to be able to orient itself at all. This becomes plain from the example with 
which Kant tries to clarify the phenomenon of orienation. 
Suppose I step into a room which is familiar to me but dark, and which has 
been rearranged [umgeraumt] during my absence so that everything which 
used to be at my right is now at my left. If I am to orient myself the 'mere 
feeling of the difference' between my two sides will be of no help at all as 
long as I fail to apprehend some definite object 'whose position', as Kant 
remarks casually, 'I have in mind'. But what does this signify except that 
whenever this happens I necessarily orient myself both in and from my 
being already alongside a world which is 'familiar'? The equipment-
context of a world must have been presented to Dasein. That I am already 
in a world is no less constitutive for the possibility of orientation than is 
the feeling forright and left. While this state of Dasein's Being is an 
r' 
obvious one, we are not thereby justified in suppressing the ontologically 
constitutive role which it plays. Even Kant does not suppress it, any more 
257 
than any other Interpretation of Dasein. Yet the fact that this is a state of 
which we constantly make use, does not exempt us from providing a 
suitable ontological explication, but rather demands one. The 
psychological Interpretation according to which the "I" has something 'in 
the memory' ["im Gedachtnis"] is at bottom a way of alluding to the 
existentially constitutive state of Being-in-the-world. Since Kant fails to 
see this structure, he also fails to recognize all the interconnections which 
the Constitution of any possible orientation implies. Directedness with 
regard to right and left is based upon the essential directionality of Dasein 
in general, and this directionality in tum is essentially co-determined by 
Being-in-the-world. Even Kant, of course, has not taken orientation as a 
theme for Interpretation. He merely wants to show that every orientation 
requires a 'subjective principle'. Here 'subjective' is meant to signify that 
this principle is a priori. Nevertheless, the a priori character of 
directedness with regard to right and left is based upon the 'subjective' a 
priori of Being-in-the-world, which has nothing to do with any 
determinate character restricted beforehand to a worldless subject. 17 
This passage needs to be read carefully. The difference between left and right, as it is a 
non-conceptual difference, too quickly becomes for Kant a matter of mere feeling. But 
that which Kant names a "feeling" cannot be reduced to the subject without contradiction. 
A worldless, hence body less subject is not able to feel a difference that in the 
circumstances simply does not exist. With its feeling for the difference between its two 
sides, the Kantian subject does not, strictly speaking, make sense of its world, since it is 
rather world that in advance makes sense for the Kantian subject of the difference 
between its two sides. There is therefore in Kant's treatment of orientation something of 
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the farce of the "discovery" of populated countries. Insensitive to its own Being-in-the-
world, the Kantian subject discovers what has already been uncovered yet discovers it by 
nonetheless mistaking its nature. In other words, it successfully orientates itself within its 
world, not by grasping world as such, but rather by piecing together its feeling for the 
difference between its two sides and an object whose position it remembers. What the 
Kantian subject discovers in the moment of its re-orientation is that which was already 
"there" for it, albeit without the familiarity of the everyday. Orientation, in Kant's 
account, ceases explicitly to be an existential mode of Dasein and becomes an 
epistemological problem for the subject. 
Heidegger and Kant thus differ in the sense they give to finding oneself in the 
world. For the former, what is involved is an understanding of the world in which one 
finds oneself even as one is disoriented within it, whereas, for the latter, one finds oneself 
in the world at the moment one overcomes the disorientation by which one is seemingly 
outside the world. Presupposing its orientation as Being-in-the-world and yet turning 
aside from it as a question, the Kantian subject in its momentary and superficial 
disorientation searches among phenomena for the point of familiarity by which it could 
assure itself of the continuity of its "world" and feel orientated. In Kant' s example the 
point of familiarity is the object in the darkened room whose position he remembers and 
from which he is then able to reassemble the context of his everyday activity. For 
Heidegger, what is important is less the re-established context of everyday activity than 
the world in which Kant first remembers an object's position and whose ontological 
explication he notwithstanding omits. Hoping to pass off the skeletal marriage of 
proprioception and a remembered object as the richness of the phenomenon of 
orientation, Kant swiftly passes over their common ground in world to the successful 
orientation within the unworlding of world in everyday activity. 
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If Heidegger stresses the subjectivity in Kant's account of orientation, it is not in 
order to suggest that orientation, for Kant, is solely the affair of the feeling for the 
difference between the two sides of one's body. The casualness with which Heidegger 
hears Kant introduce the object whose position he recalls is, for Heidegger, the 
casualness with which one might speak, not so much of a superfluity, as of something 
self-evident. It is this appearance of self-evidence and its uninterrogated ontological 
presuppositions that Heidegger seeks to address and that he can only address by 
abandoning the conventional definition of orientation as a familiarising of oneself with 
one's environment. Being-in-the-world, as the possibility of orientation and hence as the 
site of the distinction between the familiar and the unfamiliar, can never be the point of 
familiarity by which the subject orientates itself and recovers itself for the immersion in 
everyday activity. For the sake of an understanding of its primary orientation as Being-
in-the-world, Dasein has therefore to resist the seductions of the familiar and the comfort 
of feeling itself oriented within the context of its everyday activity. 
This resistance, in turn, cannot without contradiction become a voluntary activity. 
It cannot become the enduring task that develops into the point of familiarity by which 
Dasein orientates itself within as well as against its world. Dasein must lose itself even in 
its disorientation, since only then can it hope to find itself in world as such. In the 
definitive example of orientation, the sun - on the basis of whose familiarity one is able 
to align the horizon with the points of the compass and continue on one's way - does 
not illuminate Being-in-the-world, but rather contributes to its obfuscation under the 
reassertion of everyday activity. By fixing his attention on the world that is tacitly 
presupposed in Kant' s account of orientation, Heidegger does not, as it were, fill out a 
lacuna in Kant's account, because this account is adequate to its definition of secondary, 
i.e. everyday orientation only so long as Being-in-the-world is not thematized. 
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Heidegger' s reading of "What is Orientation in Thinking?" does not succeed as an 
immanent critique of Kant. Heidegger freely admits that Kant had set himself a quite 
different task: Kant' s interest in treating orientation was to show that every orientation by 
the familiar involved a subjective principle. In several respects, Kant's brief essay of 
1786 constitutes a digest of the earlier Critique of Pure Reason. By means of his opening 
description of orientation in a darkened room Kant arrives at the subjective principle that 
is none other than the a priori intuition of space, and from this reprise of "The 
Transcendental Aesthetic" he then proceeds to a comparable discipline of theology. 
Orientation is, for Kant, the occasion to demonstrate, once again, the complementarity of 
intuition and concept and thereby to reprove the exclusive conceptualism of dogmatic 
metaphysics. Given the task that he had set himself, Kant has to extract from the 
phenomenon of orientation, not world as such, but that which is at once non-conceptual 
and a priori. Already in one of his pre-critical writings Kant had adduced the difference 
between the two sides of one's body as an example of a non-conceptual difference. And 
in the feeling of this difference, on account of the role it plays in every orientation, Kant 
willingly notes the a priori and thereafter turns to his critique of Mendelssohn. 
As it is not his aim in "What is Orientation in Thinking?" to confound empiricism, 
let alone nationalism, Kant makes very little of exposing a transcendental moment in 
orientation. On his way to his encounter with dogmatic metaphysics, Kant thus calls into 
question with what right any phenomenon could be taken for that which is most familiar. 
Whenever it orients itself, whenever it feels that it is "at home", the Kantian subject has 
recourse to the feeling of the difference between left and right. This a priori feeling is 
more familiar than any of the various objects that must combine with it in the process of 
orientation. The Kantian subject is thus more "at home" in the a priori than it is among 
any given phenomena. Its well-known cosmopolitanism is the consequence of this 
demotion of the familiarity of phenomena. What is decisive for the Kantian subject's 
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being-at-home is the application of the subjective principle, rather than the spatial 
immediacy of a Heimat. For Kant, the object whose position he remembers in the 
darkened room is not superfluous to orientation, but its familiarity is certainly 
subordinate to the familiarity of the constant differentiation between the two sides of his 
body. 
Heidegger does not protest this subordination. In his reading of "What is 
Orientation in Thinking?", Heidegger does not rescue the object in the darkened room. 
He does not seek to reverse the demotion of its familiarity and to enter an empiricist's 
claim for the originarity of phenomena. What Heidegger protests is the disregard of the 
world that first renders familiar both the object and the subjective principle of the 
difference between left and right. 18 It is Being-in-the-world that is, for Heidegger, the 
true a priori of orientation, just as it is Being-in-the-world that is experienced by Dasein, 
however, as disorientation when it is torn from its immersion in the everyday. 
The true a priori, as that which is ontologically closest to Dasein, is the true 
Heimat. It is the originary in its most exacting sense and that by which every definition 
of Heimat must therefore be governed. But this Heimat, which is closest to Dasein, is not 
for that reason familiar to Dasein. Indeed, the very originarity of Being-in-the-world 
excludes it from becoming familiar. As it is not an intraworldly being, it cannot give 
itself up in the light of presence to be apprehended in a stable set of properties. The 
repetition in which the familiarity of the familiar is experienced, because the being at 
issue is re-cognised, is defined by the vulgar understanding of temporality. The atomistic 
"now", which is only able to give way to its successor because it presupposes the ecstases 
of originary temporality, affords the necessary distinctness of the entity that is to be 
repeated and, in being repeated, recognised as familiar. In contrast to the stable entities 
of recognition, Being-in-the-world is transcendent and thus unrepeatable. It is neither the 
feeling for the difference between right and left nor an object whose position one 
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remembers, because it is the sense of these individual components by which Kant 
reconstructs the phenomenon of orientation. Being-in-the-world can never become 
familiar. It is also, one might say, the strangeness at the heart of what is taken to be 
familiar. When one's surroundings are experienced as unsettling and alien, this is for 
Heidegger not a merely subjective disturbance in the apprehension of things as they are. 
What a thing is said to be in its everyday acceptation, how an object can appear familiar 
within a darkened room, presupposes the suppression of the inscrutability of Being-in-
the-world. Heidegger' s account of orientation effectively concludes with the statement 
that orientation, in Kant's sense, is impossible: the more meticulously one studies one's 
surroundings and endeavours to grasp them as they are so as thereby to become oriented, 
the more one is overwhelmed by the strangeness of Being-in-the-world. 
Kant' s account of orientation thus undergoes in Heidegger' s reading a 
suggestively oriental destruction. The stability of the points of reference by which Kant 
orients himself is undermined in Heidegger by the intrusion of that which refuses to 
stabilise. In its resistance to reification and to its incorporation in a frame of reference, 
Being-in-the-world stands under the prohibition on images. Kant orients himself in spite 
of Judaea. With a northerner's perception of the sun's position at noon Kant writes: 
To orientate oneself, in the proper sense of the word, means to use a given 
direction - and we divide the horizon into four of these - in order to find 
the others, and in particular that of sunrise. If I see the sun in the sky and 
know that it is now midday, I know how to find south, west, north, and 
east. For this purpose, however, I must necessarily be able to feel a 
difference within my own subject, namely that between my right and left 
hands. 19 
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Kant supplements the constancy of the Orient as the fixed point of orientation with the 
constancy of the subject. For Heidegger, however, it is not a matter of finding what is 
constant, since making sense of the subject, which in Kant' s exposition makes sense of 
the sun, is the inconstancy of the transcendence of Being-in-the-world. In his destruction 
of the traditional account of orientation, Heidegger does not come upon the fixed point 
whose stability is grounded in classical ontology's understanding of Being as presence. 
Heidegger' s Orient does not turn out to be Greek. 
For Heidegger, orientation is a being-at-home in Being-in-the-world. As Dasein 
is essentially Being-in-the-world, Dasein is always at home. But Dasein misunderstands 
the character of its Heimat. In confusing its Heimat with a given intraworldly being or a 
subjective principle, Dasein convinces itself that is "at home" in what is nonetheless alien 
to its Being. It is only in Being as such that Dasein can be at home and it is at home to 
the extent that it is disconcerted. 
By comparison, Descartes arguably retains the conventional definition of the 
security of Heimat when he grounds modern metaphysics on the terra firma that is 
subjectivity. In his lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel discusses the transition 
from the philosophy of the Middle Ages to the philosophy that, with Descartes, knows 
itself as self-consciousness and is at home: 
Philosophy in its own proper soil separates itself entirely from the 
philosophizing theology, in accordance with its principle, and places it on 
quite another side. Here, we may say, we are at home, and like the 
mariner after a long voyage in a tempestuous sea, we may now hail the 
sight of land; with Descartes the culture of modern times, the thought of 
modern philosophy, really begins to appear, after a long and tedious 
journey on the way which has led so far.20 
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The Cartesian doubt that questions everything except the certainty of itself as doubt is 
that alienation from the thingly by which the subject is forced to the acknowledgement 
that, henceforth, it is only with itself that it can feel at home. With the guarantee of this 
self-certainty of alienation, a knowledge of what is can again be attempted. But by 
retaining the conventional definition of the security of Heimat in the foundation of his 
metaphysics, Descartes conceals from himself the questionability of requiring certainty 
from a starting point. He begins from what is familiar and certain and employs its 
familiarity and certainty as the stable measure of beings. Kant, who inherits from 
Descartes the conviction of the desirability of certain foundations, is too ready to find a 
use for the constancy of the transcendental subject. The certainty with which the 
transcendental subject can be held to repeat its "I think" alongside every judgement and 
thereby provide the foundation for possible syntheses is not itself originary. The 
repetition of the transcendental subject's "I think" is only conceivable within the discrete 
"nows" of derivative temporality: the certainty of the transcendental subject is its 
reification into that which is always only ever present-at-hand. Kant's cosmopolitanism 
is a being-at-home everywhere because it finds itself everywhere as the presence of what 
is. But in being always only ever present-at-hand, the cosmopolitan subject is shut out 
from the originary as such and is properly homeless. The true Heimat, judged by the 
originarity of originary temporality, cannot be present-at-hand. 
Strictly speaking, then, Heidegger does not reassert in the phenomenon of 
orientation the object that Kant pushes to the background in concentrating on the subject. 
Heidegger dwells on the object whose position Kant remembers not for its own sake but 
for the sake of its foundation in Being-in-the-world. Heidegger pulls the object back to 
the foreground in discussions of orientation in order to interrupt the process by which the 
Kantian subject finds itself at home in subjectivity, rather than - more originarily - in 
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Being-in-the-world. He recalls Kant's dependence on the object in orientation and 
disputes the plausibility of the subject's absolute withdrawal into itself. With the 
reassertion of the object in orientation, Heidegger recovers Being-in-the-world from its 
suppression in the founding of the metaphysics of subjectity. Contending that the 
subjectivity of the subject precedes any relation to an object and suppressing Dasein's 
Being-in-the-world, Kant makes the a priori intuition of space the native element of the 
subject. In "The Transcendental Aesthetic" Kant argues of space: 
Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense. It is the 
subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is 
possible for us. Since, then, the receptivity of the subject, its capacity to 
be affected by objects, must necessarily precede all intuitions of these 
objects, it can readily be understood how the form of all appearances can 
be given prior to all actual perceptions, and so exist in the mind a priori, 
and how, as a pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined, it 
can contain, prior to all experience, principles which determine the 
relations of these objects.21 
Receptivity, which always re!llains receptivity in the face of the variety of the empirical 
intuitions received, becomes for Kant the independent form in which these intuitions are 
received. On the basis of the constancy of its reception the subject is situated in the 
ideality of the pure a priori intuition here named space. That Kant does not ask whether a 
receptivity in abstraction from every reception is meaningful is of course explained, 
albeit not justified, by his desire to salvage the integrity of geometrical space from 
Hume's critique. As the form of all possible appearances, space is present in all objects 
and its homogeneity lies in the definitional invulnerability with which it continues to be 
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affectivity through every instance of affection. What is at stake in Heidegger's reading of 
"What is Orientation in Thinking?" is not a restoration of the heterogeneity of the space 
of pre-Kantian empiricism. The "heterogeneity" of Being-in-the-world, which Heidegger 
sets against homogeneous space, is not a set of sundry objects but rather the 
transcendence of Dasein. 
It is in this sense that Heidegger' s remark on geometrical space in History of the 
Concept of Time needs to be understood: 
What is homogeneous is the pure space of metrics, of geometry. For these 
have destroyed the peculiar structure of aroundness only in order to arrive 
at the possibility of the discoverability of homogeneous space.22 
The peculiar structure of aroundness is misapprehended if it is resolved into the objects in 
one's vicinity. Aroundness, for Heidegger, precedes the discovery of homogeneous 
space and it cannot therefore be grasped in a cobbling together of homogeneous space 
and objects that are only incidentally defined by their proximity. Unless the proximity of 
the objects is understood as what is essential - and that is to understand them no longer 
in terms of the topological indifference of the objectivity of the object and thus no longer, 
strictly, as "objects" - then the presence in which the objectivity of the object stands and 
in which space is discovered as homogeneous remains determinative. The structure of 
aroundness is the sitedness of each respective Dasein in the transcendence of its world. 
Destroying this structure first establishes the objectivity of the object. The finitude of the 
peculiar structure of aroundness is thus not overcome in order to arrive at the possibility 
of the discoverability of homogeneous space, since it is in a retreat from this structure 
that homogeneous space first opens itself up. The infinity of this space is the 
consequence of its retraction into the uniformity of presence. The peculiar structure of 
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aroundness is always beyond the reach of the subject and, given the originarity of this 
structure, the subject cannot be held ever to be at home. It is only that which exceeds the 
subject, not numerically but ontologically, that can ever be at home. Only Dasein, in its 
transcendence of the presence by which the subject is defined, finds itself in the 
originarity of aroundness. It is a people, as authentic Being-with-one-another and not as 
an aggregate of territorially minded subjects, that dwells in a Heimat and, as Being-in-
the-world, even is this Heimat. When Kant raises his famous question "What is man?" in 
the introduction to his lectures on logic, and does so explicitly within the cosmopolitan 
concept of philosophy, it is without any consideration for the question of a people.23 This 
question is in fact closed to Kant because in the consistency with which he expounded the 
understanding of Being as presence he could not hesitate between the abstract individual 
subject and the rediscovery of this subject everywhere: it is therefore not without a tacit 
reference to Kant' s transcendental subject that Heidegger in Being and Time analyses the 
Seinsweise of the "they". 
In the Contributions to Philosophy Heidegger summarises his objection to 
Kantian space: 
What one otherwise and up to now has thought about space and time, 
which belong back into this origin of truth, is - as Aristotle for the first 
time worked out in the Physics - already a consequence of the previously 
established essence of beings as ouma and of truth as correctness and of 
all that which follows from that as "categories." When Kant calls space 
and time "intuitions," that is within this history only a weak attempt to 
rescue what is ownmost to space and time. But Kant had no access to the 
essential sway of space and time. In any case the orientation to "I" and 
"consciousness" and re-presentation mislays all the ins and outs.24 
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Here Heidegger retreats from his earlier thesis in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics 
regarding the union of originary temporality and the "I" of transcendental apperception. 
Kant's attempt to rescue what is ownmost to space and time through their theorisation as 
a priori intuitions founders on subjectivity. Having set forth a distinction between 
intuition - as the domain of non-conceptual differences such as that between left and 
right - and concept, Kant does not carry this distinction to the point of a rupture with 
classical ontology. The repetition by which the subject is convinced of both the formal 
independence of its receptivity and the purity of space does not ultimately differ from the 
repetition in which the concept manifests its authority over a plurality of appearances: in 
both intuition and concept the previously established essence of beings as oucrta dictates 
repetition as a repetition of presence. For Kant, regardless of his asseverations to the 
contrary, space is thus a priori inasmuch as it is substantial. Even though he rejects in 
"The Paralogisms of Pure Reason" the application of the categories of nature to the Being 
of the "I think" of the transcendental ego, the very unity of the transcendental ego evinces 
the continuity of classical ontology. With the substantiality of a space that is everywhere 
the same the Heimlichkeit and originary strangeness of Being-in-the-world has, however, 
little to do. Betraying the promise of the distinction between concept and intuition, Kant 
expels the unrepeatable from a priori space: within the publicness of Kantian space 
Dasein lacks the means to do anything but keep the whereabouts of its singular Heimat to 
itself. 
Does the fact that Heidegger criticises the cosmopolitanism of homogeneous 
space suffice to make him an advocate of the National Socialist Heimat? Heidegger's 
notion of Being-in-the-world is clearly not the theoretical justification of the smugness 
and xenophobia of the sanctioned but politically unrepresentative cultural products of the 
regime. More important, with Hitler's Lebensraum Being-in-the-world is similarly 
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incompatible. Indeed, alongside the muddled reading of Darwinian theories on which the 
notion of Lebensraum ;~sts, there can be discerned in Hitler's conception a cosmopolitan 
indifference to place.25 Hitler's biologistically conceived Volk faces the task of 
conquering for itself a territory from whose resources it will then be able to sustain itself: 
the exigencies of the struggle for survival do not permit any sentimental predilection for 
one's native soil. In the notion of Lebensraum space remains thought within the 
understanding of Being as presence, because territory takes on the stability and 
thingliness of that which is recognised in presence. With its plans for the exploitation of 
resources and its absolute subjectivity, the biologistically conceived Volk bears an 
unmistakable resemblance to the entrepreneur of high capitalism. Under the guise of the 
animal, Nazi Germany remained thus in the thrall of the model of nineteenth-century 
England and the spirit of emulation for which it reproached the Grunderjahre, in the end, 
went unchecked. National Socialism was imperialistic not because it sought a Heimat, 
but rather because, in its subjectivity, it had no proper comprehension of Heimat. In the 
abstractness with which it stood over against its environment, it had already come to the 
possibility of an expandable and domitable territory that is the inspiration of imperialism. 
If Heidegger, in his 1934-5 lecture course on HOlderlin, speaks of the fatherland 
as Being itself, it is, therefore, in order to initiate a discourse that, despite every 
appearance, had not yet begun. Heidegger's nationalism, as an interrogation of the 
originary, understands "das Deutsche" through the question of Being. Susanne Ziegler 
sees in such an interpretation Heidegger' s clear divergence from the metaphysical 
nationalism of National Socialism: 
What "das Deutsche" ultimately and genuinely means for Heidegger is the 
chance outlined in Holderlin's poetry of coming to a foundational 
experience of Being different to that upon which the entire Western 
tradition rests.26 
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Ziegler speaks of the chance of the other beginning, and it is this possibility - preserved 
under and in spite of National Socialism as deferral - that defines the fatherland for 
Heidegger with a grandeur beside which the hubris of the regime appears as petty-
mindedness. 
That which is German is not self-evident. For Heidegger, the otherness of the 
other foundational reception of Being that is "das Deutsche" is only to be fully revealed 
through the encounter with the Greeks. In this he heeds Holderlin's exhortation to such 
an encounter. But although Heidegger follows Holderlin, he interprets him in an 
elaboration, rather than a rejection of his own earlier thinking. Meditations on Heimat 
and "das Deutsche" can be discovered in Heidegger' s writings before his engagement 
with Holderlin. To address these notions with reference to Holderlin is, however, to 
address them with reference to the Judeo-Christian legacy that Heidegger, as a 
philosopher, believed he had to disown and silence. In Holderlin this legacy, which has 
nothing to do with the continuity of a tradition, stands more clearly, if still agonistically, 
out in the open. 
Repeatedly in his commentaries on Holderlin, Heidegger devotes his attentions to 
the letter to Casimir Ulrich Bohlendorff of 4 December, 1801. It is here, in the course of 
offering Bohlendorff a response to his drama, Fernando oder die Kunstweihe, that, in 
Heidegger' s exegesis, HOlderlin sets forth the question of what it is to be German. The 
passage reads: 
We learn nothing with more difficulty than to freely use the national. And, 
I believe that it is precisely the clarity of the presentation that is so natural 
271 
to us as is for the Greeks the fire from heaven. For exactly that reason 
they will have to be surpassed in beautiful passion - which you have also 
preserved for yourself - rather than in that Homeric presence of mind and 
talent for presentation. 
It sounds paradoxical. Yet I argue it once again and leave it for 
your examination and use: in the progress of education the truly national 
will become the ever less attractive. Hence the Greeks are less master of 
the sacred pathos, because to them it was inborn, whereas they excel in 
their talent for presentation, beginning with Homer, because this 
exceptional man was sufficiently sensitive to conquer the Western 
Junonian sobriety for his Apollonian empire and thus to veritably 
appropriate what is foreign. 
With us it is the reverse. Hence it is also so dangerous to deduce 
the rules of art for oneself exclusively from Greek excellence. I have 
labored long over this and know by now that, with the exception of what 
must be the highest for the Greeks and for us - namely, the living 
relationship and destiny - we must not share anything identical with 
them. 
Yet what is familiar must be learned as well as what is alien. This 
is why the Greeks are so indispensable for us. It is only that we will not 
follow them in our own, national [spirit] since, as I said, the free use of 
what is one's own is the most difficult.27 
It is worthy of note that nowhere in this passage does HOlderlin use the word "German" 
("deutsch"). For Heidegger, it is, however, tacit that "the national" ("das Nationelle") of 
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which Holderlin writes is the nationality of the German. Thus the lecture course 
Holderlin's Hymn "The Ister" reprises the letter to Bohlendorff in the following manner: 
What the Germans lack, what must therefore first come to be encountered 
by them as that which is foreign to them, is the "fire from the heavens." It 
is this that the Germans must learn to experience so as to be struck by the 
fire and thereby to be impelled toward the correct appropriation of their 
own gift for presentation. Otherwise the Germans will remain exposed to 
the danger and the weakness of suppressing every fire on account of the 
rashness of their capabilities, and of pursuing for its own sake the ability to 
grasp and to delimit, and even of taking their delimiting and instituting to 
be the fire itself. It is therefore the pure self-experiencing of his own 
poetizing when HOlderlin says of the Germans, as distinct from the 
Greeks: "whereas the main tendency in the manners of representation in 
our time (i.e. the time of the Germans) is the ability to hit on something, to 
have destiny [Geschik], since the lack of fate [das Schiksaallose], the 
8ucrµopov, is our weakness."28 
Heidegger's parenthesis, "(i.e. the time of the Germans)", that is to secure the 
interpretation betrays, rather, its peremptoriness. How is it straightforward that the time 
that Holderlin names as "our time" in its difference from the time of the Greeks in the 
"Remarks on 'Antigone"' is "the time of the Germans"? By what authority can 
Heidegger assert that Holderlin' s use of the first person plural here limits itself to an 
evocation of the community of the Germans? Yet, conceivably, Heidegger's parenthesis 
is neither an elucidation nor a stopgap whereby a presupposed rift between Holderlin's 
text and a general comprehensibility is sealed. The expression, "the time of the 
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Germans", is, if anything, more obscure than Holderlin's "our time". It is Holderlin who 
elucidates rather that which Heidegger intends by "the time of the Germans". And 
indeed, according to Heidegger, this is how it should be. In the lecture course 
Holderlin's Hymns "Germanien" and "Der Rhein", Heidegger writes of HOlderlin: 
He is the poet of the Germans. But Klopstock and Herder, Goethe and 
Schiller, Novalis and Kleist, Eichendorff and Morike, Stefan George and 
Rilke are German poets as well, belonging likewise to the Germans. Yet 
we do not mean it in that sense. "Poet of the Germans" not as subjective 
genitive, but rather as objective genitive: the poet who first poetizes the 
Germans. But have not the others also, and in their way, said and sung the 
German essence? To be sure, - and yet HOlderlin is in the superlative 
sense the poet, i.e. founder of German Being, because he has projected the 
latter the furthest, i.e. cast it out and ahead into the furthest future.29 
The sense of Holderlin's "our time" is consequently not so much to be elucidated as 
enforced: his employment of the first person plural decides, for Heidegger, the German 
essence. When HOlderlin, in the letter to Bohlendorff, speaks of the West and Heidegger 
hears only of the Germans, there is thus a double aggression. It is not merely that all the 
peoples of the West have been subsumed under the rubric "German" - the Germans 
themselves, in their historical and geographical contingency, have disappeared before the 
arrival of this other Germany: we, the non-Greeks ... 30 
Clearly the precise nature of the negation in this formula is not to be grasped in a 
bare allusion to dialectics. It is not enough to say that the Greeks and the Germans stand 
in a negative relation to one another. The identity of the Germans does not remain as a 
residuum once the stable, self-referring identity of the Greeks has been subtracted, 
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because the Greeks, in the sobriety of their gift for depiction, are to all appearances the 
most Western and thus the most German of peoples. The essence of the West is to be 
encountered, if it is to be encountered at all, in the alien - Holderlin would say, oriental 
- territory of Greek art. In what sense, then, can the Germans be more German than the 
Greeks, when every appearance suggests that it is the Greeks who are the Germans? 
Given that Holderlin writes that what is one's own must be learnt just as much as that 
which is strange, the two principles by which Holderlin defines Western and Greek art-
namely, clarity of depiction and holy pathos - do not differentiate the Greek and 
Western peoples. The differentiation becomes, rather, a future task: 
I [ ... ] know by now that, with the exception of what must be the highest for 
the Greeks and for us - namely, the living relationship and destiny- we 
must not share anything with them. 
Holderlin's first person plural, and hence Heidegger's Germans, are the people who are 
not permitted to be Greek - we, the Germans, must not share anything with them. What 
alone distinguishes the Germans is the imperative under which they stand. 
In the essay "The Perspective from which We Have to Look at Antiquity", 
HOlderlin explicitly presents this imperative as the necessity of an insurrection against 
antiquity: 
We dream of education, piety, p.p. and have none whatsoever; it is 
appropriated - we dream of originality and autonomy; we believe to be 
saying all kinds of new things and, still, all this is reaction, as it were, a 
mild revenge against the slavery with which we have behaved toward 
antiquity. There seems to be indeed hardly any other choice than to be 
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oppressed by what has been appropriated and by what is positive, or, with 
violent effort, to oppose as a living force everything learnt, given, positive. 
What seems most problematic here is that antiquity appears altogether 
opposed to our primordial drive which is bent on forming the unformed, to 
perfect the primordial-natural so that man, who is born for art, will 
naturally take to what is raw, uneducated, childlike rather than to a formed 
material where there has already been pre-formed [what] one wishes to 
form. 31 
The despotism of Greece is not to be eluded through the choice of the material to be 
fashioned into a work of art because the very fashioning of material is Greek. Under 
such conditions, the human being who is born for art prefers the crude and shapeless, 
which in the absence of any articulation and formation never emerges as such into the 
light of day. The artist who is not Greek creates nothing. Such an artist lives under a 
prohibition of images and can thus never be at home in the ontic. 
Once Greece has been defined, however summarily with respect to the art of other 
cultures, as the essence of the positive, a confrontation with Greece and Greece alone 
becomes indispensable, if the task of a radical differentiation is to be adequately 
formulated. Greece, as the essence of the positive, becomes the origin of every manifest 
culture: in November 1802, in the second of his two extant letters to Bohlendorff, 
HOlderlin can thus speak of his journey through the south of France as an encounter with 
Greece.32 Heidegger similarly absolutizes Greece. As the site of the determination of the 
essence of the planetary culture of the West, Greece is recalled by everything that is. It is 
the first beginning, which must be exhaustively thought through to its Un-thought merely 
in anticipation of the other beginning. The scope of Greece, as the scope of classical 
ontology, is not to be underestimated. 
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In one of the first studies dedicated to Holderlin, let alone to his relations to 
antiquity, Wilhelm Michel perceives an "occidental tum" (abendlandische Wendung) in 
the late poetry and interprets it as an ultimately unavailing defence against the heavenly 
fire of the Greeks.33 But what is the West towards which Holderlin is said to have 
turned? The earlier poetry is not lacking in Swabian place names just as the later is not 
lacking in Greek - that which Holderlin opposes to the Greeks is not a matter of 
cartography.34 The imperative voiced in the letter to Bohlendorff, as Holderlin's recent 
realisation of the limits imposed on his labours in the sphere of Greek art, does not and 
cannot issue in a poetics for the establishment of a specifically Western poetry. The 
imperative is left to sound by itself. The negation that announces itself at first as a failing 
and as a deficiency (the inability to equal the Greeks) is to be reclaimed as an affirmative 
divergence in another art, a non-art. Holderlin, as the founder of German Being, founds a 
people in this poverty and necessity. For Heidegger, it is this very poverty and necessity 
that constitute the affirmative divergence of HOlderlin' s poetry: 
. Holderlin puts into poetry the very essence of poetry - but not in the 
sense of a timelessly valid concept. This essence of poetry belongs to a 
definite time. But not in such a way that it merely conforms to that time as 
some time already existing. Rather, by providing anew the essence of 
poetry, Holderlin first determines a new time. It is the time of the gods 
that have fled and of the god who is coming. It is the time of need because 
it stands in a double lack and a double not: in the no-lopger of the gods 
who have fled and in the not-yet of the god who is coming.35 
Holderlin's art is the negation of art and, in the age of "a double not" and its crisis, it is 
thus the essence of poetry. Holderlin' s art is the art of the gods who have fled and of the 
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god that is coming because it is the most mimetic, the most rigorously deferring. It is too 
poor in "reality" to be nihilistic. As the art that is the furthest removed from "reality", it 
is the closest to the non-nihilistic essence of a nihilistic age. It is the art of the 
inconspicuous. 
Listing in his commentary on the hymn "Der Rhein" three reasons for choosing 
Holderlin as his subject, Heidegger contends that this art has to be known in its 
inconspicuousness: 
1. Holderlin is the poet of the poet and of poetry. 2. In accordance with 
that, Holderlin is the poet of the Germans. 3. Because Holderlin is this 
concealed and difficult thing [dieses Verborgene und Schwere], poet of the 
poet as poet of the Germans, he has not yet become the power in the 
history of our people. Because he has not yet become this, he has to -
become it. To contfibute to this is "politics" in the highest and authentic 
sense, so much so that whoever achieves something here has no need to 
talk about the "political".36 
Inasmuch as they neglect a confrontation with the concealment and difficulty of 
Holderlin, the Germans are oblivious of their essence and, that is to say, of their poverty 
and their politicality. Strictly speaking, therefore, the Germans as Germans do not yet 
exist and their fatherland cannot yet be thought. The poverty that Holderlin intimates to 
Bohlendorff as the possession specific to the West remains to be grasped as such and thus 
truly possessed. This poverty is the caesura of the decision. The counterfeit witticism on 
the emptiness and hence indecisiveness of Heidegger's thinking of decision that 
circulated among the auditors of his lectures in the late 1920s ("I am resolved, but to 
what I don't know") belittles Heidegger's attempt to grasp the poverty of the caesura. 
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The crisis that resolves itself in deciding in favour of one of its options weakens in its 
resolution, because it has done with decision. As Jean-Luc Nancy writes in The Birth to 
Presence, it is the undecidability composing the decision that has to decide itself and 
decide in favour of itself. 37 For Heidegger, it is in the ontic poverty of resoluteness that 
Dasein properly gathers itself into the wealth that is its distance from the reification 
holding sway in the thought of humanity since the inauguration of classical ontology. 
The people that comes to be within the decision would not be Greek, and not because of 
any extant and thus decidable and mutually exclusive attributes. 
Even before the explicit concern with Holderlin's poetry, Heidegger, in the 1934 
lecture course Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, approaches 
the question of what it is to be German by way of the existential of resoluteness. Having 
rejected as unduly metaphysical all expositions of the essence of a people based on 
notions of the body, the soul and the spirit, Heidegger proceeds: 
It will be a matter of answering the question concerning the essence of the 
people in the same manner in which we have posed questions at all - thus 
in the direction of the question to which the answer "We are the people" 
was given: in the direction of the question "Who ... ?" Hence here as well 
we cannot ask: "What is a people?", in order to arrive at a universally 
binding definition, but rather: "Who is this people that we ourselves 
are?"38 
The people never yields up its essence to questions after its qualities. The question 
"What. .. ?" always overrides its transcendence. The reservations Heidegger harbours in 
Being and Time towards explications of individual Dasein are here carried over to the 
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first person plural. Heidegger does not ask after a general essence of the people. Instead, 
he enquires into the nature of the particular people evoked by the first person plural. 
Who constitutes the "we" in this passage? The "people" composed of Heidegger 
and the racially monitored student body of 1934? To be sure, in this lecture course 
Heidegger' s fascination with the new regime frequently appears undisguised. At one 
point, he suggests a museum is the fitting resting place for the aeroplane that had recently 
conveyed Hitler to his meeting in Venice with Mussolini.39 The suspicion cannot 
therefore be dismissed that Heidegger is promoting a National Socialist conception of the 
Volk. And yet it would likewise be suspect to assert that nothing besides a National 
Socialist conception of the people is at work in these lectures. Heidegger, who in 1934 
discourses upon the people of the decision and commends service within the SA, retains, 
in the later lectures on Holderlin, the same definition of the people and yet employs it 
polemically against the existing populism. It is as though National Socialism had 
revealed itself as a feeble makeshift for Holderlin. 
If there is disillusionment already in Logic as the Question Concerning the 
Essence of Language, it is because the revolution promised by National Socialism has not 
eventuated. A year after the seizure of power, Heidegger announces in these lectures: 
"We are then as beings not those who we are."40 Human Dasein has not overcome its 
ontic cast. The first person plural is here at odds with itself: it answers to a "What ... ?" 
when it is a "Who ... ?"that befits it. The German Volk shies away from the revolution 
that is to challenge the hegemony of reification, because it shies away from the decision 
and the rediscovery of itself in originary temporality: "In resoluteness (Entschlossenheit), 
the human being is directed, rather, into the happening of the future. "41 It lies in the 
nature of the revolution that Heidegger envisioned to be, not a moment in time, but an 
opening up of time. National Socialism will and must retreat in favour of HOlderlin. In 
its concentration on the extant attributes of a biological conception of the people, the 
movement was less open to the affirmative undecidability of the crisis by which 
Heidegger understands the future, and hence it was unable to think the people in the 
transcendence proper to Dasein. 
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The National Socialist orthodoxy that appears to announce itself in the selection 
of the problem of the people as matter for a lecture course is already scarcely audible in 
the following passage: 
With the transformation of the question "What are we?" into the question 
"Who are we?", it is not the interrogative pronoun alone that is changed. 
The whole sense of the enquiry is different, not only the "we" now accords 
with decision, but the Being of the question as well. Hence the second 
question of our enquiry: "What does decision mean here?" It must be 
raised because otherwise the answer "We are the people" remains 
incomprehensible.42 
The interrogative pronoun "who" expresses an understanding of Being different to that 
expressed by the interrogative pronoun "what". To ask "Who ... ?" is to ask after 
existence in its irreducibility to the real predicates investigated by the question 
"What. .. ?". To ask "Who is this people that we ourselves are?" is to refuse the 
biological determinations proffered by National Socialism, just as it is to ask after the 
sense of Being forgotten by classical ontology. The German people that is to decide itself 
in National Socialism, but that ultimately cannot decide itself there is later called upon to 
hear itself in the first person plural of Holderlin. It is the Volk whose mission is to be the 
people of Being. Its highest care is not the defence of the Lebensraum of the Aryan 
"type". Its fatherland, and thus its highest care, is Being. 
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The essence of Heidegger's Volk is its mission. The Volk must learn that which is 
its own. That a given people should be confronted with its essence as with something 
alien is a paradox from which Holderlin does not shrink and upon which he insists in the 
first letter to Bohlendorff. It is the same paradox that Freud in 1919 and Heidegger in 
1927 will discuss as "the uncanny". Since the passage in question in Being and Time 
reads implicitly as a critique of the Freudian position it nonetheless in several aspects 
resembles, it is perhaps worthwhile to place Freud's text openly beside Heidegger's. 
Doing so will also enable us to give closer attention to Heidegger' s notion of the 
ownmost (das Eigene). That which is ownmost to Dasein, that which is its essence as an 
exception to classical ontology, is that which it is the mission of the Volk to understand. 
Meticulously determining the domain of "the uncanny" (das Unheimliche), Freud 
begins his text of that title: 
The German word 'unheimlich' is obviously the opposite of 'heimlich' 
['homely'], 'heimisch' ['native'] - the opposite of what is familiar; and 
we are tempted to conclude that what is 'uncanny' is frightening precisely 
because it is not known and familiar. Naturally not everything that is new 
and unfamiliar is frightening, however; the relation is not capable of 
inversion. We can only say that what is novel can easily become 
frightening and uncanny; some new things are frightening but not by any 
means all. Something has to be added to what is novel and unfamiliar in 
order to make it uncanny.43 
Having urged that what is not the one is not necessarily the other, Freud then queries 
whether the opposites themselves are exclusive. After quoting Jacob and Wilhelm 
282 
Grimm on the connotations of "heimlich" as that which is disguised and perilous, private 
and hence mysterious, he continues: 
Thus heimlich is a word the meaning of which develops in the direction of 
ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite, unheimlich. 
Unheimlich is in some way or other a sub-species of heimlich.44 
Freud thereupon allows a usage of the word "uncanny" to illuminate this relation: 
It often happens that neurotic men declare that they feel there is something 
uncanny about the female genital organs. This unheimlich place, however, 
is the entrance to the former Heim [home] of all human beings, to the 
place where each one of us lived once upon a time and in the beginning. 
[ ... ] In this case too, then, the unheimlich is what was once heimisch, 
familiar; the prefix 'un' ['un'] is the token of repression.45 
The origin has become something alien as a consequence of repression. 
§40 of Being and Time will speak similarly of the uncanny as the origin that has 
become alien and disquieting, but there the agent of repression is not so much Oedipus as 
classical ontology. In the exposition of Angst (Macquarrie and Robinson's "anxiety"), 
Heidegger describes the uncanny: 
Anxiety pulls Dasein back from its falling-away emergence in the 'world'. 
Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein is isolated, but isolated as Being-
in-the world. Being-in enters into the existential 'mode' of the "not-at-
home". Nothing else is meant by our talk about 'uncanniness' .46 
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The world from which anxiety withdraws Dasein and for which Heidegger employs 
ironicizing quotation marks is the worldliness of chatter and curiosity. Dasein is thrown 
back upon itself in the uncanny and, in being thrown back upon itself, it is bereft of its 
familiarity with its environment. And yet it is world, now without quotation marks, that 
suddenly emerges from under the instrumentalisation by which Dasein falls away from 
itself in falling towards the cosmopolitan realm of its inauthenticity. The world that 
emerges is Dasein' s Being-in-the-world even as Dasein suffers on account of its intense 
strangeness: "That in the face of which one has anxiety [das Wovor der Angst] is Being-
in-the-world as such. "47 Dasein abruptly finds itself both within the world and not at 
home. Heidegger stresses: "From an existential-ontological point of view, the 'not-at-
home' must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon."48 In the being-outside-
of-itself of anxiety, Dasein experiences the truth of its originary transcendence. 
Elaborating on this more originary phenomenon as it manifests itself in anxiety, 
Heidegger writes: 
That in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite. Not only 
does this indefiniteness leave factically undecided which entity within-the-
world is threatening us, but it also tells us that entities within-the-world 
are not 'relevant' at all. Nothing which is ready-to-hand or present-at-
hand within the world functions as that in the face of which anxiety is 
anxious.49 
Through anxiety the hegemony of the ontic is challenged. Something else, something 
that exists beyond reification and that is thus "nothing", makes itself felt. 
Like Freud, Heidegger permits himself an elucidatory example: 
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Anxiety can arise in the most innocuous Situations. Nor does it have any 
need for darkness, in which it is commonly easier for one to feel uncanny. 
In the dark there is emphatically 'nothing' to see, though the very world 
itself is still 'there', and 'there' more obtrusively.50 
The night is not nothing, but in the dark Dasein no longer sees itself surrounded by the 
objects of its everyday existence. It becomes disoriented, and inasmuch as it sets about 
orientating itself, it is still disoriented. Orientation, as the experience of the uncanniness 
of Being-in-the-world, becomes an issue for Dasein. Although it otherwise neglects the 
uncanniness of Being-in-the-world, in its dread before nothingness Dasein is unable to 
reorient itself in its everyday environment by disorienting itself in its understanding of its 
own Being. Strictly speaking, Dasein never reorients itself in the everyday - it is only 
ever already reoriented in the everyday. Orientation as such, because it brings into play 
Dasein's Being-in-the-world, is always a disorientation. Dasein is no longer and not yet 
at home in the everyday, and it cannot make itself at home. Orientation has become a 
matter of urgency that works both for and against the inauthentic immersion of Dasein in 
its environment. No longer confronted with beings, Dasein finds itself in the uncanny 
before the Nothing. It exists authentically in orientation and the uncanniness that it 
encounters in its vicinity is its own Being-in-the-world. In anxiety, Dasein experiences 
the origin that is its being not at home in the 'world'. 
The proper homeland of Dasein is its disorientation and not any object to which 
its genesis could be attributed. Heimat, which is defined by originarity, acquires, with 
Heidegger' s exposition of the "not-at-home" as the more primordial phenomenon, a sense 
at odds with its conventional signification. Heidegger' s Heimat is proximal to the extent 
that it is uncanny. It is uncannily familiar, but not because it recalls something that 
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momentarily cannot be specified. What is at once familiar and unsettling in the "not-at-
home" is Dasein's own Being. Heidegger does not follow Freud in providing an ontic 
answer to anxiety. The homeland of Dasein's originarity pushes itself to the fore in 
anxiety by its proximity to the being that Dasein itself is: it is that which is nearest in an 
essential sense. This nearness, in its metaphysical unthinkability, is nowhere: 
That which threatens cannot bring itself close from a definite direction 
within what is close by; it is already 'there', and yet nowhere; it is so close 
that it is oppressive and stifles one's breath, and yet it is nowhere.51 
In anxiety a "space" opens up between Dasein and the objects of its immediate 
environment. Anxiety comes not from anything that is close by, but from the "space" 
that, as Being-in-the-world, is the truth of Dasein's engagement with its environment. 
In "The Origin of the Work of Art" Heidegger again addresses the uncanny nature 
of the proximal: "The familiar is ultimately not familiar [geheuer]; it is monstrous [un-
geheuer]."52 The becoming-monstrous of the familiar is its becoming-world. The 
homeland is always, and by definition, monstrous. As an essential possibility of the 
everyday, Hdmat is not threatened but threatening. Angst is the mode of dwelling in the 
fatherland. 53 Can it be said then that for Heidegger, in some sense, it was the victims of 
the National Socialist terror still living uncertainly within the fatherland who were its 
proper inhabitants? In dread the originarity that is definitive of any notion of Heimat is 
experienced in its most radical cast. 
Heidegger differs from Freud through a complicity with the uncanny. He refuses 
any explanation of the phenomenon whereby the rupture it effects in the everyday's 
character of self-evidence might be made good through its reification. For Heidegger, the 
uncanny does not admit of resolution into an object. That Freud's maternal body has 
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been removed from the scene leads Irigaray to criticise Heidegger for perpetuating 
repression, "the reduction to nothing of that whence, matter-flesh, he proceeds"54• But in 
what manner could repression not be perpetuated? Certainly Heidegger' s theorisation of 
Angst, to the extent that it interprets it as a mode of authentic Dasein, prizes the return of 
the repressed in its unavowable shape as " ... " and thus maintains repression. And yet, in 
naming this" ... " as the maternal body, Irigaray has recourse to an object, and hence to 
the recognizability instituted by metaphysics, in order to repress the challenge to the 
hegemony of the antic that Heidegger seeks to hear in the silence of the uncanny.55 
Although Heidegger's text is later than Freud's, it says less because it wishes to think the 
uncanny as such. A decipherment of the uncanny, a treatment that solves its "riddle" 
clarifies only by obscuring the essence of the phenomenon. As the uncanny ceases to be 
uncanny once it has been explained and the explanation accepted, Freud's explanation of 
the uncanny is entailed by a curative practice dedicating itself to the preservation of 
Dasein in its reification: Dasein is to be safeguarded in its domesticity among beings. 
Heidegger does not propose an "explanation" of the uncanny. In naming the fatherland 
as Being and in discussing anxiety as the experience of the originarity of Being-in-the-
world, he does not place the fatherland in simple rivalry with Freud's maternal body. 
The fatherland that is defined as Being, and thus by inference as Nothing, cannot be 
encountered within metaphysics as an object. Its repression cannot be overturned as it 
cannot stand in the light of presence as a distinct entity. The fatherland is too near to 
acquire substance and, for that reason, it can neither be defended nor extended. 
In his commentary on Holderlin's poem "Heimkunft'', Heidegger thus writes: 
The nearness that now prevails lets what is near be near, and yet at the 
same time lets it remain what is sought, and thus not near. We usually 
understand nearness as the smallest possible measurement of the distance 
between two places. Now, on the contrary, the essence of nearness 
appears to be that it brings near that which is near, yet keeping it at a 
distance. This nearness to the origin is a mystery [Geheimnis]. 56 
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Nearness to the origin is essentially a secret (Geheimnis) because there cannot come a 
time in which it is divulged. The secretiveness of this nearness derives from the reserve 
with which the origin stands towards the light of presence. The origin that is not a secret, 
that exhibits itself in the public spectacle of a nationalistic uprising is never originary in 
Heidegger's sense. What is originary in the National Socialist Heimat is neither the Blut 
und Boden of the Aryan "type" nor the Lebensraum of German monopoly capitalism -
what is originary in this Heimat is the dread experienced by the victims of this 
nationalistic uprising. The fathetland was the secret (Geheimnis) that the victims of 
National Socialism could not but keep to themselves. 
It is thus with an idiosyncratic patriotism that Heidegger in Being and Time is on 
the alert for uprisings of the uncanny: "This uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly, and 
is a threat to its everyday lostness in the 'they', though not explicitly."57 Dasein is 
shadowed by the experience of its own originarity, of the Heimat that is its Being-in-the-
world. Uncanniness constantly threatens to recover Dasein from the worldless 
cosmopolitanism of the "they". When anxiety overtakes Dasein, it disorients it, 
disrupting the impoverished frame of reference by which Dasein orients itself in the way 
of Being of the "they". In the grip of anxiety, Dasein is no longer and not yet able to 
differentiate between its left and right sides and is thus unable to orient itself in the 
flattened world of Kantian cosmopolitanism. And orienting itself in the more primordial 
phenomenon of the "not-at-home", Dasein does not come to itself as the pure ego of 
Hegelian negativity.58 It remains a being-outside-of-itself in the essential "not-at-home" 
of its Heimat. The home of Dasein eludes it as a stable possession and must elude it in 
order to remain the Nothing.59 Dasein is born from nothingness in the sense that any 
other derivation would amount to its reification, just as it lives in nothingness as the 
uncanniness of its orientation in Being-in-the-world. 
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World, revealing itself in the Nothing, does not reveal itself. Even in the 
overwhelming experience of the uncanny, it continues to be a secret ( Geheimnis). Dasein 
is able to say neither where it comes from nor where it is without reifying the Nothing. 
The home of Dasein is a secret because it is too private (heimlich) to ecstatic temporality 
for it to assume the cast of a repeatable entity. To put it differently, it is the 
untransmittable that, for Heidegger, constitutes the Heimat of Dasein, since transmission 
is the substance of the "they", of the everyone that is everywhere. The strangeness of the 
Heimat is the impenetrable idiocy of time. Heidegger' s provincialism, notwithstanding 
its conventionality and occasional kitschiness, never lies far removed from the question 
of an understanding of originary temporality. Heimat, for Heidegger, is defined by the 
unrepeatability of the originary. The following passage on dialect from "Language and 
Homeland" thus needs to be read for its polemic against the understanding of language as 
the vehicle for the transmission of information: 
The essence of language has its roots in dialect. If dialect is the mother's 
language, the homeliness of the home, the homeland has its roots in it as 
well. Dialect is not only the mother's language but, at the same time and 
still more so, the mother of language. Yet at the present hour as we heed 
what has just been said, I refer to the world-historical hour of our age, the 
inherited and traditional relations between language, mother tongue, 
dialect and homeland are already out of joint. Humanity appears to be 
losing the language fatefully allotted to it in each age, becoming in this 
sense speechless, although never in human memory has the globe been so 
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uninterruptedly encircled by chatter. Humanity appears to be becoming 
homeless, so that the pronouncement holds good that Nietzsche in 1884 
delivered to the future in a poem with the title "Ohne Heimat": 
The ravens shriek 
And in whirring flight head towards the city: 
- soon it will snow, 
Woe to him who does not have a homeland.60 
Dialect, and with it language as a whole, retreats before universal exchange and its 
necessary deracination from the world founded by language. The superiority of a dialect 
is that it does not erase its world, that it knows how to keep secrets. A dialect is, as it 
were, a secret to the highest degree because it can never be divulged: it has no other 
content apart from its secretiveness. A dialect says the incomprehensibility of world. For 
Heidegger, a universal language is anathema: 
Language in the singular does not exist. To put this more cautiously: 
language in the sense of a universally comprehensible and uniquely 
binding world-language does not yet exist, even though there are many 
indications that it is readying itself for a dominance that only to a small 
degree rests on human planning and intrigues.61 
What a dialect has to say is less important than the manner in which it says it, in which it 
does not say it. The content of an utterance in dialect is its point of weakness regarding a 
universally comprehensible language, since it is the content that admits of transmission 
and that is consequently the promise of a global language. The dialect in its secrecy 
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stands opposed to reification and in place of an extra-lingual object it harbours Heimat as 
the originary idiocy of Dasein. Dialect is dialect only if it is uncanny, if, by failing to 
transmit something intact into another dialect, discourse or language, it thereby 
communicates the Nothing. In this failure that is, properly speaking, its merit, dialect 
discloses itself as originary: it is the language of originary temporality. The essential 
provincialism of Dasein rests on its utmost exposure to nothingness. In not reaching 
beyond its world, dialect reaches beyond the limits of classical ontology. 
That there might be something other than simple bigotry in Heidegger' s 
provincialism is never conceded by Adorno. The latter, in his essay devoted to Holderlin, 
"Parataxis", writes: 
Hardly anywhere did Holderlin prove his posthumous champion more 
wrong than in his relationship to what is foreign. Holderlin's relationship 
to it is a constant irritation for Heidegger. For Heidegger, the love of a 
foreign woman requires an apology. She is "the one who at the same time 
makes us think about our native land."62 
Heidegger' s provincialism here becomes a disavowal of the exotic. But is such an 
interpretation the only one possible? Does the exotic suggest that which is native merely 
as its opposite? In order to accuse Heidegger of a misinterpretation of the letter to 
Bohlendorff, Adorno passes over the interplay between the exotic and the national, 
between Aufgegebenes and Mitgegebenes in Holderlin's and Heidegger's texts and 
arrives at the conclusion: "The exiled HOlderlin, who said in the same letter to 
Bohlendorff that he wished himself away in Tahiti, is made into a trustworthy German 
living abroad. "63 
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On the basis of the published archival material it can be argued that Heidegger' s 
nationalism is not as straightforward as Adorno pretends. In his 1944 lecture notes, 
Introduction to Philosophy: Poetry and Thinking, Heidegger again comments upon 
Nietzsche's poem "Ohne Heimat" (or, as it is given in the critical edition, "Abschied") 
and its counterpart, "Antwort". The second poem, clarifying the first, reads: 
God have mercy! 
He thinks I was longing 
For German warmth, 
For the stifling joys of German domesticity! 
My friend, that which here 
Hampers me and holds me back is your understanding, 
Compassion for you! 
Compassion for German wrong-headedness! 64 
For neither Nietzsche nor Heidegger is the homeland an object of conventional nostalgia. 
As Heidegger writes in his commentary - and as Holderlin writes to Bohlendorff- it is 
something that must be won: 
In the complementary poems "Ohne Heimat" and "Antwort", there speaks 
this doubly directed compassion that suffers back and forth between the 
incapacity of the former homeland and the heights of the future 
homeland. 65 
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The incapacity of Bismarck's and of Hitler's Germany follows from its homelessness. 
This helplessness is belied neither by military victories nor by increases in production, 
because such "successes" reveal themselves precisely as a flight from nothingness to the 
realm of reification and calculation. Flying from nothingness, imperialism flies from the 
question of world, from the question of Being-in-the-world that can be raised only in a 
challenge to the hegemony of the ontic and that alone contests homelessness. 
Holderlin's poetry, by contrast, stands fast within the uncanniness that he 
expounds as the tragic caesura. In a letter to Erhart Kastner, Heidegger writes: 
What does Holderlin's poetry say? Its word is: the Holy. It speaks of the 
flight of the gods. It says that the fled gods spare us. Until we are capable 
and of a mind to dwell in their vicinity. This place is that which is unique 
to the homeland. 66 
What characterizes the homeland is the nearness of the gods. The absence of the gods is 
equivalent to the absence of the homeland. The gods who have fled before onto-theology 
have borne the homeland with them as the nothingness that is the Un-thought of 
metaphysics: what metaphysics cannot think constitutes the specificity of the homeland. 
It is the homeland as such that metaphysics cannot think in its rush towards the universal, 
in its pursuit of the reification that is the precondition of exchange. 
Standing in the caesura between the "no-longer" and the "not-yet" of the gods, 
Holderlin says the homeland that is missing. He does not think so much the challenge to 
the hegemony of the ontic as the absence of this challenge. On account of the absence of 
this challenge, it cannot be said that we have any understanding as yet either of 
nothingness or of Heimat. HOlderlin, more than any other poet, is the founder of German 
Being because he experiences, more than any other, the national as a question against 
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rather than of metaphysics. Holderlin founds German Being as a question that is 
nonetheless still unheard. That is to say, he founds the possibility of a people that would 
be, in the true sense, the German Volk. 
Insofar as Holderlin can found only the possibility of a people, it can be said that, 
in one respect, there has never been a people. A fragment preserved in the Homburg 
folio notebook, and quoted earlier, suggests that the Greeks were not for themselves a 
people: 
do you think 
It will proceed 
Along the course of old? Namely they wanted to found 
A realm of art. But thereby 
The national was neglected 
By them and pitifully 
Greece, the fairest of all, was destroyed. 
Now presumably matters 
Stand otherwise. 
In wanting to found a realm of art the Greeks neglected, not the nation, but the national 
and thereby initiated their decline. Holderlin's choice of the substantive "das 
Vaterlandische" (here translated as "the national") works against any interpretation that 
here the Greeks are being reproached with impracticality. Certainly "the national" is 
distinguished from the realm of art, yet "the national" cannot be taken to refer to the 
defences of a country, to the maintenance of its economy and public order. These matters 
are to varying degrees of concern in every nation and, in themselves, do not make the 
nation national. In their neglect of the national (as distinct from the nation), the Greeks 
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neglected that which was specific to them. It is by means of this neglect that they fell 
into decline. It was the beautiful that they put in place of the national. As a result, Greek 
decline is not subsequent to the age of outstanding achievements in Greek art: the Greeks 
created works of art precisely in falling away from themselves as a people.67 The 
inauthenticity of Greece is its beauty and it is this beauty, rather than any foreign 
invasion, that signals and consummates its decline. As the most beautiful, Greece 
sentenced itself to decline because it neglected the specificity and privacy of world in its 
unpresentability for the sake of the universality and presence of art. The world of the 
Greeks disappears in its surrender to the recognizability of the public sphere. Greece 
manifested itself as the realm of art and thereby fell away from the Nothing of its world. 
That which was specific, and thus necessarily private, to the Greeks could not be made 
present in the work of art without becoming an item of exchange in the traffic of peoples. 
Art reveals too much- it tears too much from the native earth.68 Having transformed 
themselves into the people of art, the Greeks no longer possessed a homeland and, in 
complicity with their unacknowledged diaspora, they even forgot what it was not to be 
homeless. 
Peter Szondi emphasizes the extremism with reference to Winckelmann in 
Holderlin's attitude towards Greece. Discussing the essay "The Perspective from which 
We Have to Look at Antiquity", Szondi writes: 
The essay is Holderlin's early attempt to lodge a protest, however 
inadequate, against the thesis that imitation of the ancients is the only way 
for us to become great, indeed inimitable were that possible. Neither in 
the name of the modem nor against antiquity, nor for that matter on the 
basis of the Herderian view that to every epoch there must belong an art 
proper to it is the protest being raised. Instead, the protest directs itself 
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against the principle of imitation as such, and it does so in the name of that 
which in bare reproduction must relinquish its life: the vitalforce.69 
The living force does not reproduce itself, and in not repeating itself, in not dividing itself 
up into the distinct entities of derivative temporality, it holds itself back from reification 
and thus from the visibility of the work of art.70 Its originality is its invisibility. Its 
obstinate specificity is akin to non-existence. 
In the Aesthetics, Hegel, from his point of view, has to denounce the non-
producti ve artist: 
For what is supreme and most excellent is not, as may be supposed, the 
inexpressible - for if so the poet would be still far deeper than his work 
discloses. On the contrary, his works are the best part and the truth of the 
artist; what he is [in his works], that he is; but what remains buried in his 
heart, that is he not. 71 
For Hegel, production is existence. Greece exists in having produced itself. For 
Holderlin, a people that does not wish to produce, that does not want to be recognised, 
which is to say, that does want to be recognised as Greek, is the people that finds itself, as 
it were, in not existing. Not neglecting its specificity, not destroying itself through art 
this people is an invisible people, a people that is missing - an uncanny people. 
Holderlin, in the letter to Bohlendorff, does not speak of national arts. Art, for 
Holderlin, is essentially a-national. The distinct gifts of the Greeks and the Hesperians do 
not hinder them from approaching a common art; instead, they establish the differing 
tasks by whose execution the goal is to be attained. Art draws the peoples together. 
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Holderlin' s essay "On the Operations of the Poetic Spirit" rejects one-sided definitions of 
the work of art in favour of their co-ordination: 
[ ... ] not merely primordial simplicity of the heart and of life where man 
feels himself uninhibitedly as in a restricted infinity, nor merely attained 
simplicity of the spirit where that very sensation which is purified to a 
pure [and] formal mood receives the entire infinity of life, (and is ideal), 
but which is instead spirit reanimated by the infinite life, not chance, not 
ideal, but is accomplished work and creation [ ... ]72 
One of the most deeply Classical aspects of Holderlin' s poetry is this emphasis on 
reconciliation. The bridal feasts shared by gods and humans at the centre of many of the 
hymns depict, at the very least, the celebration of that peace among the nations which is 
promised by art. 
And yet, in the "Remarks on 'Oedipus'", the bridal feast becomes the monstrous 
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violence at the heart of tragedy.73 Here reconciliation loses its innocence but remains 
art's dominant imperative. Holderlin, notwithstanding his increasing sense of the 
magnitude of the task of reconciliation, is unable to conceive of an art that does not aspire 
to reconciliation, and he thus figures within eighteenth-century aesthetics as its 
impossibility. The notion of the beautiful that, in Kant' s Critique of Judgement, aligns 
itself, in part, with a universal accord of the respective judgements and that, in Schiller's 
"On the Aesthetic Education of Man", is defined by the reconciliation of sense and 
intellect receives perhaps its most extraordinary form in Holderlin's Hyperion. There the 
EV 81a<j>Epov E<X'lYW of Heraclitus is interpreted in terms of beauty, since the beautiful has 
become the community of beings as a whole.74 It is not that HOlderlin (and with him the 
eighteenth century) does not question whether art's concern is with the beautiful. He 
does - it is for the sake of the beautiful that art first assumes its importance. 
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Greece, as the most beautiful, cannot but neglect the national since, as the most 
beautiful, it is the site of reconciliation and thus also the most cosmopolitan. HOlderlin 
writes in the fragment from the Homburg folio notebook quoted earlier: 
Now presumably matters 
Stand otherwise. 
The Greek neglect of the national is no longer appropriate. Something other than art is 
required, because the unity effected in the beautiful has been revealed as pernicious. 
Greece, the most beautiful, falls into ruin. That which is now required as other than art is 
required on the grounds of that which in it is not beautiful. This negative quality is not 
ugliness, but the irreconcilable, since the beauty of a work of art is its harmoniousness. 
And this harmoniousness, as the decline of Greece demonstrates, was never more than 
ostensible. Art reconciles only by suppressing the intractable. 
Holderlin confesses to Bohlendorff that the study of Greek art has instilled in him 
a desire for self-assertion: 
I have labored long over this and know by now that, with the exception of 
what must be the highest for the Greeks and for us - namely, the living 
relationship and destiny - we must not share anything identical with 
them. 
"We" must differ from the Greeks, so that the living mediation and destiny, shared with 
them as the highest, might not lack that resistance from which the vitality of mediation 
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and destiny issues. The difference, as Holderlin's letter to Bohlendorff makes clear, is 
not to be found in the realm of art where the inhabitants of Greece and of Hesperia 
converge, if by separate paths. Holderlin is not able to say where the difference would lie 
and it is this inability that maintains the force of the imperative. The visible failure of 
Greek art is precisely its visibility, the ease with which it occupies the public sphere and 
abandons the secrecy of the intimate and the originary: the imperative to differ from the 
Greeks is the call of the uncanny. 
Holderlin asks of himself the impossible. Witnessing the fall of Greece through 
art, he nonetheless does not renounce poetry. What HOlderlin asks of himself is a 
differentiation from the Greeks that does not depart from their realm. Poetry is to retain 
the concreteness of the reified and yet it is to heed the uncanny of the national. The 
beauty of such a poetry is to lie in its reconciliation: it would, in effect, be the poetry of 
the ontological difference, reconciling beings and Being without suppression. Being, 
which announces itself in the uncanny as the "nothingness" of world, would here be 
heard even in the reification by which it has otherwise concealed itself. Such a poetry, in 
which the work of art's question against metaphysics would no longer be misinterpreted, 
is as it were commanded by the age: 
Now presumably matters 
Stand otherwise. 
The national, as the originarity that is forgotten in reification, no longer allows itself to be 
neglected. Although why that should be so, is not apparent from these verses. 
If there is a neglect that HOlderlin admits and endeavours to rectify in his later 
poetry, it is a neglect of Christianity. Certainly a poet will seem more national in a 
Christian country if his poetry addresses Christian themes, but nationality and 
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Christianity are to be thought in a more demanding sense in Holderlin's poetry.75 In the 
lecture course on the poem "Andenken", Heidegger suggests that the nationality and 
Christianity of the later poetry receive their sense only in the elaboration of the question 
of Greece: 
The new relationship to Greece is not a turning away, but rather a more 
essential turning towards Greece and a pressing for a more originary 
confrontation, without of course seeking in Greece the origin and ground 
of the proper [Grund des Eigenen].76 
It is in the quest for this origin and ground of the proper that nationality and Christianity 
open up in their abyssal character as the Un-thought of Greece. This search for the origin 
is, for Holderlin, a poetic search. 
Holderlin's own experience is that he cannot be a Christian poet: poetry is in 
some way inimical to Christianity. "An die Madonna" contains the confession: 
And many a song which to 
The Highest, the Father, I once was 
Disposed to sing, was lost 
To me, devoured by sadness.77 
"Der Einzige", with its wish to bring together Christ and the gods of Greece, is more 
expansive on the nature of this melancholy: 
And now my soul 
Is full of sadness as though 
You Heavenly yourselves excitedly cried 
That if I serve one I 
Must lack the other.78 
300 
The reconciliation for which Holderlin sought has been withheld. He admits to Christ: 
And yet a shame forbids me 
To associate with you 
The worldly men.79 
The gods of Greece are here presented as profane men among whose number Christ is 
never to be counted. The poem's final lines read therefore as an objection: 
The poets, and those no less who 
Are spiritual, must be worldly. 80 
Poetry, as that which fundamentally concerns itself with the beautiful, cannot submit to a 
failure of the reconciliation of the urbane and the spiritual. Christ can fill HOlderlin as a 
poet only with sadness. This sadness turns in the second version of "Der Einzige" to 
rage: 
For since evil spirit 
Has taken possession of happy antiquity, unendingly 
Long now one power has prevailed, hostile to song, without 
resonance, 
That perishes in masses, the violence of the mind. 81 
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Antiquity has given way to a monotheism that, in its hostility to the urbane, declares itself 
the enemy of song. It is intractable and therefore refuses the beautiful. The Christianity 
that is suggested by these lines is too ascetic to be representative either of the German 
churches of Holderlin' s day or of the churches as a whole. What this violently 
recalcitrant Christianity represents is, instead, the ultimate task of poetry as 
reconciliation. Holderlin' s rage cannot therefore permit itself to terminate in a rejection. 
As that which is intractable to reconciliation with the urbane, as that which cannot be 
sung, as that which stands apart from all that is, Christianity here discloses itself as a 
challenge to the hegemony of the ontic. Poetry can no longer continue in the Greek 
manner, since with the sounding of this challenge in the Christian revelation the beautiful 
is only attained through a reconciliation still more inclusive than that undertaken by the 
Greeks. The ontic can no longer pretend to constitute the domain of the beautiful. The 
poet who now accomplishes the reconciliation of the beautiful will be the poet of poetry 
and, as such, this poet will be, according to Heidegger in Holderlin 's Hymns 
"Germanien" and "Der Rhein", the poet of the Germans. 
For Hegel, the Christian revelation likewise enacts within the classical world a 
rupture. Both Hegel and Holderlin acknowledge the adverse conditions henceforth facing 
the production of a work of art. Yet whereas Hegel asserts that philosophy alone is able 
to achieve the reconciliation by which art was once defined, because in the modem age 
only philosophy can encompass the revealed negativity of Spirit, Holderlin seeks a poetry 
that does not neglect the national because it heeds its challenge to the hegemony of the 
ontic. Hegel and HOlderlin are thus at odds in their explanations of the decline of Greece. 
For Hegel, it was rather the Greeks' absolute immersion in the national to the exclusion 
of the dawning negativity that was responsible for their downfall: 
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Just as external and actual appearance was essential for the Greek spiritual 
art-form, so too the absolute spiritual destiny of man was accomplished in 
the phenomenal world as a real actuality [the state] with the substance and 
universality of which the individual demanded to be in harmony. This 
supreme end in Greece was the life of the state, the body of the citizens, 
and their ethical life and living patriotism. Beyond this interest there was 
none higher or truer. 82 
In Hegel's account, the exhibition of autonomous subjectivity in the person of Socrates 
places an intolerable strain on the reconciling powers within the Greek no.Ate;. The 
infinite and de-nationalised negativity of the self-reflective subject opens a fissure in the 
concrete life of Greek politics and Greek art. As the transcendental, this de-nationalised 
subject becomes the deterritorialised territory of the Christian faith as it is formulated in 
and as Hegel's philosophy. The rupture that Holderlin and later Heidegger explain in 
terms of the national appears, in Hegel's eyes, as the awakening of Spirit: the encounter 
with the Nothing becomes the liberation of the subject from all other beings so that it 
might finally encounter itself. 
Holderlin does not see that the task in the post-classical age is the reconciliation 
that would encompass even the universal of absolute subjectivity. The fact that, for 
Holderlin, even the Greeks neglected the national indicates that it is toward the specific 
that art must now turn in order to bring about the reconciliation by which he understands 
the beautiful. Art has always been too one-sidedly ontic to be beautiful. It has always 
been too much under the sway of the Dingbegri.ffe of classical ontology. Even as 
mimesis, it has always been too "present" to interrupt the particular's subsumption under 
the universal. The evil spirit in the hymn "Der Einzige" is the enemy of song and its 
unitarity cannot be equated with the universal. Its singleness denotes its jealousy, not its 
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universality. HOlderlin's Christianity, with its Judaic cast, confronts art with its 
limitations from below, setting against art's universality, not the sublation of the concrete 
notion, but the recalcitrance and undecidability of the private. 
As the enemy of song, the evil spirit that seized hold of antiquity harbours the 
possibility of thinking the national. More than any other province of the Empire, Judaea 
staged the failure of the cosmopolitanism of the Roman Peace. Neither the destruction of 
the Temple under Titus nor the enforced exile of the Jews under Hadrian sufficed to 
extinguish Jewish particularism, and even the later ordination of the Jewish people as 
bankers and intellectuals, as agents of circulation83 did not dispel the myth of their 
secretiveness. In many respects, Judaea was seen to constitute an exorbitant revolt 
against the commensurable. Christianity, inventing itself as the absolute secret, spread 
from Judaea to affront the classical world with a pure and internal barbarism. Its secret 
was simply its rejection of glory. When Jesus rejects the public realm in which the 
Pharisees performed their good deeds and preaches that the left hand should not know 
what the right hand is doing (Matt. 6: 3), he privileges secretiveness over that which 
stands in the light of presence. Christianity was an uprising of the concealed with respect 
also to language. Although the glossolalia of the Gnostics and early Christians occupied 
the space of language, it yet offered nothing that on account of the universality of its 
content could be translated. It said the Nothing - not the negativity of the Hegelian ego, 
but the nothingness of the a-signifying. In glossolalia, the harmony of meaning and 
material, by which Hegel defines classical art, is not disrupted by the preponderant 
meaning of the Christian Logos. Only within an anachronistically theological 
interpretation of the early Church is it possible to imagine that the disgust felt by the 
classical world for Christianity and for Judaism can be explained as a pagan reaction to 
monotheism. What horrified the classical world was more the secretiveness, the 
privileging of the private and idiosyncratic (in short, that which was, for the classical 
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world, the idiotic) over the public, the transmittable, the comprehensible and 
commensurable. Sensitive to this aversion, Saint Paul cautioned in the First Letter to the 
Corinthians against speaking in tongues, voicing his apprehension that outsiders might 
hold believers in contempt as mad (1 Cor. 14: 23). Glossolalia is absolute dialect. In 
focussing his attention on dialect's inability to transmit information, Heidegger proposes 
an understanding of dialect reminiscent of the early Christian polemic against 
unconcealment. 
HOlderlin's wish to be a Christian poet, expressed in "Der Einzige" and "An die 
Madonna", is flouted by Christianity' s refusal to be reconciled with the light of presence 
in which the work of art stands. Holderlin's wish is to be the poet of that which is 
unsayable within the limits of poetry laid down by the Greeks. Holderlin's inability to be 
a national poet is his inability to be a Christian poet. It is the inability of poetry as such, 
rather than any inability peculiar to Holderlin, because in both the national and the 
Christian, at least in HOlderlin's sense, poetry confronts that which is intractable to 
reification. For Holderlin, the fatherland is essentially Christian. It is Holderlin's 
absolute ambition as a poet, not Heimweh, that determines the national as an object of 
aspiration. 84 Holderlin aspires to the fatherland because he wants more than has ever 
been wanted. In the lecture course Heraklit, Heidegger draws attention to this aspect of 
Holderlin as it is embodied in the name and figure of the eponymous hero of his novel: 
"'YnEptov is the name of the one who goes further than the others, even to that which for 
'rational human beings' always goes 'too far' ."85 For both Holderlin as a poet and for 
Heidegger as a thinker, Greece is the point of departure - the fatherland lies elsewhere 
as its unfamiliar complement. 
Yet in a fragment HOlderlin writes: 
About the Highest I will not speak. 
But, like the laurel, forbidden fruit 
Your country is, above all. To be tasted last 
By any man,86 
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The national neglected by the Greeks is here for HOlderlin just as much forbidden fruit as 
the laurels that the Greeks did not neglect. Heidegger quotes this fragment at the 
beginning of his lectures Holderlin's Hymns "Germanien" and "Der Rhein" and 
continues: 
The Fatherland, our Fatherland Germania - forbidden to the utmost, 
withdrawn from the hurry of the everyday and the blare of commotion. 
The highest and thus the hardest, the last because fundamentally the first 
- the concealed origin. Thereby we have already said what our 
beginning with "Germania" does not mean. It is not a question of offering 
something amenable and useful for daily requirements, thereby securing 
testimonials for the lecture series so that the pernicious opinion could arise 
that we are wanting to provide Holderlin with a cheap timeliness. We do 
not want to bring Holderlin into accordance with our time, rather the very 
opposite: we want to bring ourselves, as well as those to come, under the 
poet's measure. 87 
Heidegger does not want Holderlin to appear timely in the winter semester of 1934-5. He 
does not want Holderlin's patriotism to appear to anticipate National Socialism. That 
which makes Holderlin seem untimely - the prohibition upon the fatherland - is, for 
Heidegger, not something that can be held against Holderlin, since it is Heidegger's age 
that is out of step. The fatherland must be prohibited in order to remain the fatherland: in 
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1934-5 its time has not yet come. Holderlin is, for Heidegger, the poet of the no-longer 
of the Greeks and the not-yet of the fatherland. He is the poet of the task of the 
reconciliation of the cosmopolitan with the national, but he is not the poet of the 
reconciliation itself. For HOlderlin, both the laurels of the public realm and the fatherland 
of the secret are forbidden, since he is the poet for whom the necessity of their 
reconciliation is not to be forgotten through an absorption in the one to the neglect of the 
other. Holderlin's poetry is therefore not strictly beautiful, even though it records the 
promise of the greatest beauty. It is neither national nor transnational. Instead, it 
promises a nationalism more deeply rooted than any chauvinism and a reconciliation 
more inclusive than any cosmopolitanism. 
The impossibility at the heart of Holderlin' s poetry is its position within the cleft 
between the ontic and the ontological, between Greece and Judaea. This cleft constitutes 
the impossibility of the West. It is the "and" in the title of Shestov' s Athens and 
Jerusalem, which Shestov himself refused to countenance, preferring a mutually 
exclusive and global disjunction88 (Shestov does not want to know anything of that which 
Derrida calls the cleft's hypocrisy89). For Holderlin, as a poet, there is no choice but to 
remain within the cleft and to attempt the reconciliation of the thingly and the 
iconoclastic. If it is ever to be beautiful, poetry has to disorient itself within its Greek 
positivity, to open within itself a distance from the ontic. It must set out for that Hesperia 
which as the undecidable other of Greece is the Dis-orient, the uncanny orientation of 
Dasein within the Nothing and the Un-thought of classical ontology. Hesperia, or that 
which Heidegger names as the fatherland, is Being. Inasmuch as Greece could thus never 
have been a fatherland even for the Greeks, Klopstock's question becomes senseless: 
Is Achaea the Teutons' Fatherland?90 
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V The Geschlecht of the Poem 
From its cursory employment in Being and Time, the word "Volk" flares up in the thirties 
and early forties to a dominance in Heidegger's thinking that is not afterwards sustained. 
An exception to the apparent ban imposed on the word "Volk" - that is also not an 
exception - lies in the polysemy of "Geschlecht". In the 1952 essay on Trakl, 
"Language in the Poem", Heidegger adresses the polysemy of "Geschlecht" as an 
occasion for the question of Being. Has the German Volk been relieved of its ontological 
mission? Given that, for Heidegger, the Volk was nothing other than this mission, the 
later text cannot be interpreted as relieving the Volk of its mission or as replacing it with 
the Geschlecht. That which in 1952 is named "Geschlecht" is better understood as a 
clarification of that which had previously been named "Volk". The clarification lies in an 
emphasis - characteristic of late Heidegger - on the role of difference in the question 
of Being. 
This polysemy of "Geschlecht", according to Heidegger, is not external to the 
individual significations of the word: 
Our language names the human essence shaped from a single blow 
(Schlag) and misshapen (verschlagen) in this blow the "Geschlecht". The 
word signifies the human species (Menschengeschlecht) in the sense of 
humanity as well as Geschlechter in the plural sense of tribes, houses and 
families, all of these stamped again in the twoness of the Geschlechter. 1 
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A Geschlecht can never be integral since it is, by definition, stamped with a twoness.2 
The people that, for Heidegger in 1952, survives in "Geschlecht" survives only in being 
given up to division: 
With what has this Geschlecht been struck, i.e. cursed? Curse in Greek is 
nAY]Yll, our word "Schlag" (blow). The curse of the decaying Geschlecht 
consists therein, that this old Geschlecht has been struck apart into the 
discord of Geschlechter. Out of discord each Geschlecht strives into the 
unleashed uproar of the isolated and sheer wildness of wild game. Not 
twoness as such, but rather the discord is the curse. Out of the uproar of 
blind wildness it carries the Geschlecht into strife, where it is struck with 
untrammelled isolation. Thus cleft and shattered, the "decayed 
Geschlecht" can on its own no longer find its proper cast. The proper cast 
lies only with that Geschlecht whose twoness leaves discord behind and 
wanders ahead into the gentleness of a simple twofold, i.e. is strange and 
thus follows the stranger.3 
The "decayed Geschlecht" does not find its proper cast in being made whole. The 
Geschlecht is cursed, not in being divided, but rather in the aggravation of its division to 
the point of discord. Falling upon a community as upon the other senses of Geschlecht, 
the proper cast of Geschlecht returns it to its essential, yet paradoxical solidarity in the 
loneliness of its members. Geschlecht cannot come to its twofold self within the narrow 
and paranoiacally regulated unity of National Socialism, because such a unity never 
encompasses Geschlecht in its fragmentary whole and thus merely testifies to discord. 
The Geschlecht finds its "proper" cast in the decay of a unity such as Hitler's Volk. 
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As a letter from 1938 might be taken to suggest, National Socialism prompted in 
Heidegger an attachment to loneliness: 
I believe that an age of loneliness must break over the world, if it is once 
more to draw breath for action that restores to things their essential force.4 
Arguably the loneliness of which Heidegger is speaking is not the loneliness of the 
isolation that afflicts the Geschlecht in its open discord. The loneliness that appears 
when the Geschlecht is frozen into reactive and antagonistic determinations bears scant 
resemblance to the loneliness of the relation to the essential. Heidegger speaks of an age 
of loneliness that is to break over the entire world. Accordingly, he does not situate the 
loneliness of the relation to the essential in the idiosyncrasy of a numerical minority. The 
essential is itself the element of loneliness. In its originarity and hence its difference 
from the positive, the essential offers nothing against which a being could determine 
itself and re-compose itself. Once it has set out on the path to this other loneliness and 
the curativeness of the indeterminacy of the twofold, it is doubtful - as Trakl was well 
aware - that the Geschlecht can remain recognisably human. Heidegger's question of 
1934, "Who is this people that we ourselves are?", has, if anything, become more 
questionable. 
But what does it mean in any case to be human? Heidegger's essay on Trakl 
often recalls his earlier expositions. Yet that which elsewhere appears peremptory and 
conventional becomes unsettling in the text on Trakl. Heidegger sets himself the task of 
thinking through Trakl's notion of humanity: "The Geschlecht of humanity's 'decayed 
form' is what the poet calls the 'decaying' Geschlecht."5 Trakl's humanity decays as 
Geschlecht. If it is in the grips of decomposition, if it is not itself, it may then, Heidegger 
argues, be something else. After having for decades drawn a distinction between the 
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animal and the human, Heidegger in 1952 problematizes the distinction with reference to 
Trakl's "blue deer": 
Who is the blue deer to whom the poet calls out that it recollect the 
stranger? Is it an animal? To be sure. Is it only an animal? By no means. 
For it is said to recollect. Its face supposedly looks out for ... and looks to 
the stranger. The blue deer is an animal whose animality presumably does 
not lie in the bestial, but rather in that watchful recollection after which the 
poet calls. This animality is still distant and scarcely visible. The 
animality of the animal here in question thus oscillates in the 
indeterminate. It has not yet been brought into its essence. This animal, 
namely the one that thinks, animal rationale, humanity, remains, 
according to an expression of Nietzsche's, not yet firmly established. 6 
Heidegger is not anthropomorphizing Trakl' s figures as though only the human were a fit 
matter for poetry. On the contrary, it is because the human has not yet become 
recognizable as a distinct entity that it cannot be absolutely distinguished from a blue 
deer. Heidegger continues: 
The proposition does not mean in any way that humanity has not yet been 
factually "established". It has been only all too definitely. What is meant 
is that the animality of this animal has not yet been brought "home", into 
firmness, the ownness of its concealed essence. This determination has 
been the goal for which Western-European metaphysics has been 
struggling since Plato. Perhaps it struggles in vain.7 
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The animality of the animal that is the human being has not yet been understood. 
However recognisable the human being is said to be, it has not yet become recognisable 
as human. Whatever is passed off as human, out of impatience and short-sightedness, is 
simply an imposition: 
The blue deer, where and when it essences (west), has left the previous 
essential form of humanity behind. Humanity, as it has been known up to 
now, decomposes insofar as it loses its essence (Wesen), i.e. decays 
(verwest). 8 
The blue deer is the essence of humanity. It emerges with the decay of that which has 
been understood as "humanity". In decaying, humanity wrests apart artificial 
configurations of its essence. Decay undermines the rigidity and hence discord through 
which the Geschlecht finds itself cursed. It restores the Geschlecht to the gentleness of 
its double nature . 
. Decay is not a calamity that befalls the Geschlecht from outside, since it is the 
I 
essence of the Geschlecht to decay. Fellini, for whom decay was likewise not a calamity, 
coined the word "procadence" in the conviction that the negative prefix "de" in 
"decadence" is misleading. In Trakl's poetry, decay cannot be said to be an unequivocal 
object of lament. For all the evocations of decay in his work, it is only in the prose poem 
"Traum und Umnachtung", with its wish that it be spring, that there is anything 
approaching an aversion. Otherwise Trakl - unlike Lorca, for instance, and the great 
body of satirical literature - foregoes contrasting and condemning decay with images of 
whaCinight be taken for a prelapsarian humanity. In themselves, the representations of 
decay in Trakl's poetry offer little by way of eulogy: 
Decay glows in the green puddle. 
("Kleines Konzert", v. 9) 
Lepers who perhaps decay at night 
Read the scattering signs of birdflight. 
("Traum des Bosen", v. 13-14) 
A herdsman decays on an old stone. 
("Im Dorf', v. 2) 
Soul sang death, the flesh's green decay. 
("An einen Frtihverstorbenen", v. 11) 
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These verses do not express an opposition to decay. Given the impassivity with which 
they are described, the lepers and the herdsman seem not so much to be afflicted by 
decay as to have decay as their way of Being. These figures are at home in decay. And 
that is to say, inasmuch as they have not congealed into an inalterable form, they are 
human. 
To be human, to be that for whose determination metaphysics struggles in vain, is 
to be nothing else but decaying. That the blue deer could be human is because it itself 
hesitates in its essence: 
In the poetizing name "blue deer" Trakl calls that human essence whose 
countenance, whose countering glance, is seen by the night's blueness in 
its thinking of the stranger's steps and is thus illumined by the holy. The 
name "blue deer" names mortals who recollect the stranger and who would 
wander with him through the ownness of the human essence.9 
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The blue deer appears in the decay of humanity in response to the promise of the latter's 
essence. Appearing with the decay of every reification of humanity, the blue deer cannot 
appear with the factuality of something present-at-hand. The blue deer essentially 
hesitates, and thus hesitates in its appearance, because it wanders, and it wanders because 
it dies. The death that Heidegger elsewhere denies the animal10 is here granted the blue 
deer. The blue deer dies; it does not merely perish. By means of its essential finitude, it 
departs in search of that which is proper to the human and hence not present-at-hand. 
The blue deer, since it is mortal, decays and it is by decaying that it sets out on its quest 
for the non-positivity of the human. It embarks for what is most distant without having to 
move from its place. 
The blue deer, because it is never itself, cannot die in the sense of being 
extinguished. Death changes its nature in Trakl, as Heidegger notes: 
In the poem "Psalm" Trakl says: 
The madman has died. 
The next strophe says: 
The stranger is buried. 
In the "Siebengesang des Todes" he is called the "white stranger". 
The last strophe of "Psalm" ends with the line: 
In his grave the white magician plays with his snakes. 
The deceased lives in his grave. He lives in his chamber, so quietly and 
lost in thought that he plays with his snakes. They can do nothing against 
him. They have not been strangled, but their evil has been transformed. 11 
As a figure of decay, the white magician "lives" even in his grave. He lives by dying and 
not perishing. He continues to "live" by decaying. 12 As it is by decay that the strife of 
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the individuated is mollified, the uproar of the determinate against the determinate yields 
in the grave to quiet play. For the white magician, his snakes cease to be evil. The curse 
of the Geschlecht, which had brought the snakes into open discord with him, has been 
lifted. In his decay, the white magician surrenders the on tic ground for his differentiation 
from the snakes. He dies away from the determinate towards the becoming of decay. He 
dies towards his snakes. 
To be dead here, as Heidegger writes, is not to be no more: 
The deceased is the madman. Is this a question of someone who is 
mentally ill? No. Madness (Wahnsinn) here does not mean a thinking 
(Sinnen) that imagines (wahnt) nonsense (Unsinniges). "Wahn" belongs to 
Old High German wana and means: "ohne" ("without"). The madman 
thinks, and he thinks even as no one else has yet thought. But he thus 
remains without the sense (Sinn) of others. He is of another sense. 
"Sinnan" signifies originally: to journey, to strive after, to strike out in a 
direction; the Inda-Germanic root "sent" and "set" means "way". The one 
who has departed is the madman, because he is underway in another 
direction. 13 
The dead and the mad are both engaged in a pursuit of the essence of the human. That is 
to say, they have both turned away from every determination of humanity. Accordingly, 
it is among the dead and the mad that Being and Time finds its true readers. In their eyes, 
Dasein is compelled to stand forth from the anthropomorphisations and reifications 
concealing and debasing it. 
Humanity is in decay. Decay is not a property of the human being, let alone a 
property that would be predated by every other property. On the contrary, decadence is 
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the origin from which humanity falls away. Ceasing to be itself in acquiring its extant, 
and hence recognisable, attributes, the Geschlecht stands under the curse of no longer 
decaying. 14 What Heidegger writes of decay in Trakl' s poetry does not place it in 
opposition to the origin: 
The language sings the song of the departed homecoming, which from the 
lateness of decay comes to rest in the earliness of the quieter, still un-been 
beginning.15 
The lateness of decay converges with the earliness of the beginning that continues to 
"have been" (gewesen) because it is not past (vergangen) and extinguished as an earlier 
"now". Trakl' s language sings the homecoming of decadence away from its 
misapprehended, negative nature into its truth as the originary. Decay is not to be 
overcome for the sake of a return to the origin. Instead, it is to be understood as the 
originary. 
Heidegger, accordingly, does not ascribe to Trakl a motif of regeneration, as the 
following lines on the site of his work make clear: 
The situality of the site [die Ortschaft des Ortes] that gathers Trakl's work 
into itself is the concealed essence of departedness, and is called "Evening 
Land", the Occident. This land is older, i.e. earlier and therefore more 
promising than the land conceived as Platonic-Christian, let alone as 
European.16 
Platonism and Christianity constitute neither the site of Trakl' s work nor its promise. For 
that matter, the Occident is not the site of Trakl's work. On the contrary, the Occident is 
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the manner in which this work is situated at all. Its occidental site is a being vespertine 
rather than a geographical location, and it is decadent rather than regenerative. Precisely 
because it is decadent, the "Evening Land" is closer to the origin than the land conceived 
as Platonic-Christian. In its decay, it does not submit to the Platonic-Christian imperative 
of purification and thus does not set itself apart from the indeterminacy of finitude. 
Trakl's "Evening Land" would only be identifiable as the distinct geographical entity 
known as Europe if it submitted to the Platonic-Christian imperative. As the poet of the 
Occident, Trakl is the poet of the originary. As the poet of the originary promise of 
decay, he does not subscribe to any Platonic-Christian model of regeneration. 17 That 
which does not decay, that which in its immutability informs the Platonic doctrine of 
ideas and the Christian doctrine of the soul, has always, in itself, fallen away from 
originary temporality. The immutability of the idea and the soul is proof, not so much of 
their dignity, as of their fallenness, since this immutability is grounded in the derivative 
understanding of temporality. The soul and the idea have their roots in presence. 
In order to extricate Trakl from the vulgar concept of time, Heidegger opens his 
text with a violently expropriative reading of a line from the poem "Fruhling der Seele" 
(v. 22): 
The soul is strange to the earth. 
By means of an examination of the etymology of ''fremcf' ("strange"), Heidegger refuses 
here a Christian interpretation of the soul: 
But ''fremd'', the Old High German ''fram", really means: forward to 
somewhere else, underway toward ... , onward to that which has been kept 
in store for it. 18 
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The soul does not set itself apart from the earth. On the contrary, it is a moving-towards-
the-earth. The soul is ecstatic because it is strange (jremd), and it therefore cannot be 
contained in the presence of Christian immortality. 19 Trakl's soul is a being that has 
transcendence as its Being. It decays within the origin and it is as originary temporality, 
and hence as Dasein, that it decays. 
The origin in Trakl is, for Heidegger, too originary to be metaphysical. It is the 
essence and homeland seen and thought only by the "madman": 
Trakl' s poetry sings the song of the soul, which, "strange to the earth", 
wanders the earth precisely as the quieter homeland of the homecoming 
Geschlecht. 
Dreamy romanticism at the periphery of the technico-economic 
world of modem mass existence? Or- the clear knowledge of the 
"madman" who sees and thinks differently to the reporters of the topical 
who exhaust themselves in the recounting of whatever is contemporary, 
whose calculated future is only ever a prolongation of what is current, a 
future that is forever without the advent of a destiny that could ever 
concern humanity at the beginning of its essence?20 
Trakl' s soul is strange to the earth and the origin, but the earth and the origin are, for that 
reason, not that which is familiar to the reporters of the topical. Heidegger is not 
attributing to Trakl' s soul nostalgia for the lost Bodenstandigkeit of the familiar. He is 
not appealing to the origin, to homecoming and to the homeland, in order to substantiate 
"at the periphery of the technico-economic world" some reactionary cult of the 
authenticity of the autonomous subject, as Thomas Bernhard suggests.21 It is not the 
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petty bourgeois whom he opposes to the levelled existence of the modem world - but 
then nor is it, as he earlier stresses, the individual who alerts a symptommatology of 
mental disorders. Heidegger's "madman" is to be thought differently. 
In the Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger writes: 
In the history of the truth of Being, Dasein is the essential incident 
[Zwischenfall], i.e. the intervention of that in-between [Zwischen] into 
which humanity must be deranged [ver-riickt] if it is ever again to be 
itself.22 
A human being does not so much become mad, as become human only in madness. That 
which now passes for human must hence be tom out of its determinations into the 
kairological interval that is the madness of Dasein in its essential ecstasy as originary 
temporality. The mad, following Heidegger in his etymology of "Wahnsinn", cannot be 
said to have embarked on a journey as though it were an activity undertaken by 
grammatical subjects. The mad are the journey in the same exhaustive and essential 
sense that Dasein is transcendent. Consequently, the origin is the destination of the 
journey - that toward which the "strange" soul is underway - insofar as it does not 
denote its conclusion, but rather its realisation as journey. The origin is to be understood 
as ecstatic, and thus as that which is properly human. 
In 1952, "madness" thus comes to name the Un-thought of classical ontology and 
it is to the "mad" that Heidegger entrusts the question of Being. The essay on Trakl is, 
accordingly, a further attempt at that critical destruction of the metaphysical tradition 
undertaken since the 1920s. Where "The Self-Assertion of the German University" 
appealed to the Volk, "Language in the Poem" appeals to the mad and the dead. 
Precedents, therefore, suggest themselves for that which Heidegger seeks to think with 
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the word "Wahnsinn". Nonetheless, the consistency should not be exaggerated. What 
Heidegger earlier thinks with "transcendence" - the most obvious precursor for his 
etymology of "Wahnsinn" - must be rethought in the light of the later text and its 
reappraisal of the human. To do so is to ask after the linkages between Dasein, the Volk 
and the "mad". It is to ask after the nature of the humanity of the being that raises the 
question of Being. 
In the 1929-30 lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 
Heidegger offers his most extensive treatment of the difference between the animal and 
the human. Discussing the essential transcendence of Dasein, he writes: 
For the being-there of Da-sein means being with others, precisely in the 
manner of Dasein, i.e., existing with others. The question concerning 
whether we human beings can transpose ourselves into other human beings 
does not ask anything, because it is not a possible question in the first 
place. It is a meaningless, indeed a nonsensical question because it is 
fundamentally redundant. [ ... ] Being-with belongs to the essence of man's 
existence. 23 
Dasein is always already transcendent. It is not possible for human beings to transpose 
themselves into other human beings, since to attribute transcendence to human beings as 
a possibility is to transform what is essential into what is optional. 
In 1929-30, Heidegger distinguishes between the essential transposition of the 
human being, the limited transposability of the animal and the non-transposability of the 
inanimate object: 
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In contrast with the stone, the animal in any case does possess the 
possibility of transposability, but it does not allow the possibility of self-
transposition in the sense in which this transpires between one human 
being and another. The animal both has something and does not have 
something, i.e., it is deprived of something. We express this by saying that 
the animal is poor in world and that it is fundamentally deprived of 
world.24 
Heidegger stresses that this last proposition is not to be understood as an additional 
property of the entity that has long been the domain of zoological enquiry: 
Where does the proposition 'the animal is poor in world' come from? We 
can answer once again that it derives from zoology, since this is the 
science that deals with animals. But precisely because zoology deals with 
animals this proposition cannot be a result of zoological investigation: 
rather, it must be its presupposition. For this presupposition ultimately 
involves an antecedent determination of what belongs in general to the 
essence of the animal, that is, a delimitation of the field within which any 
positive investigation of animals must move.25 
Admittedly, Heidegger, who thereupon proceeds to talk of earthworms, moles and 
beetles, does not appear in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics to wish to 
challenge the delimitations of the zoological. 
Twenty years later, however, he calmly announces that a blue deer is human. 
Why? Because it thinks. At once it seems that he is invoking the arguments of The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics on the humanity of thinking. There, in §58, 
Heidegger writes: 
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Captivation is the condition of possibility for the fact that, in accordance 
with its essence, the animal behaves within an environment but never 
within a world. 26 
What stands between the animal and a world is its captivation (Benommenheit). The 
nature of this captivation is not to be a captivation with something as such. Indeed 
"Benommenheit" could be more suitably (and more conventionally) translated by "daze" 
- the captivation that defines itself as an inability to be captivated by something as such. 
This captivated daze in which the animal lives prevents a world from emerging in the 
wealth of its articulations: 
When we say that the lizard is lying on the rock, we ought to cross out the 
word 'rock' in order to indicate that whatever the lizard is lying on is 
certainly given in some way for the lizard, and yet is not known to the 
lizard as a rock. If we cross out the word we do not simply mean to imply 
that something else is in question here or is taken as something else. 
Rather we imply that whatever it is is not accessible to it as a being. 27 
For late Heidegger, as is well known, it is the word "Being" that we ought to cross out, in 
order to indicate that Being as such is not accessible to us. Without access to the Being 
of beings and thus to what beings are as such, we are not free of the captivation in which 
the animal lives and perishes. 
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However, in 1929-30 the question of Being has not yet fully undermined the 
metaphysical distinction between the animal and the human. The lizard lies on a rock, 
but it does not lie knowingly on a rock. The rock as such withholds itself. The world 
refuses itself to the animal in general because it is accessible only to the being that 
knows. World becomes the prerogative of the human as the being that knows. 
Heidegger' s choice of examples for discussion from the animal kingdom is seemingly 
dictated by a desire to avert suspicion from the definition of the human as the being that 
knows. The behaviour of bees while feeding conveniently furnishes Heidegger with a 
further example of a being that does not know: 
[T]he bee recognizes that it cannot cope with all the honey present. It 
breaks off its driven activity because it recognizes the presence of too 
much honey for it. Yet, it has been observed that if its abdomen is 
carefully cut away while it is sucking, a bee will simply carry on 
regardless even while the honey runs out of the bee from behind. This 
shows conclusively that the bee by no means recognizes the presence of 
too much honey. 28 
The honey as such does not appear for the bee. Not knowing what it is doing, the bee 
does not behave within a world. 
But what does it mean for world to be tied to the knowability of what is? How 
can Heidegger' s argument in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics be brought into 
agreement with his demotion of epistemology in § 13 of Being and Time? There he 
writes: 
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But a 'commercium' of the subject with a world does not get created for 
the first time by knowing, nor does it arise from some way in which the 
world acts upon a subject. Knowing is a mode of Dasein founded upon 
Being-in-the-world. Thus Being-in-the-world, as a basic state, must be 
Interpreted beforehand. 29 
In Being and Time, Dasein knows because it is Being-in-the-world. In The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics, the bee is not Being-in-the-world because it does not know. 
There is an asymmetry between the two propositions. In Being and Time, Being-in-the-
world is the presupposition of knowledge, whereas in The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics knowledge is the proof of Being-in-the-world. Yet in what way can 
knowledge be a proof of Being-in-the-world? Beings are knowable because they are 
cleared in the clearing of beings that is Being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world is the 
knowability of what is and Dasein is the being that knows. But Dasein is not the being 
that knows in the sense that it is a subject that stands over against an object that it submits 
to scrutiny and about which it draws binding conclusions. Dasein is the being that knows 
because it is the clearing of beings. The bee is not the being that knows because it is a 
being that appears in the clearing of beings and is not the clearing itself. In Heidegger' s 
exxample of the bee, the distinction between the animal and the human is illustrated, but 
not without ambiguity. The poverty of the bee's world lies in its difference from the 
knowability of what is, rather than in its nonsensical behaviour. In Heidegger's example 
this is ambiguous. Being-in-the-world appears to be susceptible to verification by a test 
of expediency. The bee without an abdomen expends energy in the consumption of 
honey that it cannot retain and thus behaves irrationally: it is not the animal rationale and 
it is not Being-in-the-world. Is this ambiguity, whereby the clearing of beings converges 
with the being with the most developed sense of the economical, simply a lapse on 
Heidegger' s part? 
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If it is a lapse, it is one that is rectified in the essay on Trakl. In this later text 
Heidegger is much more careful to avoid encouraging readings that would 
anthropomorphise the clearing of beings. The greater caution alters the cast of the animal 
in Heidegger' s thinking. The question that Derrida raises concerning the tenability of the 
distinction between the animal and the human in other texts by Heidegger is thus pre-
empted by the essay on Trakl. In "Geschlecht II: Heidegger' s Hand", Derrida examines 
the passage on the ape from What Is Called Thinking?, addressing his attention to the 
sentence, "Apes, too, have organs that can grasp, but they do not have hands"30 • Here 
Heidegger reserves the hand for the human and puts it a distance from any organic 
functionalism. Derrida, in response, advances a criticism of the differentiation 
proclaimed in this sentence and of the logic that informs its counterparts in other texts: 
In its very content, this proposition marks the text's essential scene, marks 
it with a humanism that wanted certainly to be nonmetaphysical -
Heidegger underscores this in the following paragraph - but with a 
humanism that, between a human Geschlecht one wants to withdraw from 
the biologistic determination [ ... ] and an animality one encloses in its 
organico-biologic programs, inscribes not some differences but an absolute 
oppositional limit. 31 
For Heidegger, the ape gives itself up to the organic analysis of biology, and as an animal 
it cannot do otherwise. With the human being it is another matter. Between the ape and 
the human being there are not merely differences in the plural and hence on the level of 
properties. There is a difference of essence. The humanism that Derrida attributes to 
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Heidegger lies in this incommensurability. Derrida questions whether this absolute 
oppositional limit - by which the Geschlecht would be set rigidly in the discord between 
the human and the animal - does not collapse of itself. Derrida' s question, however, 
presupposes the vulnerability of Heidegger's thinking to a Hegelian criticism. Is the 
incommensurability of the ape and the human really the matter of an absolute 
oppositional limit? Is the human defined as an extant being by the negativity of its 
opposition to the ape and thus contaminated by the ape in its very essence? For 
Heidegger, the incommensurability is not a difference between two essences distinct in 
the same way. The incommensurability is the difference between the clearing of beings, 
which is thus always already contaminated through its Being-with, and a being that 
appears in the clearing and allows its enclosure in "organico-biologic programs". And 
yet the clearing of beings has hands. This, however, is not an objection, since it is the 
clearing of beings that first "has" anything. Humanism would mark Heidegger' s text 
only if it was denied that the clearing of beings has paws. 
Heidegger' s distinction between the human and the animal is better understood as 
an inclusion of the one in the other, than as a mutual exclusion. The animal that, in 1929-
30, is seemingly not thought beyond its comprehension in the prevailing biology already 
anticipates the humanity of the blue deer. A sentence such as the following from the 
"Letter on 'Humanism"' has therefore to be read for what it does not say in the language 
of humanism: 
Because plants and animals are lodged in their respective environments but 
are never placed freely in the clearing of Being which alone is "world," 
they lack language. 32 
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Plants and animals are never placed freely in the clearing of Being because they, unlike 
Dasein, are not the clearing of Being itself. Plants and animals do not speak, but then it is 
not one being among other beings that is here said to speak. The human is not, for 
Heidegger, a privileged being. Its difference from other beings as the being that speaks is 
the difference of Being from beings. Heidegger thus endows the "human" with a dignity 
surpassing that of any earlier humanism. But Heidegger's apparent humanism is, 
properly speaking, an anti-humanism, inasmuch as it does not perpetuate the Christian 
myth of the human being as a being set apart from, and over, all other beings. This myth, 
which endorses the exploitation and manipulation of beings in the service of modern 
technicism, does not find expression in Heidegger. On the contrary, by identifying the 
human with the Being of beings Heidegger does not align the manipulability of beings 
with the human, but rather names with the human being the essential resistance of beings 
to 't'EXYll. The human becomes the essential unpresentability of whatever is. It becomes 
the worlding of the world in which beings are present but which, as their condition of 
possibility and thus their truth, is not present itself. And it is not present because it is the 
non-presentability of time. Where for Aristotle the human is the only being that 
perceives time, for Heidegger the human is time.33 It is in the ecstases of temporality that 
the human both announces its incommensurability with the animal and gives itself up to 
contamination. 
In "Language in the Poem", the blue deer is human not simply because it thinks 
and knows what a bee cannot know. It is human because, in its harkening to the stranger, 
it follows him elsewhere and thinks madly, i.e. differently. As Christian humanism 
distinguished the human from the thingly but did not question the distinctness as such of 
the human, it never reached beyond matters of detail to the "madness" of a critique of 
reification. It never thought Being as such. A famous sentence from What Is Called 
Thinking? (the series of lectures delivered in the same period as the composition of 
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"Language in the Poem") reads: "Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time 
is that we are still not thinking."34 The blue deer, which does think because it thinks 
differently from the thought that is properly a non-thought, accordingly satisfies the 
definition of the human being as the thinking animal, as animal rationale. Yet it can be 
said to satisfy this definition only by overlooking the fact that the otherness of its thought 
puts any definition whatsoever into question. Its thought is less a stable property of its 
animality than its madness and decay: the humanity of the blue deer is its indeterminacy. 
We who do not yet think are not yet human. Metaphysics prevents us from strictly 
meeting its definition of humanity as the animal rationale because it prevents us from 
thinking. But in what way are we the people who do not yet think? To what degree? 
Heidegger' s response in the text on Trakl is unmistakable: to the degree that we are not 
underway, that we resist the decomposition essential to the human. 
In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics the animal does not grasp beings as 
they are. And it cannot do so because it is not Being and hence not that which is the 
knowability of beings. The animal is insufficiently ecstatic and thus insufficiently 
decadent. The blue deer bears witness to the humanity that thinks itself in the animal. 
The humanity of the animal is the transcendence that cannot be denied to the Being of 
any being. To deny the animal knowledge of beings as such is not to deny it 
transcendence, since inasmuch as the animal is, it is transcendent. The constitution of its 
identity, regardless of whether this identity is rendered an object of knowledge, takes into 
account the world from which the animal is continuously differentiated and towards 
which it must always be transcending in order for the differentiation to take effect. And 
if Heidegger' s bee is essentially always more than a bee, can it only ever - unthinkingly 
-be mistaken for a bee? The ecstasy that Heidegger endows with the name of "human" 
is the Being of beings. Within this ecstasy, beings emerge in the distinctiveness of their 
individual properties by way of a suppression of their transcendent "humanity". A stone, 
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a twig, a length of thread, as that which is merely present-at-hand, figure among the 
debris of originary temporality in its disintegration into the atomistic "nows" of 
reification. Decay is not a secondary effect of the object; rather the object is a secondary 
effect of decay. Where the blue deer can be said to think, it is because in following the 
stranger it transcends more unreservedly than the unthinking consciousness of the 
epistemological subject. Thought, in the proper sense as the thought of Being, is not a 
procedure of an extant subject, but the essence of original temporality. The blue deer that 
truly thinks does not pass beyond itself only as far as an object in whose reflection it then 
recovers (reified consciousness is a pleonasm); instead, it thinks so intensely that it 
decays into the humus of the human, disappearing after the stranger into the origin. 
If it is objected immediately that such an interpretation overlooks what is 
traditional in Heidegger's meditations on humanity, then this appearance of 
conventionality would need to be demonstrated as being more than an appearance. 
Certainly the Greek definition of the human being - soov "Aoyov EXOV - is retained by 
Heidegger: 
Nor is the capacity to speak merely one capability of human beings, on a 
par with the remaining ones. The capacity to speak distinguishes the 
human being as a human being. Such a distinguishing mark bears in itself 
the very design of the human essence. 35 
That which is human speaks. The proposition occupies in Heidegger, however, the status 
more of a problem than of a definition. What precisely it means to speak is the question 
that the essay on Trakl, and the other essays in the collection On the Way to Language, 
attempts to raise. Heidegger repeatedly insists that the essence of language does not 
disclose itself in its instrumentalisation. Language is misunderstood as soon as it is held 
to be a means of the transmission of information; evidence of comprehension within a 
discourse does not in itself prove an agent's humanity. 
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In its efforts to demarcate the animal and the human, The Fundamental Concepts 
of Metaphysics has recourse to a discussion of the nature of language that is considerably 
more wary of suggesting any philosophy of consciousness: 
The fact that there is an essential distinction between the vocal utterance of 
the animal ( <j>CDVYJ) and human discourse in the broadest sense is indicated 
by Aristotle when he says that human discourse is KCX:ta crnv8YJKYJV, 
which he interprets as O't'CXV yEVYJ't'at cruµ~oA.ov.36 
Heidegger stresses to his audience in 1929-30 that current theories of the symbol are 
inadequate for the purpose of understanding Aristotle's sense. What then is the symbol? 
Heidegger' s answer closes the circle: 
What Aristotle sees quite obscurely under the title cruµ~oA.ov, sees only 
approximately, and without any explication, in looking at it quite 
ingeniously, is nothing other than what we today call transcendence. 37 
The notion of the human that Heidegger defines as transcendence is thus not illuminated 
by the additional reference to language, since language is likewise defined as 
transcendence. Dasein speaks: a tautology whose deliberate emptiness displays its 
distance from positive determinations of humanity and of language. Dasein is whatever 
speaks, and in the liberated world of decay of Trakl's poetry a blackbird begins to banter 
with the dead cousin ("Winkel am Wald") and the ocean begins to sing ("Psalm"). Decay 
is the gift of tongues, and at the far side of reification everything begins to speak. Once 
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language is expounded as transcendence, and not as the comprehensibility of utterances, 
can it be said that the community it founds, the Being-with-others with which Heidegger 
equates Dasein, is in any way exclusive? Would it not be a proof of the deficient 
transcendence of a community, and therefore of its deficient humanity, if it were to 
distinguish itself from another, from an Other? 
In 1934, in the lecture course Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of 
Language, Heidegger defines the Volk by language.38 Given his earlier definition of 
language, Heidegger is not substituting the exclusive community of the speakers of a 
particular language for the exclusive community of the specimens of a particular racial 
type. The Volk of transcendence is a people that cannot extricate itself from other beings. 
It is incapable of standing over against beings as a subject and it is thus incapable of a 
more or less humane comportment toward them. Its humanitas is shown in the check that 
it places on the exploitation of beings by withdrawing itself, as the truth of beings, from 
the domain of 't"EXVYJ. 
As the Volk is defined by transcendence, it cannot come up against another Volk 
from which it would be distinct. There can be only the one Volk. But, as Heidegger 
makes clear in his meditations on the Geschlecht, this is very far from amounting to a 
declaration of the homogeneity of the being that raises the question of Being. The 
community that assembles in the ecstases of originary temporality is the community of 
the ontological difference. In order for it to be homogeneous, it would first have to 
surrender to its reification within derivative temporality, whereby it would obtain in its 
presence the properties of its recognizable consistency. Heidegger' s community is 
transcendent only because it is different, only because it is the transcendence that is 
difference itself. To grasp the Volk in its specificity as the Volk, rather than as an extant 
entity among extant entities, can mean nothing other than to grasp it as difference. 
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In 1952, the question of Being is the question of the Geschlecht. Having become 
the name of the being that raises the question of Being, the Geschlecht thinks the question 
in terms of its own difference. The Geschlecht does not think the Being of beings as the 
Hegelian differentiatedness of beings. Difference is to be thought on its own. Certainly 
early Heidegger speaks in the same way of transcendence, rejecting all interpretations 
that situate it as a relation between the subject and the object.39 But, as the ambiguity of 
the example of the bee in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics shows, 
transcendence is not always clearly distinguished from the knowledge that one being has 
of another being. Transcendence, as the possibility of community, is that which later 
becomes the difference of the Geschlecht. It is the ontological difference, of which 
Heidegger writes in "The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics": 
Thus we think of Being rigorously only when we think of it in its 
difference with beings, and of beings in their difference with Being. The 
difference thus comes specifically into view. If we try to form a 
representational idea of it, we will at once be misled into conceiving of 
difference as a relation which our representing has added to Being and to 
beings. Thus the difference is reduced to a distinction, something made up 
by our understanding (Verstand). 40 
The difference between Being and beings -in short, transcendence - is reduced to a 
distinction of the positivity of the understanding when it is formulated as a distinct being 
that relates Being and beings as though from outside. In order to avoid such a reification 
of the ontological difference, it is necessary to think this difference in its immanence to 
Being and beings. It is necessary to think it in its originarity as the clearing of both Being 
and beings. 
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Heidegger's lecture "Language" endeavours to rethink difference in the course of 
an exegesis of Trakl' s poem "Bin Winterabend": "The difference ( Unter-Schied') is 
neither distinction nor relation. The difference is in the highest instance the dimension 
for world and thing."41 Heidegger here hyphenates the German word for difference, 
"Unterschiecf', and in thus drawing attention to its elements "unter' ("under") and 
"Schiecf' ("division") suggests a possibility of understanding difference that is more 
originary than division and that is hence neither distinction nor relation - difference as 
the sub-lime, as the passage under the threshold between entities and as the condition of 
possibility of beings in their multiplicity. This originary difference is not, for Heidegger, 
the Being that Hegel identifies with the differentiatedness of beings. This originary 
difference clears Being even in its withdrawal from the recognisability of the 
differentiatedness of beings. It is the difference of the Geschlecht and the basis for its 
community. 
In his reading of Trakl' s verse, "Ein Geschlecht" (One Geschlecht) in "Language 
in the Poem", Heidegger again emphasises that difference is not the product of 
negotiations within a binary: 
The "one" in "one Geschlecht" does not mean "one" instead of "two". 
The "one" also does not mean the monotony of dull equality. "One 
Geschlecht" does not at all name any biological fact, neither the condition 
of being of the one sex ("Eingeschlechtlichkeit") nor that of being of the 
same sex ("Gleichgeschlechtlichkeit"). In the emphatic "one Geschlecht", 
that uniting element conceals itself which unifies out of the spiritual 
night's gathering blueness.42 
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Heidegger discounts here a series of interpretations of Trakl' s verse on the basis solely of 
their one-sidedness. Oneness, when coupled with the Geschlecht, becomes the oneness 
of multiplicity. Trakl's "one Geschlecht" is not so much a unity as that which unifies, 
although it does not unify in the same way as the Greek One of un-concealment. Trakls's 
"one Geschlecht" conceals itself as the unifying element of the ontological difference. It 
names the humanity of this difference, as Heidegger writes: 
Accordingly, the word "Geschlecht" here retains the full manifold 
meaning already named. It names at once the historical Geschlecht of 
man, humanity in its difference from all other living beings (plants and 
animals). The word "Geschlecht" names then the Geschlechter, tribes, 
clans, families of this human Geschlecht. At the same time, the word 
"Geschlecht" always names the twofold of the Geschlechter.43 
The Geschlecht that is insinuated to be difference itself cannot be distinguished from 
other living things as though it were one living thing among others. It is different from 
them as the difference from which they break towards their distinct identities as plants 
and animals. It is the Geschlecht informing them as the possibility of their determinacy 
and indeterminacy. 
"Geschlecht" is a word that names difference because it is a poetic word. What it 
names is originary and, for that reason, can only be named poetically. As Heidegger 
asserts elsewhere in On the Way to Language, the poetic has nothing to do with the 
secondariness and derivativeness of the ornamental: 
Poetry proper is never merely a higher mode (melos) of everyday 
language. It is rather the reverse: everyday language is a forgotten and 
therefore used-up poem, from which there hardly resounds a call any 
longer.44 
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As everyday language is a used-up poem, it is not by adding senses to the univocality of 
everyday language that one arrives at poetry. "Geschlecht" is a poetic word in its 
multiplicity, but this multiplicity is poorly understood as the aggregate of its senses. The 
multiplicity has to be thought in its originary simplicity. The meaning of the word 
"Geschlecht" is manifold because it lies in the poetic character of this word not to give 
itself up to the unequivocality of that which is apprehended in the light of presence. The 
manifold meaning of the word is a consequence of the originarity that prevents it from 
ever fully being unconcealed. The poetic word "Geschlecht" thus names the human in its 
status as an exception to the understanding of Being as presence. In this respect, the 
Geschlecht is a descendent of the German Volk of Heidegger' s commentaries on 
Holderlin. But with the essay on Trakl in 1952, the being that raises the question of 
Being has shed its ties to nationalism and aligned itself with difference. 
Heidegger begins "Language in the Poem" with a question after the site of Trakl' s 
poetry and suggests that it is difference itself: 
The site gathers unto itself, supremely and in the extreme. That which 
gathers penetrates and pervades everything. The site, that which gathers, 
draws into itself, preserves that which it has drawn in, not like an 
immuring capsule, but rather by illuminating and shining through what has 
been gathered, and which only thus is released into its own essence.45 
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Only difference is able to unify as well as preserve. As the site of Trakl' s work, 
difference is, in a sense, this work itself. And because difference cannot be hypostasized, 
the work is in some way a non-work: 
The poem (Gedicht) of a poet remains unspoken. None of the individual 
texts (Dichtungen), not even their totality, says everything. Nonetheless, 
each text speaks out of the whole of the single poem and at every turn 
enunciates this poem. 46 
Just as there is only the one Geschlecht for Heidegger and Trakl, there is for Heidegger 
only the one poem. And that which allows the poem and the Geschlecht to unify, hinders 
them from being present-at-hand. 
Exactly why the poem of a poet remains unspoken is not stated. In Nietzsche, 
however, Heidegger explains why the thought (more precisely, the Un-thought) of a 
thinker remains similarly unspoken. There, in a very un-Hegelian manner, he speaks of 
the inevitable transgression in commenting upon the Un-thought of another thinker: 
Every thinker oversteps the inner limit of every thinker. But such 
overstepping is not "knowing it all," since it only consists in holding the 
thinker in the direct claim of Being, thus remaining within his limitations. 
This limitation consists in the fact that the thinker can never himself say 
what is most of all his own. It must remain unsaid, because what is 
sayable receives its determination from what is not sayable. What is most 
of all the thinker's own, however, is not his possession, but rather belongs 
to Being whose transmission thinking receives in its projects.47 
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For Heidegger, the Un-thought of a thinker is not a deficiency for which the thinker can 
be held to account. Unlike Hegel, for whom the task of thinking is the task of bringing 
everything to thought, Heidegger concerns himself with the Un-thought for the sake of its 
resistance to presence. 
Commentary on the work of a poet is, as it were, a matter of attending to the 
determining element of the unspoken poem. Commentary takes as its object less the 
plurality of distinct poems by which the Geschlecht has been cursed than the decay that is 
their unity and condition of possibility .48 The charge of misreading repeatedly levelled at 
Heidegger's text on Trakl registers, but fails to understand, that it has taken the unspoken 
poem as its object.49 The violence of Heidegger's reading, as it bears on the discord of 
that which is said of the Geschlecht, is a corollary of the attempt to think the Geschlecht 
in the un-said gentleness of its simple twofold. 
In any case, the question must arise for even the crudest understanding of Trakl' s 
poetry whether fidelity is itself an appropriate criterion in judging discussions of his texts. 
Fidelity to what? Sense is conspicuously a side-effect in these compositions. Modesto 
Carone Netto50, on account of the repetition and repositioning of images, ascribes to Trakl 
a technique and practice such as that which Burroughs later employed and propagated 
under the name of "cut-up". Trakl's poetry has been analysed as a montage of quotations 
by Alfred Doppler51 as by Rudolf D. Schier52, who discovers in two verses by Trakl 
allusions to the Book of Samuel, the Gospel of Saint John, Holderlin's "Der Winkel von 
Hahrdt" and Ammer' s translation of Rimbaud. Trakl develops an art of quotation quite 
distinct from that of his contemporary Karl Kraus. The quotation in Trakl is not the 
object of attack. It is more the symptom of a decomposition. Kraus's personality, which 
stands over against the quotations and unites them, has no exact counterpart in Trakl. 
Trakl simply plagiarises. This defect is, strictly speaking, his great strength. Trakl resists 
the temptation to produce a work: the deterritorialisation of the individual quoted verses 
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is not thwarted by a reterritorialisation on any notion of the poet's "authentic" voice.53 
Trakl's singular poem is elsewhere. The Geschlecht is hidden. And it cannot be more 
thoroughly hidden than on the surface: Richard Detsch54 contends that Trakl's verse "Ein 
Geschlecht" is itself a quotation of Novalis, whereas Ursula Heckmann55 believes that 
Otto Weininger is its inspiration. The singularity of the Geschlecht does not isolate the 
Traklian corpus as its determining principle, since it must for its own part be understood 
from out of that abyssal absence of such a determining principle which is Trakl' s 
innovation as a montage artist. 
Commenting on the notion of singularity in "Language in the Poem", but 
misapprehending its abyssality, Derrida justly asserts that Heidegger is unwilling to 
position Trakl within metaphysics, let alone Christian theology: 
On the contrary, he intends to show that Trakl's Gedicht (his poetic work 
if not his poems) has not only crossed the limit of onto-theology: it allows 
us to think such a crossing rJranchissement] which is also an 
enfranchisement [affranchissement]. This enfranchisement, still equivocal 
in Holderlin [ ... ] is univocal in Trakl.56 
For Heidegger, as Derrida writes, Trakl's Gedicht is beyond metaphysics. Trakl's 
Gedicht has crossed the limit of onto-theology and thereby accomplished what "On the 
Question of Being" declares to be impossible. By means here of an allusion to 
Heidegger' s critique of Jtinger' s conviction of the violability of the limits of nihilism, 
Derrida attempts to implicate Heidegger in a self-contradiction. Yet the analysis 
promptly breaks off before it has become evident that Heidegger understands Trakl's 
Gedicht metaphysically. Only if Trakl' s Gedicht is understood in terms of an exclusive 
identity, could it be said to resemble the entities of metaphysics it is claimed to have left 
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behind on this side of the limit of onto-theology. But Trakl's singular poem is not a 
distinct entity present-at-hand, and although Derrida acknowledges in a parenthesis that 
Heidegger draws a distinction between Trakl's poem and poems, he does not allow the 
singular poem's difference from the extantness of the poems to interfere with his 
criticism. Heidegger does not advance Trakl's missing poem as an alternative and rival 
to metaphysics. Trakl's missing poem is not to be encountered with metaphysical 
distinctness on the other side of the limit of onto-theology. The Gedicht is more 
originary than metaphysics because it is decadent. It is too decadent to cross the line and 
survive intact. 
The Gedicht is, furthermore, too decadent to bear the discrete and proper name of 
Georg Trakl. Heidegger reads through the individual poems to Being. Unless "Georg 
Trakl" is seen as a cipher in "Language in the Poem", unless his poem, following 
Heidegger on the very first page of the text, is grasped as absent, little more than a 
mythologisation of a poetic corpus may appear. The decadence that emerges within 
Trakl's poetry does not come to a halt before the proper name. Decay liberates - within 
the poetry itself as well as the poetry from itself. In an important respect, Trakl reads like 
the Baroque poets he studied. Generic figures populate his poems - the stranger, the 
shepherds, the lepers, the lonely, the soldiers - in a world where everything has been 
ordered. And yet decay sets in against this stultification. In "Ruh und Schweigen" (v. 
11-12) Trakl writes: 
A radiant youth 
Appears the sister in autumn and black decay. 
Under the pressure of decay, the celestial division of labour yields and the sister changes 
and does not change her sex. She becomes. That she appears a gleaming youth is an 
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"illusion" fomented by decay, whereby decay is both noted and overlooked. The image 
of the gleaming youth collects itself within decay and steps forth from it consistent and 
recognizable. Decay as such never appears and it never can appear as such. Decay, like 
Trakl's poem and like Being, is missing. 
Trakl' s singular poem decays into discrete verses. It falls away from itself in 
becoming the extant work. Decay is by no means unilateral: the verses decay towards the 
singular poem and the singular poem decays towards the verses. Or again, the singular 
poem is decay itself. The composed is a decomposition of decomposition. That 
Heidegger, in his commentary, wishes to mark such a distinction within decay is explicit 
in his description of Elis: 
Elis is not one who has died and who decays (verwest) in the lateness of 
the lived-out. Elis is the dead who dis-essences (entwest) into earliness. 
This stranger unfolds the human essence forward into the beginning of 
what has not yet come to be borne.57 
The "Entwesung" of Elis is a decay that is not so much a falling-away as a falling-
towards, since it is in and as decay, and the demolition of all previous articulations of 
humanity, that the human essence comes to light in its originarity. Falling away from this 
essence, succumbing to a resistance to decay, humanity is estranged from itself. 
Heidegger comments: 
The wanderers who follow the stranger at once see themselves parted 
"from loved ones" who, for them, are "others". The others - that is the 
cast (Schlag) of the decayed form of humanity.58 
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In their first steps after the stranger, the wanderers are still under the curse laid upon the 
Geschlecht. They view themselves as different from other beings rather than as 
difference itself, rather than as decay. The curse that drives the Geschlecht out of the 
unity of difference into the discord of the opposed effects itself in the decay of decay. 
The curse, however, does not bring about a reversal of decay, since it conceals rather than 
heals. But in any case is decay something to be healed? 
In a letter to Jean-Michel Palmier, Heidegger insists that decay is to be understood 
neither existentielly nor anthropologically, but ontologically.59 In Being and Time, to 
whose passages on decay (Veifallenheit) Heidegger refers Palmier, there appears the 
following: 
In falling [als veifallendes], Dasein itself as factical Being-in-the-world, is 
something from which it has already fallen away. And it has not fallen 
into some entity which it comes upon for the first time in the course of its 
being, or even one which it has not come upon at all; it has fallen into the 
world, which itself belongs to its Being. 60 
Dasein can never not be decaying as it is essentially transcendent. At most, it can 
disguise its worldhood in the opposition of discord. The intimacy of decay, of 
transcendence and of being-outside-of-itself is not simply cancelled out by discord, since 
it is the precondition of the latter. 
Only within the unity of the Geschlecht can dissension arise. This unity, which is 
the difference of the Geschlecht, cannot accordingly be opposed to discord as though the 
one excluded the other. They are not options facing human communities. It is not a 
matter of "instantiating", within a specific social body, the differential unity of the 
Geschlecht in the name of an imputedly Heideggerian politics. The feasibility of such an 
341 
instantiation would depend upon a restriction of the unifying scope of the Geschlecht, and 
thus upon its demotion from difference itself. The unity of the Geschlecht is not a Utopia 
waiting to be realised. 61 From the "realisation" of its unity, the Geschlecht can only 
expect impoverishment through the loss of the ages in which it was not realised and in 
which, as supposedly unrealised, it still gathered itself as its difference from its 
realisation. 
Heidegger's voluntaristic tone when he speaks of the Geschlecht is ambiguous: 
The proper cast lies only with that Geschlecht whose twoness leaves 
discord behind and wanders ahead into the gentleness of a simple twofold, 
i.e. is strange and thus follows the stranger. 
Heidegger is not here detailing a course of action undertaken by knowing subjects 
assembled in the Geschlecht and by which they differentiate themselves from others. The 
Geschlecht of which he speaks is the ubiquitous, yet everywhere concealed, Geschlecht 
of Being. Being is always geschlechtlich, but there is no chosen Geschlecht. Every 
Geschlecht has always already been chosen and any comportment on its part towards 
difference can never appropriate its election, since difference is prior to comportment and 
overreaches it. The subject that comports itself towards difference, with the gentility it 
imagines appropriate, merely aligns itself with discord. By its comportment the subject 
cannot make good the discord in which it is grounded in its opposition to the object and 
by which the Geschlecht is cursed. The unity of the Geschlecht is not identical with the 
reciprocated indulgence of the subjects of liberalism. The last thing that Heidegger could 
be expected to say would be that the curse of the Geschlecht is lifted in liberal 
democracies with their prided tolerance. In any case, the curse cannot be lifted in favour 
of decay, since the curse is itself also decay - the condition of possibility for that 
atomization manifest in the discord of the Geschlecht lies, for Heidegger, in the 
decadence of derivative temporality (die verfallende Zeitigungsart). 
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The gentleness of the twofold of the Geschlecht is thus too inclusive to be taken 
for a political model. Derrida, in Geschlecht IV "Heidegger' s Ear: Philopolemology", 
dwells upon the equivocality of the figure of the friend in Being and Time and thereby 
emphasises the distance between Heidegger' s conception of community and a peaceful 
co-existence: 
[A] larger context[ ... ] seems to indicate that for Heidegger <j>tAEtV, on the 
nonpsychological, nonanthropological, nonethicopolitical plane of the 
existential analytic and above all of the question of being or <j>ucrts;, 
welcomes within itself, in its very accord, many other modes than that of 
friendliness, but as well opposition, tension, confrontation, rejection, [ ... ]if 
not war, at least Kampf or 1t0AEµos;. [ ... ] To be opposed to the friend, to 
tum away from it, to defy it, to not hear it, that is still to hear and keep it, 
to carry with self, bei sich tragen, the voice of the friend. 62 
The friendship that, as Being-with, is definitive of the human being lies outside the gift of 
the subject. Dasein is essentially and thus inalienably befriended. Even in its seemingly 
most fundamental isolation, Dasein continues within a community of some kind and of 
which it stands forever in need, if only so that its isolation might assert itself. Underneath 
the discord between the isolated individual and the community, there prevails the 
tenderness of the unitary Geschlecht in its transcendence. The Being-with of the 
Geschlecht that is definitive of the human being disappears from view in discord. As a 
result, Dasein confines itself to its isolation and yet sets itself at variance with solitude. It 
never beholds itself as fully human and never knows itself as estranged simply from an 
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oxymoronic image of the human. That is to say, in the discord that is the element of its 
reification the subject fails to perceive its inhumanity. The community from which 
Dasein can never break is the community of difference. Its specificity is not constituted 
by exclusion. Hence it cannot limit itself to the concourse of a given species of primates. 
The age of loneliness which in 1938 Heidegger believes must fall over the earth is to 
scatter the spurious communities that settle in the discord of the Geschlecht, disclosing as 
it were the ecstatic community of the lonely. 
Already in the 1934-5 lecture course, Holderlin 's Hymns "Germanien" and "Der 
Rhein", Heidegger writes: 
The manner of togetherness of the singular, its world-character, is solitude. 
It does not separate and expel, but rather bears forth into that originary 
unity which no community has ever attained.63 
It is for such a non-exclusive community that Heidegger reserves the words "friendship" 
and "tenderness". And that he should tear these words away from any oppositionality, 
denying that friendship excludes antagonism, that tenderness is at odds with decay, is not 
irrelevant to his ambition to think difference as other than a binary and a curse. 
But in what sense do the binary and the curse nonetheless remain in place? 
Heidegger, enquiring into the nature of the language in Trak:l's poetry, declares: 
It speaks by answering to that journey on which the stranger moves in 
advance. The path upon which he has struck out leads away from the old 
degenerate Geschlecht. It offers company on the way to the decline into 
the preserved earliness of the unborn Geschlecht. The language of the 
poem that has its site in departedness answers to the homecoming of the 
unborn human Geschlecht into the peaceful beginning of its quieter 
essence.64 
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Does the unborn Geschlecht still fall under the sway of discord, inasmuch as it 
distinguishes itself from its degenerate double? Such a conclusion appears inescapable if 
the notion of homecoming in the above passage is stripped of its radicality. The home of 
the Geschlecht cannot properly stand over against the homelessness of its degeneration 
and reification unless it is indeterminate, and as indeterminate its opposition is therefore 
essentially an inclusion. The path of the stranger leads nowhere and it is in this nowhere 
that the Geschlecht finds its home. The place of Trakl's poem is, strictly speaking, a no-
place. And yet Heidegger writes: 
The situality of the site that gathers Trakl' s work into itself is the 
concealed essence of departedness, and is called "Evening Land", the 
Occident. 
However, the West as the land of evening, as the land of decay, is too dissolute to be 
present-at-hand. Decay is not something that has struck the West. On the contrary, it is 
its essence. If, in 1912, Trakl wonders whether he should emigrate to Borneo65, then 
there is no necessity that dictates that this should be interpreted as a fantasized flight from 
the decadence of high capitalism. Decay in Trakl's poetry cannot be reduced to a moral 
phenomenon and just as Rimbaud, in "L'lmpossible", discovers the East in the West, 
Trakl may have been hoping to come upon the truth of the West in the tropical, and thus 
more rampant, decomposition of the Indonesian archipelago. When Heidegger ascribes 
to Trakl a single, yet missing, poem, it is perhaps with an intimation that the decay in 
Trakl's poems was, for Trakl, himself deficient. The substantiality of the poems is, as it 
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were, an obstacle to the decay that they invoke. Trakl's singular poem is the non-work of 
the West, and it is by means of the absolute and Utopian decay of its impossibility that it 
satirically condemns, and in condemning embraces, the partially decomposed figures of 
the poems themselves. The Geschlecht is missing, but only as such can it constitute a 
human community. 
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Conclusion 
Heidegger's conception of the Volk cannot be extricated from his engagement with 
National Socialism. Its importance as a factor in his decision to join the NSDAP was 
simply too great. And yet its role in determining Heidegger's commitment to Hitler is an 
insufficient reason for identifying Heidegger's conception of the Volk with the National 
Socialist conception of the Aryan "type" (Art). Heidegger's people does not take its 
definition from biologism. It is, however, through the very radicality with which he 
rejected biologism that Heidegger is unable to keep his conception of the Volk at a 
distance from the Nazi reification of humanity. Rejecting biologism even to its 
foundations in the Dingbegriffe of classical ontology, Heidegger elaborates a conception 
of the Volk that does not rely on the metaphysical understanding of Being as presence. 
Heidegger' s people is not a being that gives itself up to be apprehended in the light of 
presence, biologistically or otherwise. It is a being-outside-of-itself. As such, it is 
essentially corrupt and therefore lacks the means to avoid contamination with the purity 
of the Aryan "type". But in the fundamental impurity of Heidegger's Volk, in the stain of 
its Nazism, there has also to be discerned a resistance to the regime that extends further 
than any other resistance. Heidegger's opposition is inextricable from acquiescence 
because it derives from an opposition to the understanding of beings on which Nazism 
erected its apparatus of terror. The stain on Heidegger' s people is a consequence of its 
undecidability and the challenge it presents to the very possibility of control. 
For Heidegger, this undecidability is the essence of the German Volk. It is 
likewise the essence of Dasein. But is undecidability not annulled through its 
determination as "German"? And does not the direct association of the Volk with Dasein 
reduce non-German peoples, in a gesture reminiscent of Nazi racism, to beings present-
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at-hand? What Heidegger means by "German" is, however, at once orthodox and 
heterodox. The undecidability of Heidegger's Volk is the consummation and destruction 
of the complacent anti-positivism of the tradition of German cultural nationalism. 
Heidegger's people does not congeal into a stable identity over against the present-at-
hand. With Heidegger, the anti-positivism of German cultural nationalism is thought 
through to a conception of the Volk that contests the determination of beings under the 
metaphysics of presence. German nationalism hence becomes, for Heidegger, 
inseparable from the question of the Being of Dasein. The Volk, through understanding 
its own difference from the Being of the present-at-hand, is able to understand the Being 
that is proper to Dasein and that has gone unthought since the inception of classical 
ontology. The Volk's direct association with Dasein is its proximity to an understanding 
of its Being. Accordingly, the uprising of the German people under Hitler was able to 
assume in Heidegger' s eyes the aspect of a will to the question of Being. In the 
prevailing preoccupation with the specificity of the Volk, Heidegger was willing to see an 
engagement with the ontological specificity of Dasein, rather than a hierarchization of 
races. 
In the name of the Volk of the question of Being, Heidegger expressed his 
allegiance to the State in 1933. And in the name of this conception of the Germans, 
Heidegger likewise resigned the rectorship of Freiburg University and directed his 
attention to poetry. Heidegger's people is the people promised first by Hitler and then by 
Holderlin. The transition from the State to poetry was not a transition from the 
biologistically distinct people of National Socialism to the people of HOlderlin' s non-
positive nationalism. In 1933 Heidegger's Volk is arguably still more a being-outside-of-
itself than the Volk of the subsequent lectures on poetry, because it is the people whose 
impurity encompasses even biologism. In Heidegger' s refusal and overdetermined 
inability to extricate himself from National Socialism, the Volk remains in an uncanny 
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play of substitution with the specimens of the Aryan race. Heidegger' s people thereby 
evades the mission of thinking Dasein's difference from the present-at-hand and 
nonetheless thinks this difference in the impurity proper to it. 
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